Quiz. Quiz Question: What are the 3 rationalist explanations for war in Fearon s article? Which one does he consider to be less probable?

Transcription

1 Quiz Quiz Question: What are the 3 rationalist explanations for war in Fearon s article? Which one does he consider to be less probable?

2 Announcements You are strongly recommended to attend this (extra points!): Bus leaves at 3:30 pm., FASS parking lot. Classroom change: Tuesdays in FASS 1101

3 Recap War is an inefficient method of resolving disputes. Central question: Why can t states find a settlement that they both prefer to war? Answer 1: information asymmetry AND incentives to misrepresent (misrepresent what? capabilities or resolve) Implication: sometimes states must fight to figure out which side is telling the truth.

4 Another Solution: Costly Signals Costly signals are actions that demonstrate an actor s resolve or capabilities. To be credible, it is important that only some types of actors can take these actions. An action that anyone can take is not informative (ie. cheap talk). Fearon s examples?

5 Example: Gang Tattoos Many ppl want the advantages of membership, but are not reliable. Gangs must identify the highly committed recruits. Gang tattoos are difficult to remove and bring risk of punishment by police and rival gangs. Only the committed ppl will get tattoos.

6 What is Costly Depends on the Context Example: 3 Month Salary Rule You want to marry a man who really loves you. An expensive ring can signal that. But, what is expensive depends on the man s wealth. Hence the 3 month salary rule.

7 Costs of a Signal may be Potential Costly signals can include actions that will become costly in the future only if you take an undesired action. Ex: A pre-nup is not costly unless the couple divorces.

8 Example: Domestic Audience Costs Leader makes a public declaration to a certain policy position. If leader backs down, the public punishes him (audience costs). Given audience costs, only resolved leaders make such declarations.

9 Answer 2: Commitment Problems Assume there exists a mutually preferred alternative to war. Anarchy implies states can renege on agreements. If renegotiation will be less favorable to one side, then that side may prefer to fight today and secure a better outcome despite the cost of war. When should a state fear renegotiation? Examples from Fearon? Examples from current events?

10 Solutions? Transferring resources that affect bargaining power. Binding agreements via international org s? Is it possible under anarchy? What about Iran and its nuclear program?

11 Answer 3: Issue Indivisibility The basic model assumes a divisible good. If the good is not divisible, a compromise may not be possible. Winner takes all. According to Fearon, inherently indivisible goods are rare in IR, because side-payments are possible.

12 The Democratic Peace: Maoz & Russett (1993)

13 The Democratic Peace: Maoz & Russett (1993) What is the motivation or central question?

14 The Motivation / Central Question Two empirical regularities: 1. Democracies are not more peaceful in general (monadic) 2. Democracies are more peaceful to other democracies (dyadic) Why?

15 Theory What are the authors two main answers?

16 Normative Explanation States externalize their domestic norms as much as possible. Democratic norms are live and let live and peaceful compromise. Nondemocratic norms? Winner takes all and violence. Democracies resolve their differences peacefully, but they adopt non-democratic norms when dealing with non-democracies.

17 Structural Explanation War requires military and political mobilization. Democracies mobilize slowly (unless faced with a non-democratic opponent). Slow mobilization by democratic dyads allows more time for diplomatic resolution. Autocratic and mixed dyads rush to war.