NATO AND PEACEKEEPING

Transcription

1 I. INTRODUCTION NATO AND PEACEKEEPING A. From 1988 to 1992, there were more missions than during the first four decades of the United Nations. B. 19 new operations initiated between 1 January 1993 and 13 February C. Nature of peacekeeping has drastically changed since the end of the Cold War with many new missions providing humanitarian aid, political transition assistance (e.g., training police, monitoring elections), or, in some instances, peace enforcement (e.g., Bosnia, Kosovo). D. prior to 1989, the UN usually spent about $200 million per year on peacekeeping; after 1989, the peacekeeping spending became: 1989: $568.5 million 1990: million 1991: million 1992: 1,676 million 1993: 2,900 million 1994: 3,500 million 1995: 3,200 million 1996: 1,320 million 1997: 1,300 million E. With NATO s 1994 strategic doctrine of peacekeeping and nonproliferation, NATO is developing highly mobile CJTFs that can be dispatched to the world s trouble spots F. From 1976 to 1996, NATO allies shares of actual assessed payments to UN peacekeeping operations have varied from 49.4% to 82.5% yearly, with an average annual value of 70.6%. G. UN burden underestimates true NATO s peacekeeping burdens. Non- UN-financed missions:

2 2 - NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia of 72,245 troops with US contributing 20,000, UK 14,000, France 10,000, and rest of NATO 15,903 in NATO SFOR starting in December NATO KFOR in 1999 II. PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING A. Kinds of intervention - Peacekeeping: lightly armed peacekeepers as monitors or observers of a ceasefire - Peacemaking: actions to resolve a conflict or to bring about a ceasefire; these actions include negotiations, diplomacy, and arbitration. - Peace enforcement involves applying military force and other available means to end hostilities between warring sides, as the enforcement of the no-fly zone in Bosnia during attempted to do. Missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, and Somalia. B. Background: UN peacekeeping (1) UN Charter, Article 41 use of measures not involving force: economic boycotts, severance of diplomatic relations, disruption of communication (2) Articles 42 and 43 assign authority to the Security Council to take the necessary actions. Use of veto from 1946 to 1986 limited peacekeeping C. Table 4.1 of peacekeeping missions D. Four phrases (1) Initial period , four missions mostly of monitoring with

3 the exception of UNEF I in the Sinai (UN created buffer zone to separate Israeli and Egyptian Forces) (2) Active period , nine new missions including ONUC in the Congo. ONUC resulted in the death of 250 peacekeepers from some 20,000 deployed. (3) Dormant period , with one new mission UNIFIL (buffer between Israeli forces and hostile elements in Lebanon). (4) Active period 1988 to present, 33 new missions to 13 February Missions became, at times, more complex (5) Table 4.2 and six classifications E. Financial Arrangements - Until 1974 peacekeeping costs were covered by the UN regular budget - General Assembly passed Resolution 3101 (11 December 1973), which established assessment accounts for peacekeeping missions. Payments in addition to the regular budget - A few missions were still supported by regular budget - Voluntary contributions for Cyprus - Article 19 of the UN Charter provides that a country can lose its voting privilege in the General Assembly if it is in arrears for its assessed amounts for the two full preceding years. F. Assessment Account Classes - Security Council (A) countries pay 22% more than their regular budget assessment scale to peacekeeping - Twenty-two developed countries (B) pay their regular budget assessment scale. 3

4 4 - Wealthy developed countries pay just 20% of their regular budget assessment scale. - Less-developed countries pay just 10% of their regular budget assessment - A countries are assigned 63% of total assessments; B countries pay 35%; and C and D pay about 2%. G. Assessment versus actual payments. For burdens, we are interested in actual payments of assessments as a share of GDP. H. Troops versus money distinction I. In 1994 European NATO allies devoted about 2.5% of GDP on average to defense. Contributions to UN peacekeeping was less than % of GDP. III. PEACEKEEPING AS A PUBLIC GOOD A. Maintenance and achievement of peace - nonexcludable - nonrivalry of benefits - pure publicness aspects B. Nation-specific properties and impure benefits - Nearness to conflict; risks are different depending on location - Status seeking - Making up for smaller burdens of defense C. Joint product implications - burdens not correlated with income measures

5 - private benefits (e.g., status seeking) can motivate the assumption of a larger burden - suboptimality attenuated - the size of group supporting peacekeeping may have no effect on contributions if there are sufficient excludable benefits IV. NATO PEACEKEEPING BURDEN SHARING: A. Burden sharing measure: peacekeeping as a percent of GDP B. Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 for of raw data - variability - NATO s share - During the 1980s and early 1990s, the United States often withheld part of its assessment C. To test for the pure publicness of peacekeeping, we examined the correlation between peacekeeping burdens and GDP to check for exploitation D. Spearman rank-correlation test - Table 4.5 gives the ranks for 1980, 1985, 1992, Table 4.6 give the Spearman rank correlation - Evidence of exploitation in 1990s, which implies more pure publicness - Give Figure The exploitation of the large by the small is tied to the size of the peacekeeping effort 5

6 6 E. Other Considerations - non-un-financed missions: Deny Flight (April 1993 to December 1995), Operation Provide Comfort in North Iraq (1991), IFOR, SFOR, Desert Shield and Storm - Informed adjustment to the data - Spearman rank correlations (1.84) (1.86) (2.23) (1.97) (3.22) (3.18) (3.02) - For 5 of 7 years, these rank correlations are significant at the 0.5 level - Present Figure 4.2 V. WHO SHOULD DIRECT PEACEKEEPING, THE UN OR NATO? A. Locational considerations B. NATO s comparative advantage in power projection, procurement, and mobility of forces.