Three Agendas for the Future Course of China-Taiwan Relationship European Association of Taiwan Studies Inaugural Conference, SOAS, April 2004

Transcription

1 Three Agendas for the Future Course of China-Taiwan Relationship European Association of Taiwan Studies Inaugural Conference, SOAS, April 2004 Dr. Masako Ikegami Associate Professor & Director Center for Pacific Asia Studies Stockholm University Masako Ikegami 1

2 Three Agendas for the Future Course of China-Taiwan Relationship Current Settings of the Taiwan Straits Agenda I Whether/How National Consensus emerge From a Divided Society to Integrated Nation Agenda II Whether/How Taiwan s yet-to-emerge national consensus can be compromised with China s claim? Agenda III How the Military factor affect the course? How to prevent any use/threatening of forces by China Masako Ikegami 2

3 Current Settings of the Taiwan Straits: No Significant Dialogue or Discourse No significant cross-strait dialogue or discourse within Taiwan s divided society China s (Ultra-) Nationalism & Hegemonic Ambition Taiwan s National Interest not defined, no consensus Cross-Strait Economic inter-dependence Great-China Economic Prosperous Sphere? or Taiwan s economy absorbed by China? Masako Ikegami 3

4 Current Settings of the Taiwan Straits: Strategic Ambiguity of the US How to balance contradicting interests? Taiwan s autonomy: strategic interest for US Fear of being drawn into cross-strait armed conflicts; Deter China s use of forces Conditions of the conventional strategic ambiguity shifting in favour of China China s rapid and significant military build-up Taiwan s military & economy falling off the parity US overseas forces deployment over-stretched Worldwide antipathy to US military intervention China s comprehensive power superior to that of US Masako Ikegami 4

5 Agenda I: National Consensus From Divided Society to Integrated Nation Taiwan s society severely ideologically divided Simplistic criterion (distance from China) makes the political discourse zero-sum ( One-China vs. Independence ) excluding a viable option of compromise No proper political party or manifesto reflecting the majority wishing the status quo Poor political discourse and lack of statesmanship amplifies, makes sever the division of the society Ideology reproduces and amplifies ethnic frictions (Chinese vs. Taiwanese) Masako Ikegami 5

6 Agenda I: National Consensus How to achieve national consensus & integration? Realize China s real intention, not rhetoric, no illusion China s adherence to the 19th century-type territorial integrity and sovereignty; Strategic ambition China s regime can hardly tolerate democracy Identify common ground, basic principles & values to be defended by all means: DPP-KMT distance less Democracy and current level of political autonomy cannot be reduced or compromised vis-à-vis China Extend international space for full-filling political autonomy Need national manifesto transcending the parties visà-vis China and international community Masako Ikegami 6

7 Agenda II: Taiwan s national consensus can be compromised with China s claim? China does not tolerate two authorities, rejecting even KMT s proposals in the 90s. One China differently defined 1992 One China Confederation 1999 China s inflexibility, hegemonic attitude and lack of own political reform drifts Taiwan away If China can reform its political system, following economic growth, the compromise plausible, but If China maintains economic growth & military buildup and authoritarian political regime, the cross- Strait impasse may get severe and risky to Masako Ikegami 7

8 All-or-Nothing scenarios in Theory Assumptions: China will maintain authoritarian political regime, economic growth and military build-up Taiwan s economy and military forces lose parity No sufficient international support for Taiwan s autonomy US will reduce its military presence in the region, weakening of the US-led alliances in Asia If DPP government makes the stance of independence clear, risk of armed conflict higher If US intervene militarily: Taiwan gets independent If US does not intervene: Taiwan absorbed by China Masako Ikegami 8

9 All-or-Nothing scenarios in Theory If KMT resumes the government party and makes concession to China in favour of one China policy If secret deal, intimidated by China s economic and military pressure: Taiwan may barter national flags and names of the nation (PRC or RoC) Validity of US military commitment for defending Taiwan may be lost/significantly reduced Without US military commitment, China can intimidate Taiwan easily Taiwan will lose its autonomy, Hong Kong model at most Masako Ikegami 9

10 Agenda III: How Military factors affect the course of cross-strait relationship Taiwan is losing military parity to China No decision of procuring major US systems Budget pressure hindering military build-up Limited effect of deterrence by defensive capability (missile defence) vis-à-vis China s rapidly increasing offensive capability (over 500 nuclear-capable SR/MR ballistic missiles, increasing by 75 annually) Rapid expansion of China s military capability Masako Ikegami 10

11 Agenda III: How Military factors affect the course of cross-strait relationship If Taiwan s military capability considerably loses parity to China s forces, and if Taiwan either provokes armed conflict by rushing to premature independence or concedes to one China policy in favour of China s claim, Credibility of US military commitment for defending Taiwan may be lessened: Missile defence instead of extended nuclear deterrence Masako Ikegami 11

12 For Preventing Armed Conflicts and All-or-Nothing Scenarios National consensus transcending party-positions/ ideology, for defending essential principles (democracy & autonomy) and integrity of the nation needs to be defined, clarified and established. The national consensus and integrity will enhance legitimacy of Taiwan s autonomy in the international community Taiwan s efforts for maintaining military parity US defence commitment secured, international pressure against China s military threats China will realize necessity to be more flexible Masako Ikegami 12

13 For Preventing Armed Conflicts and All-or-Nothing Scenarios Cross-Strait discussions (e.g. clarification of one China policy) to be open and transparent Chinese public to be more informed of possible consequences of armed conflicts Confidence building measures (CBM) of the cross-strait military relationship can be set up in the enhanced regional security cooperation e.g. Proliferation Security Initiatives (PSI), cooperative maritime rescue training, anti-piracy patrol Masako Ikegami 13