Committee: SPECPOL. Topic Area: Reform of Peacekeeping Operations

Transcription

1 Committee: SPECPOL Topic Area: Reform of Peacekeeping Operations The topics to be discussed in this committee could serve as paragons of the caliber of the issues that the Forth Committee usually has to address. The threat of warfare still exists in the modern world and the U.N. as always endeavored to cease fires and establish peace around the world. The Peacekeeping has been recognized as one of the most effective tools available to the UN to assist host countries navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace. A peacekeeping operation has its own unique strengths, including its legitimacy, burden sharing, and ability to deploy and sustain troops and police from around the globe, integrating them with civilian peacekeeping to advance multidimensional mandates. However, the peacekeeping program has also been criticized for some major drawbacks in various aspects, which might impede the continuous development of peacekeeping operations; the insufficient supply of troops an resources, for example, is one of the main issues that has long been addressed. A) Background of the Topic 1) United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Operations: Pioneered by the United Nations in 1948 with the establishment of the UN Truce Supervision Organization(NTSO) in the Middle East, peacekeeping operations aim to help countries torn by conflict create conditions for lasting peace. Each peacekeeping operation normally consists of military, police, and civilian personnel, who work to deliver security as well as political and early peace building support. While UN peacekeeping operations are, in principle, deployed to support the implementation of a ceasefire or peace agreement, they are often required to play an active role in peacemaking efforts and may also be involved in early peace building activities. For instance, today's multidimensional peacekeeping operations facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights, and assist in restoring the rule of

2 law. UN peacekeeping operations may use force to defend themselves, their mandate, and civilians, particularly in situations where the State is unable to provide security and maintain public order. There are three basic principles for UN peacekeeping operations, which are consent of the parties, impartiality, and non use of force except in self defense and defense of the mandate. There have been 67 peacekeeping operations worldwide so far. 2) Non UN Peacekeeping Operations (NATO Peacekeeping): Not all international peacekeeping forces have been directly controlled by the United Nations. In 1981, an agreement between Israel and Egypt formed the Multinational Force and Observers which continues to monitor the Sinai Peninsula. Six years later, the Indian Peace Keeping Force entered Sri Lanka to help maintain peace. The situation became a quagmire, and India was asked to withdraw in 1990 by the Sri Lankan Prime Minister having formed a pact with the Tamil Tiger rebels. In November 1988, India also helped restore government of Maumoon Abdul Gayoom in Maldives under Operation Cactus. On 20 December 1995, under a UN mandate, a NATO led force (IFOR) entered Bosnia in order to implement The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In a similar manner, a NATO operation (KFOR) continues in the former Serbian province of Kosovo. The NATO led mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina has since been replaced by a European Union peacekeeping mission, EUFOR. The African Union has also had some limited involvement in peacekeeping within Africa since In South Ossetia, Russia and Georgia each deployed their own sets of peacekeepers to the region under the Sochi agreement. The 2008 South Ossetia War resulted in the expulsion of all Georgian forces from the region, including peacekeepers, as well as the deaths of 18 Russian peacekeepers. B) Current Status Challenges of Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) Although UN peacekeeping operations have been recognized as oneof the effective tools for UN to assist host countries in navigating the difficult path from conflict to peace, several main issues inherited in peacekeeping operations have long been drawing the attention of the international community and have remained as some of the major challenges that need to be considered in reforming peacekeeping operations or the peacekeeping program in general. 1) Ambiguous Definition of PKOs

3 Since the end of the Cold War, peace missions have become multi dimensional and increasingly complex as the nature and characteristics of conflict have changed, from inter state war to civil and intra state wars with regional impacts. Merely supervising a ceasefire in a country has become not enough. The complexity of the missions has actually generated a lack of clarity about their definition. From keeping peace and monitoring cease fires in the first decades of the UN, to dealing with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, peacebuilding and state building as well as tasks that include setting up institutions for the Rule of Law, human rights protection, monitoring of governance practices, and promotion of security sector reforms nowadays, PKOs have gradually taken up much more complex tasks than before. Moreover, because of this multi dimensional character of peacekeeping operations, the missions often involve not only military personnel but also civil administrators and many different professionals in civilian affairs. Peacekeeping is also identified with other peace and security instruments or activities such as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, and postconflict activities. These activities rarely occur in a linear or sequential way; instead, it has been shown that they should be seen as mutually reinforcing. If they are used piecemeal or in isolation, they fail to provide the comprehensive approach required to address the root causes of conflict and hence reduce the risk of conflict recurring. However, nowadays, critics have commented that the boundaries between conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace building and peace enforcement have become increasingly blurred and vague. Further, the decline in the number of armed conflicts in the last decades generated an increase in the number of post conflict situations and consequently a growing trend in the number of peacekeeping operations and political missions approved by the Security Council. Critics have also pointed out the challenge of the lack of coordination and confrontations between the UN Missions and the other UN bodies. The UN has been trying to rationalize the problems above by promoting the concept of integrated missions and dealing with these problems through reflections and handbooks such as the Capstone Doctrine of This document addresses the planning, deployments, management, relationships between headquarters and the field, logistics, administration and transitions. Peacekeeping also faced a varied set of challenges, with respect to its roles, which includes, but not limited to, the following: Deploying its largest, most expensive and increasingly complex operations;

4 Designing and executing transition strategies for operations where stability has been achieved; Equipping communities as far as possible with capacity to ensure long term peace and stability Difficulties in Reaching Consensus on Mandating PKOs Guided by the UN Charter and the priorities of sovereign states, peacekeeping operations are bounded by major limitations. For instance, the veto power of the five permanent members of the Security Council, also known as the P 5s which includes China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, insures that no UN operation can be authorized against their will. The P 5s tend to protect not only their own interests but allies and friends as well. As a result, peacekeeping often is impossible where it is needed most. While the P 5s can be a barrier to action, action is impossible without them. Conflicts can be too distant and may lack international attention, or they come during moments of international fatigue, which also results in inaction. The most difficult examples involve countries of little interest to any of the P 5s. The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 is a classic example of UN inaction. 3) Lack of Resources and Funding Although the Security Council is required to authorize PKOs, it can only do so upon the provision of the needed money and personnel by member states. While the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has impressive organizational skills, it cannot provide resources. Thus, there is a tendency for the Security Council to expect more than is possible on the ground. PKOs tend to be chronically under staffed and under funded, lacking vital equipment like trucks and helicopters. Last February 2009, the Spanish general Vicente Díaz de Villegas presented his resignation to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) for the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). As Commander in Chief of the Mission, he explained that MONUC had neither the military infrastructure nor a correct assessment, based on serious intelligence, of the dangerous and complex situation in this country. He believed that the UN capacities were inadequate to confront the great risk to local civilians and UN forces. He called the situation a potential disaster. The situation could be easily summarized in one sentence: too many contradictory and ambitious Security Council (UNSC) mandates, not enough troops and

5 resources, weak political will from the interveners, and lack of UN coordination. From a political perspective, the main dilemma is how peacekeepers can act when there is no peace to keep; the line between peacekeeping and war fighting is difficult to trace. Although the Security Council can ask countries to offer personnel, in practice there often is resistance to supply enough. The countries with the largest armed forces often are too controversial to serve as neutral peacekeepers (especially Russia and the United States). Others are hesitant to involve their armed forces outside their own borders (China). Often, poorer countries furnish troops, with financial support from richer ones. The largest providers in 2007 were: Pakistan (10,173), Bangladesh (9,675), India (9,471), Nepal (3,626), Jordan (3,564), Uruguay (2,583) and Italy (2,539). Other major supporters were Ghana, Nigeria and France. In the past, Fiji and Nepal also furnished many personnel. This approach has come in for strong criticism, since soldiers from poorer countries may lack the education or skills required for highly sensitive operations. Creation of a permanent UN peacekeeping force would solve many problems, but financing is an enormous problem, and some countries are suspicious of creating a force that could, conceivably, be used against them. The enormous cost of PKOs makes it impossible to fund them through normal UN operating funds. Regular annual donations are insufficient. The UN, moreover, must balance its books annually, making it currently impossible for the organization to save money in a trust fund for peacekeeping emergencies. Everything depends on the steady flow of country donations. However, in practice, donations rarely match promises and operations must be trimmed. Mandates also can be too weak for forthright action. During the worst years of the Bosnian war ( ), the Security Council was too divided to approve strong action to end the humanitarian disaster there. Instead it could agree only on a small force, allowed only to bring humanitarian assistance. The result was the war causing the disaster continued for years. 4) Violation of State Sovereignty Rarely are formal PKOs authorized for civil wars, since this would violate the strong belief of most member states in the primacy of state sovereignty. Intervention in civil wars is usually seen as illegitimate meddling in domestic affairs. A growing group of states, mostly in Europe but including some from Africa and Latin America, challenge this predisposition. They argue that the sovereignty of the individual can be as equally important as the sovereignty of the state, and when states blatantly violate the human rights of their people, through warfare or genocide, the international community has a Responsibility to Protect, also known as R2P. Some states

6 believe it violates the essence of the UN system, while others maintain it is the essence of the UN. Some dismiss it as simple imperialism; others believe it is essential to the credibility of the UN. 5) Potential Harm to Troops Concerns regarding the potential harm that PKOs have on the troops have been raised, as it has been recognized that peacekeeping can be very stressful. The peacekeepers are also exposed to danger caused by the warring parties and often in an unfamiliar climate. This may give rise to different mental health problems, suicide, and substance abuse as shown by the percentage of former peacekeepers with those problems. Having a parent in a mission abroad for an extended period is also stressful to the peacekeepers' family. In addition, peacekeepers, even when acting on UN mandate, may become a target for attacks by some of the parties in a conflict. Another viewpoint raises the problem that the peacekeeping may soften the troops and erode their combat ability, as the mission profile of a peacekeeping contingent is totally different from the profile of a unit fighting an all out war. 5) Misconduct of Peacekeeping Troops Reporters witnessed a rapid increase in prostitution in Cambodia, Mozambique, Bosnia, and Kosovo after UN and, in the case of the latter two, NATO peacekeeping forces moved in. In the1996 U.N. study, The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, former first lady of Mozambique Graça Machel documented, "In 6 out of 12 country studies on sexual exploitation of children in situations of armed conflict prepared for the present report, the arrival of peacekeeping troops has been associated with a rapid rise in child prostitution." Gita Sahgal spoke out in 2004 with regard to the fact that prostitution and sex abuse crops up wherever humanitarian intervention efforts are set up. She also observed, "The issue with the UN is that peacekeeping operations unfortunately seem to be doing the same thing that other militaries do. Even the guardians have to be guarded." Uruguayan President Jose Mujica apologized to Haitian President Michel Martelly over the alleged rape of an 18 year old Haitian man by Uruguayan U.N. peacekeeping troops. Martelly said "a collective rape carried out against a young Haitian" would not go unpunished. Four soldiers suspected of being involved in the rape have been detained.

7 6) Challenges in Defining Success and Ceasing PKOs Some critics have suggested that peacekeeping can become part of an international problem. In the Middle East, India Pakistan and Cyprus, PKOs dating back as much as sixty years continue to this day. It has been argued that peacekeepers allow the states to avoid settling their differences. In this sense, peacekeeping perpetuates conflicts and increases the long term risk of war. However, no agreement on how to terminate controversial PKOs has been reached in the UN, thus the issue of how to define the success of the operation is another concern raised regarding the further development of an operation. The missions today have become more risky and more unlikely to be clearly successful. One important challenge for the UN, local governments, societies and the donor community is to measure the impact and success of these operations. The current interest shown by the UN and governments to link benchmarks, accountability, and success is a product of the increasing number of missions, the complexity of the mandates, and the higher cost and risks involved. Because of the fact that UN mandates have broadened so much and that they have increasingly crossed the line between keeping the peace, erecting the pillars of peace building and state building, it s becoming more difficult to measure success and define a temporary end for the missions. Some analysts indicate that the stabilization and normalization of countries and a full recuperation of their sovereignty like Sierra Leone or Haiti could take more than two decades. Further, peace building and state building are two concepts under intense debate, with respect to their definitions and feasibility in particular. For example, questions such as Is it possible to build up peace and to construct a liberal state in postcolonial countries with complex ethnic, religious and national identities? and What constitutes normalization in Somalia? have been raised. The examples of Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq or Nigeria show that state building is a longterm historical process of continuous negotiations among the local stakeholders that can t be imposed from outside. The question of whether peace operations should perhaps return to their limited missions of supervising ceasefire agreements and protecting civilians has also been suggested. Particularly when the use of force is involved, it has also been suggested that there is a need, as Durch and England indicate, to re identify the fundamental purposes of peacekeeping, and address the associated question of when to deploy, who to send, and what to mandate them to do.

8 The UN Secretary General has once mentioned that the ingredients for successful peace operations include the following: 1. Clear mandates; 2. Political, material and financial support; 3. Institutions that uphold the rule of law; 4. An active civil society. A rejection of violence in favor of negotiation and compromise; 5. Working effectively with regional organizations. To these ingredients might be added that UN peace operations should have international legitimacy derived from an international mandate and local legitimacy and consent. However, as William Durch and Madeline England wrote in the Annual Review of Peace Operations 2009, local consensus in some instances might be partial or absent altogether. Since the political contexts in which peace operations are established use to be volatile, the social consensus regarding the operation may change from one day to another. In these cases, the mandate must be very clear about protecting victims and guaranteeing the survival of a peace process. C) Past Actions Taken in Reforming PKOs 1) Brahimi Analysis In March 2000, the Secretary General appointed the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations to assess the shortcomings of the then existing system and to make specific and realistic recommendations for change, particularly of the cases of sexual abuse by peacekeepers. The panel was composed of individuals experienced in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace building. The result, known as the Brahimi Report, after Lakhdar Brahimi, the Chair of the Panel, called for: 1. Renewed political commitment on the part of Member States; 2. Significant institutional change;

9 3. Increased financial support. The Panel noted that in order to be effective, UN peacekeeping operations must be properly resourced and equipped, and operate under clear, credible and achievable mandates. Following the Brahimi report, UN Member States and the UN Secretariat continued major reform efforts, including through: 1. Capstone Doctrine (2008), outlining the most important principles and guidelines for UN peacekeepers in the field; 2. Peace operations 2010 (2006), containing the reform strategy of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO); World Summit [A/RES/60/1], establishing the Peace building Commission; 4. High level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change [A/59/565], setting out a broad framework for collective security for the new century. 2) More Documents of Reform of PKOs The most recent reform documents The New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping (2009) and its Progress Reports No.1 (2010) and No.2 (2011) assess the major policy and strategy dilemmas facing UN peacekeeping today and in the coming years. They attempt to reinvigorate the ongoing dialogue with Member States and other partners on how to better adjust UN peacekeeping to meet current and future requirements. 3) Restructuring the Peacekeeping Department The major structural change as part of peacekeeping reform took place in To strengthen the UN s capacity to manage and sustain new peace operations, the Secretary General restructured [A/61/858] the peacekeeping architecture by: 1. Splitting DPKO into two, creating a new, separate Department of Field Support (DFS);

10 2. Bolstering the support for new activities in DPKO; 3. Augmenting resources in both Departments and in other parts of the Secretariat dealing with peacekeeping. DFS developed the Global Field Support Strategy [A/64/633] in 2010 aimed at transforming service delivery to the field and adapting it to the requirements of today s peacekeeping operations. Once implemented, support to the field will become more predictable, professional and flexible, while ensuring cost efficiencies and transparency. 4) Rates of Reimbursement to Troop Contributing Countries Historically, the countries that provide troops for peacekeeping missions are reimbursed for their contribution by the UN. The question of the rates is therefore extremely important for a large number of countries whether it's through the direct provision of military personnel or through the financial obligations that make deployment of a peacekeeping presence possible. In 2011, the General Assembly (GA) decided to tackle this subject in a comprehensive manner. The GA requested the Secretary General to establish a Senior Advisory Group (SAG) to examine the "rates of reimbursement to troop contributing countries and related issues" (ref. GA Resolution 65/289 of 30 June 2011). The SAG's membership, stipulated in the Resolution, includes five eminent persons of relevant experience appointed by the Secretary General, five representatives from major troop contributors, five representatives from major financial contributors and one member designated from each of the regional groups. Former UN Deputy Secretary General and Canadian Deputy Minister of Defense, Louise Fréchette, was appointed as the Chair of this Group. The SAG intends to complete its review by the summer of 2012, and its report will be submitted to the Secretary General and then passed to the General Assembly 5) Restructuring of the UN Secretariat The UN peacekeeping capacity was enhanced in 2007 by augmenting the DPKO with the new Department of Field Support (DFS). Whereas the new entity serves as a key enabler by coordinating the administration and logistics in UN peacekeeping operations, DPKO concentrates on policy planning and providing strategic directions.

11 6) Other Reforms The Secretary General imposed a zero tolerance policy following allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers in host countries. At the request of the Secretary General, the then Permanent Representative of Jordan to the UN, Prince Zeid Ra ad Zeid Al Hussein, produced a sweeping strategy, known as the Zeid Report [A/59/710]. It recommended engaging troop and police contributors, other Member States and the wider UN system in a new conduct and disciplining architecture for peacekeeping. In 2008, an UN wide strategy for assistance to the victims of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN personnel was adopted by the General Assembly in resolution A/RES/62/214. One suggestion to account for delays such as the one in Rwanda is a rapid reaction force: a standing group, administered by the UN and deployed by the Security Council, which receives its troops and support from current Security Council members and is ready for quick deployment in the event of future genocides. D) Brief Case Studies 1) United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) Monitoring a Cessation of Armed Violence in All Forms Established by United Nations Security Council resolution 2043 of 21 April 2012, initially for a 90 day period, the UNSMIS aimed to monitor a cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties and to monitor and support the full implementation of the Joint Special Envoy s six point planto end the conflict in Syria. After initial relative lull, hostilities in Syria resumed and on 15 June 2012, UNSMIS had to suspend its activities owing to an intensification of armed violence across the country. On 20 July 2012, the Security Council extended the mission for 30 days and said that any further extension could be possible only in the event that the Secretary General reports and the Security Council confirms the cessation of the use of heavy weapons and a reduction in the level of violence sufficient by all sides'' to allow the UNSMIS monitors to implement their mandate. As those conditions were not met, UNSMIS mandate came to an end at midnight on 19 August ) United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) Protecting Civilians and Consolidating Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

12 MONUSCO took over from an earlier UN peacekeeping operation the United Nations Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) on 1 July It was done in accordance with Security Council resolution 1925 of 28 May to reflect the new phase reached in the country. The new mission has been authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate relating, among other things, to the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical violence and to support the Government of the DRC in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts. Guiding Questions: 1. How should the reform of peacekeeping operations be preceded in the future operations, given the abovementioned challenges and issues that have been long addressed regarding peacekeeping operations? 2. What criteria should be applied in assessing the end of a PKO? 3. How can the structure of UN Peacekeeping missions be amended in order to prevent violation by the members of the UN Peacekeeping Force? 4. How can peacekeeping mandates facilitate the resolving and prioritization on the lack of resources of the operations, regarding on the personnel, finance mechanisms and other resources? 5. Does the current conduct of complex missions ensure the extension of State authority? Is there a need for change in command structure of the UN Peacekeeping Operations?

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