The System Made Me Stop Doing It. The Indirect Origins of Commercial Peace
|
|
- Evangeline Carson
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Erik Gartzke UCSD The System Made Me Stop Doing It The Indire The System Made Me Stop Doing It The Indirect Origins of Commercial Peace Erik Gartzke UCSD May 7, 2016
2 Introduction There is a large literature on trade and conflict. Considerable theoretical consensus about the relationship Trade should inhibit interstate conflict... but with whom? Evidence decidedly mixed (c.f. Beck, et al. 1998) Thesis: we may be looking in the wrong place. Erik Gartzke UCSD egartzke@ucsd.edu The System Made Me Stop Doing It The Indire
3 Basic Argument Trade story, comparative advantage, is bilateral (dyadic) Liberal peace argument also posed/tested dyadically No reason to assume that this is correct Dyadic: Incentives of states are conflicted Trading states want to trade But may also have incentives to compete/fight PD/Chicken characteristics of the situation Extra-Dyadic: No tension between incentives Trading states clearly do not want other states to fight. Main implication: to the degree that international conflict inhibits trade, trading states should seek to deter third-party disputes. Erik Gartzke UCSD The System Made Me Stop Doing It The Indire
4 Erik Gartzke UCSD The System Made Me Stop Doing It The Indire Literature Three possible relationships connecting trade and conflict... Trade reduces conflict It seems natural to associate trade with peace. Commerce requires cooperation, if not exactly amity. Trading states should be reluctant to fight if war interrupts the flow of profits. (Montesquieu 1989, Kant 1957, Cobden 1903, Angell 1933, Axelrod 1984, Rosecrance 1985, Brooks 2005). Trading states could produce interests who prevail on leaders to refrain from fighting (Bentham 1781, McDonald 2009).
5 Erik Gartzke UCSD The System Made Me Stop Doing It The Indire Literature II It also seems natural to associate trade with war. The rise of Athens as a commercial empire, and the alarm which it inspired in Lacedaemon is said to have lead to the Peloponnesian war Thucydides 1960 (page 46). Realist theories of war rely on economic development as the primary mechanism for increasing state power (Morgenthau 1948, Waltz 1959, Claude 1962, Mearsheimer 2001). Socialists were equally persuaded that the search for foreign markets propelled class warfare (Hobson 1938, Lenin 1970). It is also possible that trade has no net effect on conflict. Effects of trade could cancel each other out (Morrow 1999). Trade is seldom valuable enough to interfere with the path to war (Gartzke, et al. 2001, Gartzke and Li 2003)
6 Literature III Other issues: The commercial enterprise can continue with third parties, even when conflicts interrupt direct bilateral ties. Recognition of this fact has led to attempts to estimate the elasticities of substitution present in sourcing goods and services elsewhere (Polachek, et al. 1999, Crescenzi 2002). Others have tried to model the effects of trade networks on whether states fight (Dorussen and Ward 2008, Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2008, Lupu and Traag 2011) Erik Gartzke UCSD The System Made Me Stop Doing It The Indire
7 Theory 2 state world: States compete in a divide the dollar (like) game. Trade is a side payment for cooperating. Endogenous bargaining means that at least some of the deterrent effect of trade is absorbed in competing offers If the value of trade is low relative to value of dispute Fighting can still occur Trade must be large relative to cost of military contest in the game in order to have significant deterrent effect Erik Gartzke UCSD egartzke@ucsd.edu The System Made Me Stop Doing It The Indire
8 Theory II 3 state world: 2 states compete in a divide the dollar (like) game. 3rd state decides whether to exert influence/deter contest. 3 sets of trade relationships. 3rd state can intervene, prevent a dispute if: The 3rd state is large relative to the other two states It s value for trade is high relative to the cost of deterrence The implications of trade theory for conflict are clearer/less contingent for indirect trade relationships than for direct trade. Erik Gartzke UCSD egartzke@ucsd.edu The System Made Me Stop Doing It The Indire
9 Operationalizing Trade 3 types of trade relationships: Bilateral Monadic (state) Systemic Theoretical/empirical focus has been on bilateral trade Could use either/both bilateral/state variables for test Claims made in the literature apply equally to monadic trade If war is costly to trade (any trade), it should constrain/inform/transform trading states as predicted Trade with third parties is also impacted by conflict Conflicting incentives occur at both bilateral/state level Reverse causality problem strongest in bilateral data The clearest distinctions occur at the system level Erik Gartzke UCSD egartzke@ucsd.edu The System Made Me Stop Doing It The Indire
10 Figure 1: World Exports/Skewness of Exports Exports and Export Skewness World Exports and Export Skewness (by dyad year)
11 Dependent Variable(s): Data MID Onset: standard COW MID Dataset, coding from Maoz. Independent Variables: Trade: state/dyad/system, Gleditsch (2002), Oneal % Russett (1999). Capabilities: state CINC scores, plus interaction term. Contiguity: six categories of decreasing physical proximity Distance: nat. log. of great circle distance between capitals. Alliance Status: COW dyadic defense pact/neutrality/entente. Major Power Status: COW criteria, dummy for status. Democracy: Polity IV data, monadic/dyadic/systemic values. Development: COW CINC, energy consumption. Temporal Dependence: Beck et al. (1998) Erik Gartzke UCSD egartzke@ucsd.edu The System Made Me Stop Doing It The Indire
12 Table 1: The Effect of Trade on Systemic Conflict (Annual Counts, Negative Binomial Regression) DV: Count of Basic Model Interpolated Development Temporal Trends MID Onset Variable All MIDs Fatal MIDs All MIDs Fatal MIDs All MIDs Fatal MIDs Trade (0.0936) (0.1387) (0.0293) (0.0955) (0.1017) (0.1509) Democracy (0.8428) (1.4623) (1.3009) (0.0691) (0.9462) (1.1532) Development (0.3334) (3.2492) (4.4760) # of States (0.0092) (0.0111) (0.0037) (0.0053) (0.0054) (0.0079) Year (0.0302) (0.0337) (0.0044) (0.0065) (0.0124) (0.0239) Year (0.0002) (0.0003) Year (0.0000) (0.0000) Intercept ( ) ( ) (8.1754) ( ) (0.2206) (0.4982) ln(α) (0.4734) (4.9907) (0.2478) (8.230) (0.2737) (3.8990) N Log-likelihood χ 2 (4,4,4,5,7,7) Significance levels : : 5% : 1% : 0.1%. All reported significance levels are two-tailed.
13 Table 2: Effects of Systemic and Dyadic Trade on Dyadic Conflict (Annual Dummy, Logit) DV: MID Onset Basic Systemic Difference Interact Develop. Bilateral Variable All MIDs All MIDs All MIDs All MIDs Fatal MIDs All MIDs State Trade (low) (2.024) (2.026) (2.394) (18.35) (87.49) (37.57) State Trade (high) (0.406) (3.286) (3.574) (3.248) System Trade (1.340) (1.362) (1.385) (2.308) (1.372) State (low) Sys (139.2) (775.4) (277.2) State (high) Sys (24.74) (29.16) (24.29) Bilateral (low) (0.0007) Bilateral (high) (0.0002) Bilat. (low) Sys (0.0051) Bilat. (high) Sys (0.0015) Democracy (low) (0.0194) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0200) (0.0467) (0.0200) Democracy (high) (0.0165) Distance (0.0315) (0.0317) (0.0306) (0.0306) (0.0290) (0.0626) Contiguity (0.253) (0.256) (0.249) (0.250) (0.109) (0.104) Alliance (0.139) (0.139) (0.135) (0.134) (0.219) (0.133) CINC (ratio) (0.382) (0.382) (0.371) (0.361) (0.650) (0.352) Maj. Power (0.175) (0.174) (0.192) (0.191) (0.281) (0.188) Econ. Dev (0.0662) Intercept (0.294) (0.319) (0.324) (0.327) (0.717) (0.256) N Significance levels : : 5% : 1% : 0.1%. All reported significance levels are two-tailed. The temporal Splines and peaceyear variables have been suppressed to save space. 16
14 Table 2: Blowup Effects of Systemic of and Key Dyadic Relationships Trade Dyadic Conflict in(annual Table Dummy, 2 Logit) DV: MID Onset Basic Systemic Difference Interact Develop. Bilateral Variable All MIDs All MIDs All MIDs All MIDs Fatal MIDs All MIDs State Trade (low) (2.024) (2.026) (2.394) (18.35) (87.49) (37.57) State Trade (high) (0.406) (3.286) (3.574) (3.248) System Trade (1.340) (1.362) (1.385) (2.308) (1.372) State (low) Sys (139.2) (775.4) (277.2) State (high) Sys (24.74) (29.16) (24.29) Bilateral (low) (0.0007) Bilateral (high) (0.0002) Bilat. (low) Sys (0.0051) Bilat. (high) Sys (0.0015) Democracy (low) (0.0194) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0200) (0.0467) (0.0200) Democracy (high) (0.0165) Distance
15 Relationship Between Dyadic Trade & MID Onset New MID onsets (within Dyad) Dyadic Trade (low): percentiles in sample from lowest to highest
16 Rel. Between Systemic Trade and Dyadic MID Onset New MID onsets (within Dyad) Systemic Trade: percentiles in sample from lowest to highest
17 Systemic & State Trade (high) & MID Onset 1 Pr MID System Trade State Trade high
18 Effect of Systemic Trade on MID Onset for One Weak and One Powerful State New MID onsets (within Dyad) Systemic Trade: percentiles in sample from lowest to highest
19 Effect of Systemic Trade on MID Onset for Powerful States New MID onsets (within Dyad) Systemic Trade: percentiles in sample from lowest to highest
20 Table 3: Effects of Systemic and Dyadic Trade on Dyadic Conflict (Annual Dummy, Logit) DV: MID Onset Basic Systemic Fatal Variable All MIDs All MIDs All MIDs All MIDs Fatal MIDs Hegemon Capability (0.987) (1.309) (1.946) Hegemon Trade (0.0911) (0.117) (0.210) State Trade (low) (2.620) (17.93) (86.28) State Trade (high) (0.408) (3.224) (3.018) System Trade (2.345) (3.559) State System (low) (137.2) (765.7) State System (high) (24.44) (25.09) Democracy (low) (0.0207) (0.0451) Distance (log) (0.0613) (0.0307) (0.0280) Contiguity (dummy) (0.103) (0.250) (0.105) Alliance (dummy) (0.137) (0.135) (0.221) Capability Ratio (0.370) (0.362) (0.634) Maj. Power (either) (0.187) (0.189) (0.268) Development (energy) (0.0167) Intercept (0.294) (0.491) (1.018) N Significance levels : : 5% : 1% : 0.1%. All reported significance levels are two-tailed. The temporal Splines and peaceyear variables have been suppressed to save space.
21 Erik Gartzke UCSD The System Made Me Stop Doing It The Indire Tentative Conclusions Trade affects conflict, but not (quite) in the way we thought: Trading states are not significantly less dispute prone Trade-intensive systems are significantly less disputatious The biggest effect of trade in diminishing conflict is on the most disputatious dyads (asymmetric trading relationships) The pacific effects of trade transfer to non-trading states. It seems reasonable to suppose that the chief beneficiaries of trade are responsible for shifting the effect of liberal peace Need to demonstrate the causal mechanism, etc.
All s Well That Ends Well: A Reply to Oneal, Barbieri & Peters*
2003 Journal of Peace Research, vol. 40, no. 6, 2003, pp. 727 732 Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi) www.sagepublications.com [0022-3433(200311)40:6; 727 732; 038292] All s Well
More informationThe Relevance of Politically Relevant Dyads in the Study of Interdependence and Dyadic Disputes
Conflict Management and Peace Science, 22:113 133, 2005 Copyright C Peace Science Society (International) ISSN: 0738-8942 print / 1549-9219 online DOI: 10.1080/07388940590948556 The Relevance of Politically
More informationJust War or Just Politics? The Determinants of Foreign Military Intervention
Just War or Just Politics? The Determinants of Foreign Military Intervention Averyroughdraft.Thankyouforyourcomments. Shannon Carcelli UC San Diego scarcell@ucsd.edu January 22, 2014 1 Introduction Under
More informationJust War or Just Politics? The Determinants of Foreign Military Intervention
Just War or Just Politics? CDD Minerva Workshop Presentation November 24, 2015 Territorial Conquest Used to Be Common... Source: www.telegraph.co.uk ...But Now It Is Not. DECREASE IN CONQUEST SINCE WWII
More informationTrade Networks and the Kantian Peace. Han Dorussen and Hugh Ward. University of Essex. 5 May 2007
Trade Networks and the Kantian Peace Han Dorussen and Hugh Ward University of Essex 5 May 2007 Paper to be presented at the 6 th Pan European Conference on International Relation, Turin September 12 15,
More informationDemocracy and the Settlement of International Borders,
Democracy and the Settlement of International Borders, 1919-2001 Douglas M Gibler Andrew Owsiak December 7, 2016 Abstract There is increasing evidence that territorial conflict is associated with centralized
More informationThe networked peace: Intergovernmental organizations and international conflict
The networked peace: Intergovernmental organizations and international conflict Journal of Peace Research 1 16 ª The Author(s) 2017 Reprints and permission: sagepub.co.uk/journalspermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0022343317711242
More informationDyadic Hostility and the Ties That Bind: State-to-State versus State-to-System Security and Economic Relationships*
2004 Journal of Peace Research, vol. 41, no. 6, 2004, pp. 659 676 Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi) www.sagepublications.com DOI 10.1177/0022343304047431 ISSN 0022-3433 Dyadic
More informationCould Climate Change Precipitate Peace?
Could Climate Change Precipitate Peace? Erik Gartzke 16 March 2011 Abstract Growing interest in the social consequences of climate change has fueled speculation that global warming could lead to an increase
More informationTowards a Continuous Specification of the Democracy-Autocracy Connection. D. Scott Bennett The Pennsylvania State University
Towards a Continuous Specification of the Democracy-Autocracy Connection D. Scott Bennett The Pennsylvania State University Forthcoming, 2006 International Studies Quarterly (v 50 pp. 513-537) Mail: Department
More informationTrade, Interdependence and its Effect on Interstate Conflict: The Case of the East African Region. Hailay Gebretinsae Beyene 1
Journal of Economic Cooperation and Development, 35, 4 (2014), 25-60 Trade, Interdependence and its Effect on Interstate Conflict: Hailay Gebretinsae Beyene 1 The effect of dyadic trade on reducing disputes/conflicts
More informationDemocratic vs. Capitalist Peace: A Test in the Developing World
Volume 21 Number 1 Article 5 5-1-2014 Democratic vs. Capitalist Peace: A Test in the Developing World Faruk Ekmekci Ipek University, fekmekci@hotmail.com Follow this and additional works at: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/pcs
More informationSupplementary Material for Preventing Civil War: How the potential for international intervention can deter conflict onset.
Supplementary Material for Preventing Civil War: How the potential for international intervention can deter conflict onset. World Politics, vol. 68, no. 2, April 2016.* David E. Cunningham University of
More informationINDUCING AND SUPPRESSING CONFLICT IN INTERACTIVE INTERNATIONAL DYADS
INDUCING AND SUPPRESSING CONFLICT IN INTERACTIVE INTERNATIONAL DYADS David Kinsella School of International Service American University david.kinsella@american.edu Bruce Russett Department of Political
More informationDoes Trade Integration Contribute to Peace?
Review of Development Economics, 20(1), 327 344, 2016 DOI:10.1111/rode.12222 Does Trade Integration Contribute to Peace? Jong-Wha Lee and Ju Hyun Pyun* Abstract We investigate the effect of trade integration
More informationTo Conquer or Compel War, Peace, and Economic Development
To Conquer or Compel War, Peace, and Economic Development Erik Gartzke Dominic Rohner 23 May 2011 Abstract Theories of economic development suggest variously that national income increases or decreases
More informationInterdependence, the spirit of commerce, and natural resources
Interdependence, the spirit of commerce, and natural resources Are they compatible? Bachelor s thesis Project on The Democratic Peace Thesis Student information: Name: Coen Hermenet Student number: 1360027
More informationThe Liberal Peace Revisited: The Role of Democracy, Dependence, and Development in Militarized Interstate Dispute Initiation,
International Interactions, 32:183 200, 2006 Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 0305-0629 DOI: 10.1080/03050620600719361 GINI 0305-0629 0000-0000 International Interactions, Vol. 32, No. 2, April
More informationContiguous States, Stable Borders and the Peace between Democracies
Contiguous States, Stable Borders and the Peace between Democracies Douglas M. Gibler June 2013 Abstract Park and Colaresi argue that they could not replicate the results of my 2007 ISQ article, Bordering
More informationCauses of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations,
Paper presented at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992 John
More informationAllying to Win. Regime Type, Alliance Size, and Victory
Allying to Win Regime Type, Alliance Size, and Victory Christopher J. Fariss Erik Gartzke Benjamin A. T. Graham Abstract Studies of regime type and war reveal that democracies tend to win the wars they
More informationThe Ties that Bias Specifying and Operationalizing Components of Dyadic Dependence in International Conflict
The Ties that Bias Specifying and Operationalizing Components of Dyadic Dependence in International Conflict Erik A. Gartzke University of California San Diego Kristian Skrede Gleditsch University of Essex
More informationPermanent Friends? Dynamic Difference and the Democratic Peace. 1 January Abstract
Permanent Friends? Dynamic Difference and the Democratic Peace Erik Gartzke Alex Weisiger 1 January 2012 Abstract Perhaps the simplest explanation for where fault lines lie in a political process involves
More informationWhen It Is Not Business as Usual : Petro-states and. International Conflict
When It Is Not Business as Usual : Petro-states and International Conflict Anita R Kellogg Department of Political Science University of California, Los Angeles arkellogg@ucla.edu May 20, 2017 Draft presented
More informationThe Classical Liberals Were Half Right (or Half Wrong): New Tests of the Liberal Peace, *
2005 Journal of Peace Research, vol. 42, no. 5, 2005, pp. 523 543 Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi) http://jpr.sagepub.com DOI 10.1177/0022343305056225 The Classical Liberals
More informationThe Influence of International Organizations on Militarized Dispute Initiation and Duration 1
International Studies Quarterly (2010) 54, 1123 1141 The Influence of International Organizations on Militarized Dispute Initiation and Duration 1 Megan Shannon University of Mississippi Daniel Morey University
More informationUniversity of Georgia, Athens, Georgia, USA
This article was downloaded by:[university of Georgia] On: 21 August 2007 Access Details: [subscription number 731594552] Publisher: Taylor & Francis Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered
More informationConflict Emergence and Escalation in Interactive International Dyads
Portland State University PDXScholar Political Science Faculty Publications and Presentations Political Science 11-2002 Conflict Emergence and Escalation in Interactive International Dyads David Todd Kinsella
More informationTHE EFFECTS OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ON MILITARY EXPENDITURES: POOLED ANALYSES OF 165 COUNTRIES,
THE EFFECTS OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ON MILITARY EXPENDITURES: POOLED ANALYSES OF 165 COUNTRIES, 1950-2000 By William D. Nordhaus, John R. Oneal, and Bruce Russett June 2009 Revised October 2009 COWLES
More informationThe Influence of International Organizations on Militarized Dispute Initiation and Duration. Megan Shannon University of Mississippi
The Influence of International Organizations on Militarized Dispute Initiation and Duration Megan Shannon University of Mississippi Daniel Morey University of Kentucky Frederick J. Boehmke University of
More informationAppendix: Regime Type, Coalition Size, and Victory
Appendix: Regime Type, Coalition Size, and Victory Benjamin A. T. Graham Erik Gartzke Christopher J. Fariss Contents 10 Introduction to the Appendix 2 10.1 Testing Hypotheses 1-3 with Logged Partners....................
More informationWelcome to the Club: IGO Socialization and Dyadic Arms Transfers
University of Central Florida Electronic Theses and Dissertations Masters Thesis (Open Access) Welcome to the Club: IGO Socialization and Dyadic Arms Transfers 2015 Joseph Dimino University of Central
More informationBeing Gulliver: Diversionary War, Political Capital, and U.S. Intervention in Militarized Disputes. 10,957 Words
Being Gulliver: Diversionary War, Political Capital, and U.S. Intervention in Militarized Disputes 10,957 Words 2 Abstract How do public evaluations of recent international conflict performance affect
More informationGlobalization and Peace: Assessing New Directions in the Study of Trade and Conflict*
journal of peace R ESEARCH 1999 Journal of Peace Research vol. 36, no. 4, 1999, pp. 387 404 Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi) [0022-3433 (199907) 36:4; 387 404; 008897] Globalization
More informationAll Alliances are Multilateral:
All Alliances are Multilateral: Rethinking Alliance Formation Benjamin Fordham Paul Poast Word Count: 10,991 Abstract Alliance formation is a multilateral process. The vast majority of alliance relations
More informationTrade Does Promote Peace: New Simultaneous Estimates of the Reciprocal Effects of Trade and Conflict
Trade Does Promote Peace: New Simultaneous Estimates of the Reciprocal Effects of Trade and Conflict Håvard Hegre International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) John R. Oneal University of Alabama
More informationStudies of regime type and war show that democracies tend to win the wars they fight, but
Political Science Research and Methods Page 1 of 27 The European Political Science Association, 2015 doi:10.1017/psrm.2015.52 The Bar Fight Theory of International Conflict: Regime Type, Coalition Size,
More informationPower, Proximity, and Democracy: Geopolitical Competition in the International System
Power, Proximity, and Democracy: Geopolitical Competition in the International System By Jonathan N. Markowitz School of International Relations University of Southern California (Corresponding Author:
More informationTrade Does Promote Peace: New Simultaneous Estimates of the Reciprocal Effects of Trade and Conflict*
Trade Does Promote Peace: New Simultaneous Estimates of the Reciprocal Effects of Trade and Conflict* Håvard Hegre Department of Political Science, University of Oslo Center for the Study of Civil War,
More informationInternational Institutions
International Institutions Erik Gartzke 154A, Lecture 6 November 06, 2012 What is an IO? What is an international organization? Def: group designed to achieve collective action, usually across international
More informationDeclining Benefits of Conquest? Economic Development and Territorial Claims in the Americas and Europe
Declining Benefits of Conquest? Economic Development and Territorial Claims in the Americas and Europe Shawn E. Rowan and Paul R. Hensel Department of Political Science Florida State University Tallahassee,
More informationWar, Alliances, and Power Concentration
Division of Economics A.J. Palumbo School of Business Administration and McAnulty College of Liberal Arts Duquesne University Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania War, Alliances, and Power Concentration Mark Valkovci
More informationRegions of Hierarchy and Security: US Troop Deployments, Spatial Relations, and Defense Burdens
International Interactions Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations ISSN: 0305-0629 (Print) 1547-7444 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/gini20 Regions of Hierarchy
More informationA Re-assessment of Democratic Pacifism at the Monadic Level of Analysis
1 A Re-assessment of Democratic Pacifism at the Monadic Level of Analysis Abstract Extant studies provide inconsistent evidence that democracies are generally more pacific than nondemocracies. Many scholars
More informationThe ~Ir!Relevance of Militarized Interstate Disputes for International Trade
International Studies Quarterly ~2002! 46, 11 43. The ~Ir!Relevance of Militarized Interstate Disputes for International Trade Quan Li and David Sacko The Pennsylvania State University Do military disputes
More informationEconomic Interdependence and Armed Conflict: Some Qualifications of the Liberal Case
Economic Interdependence and Armed Conflict: Some Qualifications of the Liberal Case Gerald Schneider University of Konstanz Gerald.Schneider@uni-konstanz.de (based on co-authored work with Margit Bussmann
More informationIncomplete Democratization and the Outbreak of Military Disputes
International Studies Quarterly ~2002! 46, 529 549. Incomplete Democratization and the Outbreak of Military Disputes Edward D. Mansfield University of Pennsylvania Jack Snyder Columbia University Whereas
More informationStrengthening Protection of Labor Rights through Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs)
Strengthening Protection of Labor Rights through Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) Moonhawk Kim moonhawk@gmail.com Executive Summary Analysts have argued that the United States attempts to strengthen
More informationThe terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001 revealed
10.1177/0022002704269354 ARTICLE JOURNAL Mitchell, Prins OF CONFLICT / RIVALRY AND RESOLUTION DIVERSIONARY USES OF FORCE Rivalry and Diversionary Uses of Force SARA MCLAUGHLIN MITCHELL Department of Political
More informationGreat Powers, Hierarchy, and Endogenous Regimes: Rethinking the Domestic Causes of Peace
Great Powers, Hierarchy, and Endogenous Regimes: Rethinking the Domestic Causes of Peace Patrick J. McDonald Abstract This paper blends recent research on hierarchy and democratization to examine the theoretical
More informationThe Relevance of Bargaining in International Politics
The Relevance of Bargaining in International Politics Power, Proximity, and Uncertainty in Interstate Conflict Erik Gartzke 7 December 2011 Abstract Bargaining theory offers a compelling logic of the causes
More informationGeneral Deterrence and International Conflict: Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory
International Interactions, 36:60 85, 2010 Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 0305-0629 print/1547-7444 online DOI: 10.1080/03050620903554069 General Deterrence and International Conflict: Testing
More informationInstitutions and Collective Goods
Quiz #5 1. According to the textbook, North America accounts for what percent of all transnational terrorist attacks in the past 38 years: a.) 1%, b.) 4%, c.) 9%, d.) 27%, e.) 42%. 2. Which is NOT a right
More informationC-1: Select the ideal-typical, academically oriented book on international institutions for each decade from the 1960s through the 2000s. The books should exemplify the most important characteristics and
More informationDangerous Dyads Revisited: Democracies May Not Be That Peaceful after All
Dangerous Dyads Revisited: Democracies May Not Be That Peaceful after All Halvard Buhaug Norwegian University of Science and Technology Abstract In recent years, the quantitative IR literature has increasingly
More informationSyllabus International Security
Syllabus International Security Instructor: Oliver Westerwinter Fall Semester 2017 Time & room Office Thursday, 10:15-12h in 01-308 Oliver Westerwinter Exception: Wednesday, 22.11 Room: 52-5012, Müller-Friedbergstrasse
More information= = = = = = A Quality of Government Peace? Bringing the State Back Into the Study of Inter-State Armed Conflict. Nils Råby.
A Quality of Government Peace? Bringing the State Back Into the Study of Inter-State Armed Conflict Nils Råby Jan Teorell QoG WORKING PAPER SERIES 2010:20 THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTE Department
More informationTrade Blocs, Trade Flows, and International Con ict
Trade Blocs, Trade Flows, and International Con ict Edward D. Mans eld and Jon C. Pevehouse The relationship between foreign trade and political con ict has been a persistent source of controversy among
More informationExploring Operationalizations of Political Relevance. November 14, 2005
Exploring Operationalizations of Political Relevance D. Scott Bennett The Pennsylvania State University November 14, 2005 Mail: Department of Political Science 318 Pond Building University Park, PA 16802-6106
More informationA SUPPLY SIDE THEORY OF THIRD PARTY CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
A SUPPLY SIDE THEORY OF THIRD PARTY CONFLICT MANAGEMENT Mark J.C. Crescenzi University of North Carolina crescenzi@unc.edu Kelly M. Kadera University of Iowa kelly-kadera@uiowa.edu Sara McLaughlin Mitchell
More informationHow Cooperation Emerges from Conflict: An Agent-Based Model of Security Networks Formation
How Cooperation Emerges from Conflict: An Agent-Based Model of Security Networks Formation Zeev Maoz Department of Political Science University of California Davis Davis, CA 95618 and Distinguished Fellow
More informationPerilous Polities? Regime Transition and Conflict
University of New Orleans ScholarWorks@UNO University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations Dissertations and Theses 12-19-2003 Perilous Polities? Regime Transition and Conflict 1950-2000 Ursula Daxecker
More informationThe Impact of Conflict on Trade Evidence from Panel Data (work-in-progress draft)
The Impact of Conflict on Trade Evidence from Panel Data (work-in-progress draft) Katrin Kamin, Department of Economics, Chair of International Economics, University of Kiel Abstract This paper analyses
More informationAllying to Win: Regime Type, Alliance Size, and Victory
Allying to Win: Regime Type, Alliance Size, and Victory Christopher J. Fariss Erik Gartzke Benjamin A. T. Graham Abstract Studies of regime type and war reveal that democracies tend to win the wars they
More informationTransborder Identities, Bias, and Third-Party Conflict Management
Transborder Identities, Bias, and Third-Party Conflict Management August 16, 2018 Emir Yazici Ph.D. Candidate Department of Political Science University of Missouri 113 Professional Building Columbia MO
More informationTransnational Dimensions of Civil War
Transnational Dimensions of Civil War Kristian Skrede Gleditsch University of California, San Diego & Centre for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo See http://weber.ucsd.edu/
More informationViolent Adolescence: State Development and the Propensity for Militarized Interstate. Conflict *
Charles Boehmer and David Sobek Violent Adolescence Violent Adolescence: State Development and the Propensity for Militarized Interstate Conflict * CHARLES R. BOEHMER University of Texas, El Paso DAVID
More information7 Network Centrality and International Conflict, : Does it Pay to Be Important?
7 Network Centrality and International Conflict, 1816-001: Does it Pay to Be Important? Zeev Maoz a, Lesley Terris b, Ranan D. Kuperman c and Ilan Talmud d Abstract The position of states in the international
More informationSystemic Theory and International Relations. Professor Bear F. Braumoeller Department of Political Science The Ohio State University
Systemic Theory and International Relations Professor Bear F. Braumoeller Department of Political Science The Ohio State University Definitions Systemic theory in international relations Theorizing impact
More informationResearch Note: The Effects of the International Security Environment on National Military. Expenditures: A Multi-Country Study.
Research Note: The Effects of the International Security Environment on National Military Expenditures: A Multi-Country Study William Nordhaus* John R. Oneal** Bruce Russett*** December 15, 2010 * Department
More informationWhy Do Nations Fight?
Why Do Nations Fight? Erik Gartzke POLI 12, Lecture 2b August 9, 2010 Why Do Nations Fight? Nations go to war for some of the same reasons as individuals fight There are also bound to be differences. Differences
More informationWhy Intervene? An Examination into the Causes for United States Government-biased Military Interventions in Intrastate Wars
University of Colorado, Boulder CU Scholar Undergraduate Honors Theses Honors Program Spring 2011 Why Intervene? An Examination into the Causes for United States Government-biased Military Interventions
More informationCONSTRUCTING MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES (OF DANGEROUS DYADS)
CONSTRUCTING MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES (OF DANGEROUS DYADS) James Lee Ray Department of Political Science Vanderbilt University Nashville, TN 37235 James.l.ray@vanderbilt.edu This is a revised version of a
More informationASSESSING THE BENEFITS AND BURDENS OF NUCLEAR LATENCY
ASSESSING THE BENEFITS AND BURDENS OF NUCLEAR LATENCY Rupal Mehta Gene Gerzhoy Rachel Whitlark Annual Meeting of the Peace Science Society International November 2015 MOTIVATION: LATENCY AFTER THE JCPOA
More information!!!!!!!!! The Nuclear Balance and International Conflict
!!!!!!!!!! The Nuclear Balance and International Conflict Matthew Kroenig Georgetown University Research Affiliate Project on Managing the Atom Harvard University Michael Weintraub Georgetown University!
More informationAre There Cracks In The Democratic Peace?
Papers & Publications: Interdisciplinary Journal of Undergraduate Research Volume 3 Article 7 2014 Are There Cracks In The Democratic Peace? James W. Farmer Georgia Southern University Jamie E. Scalera
More informationVETO PLAYERS AND MILITARIZED INTERSTATE CONFLICT
The Pennsylvania State University The Graduate School College of the Liberal Arts VETO PLAYERS AND MILITARIZED INTERSTATE CONFLICT A Dissertation in Political Science by Jeremy E. Lloyd c 2014 Jeremy E.
More informationTHE LIMITS OF THE LIBERAL PEACE. Håvard Hegre International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO)
THE LIMITS OF THE LIBERAL PEACE Håvard Hegre International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) Cand.polit. thesis Department of Political Science University of Oslo June 1999 iii Table of Contents Table
More informationwarwick.ac.uk/lib-publications
Original citation: Bove, Vincenzo and Gokmen, Gunes. (2016) Cultural distance and interstate conflicts. British Journal of Political Science. pp. 1-11. Permanent WRAP URL: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/75805
More informationInternational Migration and Military Intervention in Civil War
Online Appendix 1 International Migration and Military Intervention in Civil War Online Appendix In this appendix, we report a variety of additional model specifications in order to increase the confidence
More informationIncome Distributions and the Relative Representation of Rich and Poor Citizens
Income Distributions and the Relative Representation of Rich and Poor Citizens Eric Guntermann Mikael Persson University of Gothenburg April 1, 2017 Abstract In this paper, we consider the impact of the
More informationBridging Economics and International Relations to Understand State Capacity and War in Sub-Saharan Africa
Bridging Economics and International Relations to Understand State Capacity and War in Sub-Saharan Africa Roberto Ricciuti and Domenico Rossignoli* Abstract This paper explores the relationship between
More informationTrade Composition and Acquiescence to Sanction Threats
Trade Composition and Acquiescence to Sanction Threats William Akoto University of South Carolina akotow@email.sc.edu Cameron G. Thies Arizona State University cameron.thies@asu.edu January 12, 2019 Timothy
More informationViolence Prediction. Christopher Murray, ed., Encyclopedia of Public Health (San Diego, CA: Academic Press, forthcoming 2003) Bruce Russett
1 Christopher Murray, ed., Encyclopedia of Public Health (San Diego, CA: Academic Press, forthcoming 2003) Violence Prediction Bruce Russett Yale University I. Introduction II. Inducements and Suppressors
More informationDemocratic Peace Theory
Democratic Peace Theory Erik Gartzke 154A, Lecture 5 February 10, 2009 DP - History Democratic peace research credits intellectual genesis to Kant's essay Perpetual Peace Abbe de Saint-Pierre, Rousseau,
More informationThe Effectiveness of Peacekeeping Missions in Civil Wars: Disaggregating Interventions,
The Effectiveness of Peacekeeping Missions in Civil Wars: Disaggregating Interventions, 1948-2000 Tobias Böhmelt, Nils W. Metternich, Ulrich H. Pilster, and Andrea Ruggeri* University of Essex, United
More informationUnderstanding Paramilitary Violence
Understanding Paramilitary Violence Navin Bapat Lucia Bird Chelsea Estancona Kaisa Hinkkainen University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill University of Lincoln November 13, 2015 Bapat, Bird, Estancona,
More informationGlobal Economic Expansion and the Prevalence of Militarized Interstate Disputes
Global Economic Expansion and the Prevalence of Militarized Interstate Disputes The Honors Program Senior Capstone Project Student s Name: Lucas Hahn Faculty Sponsor: Jongsung Kim April, 2016 Table of
More informationThe Influence of Regional Power Distributions on Interdependence
The Influence of Regional Power Distributions on Interdependence Michael A. Allen Boise State University March 25, 2015 Abstract Political economy debates about the influence of power and polarity in expanding,
More informationThe Joint Democracy Dyadic Conflict Nexus: A Simultaneous Equations Model
International Studies Quarterly (2003) 47, 325 346 The Joint Democracy Dyadic Conflict Nexus: A Simultaneous Equations Model RAFAEL REUVENY Indiana University QUAN LI The Pennsylvania State University
More informationTrade led Growth in Times of Crisis Asia Pacific Trade Economists Conference 2 3 November 2009, Bangkok. Session 11
Trade led Growth in Times of Crisis Asia Pacific Trade Economists Conference 2 3 November 2009, Bangkok Session 11 Revisiting Trade-Institution Nexus: A Comparative Analysis of South Asia and Global Commodity
More informationPOWER TRANSITIONS AND DISPUTE ESCALATION IN EVOLVING INTERSTATE RIVALRIES PAUL R. HENSEL. and SARA MCLAUGHLIN
POWER TRANSITIONS AND DISPUTE ESCALATION IN EVOLVING INTERSTATE RIVALRIES PAUL R. HENSEL and SARA MCLAUGHLIN Department of Political Science Florida State University Tallahassee, FL 32306-2049 (904) 644-5727
More informationDemocracy and Trade: Ties of Interest and Community
Democracy and Trade: Ties of Interest and Community Introduction For many countries in world politics, evidence that they are engaged in a peace-promoting system of dynamic, mutually reinforcing relationships
More informationIdentifying and Testing Logics of Regional War Diffusion
Identifying and Testing Logics of Regional War Diffusion Alex Weisiger August 20, 2012 Abstract Why does violent conflict tend to cluster in certain regions of the world? IR scholars are increasingly interested
More informationStructural Folds: Generative Disruption in Overlapping Groups. Balázs Vedres David Stark
Structural Folds: Generative Disruption in Overlapping Groups Balázs Vedres David Stark Columbia University Central European University Santa Fe Institute AJS, January 2010: Vedres, Balázs, and David Stark.
More informationTrade Blocs, Interstate Conflict, and the Collective Impact of Economic Integration
Southern Illinois University Carbondale OpenSIUC 2011 Conference Proceedings 6-2011 Trade Blocs, Interstate Conflict, and the Collective Impact of Economic Integration Matthew D. Shaffer University of
More informationConstructing Multivariate Analyses (of Dangerous Dyads)
Conflict Management and Peace Science, 22:277 292, 2005 Copyright C Peace Science Society (International) ISSN: 0738-8942 print / 1549-9219 online DOI: 10.1080/07388940500339175 Constructing Multivariate
More informationArkPSA Arkansas Political Science Association
ArkPSA Arkansas Political Science Association The Forgotten Disputes: Anti-Dumping and Trade Conflict at the WTO Author(s): Gregory C. Dixon Source: The Midsouth Political Science Review, Volume 14 (December
More informationProsperous Pacifists
Prosperous Pacifists The Effects of Development on Initiators and Targets of Territorial Conflict Erik Gartzke Dominic Rohner 21 January 2011 Abstract Students of international relations have long conjectured
More informationTaking a Walk on the Supply Side: The Determinants of Civilian Nuclear Cooperation*
Taking a Walk on the Supply Side: The Determinants of Civilian Nuclear Cooperation* Matthew Fuhrmann Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University Department of International
More information