Military Alliances & Coalitions
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1 Military Alliances & Coalitions or: I get by (with a little help from my friends) PSC 106, Spring 2015 April 6, 2015 (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
2 Overview Bargaining model redux Alliances Coalitions Deterrence Moral Hazard (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
3 Overview Bargaining model redux Alliances Coalitions Deterrence Moral Hazard (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
4 Recall Bargaining model of war (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
5 Recall Bargaining model of war Useful simplifications allow us to focus on causes of war (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
6 Recall Bargaining model of war Useful simplifications allow us to focus on causes of war In recitation, relaxed assumption of constant power (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
7 Recall Bargaining model of war Useful simplifications allow us to focus on causes of war In recitation, relaxed assumption of constant power With this, the model (sometimes) produces preventive war (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
8 What other assumptions might we want to consider relaxing? (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
9 What other assumptions might we want to consider relaxing? Model assumes only two players (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
10 What other assumptions might we want to consider relaxing? Model assumes only two players What if there were more? (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
11 Today s question: How does the behavior of third parties influence the prospects for war and peace? (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
12 Third parties alter distribution of power (capability aggregation) (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
13 Third parties alter distribution of power (capability aggregation) Also influence distribution of information (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
14 Third parties alter distribution of power (capability aggregation) Also influence distribution of information Early IR scholars focused on balancing vs. bandwagoning, never settled on overall effects of alliances (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
15 Third party involvement manifests in a variety of ways (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
16 Third party involvement manifests in a variety of ways Today, focus on two means of third party involvement: (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
17 Third party involvement manifests in a variety of ways Today, focus on two means of third party involvement: Alliances (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
18 Third party involvement manifests in a variety of ways Today, focus on two means of third party involvement: Alliances Coalitions (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
19 Overview Bargaining model redux Alliances Coalitions Deterrence Moral Hazard (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
20 Military Alliances Formal agreements detailing military coordination between states A type of international institution Differ in scope, commitments, membership (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
21 Military Alliances Formal agreements detailing military coordination between states A type of international institution Differ in scope, commitments, membership (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
22 Military Alliances Formal agreements detailing military coordination between states A type of international institution Differ in scope, commitments, membership (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
23 Common Provisions Defense pact Offense pact Neutrality pact Consultation agreement (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
24 Common Provisions Defense pact Offense pact Neutrality pact Consultation agreement (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
25 Common Provisions Defense pact Offense pact Neutrality pact Consultation agreement (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
26 Common Provisions Defense pact Offense pact Neutrality pact Consultation agreement (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
27 Let s play name that alliance! (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
28 (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
29 NATO (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
30 NATO 1949-present, 28 members (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
31 NATO 1949-present, 28 members Highly formalized (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
32 NATO 1949-present, 28 members Highly formalized Headquartered in Brussels, Belgium (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
33 NATO 1949-present, 28 members Highly formalized Headquartered in Brussels, Belgium Defense pact provisions (Article 5) (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
34 (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
35 SEATO (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
36 SEATO , 8 states (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
37 SEATO , 8 states Philippines & Thailand only SEA states (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
38 SEATO , 8 states Philippines & Thailand only SEA states No specific troop requirements (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
39 SEATO , 8 states Philippines & Thailand only SEA states No specific troop requirements Goal to block communism (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
40 (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
41 CSTO (1992-present) (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
42 CSTO 1992-present, 6 member states (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
43 CSTO 1992-present, 6 member states Emerged from post-soviet states (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
44 CSTO 1992-present, 6 member states Emerged from post-soviet states Non-Aggression & Defense Pact provision (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
45 CSTO 1992-present, 6 member states Emerged from post-soviet states Non-Aggression & Defense Pact provision Counterpart to NATO (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
46 (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
47 (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
48 United Nations Space Command (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
49 UN Space Command Not a real alliance (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
50 UN Space Command Not a real alliance From Halo video game series (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
51 UN Space Command Not a real alliance From Halo video game series Mistakenly used by BBC news in coverage of Syria (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
52 (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
53 Real-world Alliances take a variety of shapes Important caveat: anarchy still applies Contracts must be self-enforcing Alliances are a special case of International Institutions (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
54 Real-world Alliances take a variety of shapes Important caveat: anarchy still applies Contracts must be self-enforcing Alliances are a special case of International Institutions (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
55 Real-world Alliances take a variety of shapes Important caveat: anarchy still applies Contracts must be self-enforcing Alliances are a special case of International Institutions (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
56 Real-world Alliances take a variety of shapes Important caveat: anarchy still applies Contracts must be self-enforcing Alliances are a special case of International Institutions (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
57 Formal alliances only describe part of the picture (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
58 Overview Bargaining model redux Alliances Coalitions Deterrence Moral Hazard (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
59 Military Coalitions Group of states that coordinate for a specific purpose, then disband (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
60 Military Coalitions Group of states that coordinate for a specific purpose, then disband Ad-hoc (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
61 Military Coalitions Group of states that coordinate for a specific purpose, then disband Ad-hoc Informal, in contrast to alliances (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
62 Example: Iraq War (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
63 Coalition of the Willing (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
64 Canada, a NATO ally, is nowhere to be seen (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
65 Canada, a NATO ally, is nowhere to be seen Moldova, not a formal ally, contributed (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
66 Iraq War demonstrates an important point: Alliances do not imply intervention Intervention does not imply alliance Strategic interaction is, as usual, important (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
67 Iraq War demonstrates an important point: Alliances do not imply intervention Intervention does not imply alliance Strategic interaction is, as usual, important (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
68 Iraq War demonstrates an important point: Alliances do not imply intervention Intervention does not imply alliance Strategic interaction is, as usual, important (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
69 Iraq War demonstrates an important point: Alliances do not imply intervention Intervention does not imply alliance Strategic interaction is, as usual, important (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
70 Overview Bargaining model redux Alliances Coalitions Deterrence Moral Hazard (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
71 Deterrence When the threat of being punished prevents an actor from taking some action (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
72 Deterrence When the threat of being punished prevents an actor from taking some action Involvement of alliance or coalition partners can enhance deterrence (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
73 Deterrence When the threat of being punished prevents an actor from taking some action Involvement of alliance or coalition partners can enhance deterrence Example: Craigslist (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
74 Craigslist Suppose you want to buy a rare, collectible beanie baby (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
75 Craigslist Suppose you want to buy a rare, collectible beanie baby You find a great deal for one on craigslist (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
76 Craigslist Suppose you want to buy a rare, collectible beanie baby You find a great deal for one on craigslist Agree to travel alone to an abandoned parking garage to carry out the transaction (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
77 Craigslist Suppose you want to buy a rare, collectible beanie baby You find a great deal for one on craigslist Agree to travel alone to an abandoned parking garage to carry out the transaction The seller wrestles your wallet away, escaping with your cash and the collectible (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
78 Craigslist Suppose you bring a friend (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
79 Craigslist Suppose you bring a friend Suppose this friend is a professional MMA fighter (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
80 Craigslist Suppose you bring a friend Suppose this friend is a professional MMA fighter Upon arrival the seller realizes that if they attempt to rob you, your friend is likely to intervene (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
81 Craigslist Suppose you bring a friend Suppose this friend is a professional MMA fighter Upon arrival the seller realizes that if they attempt to rob you, your friend is likely to intervene So, the presence of a third party deters the attack (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
82 Alliances deter aggression Third party states can play the role of an MMA fighter friend (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
83 Alliances deter aggression Third party states can play the role of an MMA fighter friend By threatening to punish an attacker, allies can cause peace through deterrence (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
84 If deterrence can cause peace, then why are allied states ever attacked? (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
85 If deterrence can cause peace, then why are allied states ever attacked? Deterrence only works when threats are credible (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
86 If deterrence can cause peace, then why are allied states ever attacked? Deterrence only works when threats are credible (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
87 If deterrence can cause peace, then why are allied states ever attacked? Deterrence only works when threats are credible Credible threats are ones that the threatener is willing and able to carry out (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
88 So far, credible third-party threats encourage peace (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
89 So far, credible third-party threats encourage peace Unfortunately, this isn t always the case (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
90 Overview Bargaining model redux Alliances Coalitions Deterrence Moral Hazard (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
91 Moral Hazard Describes a situation when one actor takes an action that shields another actor from the costs of risky behavior, and is unable to monitor that risky behavior (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
92 Moral Hazard Describes a situation when one actor takes an action that shields another actor from the costs of risky behavior, and is unable to monitor that risky behavior This causes the second actor to take on more risk they would otherwise (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
93 Classic Example: Insurance When I first bought my laptop, I did not have insurance for it (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
94 Classic Example: Insurance When I first bought my laptop, I did not have insurance for it I was very careful to not spill anything on it (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
95 Classic Example: Insurance Recently, I decided to purchase a personal articles policy to cover my laptop (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
96 Classic Example: Insurance Recently, I decided to purchase a personal articles policy to cover my laptop With insurance, I am much less careful (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
97 Classic Example: Insurance Recently, I decided to purchase a personal articles policy to cover my laptop With insurance, I am much less careful #YOLO (You Only Laptop Once) (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
98 Classic Example: Insurance Recently, I decided to purchase a personal articles policy to cover my laptop With insurance, I am much less careful #YOLO (You Only Laptop Once) By shielding me from the cost of losing my laptop, insurance encourages me to behave in a more risky manner (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
99 Conflict Initiation If a state expects aid from allies, it is shielded from some costs if war breaks out (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
100 Conflict Initiation If a state expects aid from allies, it is shielded from some costs if war breaks out As a result, states expecting assistance behave more aggressively (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
101 Conflict Initiation If a state expects aid from allies, it is shielded from some costs if war breaks out As a result, states expecting assistance behave more aggressively Moral hazard can increase the probability of war (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
102 With friends like these... Third parties face a serious problem (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
103 With friends like these... Third parties face a serious problem They want to appear strong, to achieve deterrence (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
104 With friends like these... Third parties face a serious problem They want to appear strong, to achieve deterrence But don t want to write blank checks, to avoid moral hazard (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
105 With friends like these... Third parties face a serious problem They want to appear strong, to achieve deterrence But don t want to write blank checks, to avoid moral hazard This means that communication difficulties that Fearon described extend to relations among allies as well (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
106 With friends like these... Third parties face a serious problem They want to appear strong, to achieve deterrence But don t want to write blank checks, to avoid moral hazard This means that communication difficulties that Fearon described extend to relations among allies as well One (potential) answer is to build formal alliances (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
107 Deterrence vs Moral Hazard Third parties have competing effects (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
108 Deterrence vs Moral Hazard Third parties have competing effects Which one dominates? (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
109 Deterrence vs Moral Hazard Third parties have competing effects Which one dominates? Empirical evidence that design of formal alliances matters (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
110 ATOP data project (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
111 ATOP data project Codes formal alliances along categories discussed earlier (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
112 ATOP data project Codes formal alliances along categories discussed earlier Presence of defense pact reduces probability of being attacked by 28% (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
113 ATOP data project Codes formal alliances along categories discussed earlier Presence of defense pact reduces probability of being attacked by 28% Offensive alliances increase the probability of war by 47% (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
114 ATOP data project Codes formal alliances along categories discussed earlier Presence of defense pact reduces probability of being attacked by 28% Offensive alliances increase the probability of war by 47% Recent research shows that these effects depend upon conditionality (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
115 ATOP data project Codes formal alliances along categories discussed earlier Presence of defense pact reduces probability of being attacked by 28% Offensive alliances increase the probability of war by 47% Recent research shows that these effects depend upon conditionality As long as contracts are self-enforcing (recall institutions), design matters (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
116 Takeaway Deterrence peace (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
117 Takeaway Deterrence peace Moral Hazard war (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
118 Takeaway Deterrence peace Moral Hazard war Overall effect of third parties is ex-ante ambiguous (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
119 Takeaway Deterrence peace Moral Hazard war Overall effect of third parties is ex-ante ambiguous Important for states to carefully manage commitments, communication with both enemies and allies (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
120 Takeaway Deterrence peace Moral Hazard war Overall effect of third parties is ex-ante ambiguous Important for states to carefully manage commitments, communication with both enemies and allies Alliance design matters (PSC 106, Spring 2015) Military Alliances & Coalitions April 6, / 47
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