International Journal of Management and Transformation

Transcription

1 Iteratioal Joural of Maagemet ad Trasformatio Volume 5, Number 1: Sprig 011 Series Editor Cotet Dr. Siddhartha Sarkar Director, Asia School of Maagemet ad Techolog, Idia 1.User Perceptio of Automatic Ticket Vedig Machie: A Stud of Idia Souther Railwa: T.K.Murugesa ad A.Ramachadra: 3-9. Methods of Votig Sstem ad Maipulatio of Votig: J. N. Islam, H. K. Mohaja ad P. Moolio: Editorial Board 3. Assessmet of Impact of Effectiveess of Advertisig i Telecom Service Sector I Idia: P.K. Agarwal, Pradeep Kumar Ge Zhiua, Beijig Uiversit of Techolog, Chia ad Swati Gupta: Isaac K. Acheampog, Uiversit of Cape Coast, Ghaa 4. Demstifig NPAs o Educatio Loa: A Empirical Aalsis: B. C. Joh V. Mesah, Uiversit of Cape Coast, Ghaa M. Pataik, Ipseeta Satpath ad Aroop Kumar Mohapatra: Kishore G. Kulkari, Metropolita State College of 5.The Gedered Nature of Small Busiess Eviromet i Ghaa: Dever, USA A Research Ageda: Rosemod Boohee: Larr Smith, Uiversit of New Eglad, Australia 6.A Stud o Job Stress of the Emploees with Referece to Bakig Mario R. Romero, Isabela State Uiversit, Philippies Sector: Kaagaluru Sai Kumar: Mokhtar M. Metwall, Uiversit of Wollogog, 7. Competitiveess ad Its Impact o Research ad Developmet i Australia Idia Automobile Idustr: Subhrabara Das ad Pia Das: Pablo Herade, Sait Mar s College, USA 8. Etet of Kowledge Peetratio i Tetile Idustr of Pujab,Idia: P. Subbarao, Uiversit of Papua New Guiea, Papua Radha Kawal Sharma ad Prem Kumar: New Guiea Zaeta Stasiskiee, Kauas Uiversit of Techolog, Lithuaia ISSN: ISBN: X Brow Walker Press 3331 Water Circle, Boca Rato, FL , USA Copright Asia School of Maagemet ad Techolog, Idia Asia School of Maagemet ad Techolog (All Rights Reserved)

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3 User Perceptio of Automatic Ticket Vedig Machie: A Stud of Idia Souther Railwa T.K.Murugesa Assistat Professor, Departmet of Maagemet Studies, Prathusha Istitute of Techolog & Maagemet, Tiruvallure, Tamil Nadu, Idia tkm_vidhu@ahoo.co.i A.Ramachadra Director, SNR Istitute of Maagemet Scieces, SNR Sos College, Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu,Idia ram100@rediffmail.com Abstract: This paper throws a light o user perceptio of Automatic Ticket Vedig Machie (ATVM) offered b Souther Railwa i Idia. It also tries to fid out the awareess level of smart card service amog passegers i Cheai District. The smart cards are owadas commol utilied for purchasig the trasportatio services ticket fares like buses, railwas, etc. A smart card, chip card, or itegrated circuit card (ICC), is a pocket-sied card with embedded itegrated circuits which ca process data. The Idia Railwas has rolled out ATVM as part of a Ureserved Ticketig Sstem (UTS) at major railwa statios i Idia. The Railwa has issued smart cards to facilitate iter-cit travel. This card will work as a prepaid device, which will allow commuters to travel specified routes via rail without worrig about cash. The commuters would have to swipe at both occasios etr ad eit. Depedig o the distace covered, the balace o the card will be adjusted. To add to the securit at the platforms, ticket checkers would be alarmed with palm tops to sca the smart cards. The smart cards will greatl reduce queues at maual ticketig couters ad will drive process efficiecies. The souther railwa has istalled 455 Automatic Ticket Vedig Machie at more tha 191 suburba railwa statios i Cheai Cetral, Beach, Fort, Nugambakkam, Kodambakkam, Mambalam, Saidapet, Guid, St. Thomas Mout, Pahavathagal, Thirusoolam, Meeambakkam, Pallavaram, Chrome pet, Mlapore, Tambaram ad Chepauck statios. About 9 lakh people use suburba rail trasport ever da. The primar objective of the stud is to aale the awareess level of the passegers ad their perceptios regardig smart card services redered b souther railwa i Cheai district. It also focuses o the sigificat factors ifluecig the passegers to bu smart card service. It is iferred from the surve that majorit of the respodets have become aware of the smart card service redered b Souther Railwa. It also reveals that ATVM is foud to be ver persoable ad friedl while hadlig the trasactios of smart card service to make iter-cit travel. Kewords: Automatic Ticket Vedig Machie (ATVM), Itegrated Circuit Card (ICC), Ureserved Ticketig Sstem (UTS), Smart Cards, Automated Teller Machies, Kiosk, Idia Railwa Sstem. Itroductio The smart cards are owadas commol utilied for purchasig the trasportatio services ticket fares like buses, railwas, etc. There are ma such projects uderwa aroud the world for trasportatio utilit services like railwas. The importat factor for the ticketig sstem i railwas is the trasactio pamet time. The pamet time of ot more tha 300 millisecods is usuall demaded. The Idia Railwas smart card is pre-filled ad does ot have to coect to the bak's site for pamet. So, the speed of the facilit is ver good for pamet. The feedback of the respodets who alread a user of this service will deped upo this importat factor. A smart card, chip card, or itegrated circuit card (ICC), is a pocket-sied card with embedded itegrated circuits which ca process data. Smart cards are available to commuters at railwa statios. Railwas mull smart cards to facilitate iter-cit travel. This card will work as a prepaid device, which will allow commuters to travel specified routes via rail without worrig about cash. 3

4 The project is beig udertake i collaboratio with BEST bus trasport sstem of Mumbai. Durig a rail joure, the smart cards would be scaed b special machies positioed at various places at the platform. The commuters would have to swipe at both occasios etr ad eit. Depedig o the distace covered, the balace o the card will be adjusted. To add to the securit at the platforms, ticket checkers would be alarmed with palm tops to sca the smart cards. The sstem could be etremel beeficial for commuters who travel to-ad-fro betwee cities ad their respective suburbs. Delhi Metro Rail Corporatio (DMRC) is the first trasporter to have itroduced smart cards for travellig i the Capital. Aroud 1.9 lakh commuters havig smart cards travel b metro ever da. I Mumbai also, BEST bus service has lauched smart cards for frequet travellers. The chip iside the cards usuall has details of permitted routes ad validit of the smart cards. If the card is valid, the scaig machie or the ticket checker gets a gree sigal. The smart card service would ot be for low pricig but for ulimited travel o the specified route. Apart from usig radio frequec based cards (RFID) i travel, the Railwas are also uder the process of implemetig computeried chartig process. It has alread implemeted RFID tags o wagos to moitor the mobilit of wagos. Till ow it has doe a ivestmet of Rs.30 crores o,00,000 wagos. The Idia Railwas has rolled out Automatic Ticket Vedig Machie (ATVM) as part of a Ureserved Ticketig Sstem (UTS) at major railwa statios across the atio. The passegers at all these statios ca book ureserved tickets through ATVM b smart cards. The AVTM solutio i its etiret has bee coceptualied ad desiged b CRIS (Cetre for Railwa Iformatio Sstems) usig NXP s MIFARE DES Fire techolog based o the iteratioal ISO 14443A stadard. NXP is plaig to provide MIFARE DES Fire-based ICs ad Siepma's Card Sstems will provide the card. The adoptio of cotact less ticketig will greatl reduce queues at maual ticketig couters ad will drive process efficiecies. Iitiall, i 007 CRIS had developed smart card based cotact less ticketig solutios usig NXP s MIFARE 1KB Classic chip i Mumbai Suburba Railwa ad Cheai, wherei approimatel 5 lakh cards were issued to passegers i the Cetral Wester Railwa at Mumbai ad Souther Railwa at Cheai. Automatic Ticket Vedig Machie (ATVM) Automatic ticket vedig machies usig smart card desiged ad developed b the Cetre for Railwa Iformatio Sstems were istalled at all suburba railwa statios. Ma such machies have bee istalled i railwa statios over the past few ears. The facilit operates similar to the Automated Teller Machies. The commuters have to purchase Smart Card Coupos, place them i a slot o the ticket vedig machie, select the route ad destiatio o the touch scree ad oce the details are cofirmed, a computer-prited ticket is delivered. Commuters have to iitiall bu Rs.100 coupos ad later recharge them i deomiatios of Rs. 50. Recharge of the coupos could be made i specified couters. Oce the ticket is purchased through the machies, the appropriate amout would be deducted from the commuters coupo. The Souther Railwa has iitiall appoited the staff be preset ear the machies to assist the commuters. Automatic ticket vedig machies is aimed at clearig the rush of dail commuters ad avoidig overcrowdig at couters. The sstem was set up first i Mumbai ad Bagalore. Now the facilit would be available at Cheai Cetral Moore Market Comple, Beach, Fort, Park, Nugambakkam, Kodambakkam, Mambalam, Saidapet, Guid, St. Thomas Mout, Pahavathagal, Tirusoolam, Meeambakkam, Pallavaram, Chromepet, Mlapore, Tambaram ad Chepauk statios. About 9lakhs people 4

5 use suburba rail trasport ever da. At preset, the ATVMs are ol for suburba trai tickets. The ATVMs are fruitful i reducig queues i suburba statios as the trasactio is cashless ad coveiet. The time take to prit a ticket is less tha a secod. These machies are used for dispesig platform tickets ad ureserved joure tickets, A Overview of ATVM Smart card to make all hassles at couters a thig of the past Statemet of the Problem The queues i frot of the ticket couters i suburba railwa statios have bee drasticall icreased over the period of time. I order to reduce the rush of dail commuters ad to avoid overcrowdig at ticket couters, Souther Railwa has istalled Automatic Ticket Vedig Machie i major suburba railwa statios for reducig queues ad dispedig ureserved joure tickets as well as flat form tickets electroicall. The souther railwa has istalled 455 Automatic Ticket Vedig Machie at more tha 191 suburba railwa statios i Cheai Cetral, Beach, Fort, Nugambakkam, Kodambakkam, Mambalam, Saidapet, Guid, St. Thomas Mout, Pahavathagal, Thirusoolam, Meeambakkam, Pallavaram, Chrome pet, Mlapore, Tambaram ad Chepauck statios. About 9 lakh people use suburba rail trasport ever da. It has paved the wa to stud the user perceptio of smart card service offered b the souther railwa. The stud aalses the opiios of passegers regardig essetial features of smart cart service ad its utilit for commuters as smart cards will greatl reduce queues at maual ticketig couters ad will drive process efficiecies. Objectives of the Stud To evaluate the user perceptio of Automatic Ticket Vedig Machie (ATVM) that processes smart card service. To aale the level of awareess of passegers regardig Smart Card Service offered b Souther Railwa. To throw a light o the sigificat factors that ifluece the passegers to bu Smart Card Service. To offer suggestios o the basis of the opiios give b the respodets. Research Desig ad Methodolog Adopted The research desig applied for the stud is of descriptive ature. A o probabilit coveiece samplig techique was adopted for selectig the sample sie for the research paper. A sample sie of 00 respodets was draw for the stud. The saplig areas of the stud ca iclude Cheai Cetral, Beach, Fort, Nugambakkam, Kodambakkam, Mambalam, Saidapet ad Guid.The data required for the stud were purel primar data collected through the persoal 5

6 surve b preparig a structured questioaire, which cosists of dichotomous, close eded, multiple choice ad rakig questios. I order to prepare a effective questioaire, a pilot surve of 0 respodets was coducted, which is 10 percet of the total sample sie of the stud. Durig the pilot surve, most of the respodets were felt comfortable i respodig the questioaire. The same questioaire was chose for the mai surve also. The statistical tools applied for the stud for drawig statistical ifereces about the stud ca iclude chi-square Test, K-S Test, Spearma s Rak Correlatio ad ANOVA Test. The fidigs, suggestios ad coclusio about the stud are purel based o the opiios ad resposes give b the respodets. The period of the stud was oe moth, Nov-Dec 009. Limitatios of the Stud The sample sie chose for the research stud might ot be represetative of total populatio. Due to short spa of time, the stud is restricted to 00 samples ol. Data collected from the respodets are based o their opiios ad kowledge. Sometimes, the ma subject to bias. Few respodets were foud to be reluctat while aswerig the questioaire. Statistical Aalsis The researcher has applied statistical tools to the followig hpotheses for drawig statistical ifereces about the stud. H1: The demographic variables have o sigificat ifluece over the sources of awareess about smart card services redered b Souther Railwa. H: There is o sigificat relatioship betwee the occupatio of respodets ad the frequec of usig ATVM. H3: There is o sigificat associatio betwee the duratio of usig the service of smart card b the respodets ad their opiios about the services redered b the machie. 1. Chi-Square Test: Chi-square test is used to test whether a variable has a sigificat ifluece over the other variable. For this purpose, the factors cosidered for the stud are broadl classified ito two groups. The first group cosists of demographic factors amel (1) Geder, () Age, (3) Educatio, (4) Mothl Icome ad (5) Occupatio. The secod group cosists of a variable for aalsis is sources of awareess. Null-Hpothesis (Ho): The demographic variables have o sigificat ifluece over the sources of awareess about Smart Card Service redered b Souther Railwa. Table No.1: Demographic Variables Vs. Qualit of Service b ATVM Sl.No. Variables Chi-square Value Table Value S/N S 1. Geder NS. Age NS 3. Educatio NS 4. Mothl Icome NS 5. Occupatio NS (Source: Primar Data) (S: Sigificat, NS: Not Sigificat) Iferece: The Table No.1 clearl idicates that the ull hpothesis (Ho) is accepted (Not sigificat) i all the demographic variables. Hece, it is cocluded that the demographic variables such as geder, age, educatio, mothl icome ad occupatio have o sigificat ifluece o the sources of awareess about Smart Card Service redered b Souther Railwa. 6

7 . K-S Test: Null-Hpothesis (Ho): There is o sigificat relatioship betwee the occupatio of respodets ad the frequec of usig ATVM. Table No. : Computatio of D Ma Value O CFo Fo( E CFe Fe() D Ma = Fo()-Fe() ) ΣO=41.1 ΣE=41.1 (Source: Primar Data) Table No. 3: Occupatio of Respodets Vs. Frequec of Usig ATVM. Sl.No Variable 1 Variable Calculated Table Value Sigificat/ Value of D ma of D ma Not Sigificat 1. Occupatio of Frequec of Sigificat Respodets Usig ATVM. Iferece: The Table No.3 states that the ull hpothesis (Ho) is rejected (Sigificat).Hece, it is cocluded that there is a sigificat relatioship betwee the occupatio of respodets ad the frequec of usig ATVM. 3. Aalsis of Variace (ANOVA) Test: Null Hpothesis (H 0 ): There is o sigificat associatio betwee the duratio of usig the service of smart card b the respodets ad their opiios about the services redered b the machie. Table No.4: ANOVA Table Sources of Variatio Sum of Squares Degree of Free- Mea Squares dom Betwee samples Withi sample Total Calculated value of F is =.43 Level of sigificace = 5% The table value of F for v 1 = 3 ad v = 1 at 5% level of sigificace =

8 Iferece: Sice the calculated value of F =.43 is less tha the table value of F = 3.49, the ull hpothesis is accepted. It is iferred that there is o sigificat associatio betwee the duratio of usig the service of smart card b the respodets ad their opiios about the services redered b the machie. 4. Rakig of media preferred b the respodets to popularie Smart Card Service: Table No. 5: Rakig of Media for Publicit of Smart Card Service Media Rak R 1 R R 3 R 4 R 5 Total Televisio 56 (8%) 48 (4%) 48 (4%) 40 (0%) 8 (4%) 00 Radio 64(3%) 64(3%) 40(0%) 8 (4%) 4 (1%) 00 Newspaper 56 (8%) 56 (8%) 48 (4%) 3 (16%) 8 (4%) 00 Bit Notice 16 (8%) 3 (16%) 48 (4%) 64 (3%) 40 (0%) 00 Poit of Displa 3 (16%) 4 (1%) 8 (4%) 48 (4%) 88 (44%) 00 (Source: Primar Data) (Figures i parethesis idicate percetage of respodets) Figure No.1: Rakig of Media for Publicit of Smart Card Service 50 Televisio Radio News Paper Bit Notice Poit of displa % of Respodets Rak Iferece: The above figure portras that 3% of respodets or 64 respodets (Out of 00) have raked radio as No.1 media for makig publicit of Smart Card Service. The followig bo provides details of percetage of respodets who have raked differet media as No.1 for makig the publicit of Smart Card Service. Media % of Respodets Televisio 8 Radio 3 Newspaper 8 Bit Notice 8 Poit of displa 16 8

9 Recommedatio 1. It is observed from the stud that the Smart Card Service requires a wide rage of publicit i a effective ad iformative mass media like T.V., Newspapers, Theatres ad Radio etc.,. The card should be allowed for reewal with the lapsed amout with a omial pealt/fie because the passegers had a bad eperiece that the balace amout of smart card gets lapsed o epir. 3. The Souther Railwa Departmet should istall ATVMs at major railwa statios because the passegers frequetl deduct the amout b usig smart card each time a travel is made ulike a pass. I a pass, the passegers eed ot to detect the amout each time a travel is made b them. 4. The Railwa Departmet eeds to esure the fuctioabilit of ATVM because most of the respodets have voiced that the kiosk istalled are few ad ot available at all railwa statios. Wheever it is available, most of the time it is out of order, either due to paper ticket ehausted, or the kiosk itself out of order. Also, the epir of card is ot ver promiet o the scree. 5. ATVM must have a additioal feature of displaig epir date alog with the displa of balace amout o the ticket scree because passegers are alwas i a hurr to get the ticket ad take back the card. 6. Sice there is o restrictio for the passegers to carr as ma smart cards as possible, the railwa ca restrict the umber of cards a perso has to carr. Fidigs ad Coclusio 58% of the respodets are male ad 4% are female. Nearl 48% are i the age group of below 30 ears. Most of the respodets (64%) are private emploees. Nearl 85% of the respodets are aware of Smart Card Services redered b Souther Railwa ad 81% of the respodets have bee usig Smart Card Service close for more tha oe ear. 69% of the respodets would like to recommed Smart Card Service to others. 100 percet of the respodets have felt that the Smart Card Service requires wide publicit. It is cocluded from the stud that majorit of the passegers (85%) are aware of Smart Card Service redered b Souther Railwa. The surve also idicates that most of the commuters have respoded that the kow how to operate ATVM for accessig their joure tickets as well as platform tickets b usig Smart Card. Two third of the respodets have felt that ATVM is foud to be ver persoable ad friedl while hadlig their trasactios. The surve has give a clear picture that three fourth of the passegers are satisfied with essetial features of ATVM such as quick service, techolog, coveiece, prompt deliver, fleibilit ad less waitig time. I order to icrease the sales of Smart Card ad accessibilit of Kiosk, the Souther Railwa should istall ATVM i all major railwa statios. Refereces David L. Loudo ad J. Della Bitla (00), Cosumer Behaviour, Tata Mc Graw Hill Publishers. Leo G.Schiffma, Leslie Laar Kauk (00), Cosumer Behaviour, Pearso Educatio. Philip Kotler (000), Marketig Maagemet, 10 th Editio, Pretice Hall of Idia Publishers. William G. Zikmud & Michael d Amico (001), Marketig- Creatig ad Keepig Customers i a e-commerce World, 7 th Editio, Thomso Asia Pte Ltd. Naresh K. Malhotra (007), Marketig Research, 5 th Editio, Pearso Educatio. Doald R. Cooper ad Pamela S. Schidler (004), Busiess Research Methodolog, 9 th Editio, Tata McGraw Hill Publishers. 9

10 Methods of Votig Sstem ad Maipulatio of Votig J. N. Islam Emeritus Professor, Research Cetre for Mathematical ad Phsical Scieces Uiversit of Chittagog, Bagladesh H. K. Mohaja Assistat Professor, Premier Uiversit, Chittagog, Bagladesh P. Moolio Professor, Paññāsāstra Uiversit of Cambodia, Phom Peh, Cambodia Abstract: I this paper a attempt has bee take to describe various tpes of votig sstem ad maipulatio of them. Frech philosophers Marquis de Codorcet ( ) ad Jeas-Charles Borda ( ) itroduced moder votig sstem. Duca Black first itroduced the maipulatio of votig i 1958 i his book Theor of Committee ad Electios. Codorcet, Borda ad eve ma moder politicias believe that electios are logicall imperfect. I this paper this imperfectio is aaled i some detail. I this paper votig methods are discussed i ver simple but i a detailed maer. Votig sstem is directl ivolved with Ecoomics, Political Sciece ad Social Sciece. So that if oe has o proper kowledge of the votig sstem the he ca ot serve the societ i proper wa ad caot epect the ecoomic developmet of the societ. Some votig methods such as Arrow s theorem, media voter theorem, radomied votig, Muller-Satterthwaite theorem ad Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem are apparetl o-maipulabilit ad are icluded i this paper. Kewords: Votig sstem, votig parado, maipulatio of votig, codorcet wier, dictatorship, strateg-proofess. deote the set of strict liear rakigs o Y. Let { } Itroductio A votig sstem is of maipulabilit wheever some idividual misrepresets his prefereces i order to secure a outcome preferred to the outcome whe he is hoest otherwise it is strategproof. I votig sstem ever voter s preferece orderig i.e., the preferece profile, take collectivel, form the iput the output is usuall a sigle certai wier or a set of wiers. The methods of trasformig preferece profiles ito wiers i.e., mappigs from the set of possible preferece profiles ito the set of alteratives is called votig procedures. For each preferece profile the mappig produces a sigle wiig alterative. Such a mappig is called a social decisio fuctio (SDF). The social welfare fuctio (SWF) o the other had, first studied b Arrow, are the rules for trasformig preferece profile ito social preferece orderigs or rakigs. The defiitio of SWF give b Arrow is as follows: Let Y = { a, a, 1..., a } deote a fiite set of alteratives or social choice optios amog which the voters must select oe ad let R ( Y) N = 1,,..., be a fiite set of idividual voters. A fuctio f R N N : Y will be called a social choice fuctio. A member of R is called a profile of rakigs ad its ith compoet is called idividual i s rakig. A SWF is a fuctio f : R N R which aggregates voters prefereces ito a sigle preferece order o Y. The N-tuple: ( R 1,..., R N ) of voters prefereces is called a preferece profile. Arrow declared that there eist o satisfactor SWF (Islam et al. 009). A satisfactor SDF should ot be a dictatorship (Feldma 1979). Gibbard (1973, 1978) ad Satterthwaite (1975) i- 10

11 depedetl proved this as follows: If a satisfactor social decisio fuctio is oe which is alwas immue to maipulatio ad which is o-dictatorial, there is o satisfactor social decisio fuctio. Followig Merso (1996, 009) we have discussed some portio of this paper i some detail. This paper is a epositio of votig sstem ad of the maipulatio of votig. Frech political philosophers Borda (1781) ad Codorcet (1785) itroduced moder votig sstem but the had ot metioed about maipulatio of votig. Codorcet, Borda ad eve ma moder politicias believe that electios are logicall imperfect. I this paper we will eplore such imperfectios of the electio i some detail. Duca Black (1958) first itroduced the maipulatio of votig. Here we discuss i easier wa of votig sstem ad maipulatio of them (Feldma 1979; Merso (1993, 1996, 006, 009); Blackorb, et al. 1990; Blackorb, et al. 00; Saporiti ad Thomé 006; McLea 008; Saporiti 008; Miller 009; Robert ad Tsoukiàs 009; Sato 009). The cocept of Media Voter is described followig Black (1948, 1958); Gas ad Smart (1994); Merso (1996); Auste-Smith ad Baks (1999); Cogleto (004); Saporiti ad Thomé (006); Saporiti (008); ad Pe et al. (008). I this paper we have discussed relativel simple models of votig sstem but the real political settigs are more comple tha the models seem to impl (Cogleto 004). We used simple model basicall for three reasos amel: i) simple models allow kowledge to be trasferred from perso to perso tha those of more comple models, ii) simple models provide us some clear kowledge of votig whereas comple models do ot alwas provide so, iii) from simple models we, the commo people, ca uderstad the mai features of the votig sstem which is a theme of democrac. Codorcet Method A Codorcet method is a sigle-wier electio method which alwas selects the Codorcet wier (i.e., a alterative that beats ever other alterative i sequece of pair-wise majorit cotests); the cadidate who would beat each of the other cadidates i a ru-off electio if such a cadidate eists. Codorcet method is amed after the Frech political philosopher Marquis de Codorcet ( ). Codorcet (1785) itroduced imperfectio of jur b problem i probabilit theor as follows: There are two alteratives ad betwee which a pael of jur is to decide, who is guilt or iocet. Betwee the two alteratives oe is guilt ad the other is iocet. Sice the members of jur are imperfect, so the ma err. Sice the jur members are efficiet, so that if the umbers of jur members are more tha eough the probabilit of correct votig will be less wrog. Suppose, gets more votes tha, so that probabilit of beig iocet to more correct (Feldma 1979). Let probabilit of votig correctl be p, so the probabilit of votig icorrectl is ( 1 p). Suppose there are three alteratives, sa,, ad. Here oe alterative is iocet ad other two are guilt, so that the problem is complicated. Suppose the cotest will be pair wise. As before if gets more votes tha, ad gets more votes tha, ad gets more votes tha. I this case jur s decisio of beig iocet is ad the probabilit of beig iocet ca be calculated as before. But the followig case is ot so eas which creates a parado. Now we discuss the Codorcet votig parado i which there is o Codorcet wier (Codorcet 1785; Risse 005). I this sectio ad throughout the paper we cosider each voter raks the list of cadidates i order of preferece i.e., for three cadidates, ad the preferece profile of a voter ma be as follows: 1. 11

12 . 3.. Here is oe s first choice, is secod choice ad is third choice. For coveiece, we will use this profile as, PP. Let us assume that there are 17 voters of three tpes ad three alteratives,,. Let preferece relatios are as follows: Tpe 1: PP b 8 voters, Tpe : PP b 5 voters, Tpe 3: PP b 4 voters. I a electio a vote betwee ad, collects 8+4 =1 votes ad collects 5 votes, so that wis. Agai a vote betwee ad, collects 8+5 =13 votes ad collects 4 votes, so that wis. Agai a vote betwee ad, collects 8 votes ad collects 4+5 =9 votes, so that wis. We observe that there is a ccle i the votig results where is defeated b, is defeated b ad also is defeated b which is a voter parado. Codorcet s ad hoc judgmet is that is the Codorcet wier, sice wis b 7 votes ad defeats b 1 vote, wis b 9 votes ad defeats b 7 votes, wis b 1 vote ad defeats b 9 votes. But this is ot a satisfactor ad acceptable decisio. Agai cosider the preferece relatios be as follows: Tpe 1: PP b 49 voters, Tpe : PP b voters, Tpe 3: PP b 48 voters. Here is preferred b a majorit to ad b a majorit to. So, accordig to the Codorcet criterio, should wi, despite the fact that ver few voters rak i the first place but the pluralit (will be discussed later) elects. Borda Cout Jea-Charles Borda ( ) developed aother votig method amed method of marks (Borda 1781). Each elector raks the alteratives accordig to his order of preferece (ties disallowed). Oce all votes have bee couted ad the cadidate with the most poits is the wier. It is curretl used for the electio of two ethic miorit members of the Natioal Assembl of Sloveia, ad i modified forms, to select presidetial electio cadidates i Kiribati ad to elect members of the Parliamet of Nauru. It is also used throughout the world b various private orgaiatio ad competitios. I this method if there are m alteratives, a elector s first choice is assiged ( m 1) poits, his secod ( m ) poits ad so o dow to his last choice, which is assiged 0 poit. Oe propert of the Borda rule is that each of the voters of each tpe gives m ( m 1) marks to the cadidates. Borda votes i the above first eample be as follows: For : = 0 marks, For : = 18 marks, For : = 13 marks. Here gets highest marks 0, so wis. We observed that Borda method has o voter parado but it has some problems. Black (1958) ad Satterthwaite (1975) modified the Borda method b misrepresetatio of their prefereces b the electors. Now we modif the eample b addig two alteratives u ad v. The preferece relatios be as follows: Tpe 1: PPPuPv b 8 voters, Tpe : PPPuPv b 5 voters, Tpe 3: PPPuPv b 4 voters. Now Borda couts be as follows: 1

13 For : = 54 marks, For : = 5 marks, For : = 47 marks, For u: = 17 marks, For v: = 0 mark. So that i this case wis agai. If the tpe 3 voters falsel declared that their preferece orderig is as, Tpe 3: PPuPvP b 4 voters, the the Borda couts would be, For : = 4 marks, For : = 56 marks, For : = 47 marks, For u: = 1 marks, For v: = 4 marks. I this case would have wo. The voters of tpe 3 would have bee better off tha whe the voted hoestl; the method provides a temptatio for misrepresetatio of prefereces. The possibilit of maipulatio of the result of a electio through the misrepresetatio of prefereces as described above was cosidered either b Borda or b Codorcet. Borda Rule is Cloig Maipulable We have see that Borda did ot use maipulatio i his votig method. But we ca maipulate the Borda rule b itroducig a cloig cadidate (Serais 00). Suppose would be defeated i a electio followig Borda cout. The cadidate ca maipulate the electio outcome i his favor b itroducig his cloe (sa) i the choice set, the cloe beig defied as a alterative which is raked immediatel below i the idividual prefereces. Let N = { 1,,..., } be the set of idividual voters, ad let Y = {,,,... } be the fiite set of alteratives. Choose a set A Y be a fiite set where ( A) = m. Now for A = {,, } the si possible preferece orderigs over A will be umbered as follows: Table 1: Possible Preferece Orderigs Over the Set A A votig situatio is a vector, s= ( 1,..., 6 ), where ( j= 1,...,6) j= 1 j be the umber of tpe j vot- 6 ers ad j =. Here is the total umber of voters i a electio. Let 1 S = { s,..., s } be the set of all possible votig situatios. A social choice fuctio f : S A, assigs to each votig situatio a o-empt subset of A. Let the Borda score of, ad situatios i.e., follows: B s S B, s S B, s S B, s N be the umber of voters who prefer to, S, be S, be the differece of Borda score betwee ad for the votig =. Now we ca itroduce the mathematical defiitio of a cloe as B s 13

14 , i N Pi Pi ad i N, P i. This tpe of maipulatio was itroduced b Dummett (1998) where he called it ageda maipulatio. Dummett observed that the Borda rule ma suffer from this maipulatio ad eplaied b a series of eamples. Here we set a eample where there are 1 voters ad the have to choose preferece relatio amog four alteratives,, ad u. Let the preferece relatios be as follows: Tpe 1: PuPP b voters, Tpe : uppp b voters, Tpe 3: PuPP b voters, Tpe 4: PuPP b 3 voters, Tpe 5: PPuP b 1 voter, Tpe 6: PPPu b voters. Borda votes i the above eample be as follows: For : = 16 marks, For : = 17 marks, For : = 18 marks, For u: = 1 marks. Here u gets highest 1 marks, so u wis ad gets secod lowest 17 marks. Dummett assumes that before the electio, a fifth cadidate, v is itroduced b whom ever voter raks immediatel below. The the preferece profile would be as follows: A cadidate is a cloe of for a votig situatios if ad ol if X \{, } Tpe 1: PvPuPP b voters, Tpe : uppppv b voters, Tpe 3: PuPPvP b voters, Tpe 4: PuPPvP b 3 voters, Tpe 5: PPvPuP b 1 voter, Tpe 6: PPvPPu b voters. The the Borda votes would be as follows: For : = marks, For : = 9 marks, For : = 4 marks, For u: = 8 marks, For v: = 17 marks. Now gets highest score of 9 marks ad wis i the electio. Here we observed that i iitial votig situatio scored secod lowest 17 marks but after cloig a cadidate v as fifth cadidate b placed him i first positio. So that cloig maipulatio is sufficietl powerful to wi i a electio b a losig cadidate. Let there are two losig cadidates i a electio. Now we will discuss the cloig maipulatio b a sigle loser. Let A {,, } = the the votig situatio 1 s be as follows: Table : The Votig Situatio of s Score s

15 From table we fid; + + Iteratioal Joural of Maagemet ad Trasformatio 5(1): Sprig 011 = ( 1 ) 3 6, = ( 5 6) ad ( ) S + S + B, s 1 B, s N = , N N = ad N = , N + N = =, N + N = ad N + N =. N + Similarl, S + B, s = 3+ 4, =, =, = 6, N + 5 B 1, s B 1, s Let S 0 ad S 0, so that wis b Borda couts. Now suppose is i the lowest positio b Borda couts. The cadidate could itroduce u whom ever voter raks immediatel below. The the votig situatio s would be as follows: From table 3 we fid: = Table 3: The Votig Situatio of s u u ( 1 ), 3 6 ( ( + ) + + ) + ( + + ) S + B s = = S 1 + N B, s, S + B s = = S 1 +, B, s S = + 3( 3 + 4) + B, s 5 = ( + ( 3 + 4) + 5) + ( ) = S 1 + N B, s, S u = ( 5 + 6) = S B, s B, s 1. = ( 5 6), ( + + ( + )) + ( ) Sice u is cloed b, so u is alwas beate b. Now beats if, N > i.e., S S N > 1 + S B, s B, s B, s u u u u Score s i.e., ( 1+ 4) + 3( 5 + 6) > 3( 1 + 4) (1) Now beats if, N S i.e., B S, s N B s + N S 1 + N i.e., S, B, s 1 + S 1 + N B, s B, s i.e., ( 1+ 4) + 3( 5 + 6) > 3( 3 + 4) () Iequalities (1) ad () satisf all the properties of Borda rule, so that wis i the electio. Now we describe the cloig maipulatio b both of the losig cadidates. I table we cosi- 15

16 dered that wis but ad were defeated. Now both ad could itroduce cloig cadidates. Let u be the cloe of ad v be the cloe of ad let ol would be beefited b cloig. The votig situatio s would be as 3 follows: Table 4: The Votig Situatio of u v v u v u 5 6 v u u v u v 3 s. Score s From table 4 we fid: = ( 1 ) ( 3 6) ( ( + ) + + ) + ( + + ) + ( + + ) S + B, s 3 = = S 1 + N B s + N,, S 3 = ( 5 + 6) B, s = ( ( 5 + 6) ) + ( ) + ( ) = S N B, s, S 3 = ( 3 + 4) +, 5 + B s 6 = = S N B, s, S u 3 = ( 5 + 6) B, s = ( ( 5 + 6) ) + ( ) = S 1 + N B, s, S v 3 = + 3( 3+ 4) + B, s 5 = ( + ( 3 + 4) + 5) + ( ) = S 1 + N B, s. Sice u be the cloe of, so u is alwas beate b. beats if S 3 > 0 B, s ( + ( + ) + ) + ( ) + ( + + ) S > S + N 1 i.e., 1 B, s B, s i.e., 1 B, s B, s S N + N + N > S + N + N B, s B, s i.e., S N B s > S 1 + N, B, s + N, > 1 S > S 1 + N i.e., S 1 + N + N > S 1 + N ( ) ( + ) ( ) + ( ) i.e., 4( + ) > 4( + ) + ( + ). (3) Agai v is the cloe of so that S 0 gives S v 0 which implies S v 0. B 3, s B 3 B, s 3, s 6 B, s B 3, s 16

17 S 3 S N B, s B s 3 N S, N B s S N, B, s > (4) Agai beats if 0 i.e., 4( ) ( ) + 6 Iequalities (3) & (4) satisf all the properties of Borda rule, so that wis i the electio. I this sectio we have show b calculatios that Borda votig is for sicere voters ad maipulatio is impossible but a defeated cadidate ca maipulate Borda votig i his favor b itroducig his cloe. Majorit Votig I sectio we observed the votig parado i majorit votig where there is o uambiguous wier. We modif the majorit votig b the itroductio of a ageda (Black 1958; Feldma 1979). Let us agai cosider the preferece relatio of sectio i.e., Tpe 1: PP b 8 voters, Tpe : PP b 5 voters, Tpe 3: PP b 4 voters. Now suppose that is the status quo, while is a motio to chage the status quo ad is a ameded versio of that motio. A tpical committee practice, which Black (1958) called Procedure α, is to hold a vote betwee ad (the motio ad the ameded versio), ad place the wier of that vote agaist (the status quo). If votes are sicere, Procedure α produces o the first roud (the amedmet is defeated) ad o the secod (the bill is defeated). I these circumstaces, tpe voters could misrepreset their prefereces as, Tpe : PP b 5 voters. The, could wi the first roud (the amedmet would pass) ad the defeated (the ameded bill would be adopted). I this case tpe voters could be beefited b maipulatio of votig. A secod committee practice, which Black (1958) called Procedure β, pits each motio agaist the status quo. We have show defeats the status quo but does ot, so that is adopted, provided the voters vote sicerel. We observed that uder Procedure β, tpe 1 voters have a opportuit to gai b misrepresetatio. If the vote as of their prefereces were, Tpe 1: PP b 8 voters, The both ad would defeat the status quo i the first roud. I the secod roud would defeat. So that tpe 1 voters would have maipulated the choice of, which the prefer, over. Sigle Trasferable Votig Sstem The sigle trasferable vote (STV) is a sstem of preferetial votig desiged to miimie wasted votes. I STV, a costituec elects two or more represetatives per electorate. As a result the costituec is proportioall larger tha a sigle member costituec from each part. Political parties ted to offer as ma cadidates as the most optimisticall could epect to wi; the major parties ma omiate almost as ma cadidates as there are seats, while the mior parties ad idepedets rather fewer. STV iitiall allocates a elector s vote for her most preferred cadidate ad the, after cadidate have bee either elected or elimiated, trasfers surplus or uused votes accordig to the voter s stated prefereces (ties disallowed). It is a ma ballots electoral sstem ad mail used i the Eglish-speakig coutries. It ca be used for either sigle wier or multi-wier votig sstem ad we will discuss both methods i this sectio. 17

18 Histor of STV The cocept of trasferable votig was first proposed b Thomas Wright Hill i 181, for applicatio i electios at his school but was ot populated. Carft Adrae i 1855 proposed a trasferable votig sstem for electio i Demark ad used it i 1856 to elect the Daish Rigsdag. The Eglish barrister Thomas Hare is geerall credited with the cocept of STV ad proposed that electors should have the opportuit of discoverig which cadidate their vote had ultimatel couted for, to improve their persoal coectio with votig. Adrew Iglish Clark was successful i persuadig the Tasmaia House of Assembl to be the first parliamet i the world elected b what become kow as the Hare-Clark sstem, amed after himself ad Thomas Hare. The STV is a sstem of preferetial votig desiged to miimie wasted votes which provides proportioal represetatio while esurig that votes are eplicitl epressed for idividual cadidates rather tha part lists. I 007 STV is used for parliametar electios i the Republic of Irelad, North Irish Assembl ad Malta. It is also used for the Australia Seate i the form of a group votig ticket, as well as certai regioal ad local electios i Australia, local govermet electios i Australia, local govermet electios i New Zealad. It is held up b its supports as beig the best ad fairest electoral sstem i the world, but political parties dislike it ad resist to adoptig it because it requires cadidates to compete publicl with oe aother. If it is popularied i the societ the there is probabilit of political parties to be completel abolished. Settig the Quota I a STV electio, a cadidate requires a certai miimum umber of votes the quota to be elected. A umber of differet quotas ca be used; the most commo is the Droop quota, give b the formula (Droop 1881): V 1 S+ +1 where, V = the total umber of valid votes cast. S = the umber of seats to be filled. STV is a step procedure, i each step voters cast votes for their most preferred cadidate. It proceeds accordig to the followig steps: i) A cadidate who touched or eceeded the required quota is declared elected. ii) If ot eough cadidates have bee elected, the cout cotiues. iii) If a cadidate casts more vote tha the quota, the their surplus is trasferred to other cadidates accordig to the et preferece o each voter s ballot. iv) If oe meets the quota, the cadidate with the fewest votes is elimiated ad their votes are trasferred. This process cotiues util the last cadidates survive which is the wier i the electio. Agai i quota sstem, votig procedure is stopped whe the umbers of remaiig cadidates istead of coutig votes util all cadidates have reached a quota. I STV, cadidates who receive ecess votes ad cadidates who are ecluded have their votes trasferred to other cadidates, it is said to be miimie wasted votes. Let us itroduce a simple eample: Let 40 guests (voters) are ivited i part ad 5 food stuffs (cadidates), 3 of which will be selected. The cadidates are: Beef (), Mutto (), Chicke (), Fish () ad Vegetable (v). Each 18

19 of the 40 guests is give ballots. I quota sstem, the umber of votes to be elected is = I the followig table 5 we have show ol first ad secod prefereces of their food stuffs. We have ecluded higher order prefereces because i our electio these are o eeded. Table 5: First ad secod Prefereces of the Voters. No. of guests First preferece u v Secod preferece v v Whe ballots are couted the electio proceeds as follows: Step 1 Cadidates u v Collected votes I step 1 has 4 more votes tha the quota, so is declared elected. Cadidate s surplus votes trasfer equall to ad v accordig to voters of secod choice prefereces the the step beig as follows: Step Cadidates u v Collected votes I step eve with the trasfer of this surplus o cadidate has reached the quota. The u with the lowest votes is elimiated. The votes of u are trasfer to his secod preferece v to reach the quota the the step 3 beig as follows: Step 3 Cadidates v Collected votes I step 3, v is elected but has o surplus to trasfer. Neither of the remaiig cadidates meets the quota. Therefore has lowest votes is elimiated. Cadidate is the ol remaiig cadidate ad so wis the fial seat. Fial Result: The wiers are, v, i.e., Beef, Vegetable ad Mutto. The Process of Sigle Wier i STV ad Maipulatio of Votig It is also a step procedure, i which, at each step voters cast votes for their most preferred cadidate. I step 1, each voter casts vote for his most favorite cadidate. The the cadidate with the fewest votes is elimiated. I step, each elector casts a sigle vote for his most favorite amog the remaiig cadidates. As before the cadidate with the fewest votes is elimiated. The process cotiues util oe cadidate remais. The last cadidate is cosidered as the wier. Cosider the preferece profile as follows: Step 1 Tpe 1: PPPu b 10 voters, Tpe : PPPu b 7 voters, Tpe 3: uppp b 5 voters, Tpe 4: PPuP b 3 voters, Tpe 5: uppp b 4 voters. I step 1, with 3 votes is elimiated, ad the the preferece profile will be as follows: Step Tpe 1: PPu b 10 voters, Tpe : PPu b 7 voters, 19

20 Tpe 3: upp b 5 voters, Tpe 4: PuP b 3 voters, Tpe 5: upp b 4 voters. I step, u with 9 votes is elimiated, ad the the preferece profile will be as follows: Step 3 Tpe 1: P b 10 voters, Tpe : P b 7 voters, Tpe 3: P b 5 voters, Tpe 4: P b 3 voters, Tpe 5: P b 4 voters. I step 3, with 14 votes is elimiated. Fiall will be the remaiig perso ad will wi i the electio. Tpe 3 voters prefer to. The aticipate that will wi the the could maipulate the prefereces as follows: Tpe 3: PPuP b 5 voters. The as before i step 1 u with 4 votes would be elimiated ad the the preferece profile would be as follows: Step a Tpe 1: PP b 10 voters, Tpe : PP b 7 voters, Tpe 3: PP b 5 voters, Tpe 4: PP b 3 voters, Tpe 5: PP b 4 voters. I step a, with 7 votes would be elimiated ad the the preferece profile would be as follows: Step 3a Tpe 1: P b 10 voters, Tpe : P b 7 voters, Tpe 3: P b 5 voters, Tpe 4: P b 3 voters, Tpe 5: P b 4 voters. I step 3a, with 10 votes would be elimiated. Fiall would be remaiig perso ad would wi i the electio. Therefore, we have see that STV is maipulable. Tie-Breakig i STV Although we metioed above that i STV ties disallowed, sometimes ties ca occur for several differet reasos ad the ties eed to be broke (Newlad ad Britto 1997; O Neill 004). The ties ca be broke simpl b lotter sstem such as tossig coi. But this sstem is ot the best oe ad usuall the followig four rules are used i tie-breakig. i) Forwards Tie-Breakig (FTB): Choose the cadidate who has the most (least) votes at the first stage where the had uequal votes. ii) Backwards Tie-Breakig (BTB): Choose the cadidate who has the most (least) votes at the previous stage or at the latest poit i the cout where the had uequal votes. iii) Borda Tie-Breakig: Choose the cadidate with the highest (least) Borda score. iv) Cooms Tie-Breakig: Choose the cadidate with the fewest (most) last place votes. 0

21 Sometimes after breakig tie b a of the above metioed rules the cadidate would still face tied. I this case it is useful to distiguish betwee weak ties ad strog ties. A weak tie occurs whe cadidates have the same umber of votes at a give stage. A strog tie occurs whe cadidates are still tied after applig a tie-breakig rule (a oe rule from (i) (iv) metioed above). A strog tie would be broke b lotter. Here we will use ERS97 rules of tie-breakig (Newlad ad Britto 1997; O Neill 004). The differece betwee FTB ad BTB is give i table 6 which is from Newlad & Britto (1997) without a chage. Table 6: Eample Tall with ERS97 Rules where 60 Voters are Electig Cadidates from 6. Surplus of Elimiate w Elimiate v Elimiate Stage u v w No-Trasferable Here we have to elimiate oe cadidate at stage 4 ad there is a tie betwee cadidates ad u. Thus, tie-breakig eeds to be used to determie which cadidate is to be elimiated. We use the FTB followig ERS97 rules. I this case we first look to the couts at stage 1. From table 6 we see that u has oe more vote tha at stage 1. So that cadidate is elimiated. If ad u had bee tied at stage 1, the we would have to be looked to subsequet stages. If ad u would have bee tied i all stages, the we would have bee a strog tie which would have bee broke b lotter. But i BTB we have to look at the previous stage to break ties ad if ecessar to the precedig stages. I table 6 we see i precedig stage 3 that is ahead to u, so that u would be elimiated. Oe problem arises with FTB where the elimiatio order is: 4, 1,, 3 which is ot sequetial ad is udesirable. If we make a meaigful sequece startig from 4 the the order is: 4, 3,, 1 which is BTB. Agai FTB does ot use the most relevat iformatio tha BTB to break the tie. Hece BTB is better tha FTB i tie-breakig. Probabilit of Elimiatig of Wiig Cadidates i Tie-Breakig STV I tie-breakig STV, ERS97 rule sometimes elimiates wiig cadidates without maipulatio of votig which is udesirable. Suppose there are 31 voters ad 6 cadidates amog which oe will be elected. Each of the voters is give 4 ballots (O Neill 004). I step 1 the prefereces would be as follows: Step 1 No. of votes st preferece u v w d preferece 3 rd Preferece 4 th preferece 1

22 I step, u with fewest votes would be elimiated ad u s votes would be trasferred to his secod preferred cadidate. The preferece profile of step would be as follows: Step Cadidates v w Collected votes I step 3, v with fewest votes is elimiated ad v s votes would be trasferred to his secod preferred cadidate. The preferece profile of step 3 would be as follows: Step 3 Cadidates w Collected votes I step 3, a tie arises betwee ad with the fewest 5 votes. The both would be elimiated b ERS97. However, istead tie would be broke b FTB or BTB or b lotter. Suppose was elimiated b lotter ad s votes would be trasferred to his secod preferred cadidate. The would be tied with. The preferece profile of step 4 would be as follows: Step 4 Cadidates w Collected votes I that situatio tie would be broke b FTB rule. I step 1 cadidate has fewer votes tha, so that would be elimiated ad as s secod preferred cadidate received all of s votes ad beat w with 0 to 11 votes i fial step. Therefore, wiig cadidate i ERS97 rule was elimiated which is uacceptable situatio i STV electio. So that there is a flaw i STV, ERS97 FTB rule. This flaw could be removed i two was: (i) b chagig the rules of STV, ERS97, (ii) b usig BTB rule which is better as we have see before. Hece with FTB a wiig cadidate could be improperl elimiated however, with BTB both of these last-place cadidates caot wi ad ca thus be properl elimiated. Pluralit Votig The pluralit votig sstem is a sigle-wier votig sstem ofte used to elect eecutive officer or to elect members of a legislative assembl, which is based o sigle member costituecies. This is the simplest of all votig sstems for voters ad vote coutig officials. Geerall pluralit ballots ca be categoried ito two forms. The simplest form is a blak ballot where the ame of a cadidate is writte i b had. A most structured ballot will list all the cadidates ad allow a mark to be made for a sigle cadidate; however a structured ballot ca also iclude space for a write- i cadidate as well. Sometimes at the ed of each cadidate a kow smbol is eclosed ad each voter votes for his favorite b sealig o the smbol of his favorite. Uder this sstem the wier of the electio acts as represetative of the whole regio of his costitutig area. I this method there are ma cadidates or alteratives ad there are ma voters or idividuals where each voter casts ol oe vote for oe cadidate. The cadidate who collects highest total wis i the electio; there is o requiremet that the wier gai a absolute majorit of votes. This tpe of votig sstem is prevailed i most of the coutries i the world such as the USA, the UK, Caada, Idia, Bagladesh, Pakista, ad so o. This tpe of votig sometimes is called simple pluralit, first past the post (FPP) or wier-takes-all. Pluralit votig is used for local ad/or atioal electios i about 43 of the 191 coutries of the UN. The term FPP was coied as a aalog to horse racig, where the wier of the race is the first to pass a particular poit as the track, after which all other ruers completel lose. I some coutries such as Frace a differet pluralit sstem is used, where there are two rouds; the two-ballots or ru off electio pluralit sstem. If a cadidate i the first roud gais majorit of the votes the there