Majoritarian or propotional vision. The consequences of the varieties of democracies. Strengths and weaknesses. Identifiability of Responsiblity

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Audra Gilmore
5 years ago
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1 The consequences of the varieties of democracies Majoritarian or propoal vision One way to judge these alternative ways of organizating a society is by thinking about the way the influence the extent to which citizens can influce Elec outcomes Policy Welfare outcomes Strengths and weaknesses Because minimial winning coali single party coalis are common in Majoritarian systems, voters are better able evaluate candidates in such systems than in proporal systems Majoritarian systems do a good job of allowing citizens to hold governments accountable Proporal systems provide mechanisms by which most voters can say that their interests are represesented in a meaningful way. Better prospective evaluas allows for the crea of clearer mandates Mandates exist only when parties can claim that the voters chose a distinct policy platform Better Retrospective evaluas provide for greater accountability Accountability exists only when voters can identify who is responsible for parties Link between cabinet type and identifiability of responsibility over policy 1. Minortiy Govt (least amount of identifiability) 2. Minority govt with outside support (clearer because we have a sense of who shares the blame ) 3. Majority govt negotiated after elec (can identify who shares blame, but their manifestos were competing) 4. Multiparty preelec majority govt (common policy platforms, makes it hard to distance themselves from govt policies) 5. Sinlge party majority govt (you can run, but you can t hide) Identifiability of Responsiblity Country Pure minority Supported minority Postelec CoaliPreelec Coali Single Majority Avg majority Status Score Den Nz Swe Ita Fin Bel Ire Fra Net Us Spa Ger Aut Can Swi Uk Jpn Gre Aul Nor

2 Other insitus diffusing govt responsibility 1. Governing Lacks Cohesion 2. Government has short tenure in office 3. Federal System 4. Bicameral Opposi 5. Committee Influence (when opposi can participate/chair) Prospective Evaluas Matter as well Voters may care about what governments say they are going to do, but this only matters where voters can make a link between their vote and who will govern Veto Institus and committee systems may block the ability of govts elected with a mandate to implement that mandate Proporal Model Representa tends to be more proporal in multimember districts Government Parties tend to represent a larger share of the voters in proporal systems Country Basis of Govt Vote Basis of Government Parties Switzerland Majority Coali 78% Finland Majority Coali 60% Germay Preelec coal 56% Italy Majority Coali 55% France Preelec coal 54% Austria Majority Coali 53% Ireland Preelec coal 52% Netherlands Majority Coali 52% US 51% Spain Majority 49% Greence Majority 48% Belgium Majority Coali 48% Japan Majority 48% Sweden Supported minority 46% Australiat Preelec coal 46% UK Majority 42% New Zealand Majority 39% Canada Minority 36% Denmark Minority 33% Norway Minority 32% In addi, some governments have to bargain with the opposi Minority governments Opposi influence on committees Bicamerialism Federalism Country Basis of Govt Total condis for effective represent Finland Majority Coali 84 Switzerland Majority Coali 83 Denmark Minority 82 US 77 Sweden Supported minority 71 Austria Majority Coali 71 Germay Preelec coal 71 Norway Minority 68 Canada Minority 68 Netherlands Majority Coali 68 Italy Majority Coali 64 Belgium Majority Coali 63 Spain Majority 62 Japan Majority 57 Ireland Preelec coal 57 Australiat Preelec coal 55 France Preelec coal 53 Greence Majority 52 UK Majority 46 New Zealand Majority 43

3 Two Ideals of Democratic Responsiveness 100% 50% 0% Majoritarian ideal 50% Share of Vote Proporal ideal 100% To what extent are these goals achieved? Majoritarian vision adheres closely to its own vision for party seats, a bit less closely for party votes (figure 6.2) PR system not as clear a success on its own terms sure there s a close link between party vote and party seats, but the connec between party vote and govt share isn t what prop advocates would hope (and, in fact, shows that link between elecs and control govt is unclear). (Figu 6.4) Responsiveness In Majoritarian Systmes Responsiveness in Proporal Systems But. Once we consider linke between party vote and policy making share majoritarian and proporal systems each seem to accomplish their goals. (are figure 6.3 and 6.5

4 Proporal and Majoritarian Visions and Macroeconomic Performance Consensus Democracy and Macroeconomic Performance (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Unemployment Infla GDP Growth Unemployment Infla GDP Growth Consensus Dim * ** 0.240** * (0.059) (0.146) (0.153) (0.089) (0.186) (0.172) Consensus Dim ** (0.046) (0.129) (0.119) (0.100) (0.169) (0.174) Capital mobility (0.061)* (0.169) (0.154) (0.067) (0.191) (0.171) Lagged dv (0.018)** (0.072)** (0.076)** (0.021)** (0.072)** (0.077)* openlag*oecdgdp (0.000)** (0.002)** (0.001)** (0.000)** (0.002)** (0.001)** OIL Dependence (1.629) (5.503) (4.305) (1.704) (5.474) (4.618) (0.346) (1.514) (0.944) (0.343) (1.495) (0.940) Corporatist Labor Market (0.073)* (0.160) (0.111) Cbi (0.486) (0.947) (0.946) Fixed Exchange Rate (0.131) (0.457) (0.392)* Left Governance (0.068) (0.158) (0.148) Constant (0.355) (1.535) (0.964) (0.419) (1.609) (1.071)* Observas Number of Countries Standard errors in parentheses significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% period fixed effext not reported Effect of both dimensions (1) (2) (3) GDP Growth Unemployment Infla Consensus (sum of both Dimensions) (0.130) (0.074)* (0.139) Capital mobilityg (0.156) (0.061) (0.186) Lmi (0.112) (0.076) (0.159) Cbi (0.834) (0.327) (0.879)** my dummy, has germany as fixed (0.393)** (0.119)* (0.385) Left (0.149) (0.066) (0.159) Lagged dv (0.077)** (0.021)** (0.072)** openlag*oecdgdp (0.001)** (0.000)** (0.002)** OILD (4.375) (1.649) (5.444) Constant (1.082)* (0.429) (1.581) Observas Number of clark's country codes Standard errors in parentheses significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% Are the dimensions Subsitutes> (1) (2) (3) GDP Growth Infla Unemployment Consensus first dimension (0.170)** (0.180)* (0.090)** Consensus Second dimensions (0.181) (0.175) (0.102) Consensus First*Second (0.107)* (0.082) (0.042) Capital mobilityg (0.190) (0.195) (0.073) Corporatist Labor Relas (0.115)* (0.163) (0.070)** Cbi (1.031)* (0.986) (0.518) Fixed Exchange Rate (0.410)** (0.479) (0.128) Left (0.152) (0.160) (0.068) Lagged GDP growth (0.078)* (0.073)** (0.021)** Systemic omy (0.001)* (0.002)** (0.000)** OILD (4.556) (5.445) (1.682) Constant (1.125)** (1.613) (0.418) Observas Number of clark's country codes Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% Wealth and Heterog are associated with more Fracaliza, Presidentialism and SMDP with less. Constitu Social environment in mid1960s Arrangements Small Heterog Pop Dev Agri Cath. Pres. Smdp Fracali za.02.33**.45**.59**.22**.32**.67**

5 Development is associated with Strong Linkages, SMDP is associated with Weak Large and heterogeous populuas are associated with more mist voting support, Presidentialism and SMPD with less Constitu Social environment in mid1960s Arrangements Small Heterog Pop Dev Agri Cath. Pres. Smdp.03.37** ** Constitu Social environment in mid1960s Arrangements Small Heterog Pop Dev Agri Cath. Pres. Smdp.29**.10.27**.62**.04.14**.53** Presidentialism and Heterogenetiy are associated with more Volatility of party representa, omic development with less. Constitu Social environment in mid1960s Arrangements Small Heterog Pop Dev Agri Cath. Pres. Smdp Volatity of Representat ion.06.33**.14.22*.08.16*.02 Strong partygroup links and comp encourage Turnout system Environmental condis Small Turnout.35.68** ** Executive durability inhibits Executive durability system Environmental condis Small ** Fracaliza reduces the likelihood of Majority control of the legislature Majority control system Environmental condis Small Popul a.62* Surprising!

6 Large populas and extre encourage Rioting, fracaliza discourages rioting system Environmental condis Large Rioting *.00.35**.72**.21*.06 Why might large populas encourage rioting? Threshold model of participa. People participate in large scale political events if they think a critical number (T) of others will also participate *.67** omic development and homog are associated with fewer Violent political deaths, large populas, more system Environmental condis Large Violent political deaths *.32**.37** **.09 Turnout Executive Durability Riots Deaths Effect of Electoral system and Presidentialism group Extr emis Fracaliza Heteroge neity SMDP President ialsim Majority Control

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