Sailing the Ship through the Storm. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Breakdown and Survival of Electoral Regimes in the Interwar Years

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1 1 Sailing the Ship through the Storm. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Breakdown and Survival of Electoral Regimes in the Interwar Years Steffen Kailitz 1 Draft paper prepared for presentation at the IPSA-ECPR Joint Conference: Whatever Happened to North-South?, Sao Paulo, February 19th, Abstract Based on a configurational analysis this paper identifies, which conditions are necessary and which are sufficient for the breakdown and survival of non-autocratic electoral regimes in the interwar period. It turns out that economic, political and social stress might well be the main reason why there was an authoritarian reverse wave in the interwar period, but this factor does not help us to explain why some democracies in this period survived while others failed. The results are as complex as historic reality. Structural factors do matter as well as institutions and actors. It turns out that under the preconditions that an electoral regime had a strong labor-repressive agrarian elite, was not highly developed and had no electoral and constitutional tradition before the First World War and no leading politician acted in favor of democracy during a times of crisis, and, the regime broke down if there was either no Charlemagne heritage or a leading politician acted in favor of autocracy in a time of crisis or there was a strong president. Conversely, a non-autocratic electoral regime survived the interwar years under the preconditions that it had a tradition of a strong and effective state apparatus (Charlemagne heritage) and no territorial loss and there was no pro-autocratic action of a leading politician in a economic and/or political crisis, if it either established a constitutional democracy pre World War I or there was a pro-democratic action of a leading politician in a time of crisis or the democratic regime was parliamentarian. 1 University of Erfurt (Visiting Professor) and Hannah-Arendt-Institute for Research on Totalitarianism at the University of Dresden kailitz@hait.tu-dresden.de and kailitz@uni-erfurt.de. 2 I thank Robin Dyck, Erik Fritzsche, Tanja Havlin, and Katrin Strehle for research assistance. I also thank Dirk Berg-Schlosser and the participants of the the Symposium on Conditions of Democracy in Inter-War Europe C.C.C. Revisited, Marburg, July 3, 2009 for helpful comments.

2 2 1. Introduction Around 1918 political observers (e.g. Bryce 1921) thought they were experiencing a worldwide victory of democracy pretty much like at the beginning of the 1990s (e.g. Fukuyama 1992): It was assumed that with the spread of popular elections the principles and methods of democracy would eventually prevail among all enlighted people (Dean et al. 1934, 1). But during the interwar period an authoritarian reverse wave followed. When Lenin took over in Russia in 1917 the era of Communism and, only a few years later, in Italy in 1923 the era of fascism began. Until 1939 all the states of Central- and Eastern Europe, with the exceptions of Czechoslovakia, Finland and Switzerland had fallen to various forms of autocratic rule. The reasons for survival and breakdown of electoral regimes in the interwar years appear to be, especially after the Interwar project of Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Jeremy Mitchell (Berg-Schlosser and Mitchell 2000, 44-70; 2002; Berg-Schlosser and Meur 1994; Berg-Schlosser 1998), the most studied issues in the subfield of democratization studies focusing on the persistence of democracies (see also Aarebrot and Berglund 1995; Ertman 1998; Linz and Stepan 1978; Skaaning 2008). So why does it make sense to review this issue? First, different from previous studies I include in my analysis all countries in the world, not only the European countries. Second, I apply a different method on the topic. I argue that an explanation for the outcome that does not include all necessary conditions is never able to explain the outcome, since the outcome would by definition not take place without the necessary conditions. So this paper identifies necessary and sufficient conditions for 1. the breakdown and 2. the survival of electoral regimes in the interwar period. 3 Only recently, researchers (Goertz 2006; Braumoeller and Goertz 2000; Goertz and Starr 2003; Ragin 2006) have emphasized the importance of necessary conditions. Since classical statistical approaches are not able to identity necessary conditions, other tools namely the different forms of a configurational analysis 4, have been developed for this kind of research. Boolean algebra is the perfect tool to check the necessity of conditions (Caramani 2009, 58-61; Ragin 2006, 2008). When Charles Ragin (1987) first introduced crisp set qualitative comparative analysis (csqca), the main advantage he emphasized was that this method it is able to identify more than one path leading to the same outcome, even if it was noted from the beginning that 3 The most similar analysis on this topic is (Skaaning 2008). However, Skaaning focuses geographically on the European cases and on structural explanations of the breakdown and survival of the electoral regimes and he includes all European countries, even the USSR. 4 Configurational analysis is used as a generic term for crisp set qualitative comparative analysis, fuzzy set/qualitative comparative analysis and multi-value qualitative comparative analysis. See Ragin (2008); Rihoux and Ragin (2008).

3 3 Boolean algebra is a tool to test the necessity and sufficiency of conditions (Ragin 1987, ). Until today most researchers using configurational analysis be it, csqca, fuzzy set QCA (fsqca) or multi-value QCA (mvqca) still work only top-down and search for sufficient conditions of the outcome. Necessary conditions, however, have to be checked bottom-up (Ragin 2000, 218; see e.g. also Schneider and Wagemann 2007, 57-62). 5 A bottom-up analysis has further advantages. It is more case-orientated than the top-down analysis. Condition by condition the researcher deals with the truth tables and it is easy to address which cases have led to a result. 2. Selection of cases To identify non-autocratic electoral regimes I use three indicators on two dimensions. On the first dimension I distinguish electoral regimes from non-electoral regimes by the dimensions public competitiveness and participation (Dahl 1971, 6). To measure competitiveness and participation I use the well-known measures by Tatu Vanhanen (1984, 1990, 1997, 2003). Competition is measured by subtracting the largest parties vote share in parliamentary, or presidential elections, or both (depending on the kind of electoral regime) from 100. Participation is calculated as the percentage of voters in relation to the total population (Vanhanen 1984, 28-33; 1997, 34-37). On this dimension I classify political regimes as follows: Electoral democracy competitiveness 20 and participation 15 Electoral oligarchy and/or semi-competitive system competition 10 and < 20 and participation 5 and < 15 Non-participative and/or non-competitive competition < 10 or participation < 5 regime The thresholds do differ only slightly from the suggested thresholds by Tatu Vanhanen (1997, 33). Too much of the previous literature placed an overwhelming emphasis on the electoral process and thus overlooked other fundamental dimensions that are criteria for analyzing regimes (Snyder 2006, 220). There are, however, regimes with elections that are still autocracies (Levitsky and Way 2002; Schedler 2006; Levitsky and Way 2010). An autocracy is defined as a political regime in which the executive is almost unrestricted (see e.g. Loewenstein 1957, 28). Mexico until the end of the 1980s is a classic example of an electoral 5 A problem of only using the classical top-down analysis of sufficient conditions via Tosmana or fs/qca is also that the algorithm sometimes identifies a condition as necessary, because it is included in all paths to the outcome. But sometimes this condition does not pass a bottom-up test of necessary conditions.

4 4 autocracy (Magaloni 2008). On the non-autocratic dimension I measure the executive constraints by Polity IV (Polity IV Project 2009). Thus, I distinguish between three regime types on this dimension: Constitutional regime Hybrid regime Autocracy The executive is effectively constrained (Polity IV, executive constraints = 7) The executive is subject to some constraints at any rate (Polity IV, executive constraints = 5 or 6) The executive is not constrained (Polity IV, executive constraints = 4 to 1) I consider all constitutional and hybrid electoral regimes in the period from 1919 to 1938 with a population of more than inhabitants all over the world. So Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco and San Marino are excluded because of their small size. I further exclude regimes which are either completely non-democratic or completely not constitutional. Namely, I exclude Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and the Soviet Union which were included in one or the other previous analysis of democracies in the interwar period (Berg- Schlosser and Mitchell 2000, 2002; Skaaning 2008). In Hungary, for intance, in 1926 the white regime led by István Bethlen, a Transylvanian aristocrat, and Miklós Horthy, the former commander in chief of the Austro-Hungarian Navy, took over. This can be seen as a reaction to the red revolution, led by Béla Kun. Red terror was followed by white terror. Many Communists and other leftists were tortured and executed without trial. From 1932 on the regime showed strong fascist elements. In any case, at no point in the interwar years had Hungary been non-autocratic. There is only one ambiguous case, Honduras. Although Polity IV data measures a hybrid regime in the interwar years I classify this regime as an electoral autocracy because it had only presidential elections and in addition to that these elections were subject to massive electoral fraud (Bendel 1995, 150). In the following inquiry I include electoral oligarchies (Argentina, Cuba, Portugal, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia) with an electoral participation of more than 5 and less than 15 per cent of the total population in national elections I consider 16 non-autocratic electoral regimes that survived the interwar years Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the USA and 14 electoral regimes that broke down.

5 5 Table 1: Breakdowns of Electoral Regimes in the Interwar Years in Chronological Order Country Date of breakdown Before change of regime Change of regime Italy 29-Oct-1922 Hybrid electoral to electoral autocracy (3/1); on democracy 03-Jan-1925 from electoral autocracy to non-electoral autocracy (3/3) Poland 12-May-1926 Constitutional to hybrid non-electoral system democracy Portugal 28-May-1926 Hybrid electoral oligarchy (2/3) to non-electoral autocracy (3/3) Lithuania 17-Dec-1926 Hybrid electoral democracy Cuba 01-Jan-1928 Hybrid electoral oligarchy Yugoslavia 06-Jan-1929 Hybrid electoral oligarchy Argentina 06-Nov-1930 Hybrid electoral oligarchy Germany 30-Jan-1933 Hybrid electoral democracy Uruguay 31-Mar-1933 Hybrid electoral oligarchy Austria 25-Jul-1934 Hybrid electoral democracy Estonia 12-Mar-1934 Constitutional democracy Latvia 15-May-1934 Constitutional democracy Greece 04-Aug-1936 Constitutional democracy Spain 01-Apr-1939 Constitutional democracy to non-electoral autocracy (3/3) to non-electoral autocracy (3/3) to non-electoral autocracy (3/3) to non-electoral autocracy (3/3) to non-electoral autocracy (3/3) to non-electoral hybrid regime (2/3) to electoral autocracy (3/1) to non-electoral autocracy (3/3) to non-electoral autocracy (3/3) to non-electoral autocracy (3/3) to non-electoral autocracy (3/3) 3. Method: The Analysis of Necessary and Sufficient Conditions First, I will test the necessity (and sufficiency) of the different explanations for democratic breakdown and survival of electoral regimes bottom-up one by one. After that I provide a topdown analysis of the sufficient paths to the outcome (the classical configurational analysis). Finally, I will merge the solution formulas for necessary and sufficient conditions. Data management and analysis was performed using fs/qca 2.5 and Tosmana. As a reminder: A necessary condition has to be fulfilled whenever the outcome is present. The cases with the outcome are a subset of the cases with the condition. But there can be cases where the condition is present but not the outcome.

6 6 Condition is completely necessary Condition absent Condition present Outcome present 1. no cases here 2. cases here Outcome absent 3. not relevant 4. not relevant When a condition is completely sufficient, the outcome always takes place when the condition is present. Therefore, cases with this condition are a subset of the cases with the outcome. This does not, however, mean that the outcome cannot take place when the condition is not present, because there can be other conditions or combinations of conditions leading to the same outcome. Condition is completely sufficient Condition absent Condition present Outcome present 1. not relevant 2. cases here Outcome absent 3. not relevant 4. no cases here When it comes to necessary conditions, we always have to check if a condition is only of trivial necessity. All necessary conditions are regarded as trivial in which the cause is present in all cases, irrespective of outcome (Caramani 2009, 62; Braumoeller and Goertz 2000, 854). For obvious reasons, for instance, no war can be fought and peace achieved without air and gravity. To analyze the necessity (and sufficiency) of a condition bottom-up I use also Ragins measures of consistency and coverage of necessary and sufficient conditions (see the table in the appendix). The measure of consistency tells us to which degree a subset relation has been approximated. The coverage assesses the relevance of a consistent subset (Ragin 2006, 2008). With these measures of consistency and coverage it is possible to identify whether a condition is almost necessary and/or sufficient for an outcome. The measures are calculated by the following formulas: consistency necessity (and at the same time coverage sufficiency) = number of cases with condition and outcome/number of cases with outcome consistency sufficiency (and at the same time coverage necessity) = number of cases with condition and outcome/number of cases with condition

7 7 Consistency is always the crucial measure. It is pointless to regard coverage if a condition is not close to being necessary (or sufficient). In order to measure consistency a minimum requirement has to be chosen, while this is not necessary for coverage. Ragin (2008) suggests that the level of consistency should be above 0.8. To be on the safe side I set a threshold of Nevertheless, if we speak of necessity and sufficiency in the context of a configurational analysis, only a possible necessity or a possible sufficiency is meant by these expressions. The fewer cases one analyzes, the likelier are errors concerning one`s claims on necessity and sufficiency. What is the surplus value by measuring consistency and coverage of sufficient and necessary conditions compared to the classical quantitative toolkit? A correlation matrix reveals the relationship between certain conditions and the outcome if there is a relationship. Only if we are very lucky and social scientists are never that lucky we measure a perfect relationship, which means that our condition is necessary and sufficient. All values in between one and zero do not tell us if a condition is either (close to being) sufficient or (close to being) necessary. So we get a lot more information if we check necessity and sufficiency separately. Different from a regression analysis a top-down analysis of sufficient conditions is able to identify INUS-conditions (insufficient but non-redundant elements of a complex which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the outcome). 4. Theoretical Explanations and Operationalization 4.1 Structural Approaches Modernization Theory: Socioeconomic conditions Since Seymour Martin Lipset published his seminal article Economic Development and Democracy (1959) the following thesis is one of the best known in social sciences: the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy (31). The argument is, in a nutshell, that wealth can cause higher education to spread, can strengthen the middle class and create a democratic civil society and thus make democracy sustainable. For Lipset, modernization is the prerequisite of the development of a democratic political culture. On the micro-level well-being and education foster the demand of people for freedom and emancipation for themselves (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Welzel 2002; Welzel et al. 2003). Especially education fosters the ability to think rationally and the will to participate politically

8 8 (Inkeles 1969; Lerner 1958). 6 I focus on wealth, namely GNP, and education, namely literacy. For the purpose of this paper I have constructed an index of the degree of modernization of a country as follows: Highly developed country: High GDP (> 3750$) and High Literacy (> 90%) Medium developed country: Medium GDP ( $) and High Literacy (> 90%) or High GDP (> 3750$) and Low Literacy (< 90%) Low developed country: Low or Medium GDP (< 3749$) and Low Literacy (< 90%) Literacy is measured by data from Vanhanen (2009) and gross domestic product (GDP) at purchasing power parity (PPP) per capita by data from Maddison (2009) Historical Structures Strong labor-repressive agrarian elite Barrington Moore claimed in his seminal work Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (1993) that the two undemocratic routes to modernity, the authoritarianreactionary route and later fascist route followed by Germany and Japan and the communist route followed by China and the Soviet Union are linked to the occurrence of strong laborrepressive agrarian elites. In Moore s footsteps Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992) and Stephens (1989) pointed out that a strong labor-repressive agrarian elite also undermines democratic stability. The argument in a nutshell is that the existence of a large laborrepressive landed class in the nineteenth and early twentieth century changed the alliance options for the other classes and as a consequence the political outcome (Stephens 1989, 1070). The method of labor control leads the landlords to seek an alliance with those in control of the means of coercion, the state, and it accounts for the strong anti-democratic impulse of the aristocracy (Stephens and Kümmel 2002, 41). By using data of scholars such as Ersson (1995) and Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992, ) I distinguish between the presence and absence of a significant landed upper class engaged in labor repressive agriculture. If there is either no strong agrarian elite or the agriculture is not laborrepressive cases are coded as 0. 6 For a more thorough argument with regard to why literacy is important for the democratization process see Hadenius (1992).

9 Secularism and State-Building In another seminal work on the influence of historical structures, Stein Rokkan drew a conceptual map of Europe (Rokkan 1970; Rokkan et al. 1999). Two axes divide the countries on his map. The East-West axis is based on the strength of city networks and political center formation that is strong in the East and weak in the West. The North-South axis is based on the integration of state and church, which was traditionally strong in the secularized Protestant North and weak in the Catholic South. The argument is that in Protestant countries the autonomy of the state is less developed than in Catholic countries. In addition to that Protestantism fosters individualism, constitutionalism (effective control of politicians by the public), democracy, strong sentiments against corruption and the development of a civic society (Treisman 2000; Weber 2009) In accordance with Aarebrot, Berglund (1995, 218) and Skaaning (2008), I distinguish also between countries with a tradition of a strong and effective state apparatus (Charlemagne heritage) and those with a different heritage (namely the Byzantine heritage). All Western and Central European countries had been exposed to early state building, but all the countries which derived from the Russian and Ottoman Empires had only very limited experiences in the process of state building (see e.g. Aarebrot and Berglund 1995). While the first group had had its experiences e.g. with feudalism and Roman law (Charlemagne heritage), the second group of states lacked these characteristics (Byzantine heritage). Ex-British and Ex-Spanish settler colonies are coded like their motherlands. While there is an early tradition of executive constraints in countries with a Charlemagne heritage, the further we travel to the east, the stronger lasted the influence of the idea that the ruler is allowed to act as he pleases (Schöpflin 1993) Legacy: Electoral and Liberal-Constitutional Tradition According to Gregory Luebbert (1991), in all societies where liberals were hegemonic an interclass coalition followed. Hence, for Luebbert, pre-war liberal hegemony is a sufficient cause for the survival of democracy in the interwar years (8). However, I would argue that the stronger argument is that democracy and constitutionalism fosters the development of a democratic political culture and thus the consolidation of democracy. I test the effect of an electoral and constitutional tradition before World War I.

10 Stress Approaches Based on David Easton s system theory (1965; 1973), it seems likely that political systems under extraordinary stress experience a breakdown, because the citizens are not willing to support a regime that does not satisfy their demands. If the will of the people to support the political system decreases, the stress on the regime increases further. Especially the correlation between the absence of economic stress (that means economic growth, absence of an economic crisis and low inflation) and the stability of democracy is well established (Przeworski 1996; Przeworski et al. 2000). Stress for a political system, however, can have very different causes Economic Decline Postwar Crisis It seems to make sense to argue that a sudden drop in economic wealth endangers the persistence of an electoral regime. A time-specific factor of stress for some electoral regimes in the interwar periods was a strong economic and social crisis after World War I. World War I was a traumatic experience for all countries taking part in that war, especially for the European countries which lost the war. A typical example of a postwar crisis is Germany. In 1919 Free Corps took Berlin and the Spartakus leaders Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg were murdered; soon afterwards the German Revolution was crushed. I followed the coding rule by Berg-Schlosser/de Meur (1994) to distinguish between countries that experienced a post-war crisis and those that did not. Great Depression It is often said that the strong effect of the world economic crisis is indeed one of the major reasons why so many democracies failed in the interwar years (referred to Weimar Germany see Lepsius 1978, 50). Using the data of Berg-Schlosser and Mitchell 2002 (2002) and Angus Maddison (2009), I test if there was a strong effect of the Great depression after However, all electoral regimes that broke down before 1929 are coded with 0, because the condition did not precede the outcome and therefore the economic crisis could not have played a role in these breakdowns.

11 11 Double Crisis The last step is to clarify whether a combined strong effect of a postwar crisis and the Great Depression helps to explain the breakdown of non-autocratic electoral regimes. Only cases which experienced both forms of crisis are coded with Territorial Loss After World War I huge territorial shifts occurred in Europe. It can be argued that every nation experiences great stress when it is confronted with substantial loss of territory and/or many of its native people. People of a former greater empire might think it is necessary to support a strong autocrat, that is aiming and able to retake territory and free the own people abroad (on the effects of postimperial stress on Weimar Germany and Post-Soviet Russia see Kailitz and Umland 2009) Institutional Approaches: Democratic Regime Type and Electoral System Institutional variables have a special appeal for researchers, because politicians can change them without great effort via constitutional engineering (Sartori 1997). It is relatively easy to modify the electoral system, whereas it is often a long lasting and complicated process to improve socio-economic conditions. I examine the effect of two institutional variables: 1. a strong president and 2. a proportional electoral system. I have chosen these factors according to the following arguments in the literature: Juan Linz (1994) and many others argued that presidential democracies are more prone to democratic breakdown (see e.g. also Kailitz 2004a; Valenzuela 2004). The point is that the president and the majority of parliament are independent of each other and there is no constitutional resolution for a deadlock between these two institutions. 7 Regarding electoral systems Ferdinand Hermens (1941) claimed that proportional electoral systems not only lead to high level of fragmentation of party systems and low levels of government stability, but also in the end to the breakdown of democracy. 7 In the discussion on the constitution of the Weimar Republic most prominently Karl Dietrich Bracher pointed out that the dual legitimacy of two popularly elected bodies independent of each other the president of the state and the parliament undermined the stability of the governments and led to a presidential dictatorship (Bracher 1962). Until today many political scientists stress that semi-presidentialism was a main problem of the Weimar Republic (Rüb 1994; Skach 2005).

12 Actor-centered Approaches Dankwart Rustow (1970), the godfather of the actor-centered approach to transitions from and to democracy, stated that a democracy cannot be stable without the decision of the main actors to sustain it (see e.g. also Dahl 1989, 264). It is argued that especially under conditions of deep political crisis, institutional structures become malleable and the space of maneuver for the main actors is broader than during quiet times (Dobry 1986). In such situations the actors are able to make certain choices that can increase or decrease the probability of persistence and stability of a regime (Linz 1978, 4). However, the ordinary people as an important actor should not be forgotten (Bermeo 2003). It is a fundamental problem for democracy if there are not enough people who principally prefer the idea of democracy to the idea of autocracy, and there is no hegemony of a democratic political culture. However, theree are good reasons to claim that to sustain a democracy it is sufficient if the people just follow democratic rules by custom or rational choice this can be assumed in a similar way for all political systems (Linz 1978). Only if many people vote for anti-democratic parties or act anti-democratically, is the electoral regime in danger. The larger the vote share for left-wing and right-wing anti-system parties the higher the risk of polarization of party systems and the breakdown of electoral regimes (Capoccia 2002, 2005; Ieraci 1992; Powell 1986; Sani and Sartori 1983). I define as anti-democratic parties that try to establish an autocratic regime and overthrow the electoral regime, like the fascist and communist parties in the interwar period (Kailitz 2004b). After that I turn to the question of whether the actions of a leading politician mattered for the survival or breakdown of an electoral regime. To answer the question, I code if one of the leading politicians, be it a president, prime minister or king, intervened in favor of democracy or not. Third, I code if a leading politician, be it a president, prime minister or king, intervened in favor of autocracy. Such an action is, for example, an executive coup (autogolpe) or a royal coup by leading politicians themselves or the acceptance of a legal revolution of extremist parties by leading politicians.

13 13 5. Results 5.1 Structural Approaches Socioeconomic conditions The absence of a high level of development is a necessary condition for the breakdown of electoral regimes. In other words, an electoral regime does not break down when it has reached a certain level of economic development. This result is in line with (Przeworski et al. 2000). All electoral regimes that broke down were solely countries with low or medium levels of development. All electoral regimes with a high level of development surived the interwar years. However, a high level of development is not a necessary condition for the survival of electoral regimes since Czechoslovakia, Costa Rica, Finland, Ireland, Norway, and Sweden survived without being highly developed. Nevertheless, the absence of a low level of development is almost a necessary condition (consistency 0.88). Only the electoral regimes in Costa Rica and Ireland survived the interwar years despite a low degree of modernization. Nevertheless, Costa Rica is not a strong contradiction to the claim that electoral regimes with low levels of development broke down in the Interwar years. 8 The electoral regime in Costa Rica broke down shortly before the start of the interwar years in 1917 as well as shortly after the end of the interwar years in However, it is obvious that the electoral regimes in Argentina, Austria, and Germany broke down despite exhibiting at least medium levels of development. And if I were to only slightly reduce the threshold for a high GDP, Austria (GDP 1913: 3465$ per capita) and Germany (GDP 3523$ per capita) would even count as highly developed countries. That is why one could argue that the Austrian and German development somehow contradicts the modernization theory (see e.g. Lipset 1960, 28). Table 2: Modernity (high) and Breakdown Modernity Outcome Countries (high) 0 0 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Netherlands, New Zealand, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA 0 1 Austria, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Spain, Greece, Argentina, Cuba, Portugal, Uruguay, Yugoslavia 1 0 Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden However, presently we can observe the pattern of a surviving democracy despite a low level of modernization, for example in India.

14 14 Table 3: Modernity (low) and Breakdown Modernity (low) Outcome Countries 0 0 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA 0 1 Austria, Germany, Argentina 1 0 Costa Rica, Ireland 1 1 Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Spain, Greece, Cuba, Portugal, Uruguay, Yugoslavia Historical Structures Strong labor-repressive agrarian elite A strong agrarian elite combined with a labor-repressive agriculture was a necessary condition for the breakdown of an electoral regime in the interwar period. In we turn the tables the absence of a strong labor-repressive agrarian elite was not a necessary condition for the survival of an electoral regime. That means electoral regimes can survive very well with a strong agrarian labor-repressive elite. Anyhow: no breakdown of an electoral regime without a labor-repressive agrarian elite. Table 4: Strong labor-repressive Agrarian Elite Strong laborrepressive Outcom Countries e agrarian elite 0 0 Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom Australia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Ireland, USA 1 1 Austria, Germany, Italy, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Spain, Greece, Argentina, Cuba, Portugal, Uruguay, Yugoslavia Secularism and State-Building Secularized Protestantism was an almost necessary condition for an electoral regime to survive in the interwar years (consistency of 0.88). Nevertheless, the electoral regimes in Costa Rica and Ireland survived with a Catholic culture. Moreover, three electoral regimes in countries with secularized Protestant majorities broke down. If we turn the tables, the absence of secularized Protestantism as the dominant culture did not fulfill the criterion of quasinecessity for the breakdown of the electoral regime (consistency of 0.79)

15 15 Table 5: Secularized Protestantism Secularized Outcome Countries Protestantism 0 0 Costa Rica, Ireland 0 1 Austria, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Spain, Greece, Argentina, Cuba, Portugal, Uruguay, Yugoslavia 1 0 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA 1 1 Estonia, Germany, Latvia A Charlemagne heritage was a necessary condition for the survival of an electoral regime in the interwar years. Not a single electoral regime with Byzantine heritage survived the interwar years. Nevertheless, Byzantine heritage was not at all a necessary condition for the breakdown of an electoral regime in the interwar years. The electoral regime broke down in eight countries with a Charlemagne heritage. Table 6: Charlemagne Heritage Charlemagne Outcome Countries Heritage Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Greece, Yugoslavia 1 0 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA 1 1 Austria, Germany, Italy, Spain, Argentina, Cuba, Portugal, Uruguay Legacy: Electoral and Liberal-Constitutional Tradition The absence of an electoral and constitutional tradition before World War I is a necessary condition for the breakdown of an electoral regime. Conversely, the presence of an electoral and constitutional tradition is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for the survival of a democracy. Table 7: Electoral and Constitutional Tradition pre World War I Electoral and Outcome Countries Constitutional Tradition 0 0 Czechoslovakia, Finland, Ireland 0 1 Austria, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Spain, Argentina, Cuba, Greece, Uruguay, Portugal, Yugoslavia 1 0 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, France, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA 1 1 -

16 Stress Approaches Economic Decline Postwar crisis The presence of a postwar crisis is not a necessary condition for the breakdown of an electoral regime. However, the absence of a postwar crisis is almost a necessary condition for the survival of electoral regimes. Of 16 surviving electoral regimes only two had to struggle with a postwar crisis. In these two countries, Czechoslovakia and Finland, the electoral regimes stood at the age of a precipice. Table 8: Postwar Crisis and Breakdown Postwar Outcome Countries crisis 0 0 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, France, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA 0 1 Spain, Greece, Argentina, Cuba, Portugal, Uruguay, Yugoslavia 1 0 Czechoslovakia, Finland 1 1 Austria, Germany, Italy, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland Great Depression Nearly all electoral regimes of the late 1920s were strongly affected by the world economic crisis of the late 1920s and early 1930s (for details see Saalfeld 2002; Zimmermann and Saalfeld 1988). 9 Due to the fact that the fascists already came to power in Italy in 1923 and seven more electoral regimes broke down before the Great Depression, a strong impact of the world economic crisis is no necessary condition for the breakdown of electoral regime. However, this does not imply that the impact of the Great Depression was not a reason why electoral regimes that survived until 1929 broke down. Table 9: Great Depression Strong impact of Outcome Countries Great depression Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Spain, Argentina, Cuba, Portugal, Yugoslavia 1 0 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA 1 1 Austria, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Uruguay 9 The data even give us the peculiar answer that a strong effect of the World economic crisis is a necessary reason for the survival of an electoral regime.

17 17 Double Crisis Maybe the impact of double crisis (Arends and Kümmel 2000) does not help to explain as much as one might think when we only take a look at the German case. Of the 14 failed electoral regimes, only four suffered a double crisis. So, a double crisis was not at all necessary for an electoral regime to break down. It is also not very probable that the failures of the electoral regimes in Austria, Estonia, Germany, and Latvia are directly related to the fact that the impact of the world economic crisis ( ) was the second profound crisis in less than ten years. For example, in Germany the economy recovered rather quickly after the disastrous inflation of 1923 and it could therefore not have had any direct impact on the democratic breakdown in Germany. During the golden years of the Weimar Republic between 1924 and 1929 the GNP per capita increased at an average rate of four per cent. Argentina, Cuba, Spain, Portugal, Yugoslavia neither experienced a crisis after World War I nor were they strongly affected by the world economic crisis before the electoral regime broke down However, since only two of 16 of the surviving electoral regimes experienced a double crisis the absence of a double crisis is almost a necessary condition for survival. In addition to that we should also consider again that the electoral regimes in Czechoslovakia and Finland were very close to a breakdown of the electoral regime. Table 10: Double Crisis Double Outcome Countries crisis 0 0 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, France, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA 0 1 Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Spain, Argentina, Cuba, Uruguay, Portugal, Yugoslavia 1 0 Czechoslovakia, Finland, 1 1 Austria, Estonia, Germany, Latvia Territorial Loss Three Empires the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, the German Empire, and the Ottoman Empire perished after World War I. Only two of our observed electoral regimes Austria and Germany suffered huge territorial losses. Germany lost 13 per cent of its previous territory and with it 15 per cent of the cultivated rural land (Arends and Kümmel 2000, 199). In Austria as well as Germany fascists gained ground and the electoral regime broke down. Huge territorial losses are not at all necessary for an electoral regime to break down. No electoral regime that had to cope with huge territorial loss survived. So the absence of territorial loss is a necessary condition for the survival of electoral regimes. Huge territorial

18 18 losses might well be the missing explanation for why two relatively well-developed countries turned into autocracies in the interwar years. It might especially explain the strengthening of fascist parties in these countries. In Germany the Nazis took over power and in Austria the fascists were at least part of a coalition government. Table 11: Territorial Loss Territorial Outcome Countries loss 0 0 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA 0 1 Estonia, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Spain, Argentina, Cuba, Portugal, Uruguay, Yugoslavia Austria, Germany 5.3. Institutional Approaches: Democratic regime type and Electoral System The presence or absence of a proportional electoral system is neither a necessary (or sufficient) condition for the survival or breakdown of an electoral regime. Table 12: Proportional Electoral System Proportional Outcome Countries system 0 0 Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, USA, 0 1 Spain, Cuba, Portugal, Uruguay 1 0 Belgium, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 1 1 Austria, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Argentina, Yugoslavia The presence or absence of a strong president is also neither a necessary (nor a sufficient) condition for the breakdown or survival of an electoral regime in the interwar years. Costa Rica, Finland, USA survived with a strong president and five electoral regimes survived with a parliamentarian regime. However, the absence of a strong president (= parliamentarianism) only scarcely misses the threshold of quasi-necessary condition (consistency: 0.81). Table 13: Strong President Strong Outcome Countries President 0 0 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom 0 1 Estonia, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania 1 0 Costa Rica, Finland, USA 1 1 Austria, Germany, Poland, Spain, Argentina, Cuba, Portugal, Uruguay, Yugoslavia

19 Actor-centered Approaches Popular Support of anti-democratic Parties Strong anti-system parties are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the breakdown of electoral regimes. In seven electoral regimes broke down without strong anti-democratic parties and in four countries democracy survived despite strong anti-system parties. Table 14: Popular Support of Anti-Democratic Parties Anti-systemparties Outcome Countries 0 0 Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA 0 1 Greece, Poland, Argentina, Cuba, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Portugal 1 0 Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Netherlands 1 1 Austria, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Spain Autocratic Behavior of Leading Politicians The absence of action on the part of leading politicians to save democracy is a necessary condition for the breakdown of an electoral regime. Every time leading politicians acted in favor of autocracy, democracy broke down. Autocratic behavior of leading politicians is a sufficient condition for the breakdown of electoral regimes. The same can be said for regimes in which leading politicians acted in favor of democracy in times of crisis, as in Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Finland (for the datails see Capoccia 2005). Under unfavorable conditions it seems to have a fundamental impact if leading politicians support democracy, as in Finland and Czechoslovakia, or whether they are not willing to defend it, for example Hindenburg in Weimar Germany or King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy. If we turn the tables, it was a necessary condition for an electoral regime to survive the interwar years that no leading politician acted in favor of autocracy. Moreover, it was a sufficient condition for the survival if a leading politician acted in order to save democracy. In Germany and Italy the power was handed over voluntarily to the fascists by a non-democratic president (Germany) or king (Italy). In Austria the King shifted the power to anti-democratic, non-fascist actors, which included fascist groups in the government, partly to prevent a fascist autocracy In Germany we can actually observe both patterns. First, in 1930 Hindenburg handed the power over to antidemocratic, non-fascist forces. When the constitutional dictatorships of Schleicher and Papen did not work out well, however, he finally empowered Hitler in 1933 (Bracher 1955).

20 20 Table 15: Pro-Autocratic Behavior of a Leading Politician in a Time of Crisis Pro-Autocratic Outcome Countries Behavior 0 0 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA 0 1 Lithuania, Poland, Spain, Argentina, Portugal, Uruguay Austria, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Greece, Cuba, Yugoslavia Table 16: Pro-Democratic Behavior of a Leading Politician in a Time of Crisis Pro-Democratic Outcome Countries Behavior 0 0 Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, France, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA 0 1 Austria, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Spain, Argentina, Cuba, Portugal, Uruguay, Yugoslavia 1 0 Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Finland An Explanation for the Failure and Success of Electoral Regimes in the Interwar Years In the bottom-up analysis the absence of a high level of modernization and the absence of a liberal and electoral tradition pre World War I and a strong agrarian labor-repressive elite and the lack of a pro-democratic action of a leading politician in a (economic and/or political) crisis appeared to be necessary conditions for the breakdown of an electoral regime. Hence, only if all four conditions (prerequisites) had been fulfilled in the interwar years, did an electoral regime break down. 11 The bottom-up analysis also shows that a Charlemagne heritage and the absence of a huge territorial loss and an autocratic action of leading politicians are necessary factors for the survival of electoral regimes in the interwar years. 12 In addition to that the absence of a low level of modernity (presence of at least a medium development; exceptions: Costa Rica and 11 High levels of economic development (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, New Zealand, Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA), the absence of a strong labor-repressive agrarian elite (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland) and a tradition of liberal constitutionalism dating back to the time before World War I (Australia, United Kingdom, Belgium, Canada, New Zealand, Costa Rica, Denmark, France, Netherlands, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, USA) and a pro-democratic action of leading politician in a (economic and/or political) crisis (Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Finland) are sufficient conditions to explain the survival of electoral regimes (in combination with the necessary conditions). 12 If we go the way bottom-up, conversely, the absence of a Charlemagne heritage (Estonia, Latvia, Greece, Lithuania, Poland, Yugoslavia) and a huge territorial loss (Austria and Germany), and the occurrence of a proautocratic autocratic action of a leading politician in a (economic and/or political) crisis (Austria, Cuba, Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Germany, Greece, Yugoslavia) are sufficient conditions to explain the breakdown of electoral regimes (in combination with the necessary conditions). Nevertheless, not all cases are explained by these three paths.

21 21 Ireland), a dominant culture of secularized Protestantism (exceptions: Costa Rica and Ireland) and a double crisis (exceptions: Czechoslovakia and Finland) 13 are quasi-necessary conditions for the breakdown of electoral regimes in the interwar years. In two of the four deviant cases, Czechoslovakia and Finland, the electoral regime almost broke down and it seems almost only due to pro-democratic actions of leading politicians that democracy survived (Braghiroli 2007; Karvonen 2000; Bradley 2000). In Costa Rica the electoral regime broke down shortly after and before our time of consideration. Ireland became independent in 1921 after centuries of British rule. The argument those would be that Ireland in fact had a liberal and constitutional tradition pre World War I. This means consequently: Having had no immediate experience of anything but the Westminster system, most Irish citizens [and so also the main political actors, S.K.] perceived the idea of an alternative regime type as beyond the limits of realistic consideration (Zink 2000, 292). To present the results of our top-down analysis of sufficient conditions, the reader needs to know the complete truth table: Table 17: Truth Table of all Conditions for the Survival and Breakdown of Electoral Regimes v1 v2 v3 v6 v7 v8 v9 v10 v11 v12 v13 v14 v15 v16 v17 O Country Australia, United Kingdom Austria Belgium Canada, New Zealand Costa Rica Czechoslovakia Denmark Estonia, Latvia Finland France, Netherlands Germany Ireland Italy Lithuania Norway Poland Sweden Switzerland USA Spain Greece Portugal Argentina Cuba Uruguay Yugoslavia 13 A postwar crisis is also a quasi-necessary condition, but this factor is already implied in the double crisis.

22 22 v1: Protestant-secular tradition; v2: Charlemagne heritage; v3: strong labor-repressive agrarian elite; v4: huge territorial loss; v5: postwar crisis; v6: strong anti-democratic parties in parliament; v7: proportional electoral system; v8: strong president; v9: high modernity; v10: low modernity; v11: strong effect of Great depression ; v12: pro-autocratic action of a leading politician in a time of crisis; v13: pro-democratic action of a leading politician in a time of crisis; v14: double crisis ; v17: electoral and constitutional tradition pre World War I; O: breakdown of non-autocratic electoral regime. If all necessary conditions were fulfilled, according to the top-down analysis of sufficient conditions, three paths led to an electoral breakdown in the interwar years: Result for sufficient conditions of breakdown: no Charlemagne heritage or Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Yugoslavia pro-autocratic action of a leading politician in a time of crisis or Austria, Cuba, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Italy, Yugoslavia strong president (and no prodemocratic action of a leading politician) Argentina, Austria, Cuba, Germany, Poland, Spain, Portugal, Uruguay, Yugoslavia Remainders included, choice of prime implicants by the author based on theoretic assumptions. In italics cases which are solely covered by this path. The other way round, if all necessary conditions were fulfilled, there are three paths that led to the survival of an electoral regime in the interwar years: Results for sufficient conditions of survival: electoral and constitutional democracy pre World War I or Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, France, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA no pro-democratic behavior of a leading politician in a time of crisis or Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Finland Parliamentarianism (and Charlemagne heritage and no pro-autocratic behavior of a leading politician in a time of crisis) Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ireland, France, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom Remainders included, choice of prime implicants by the author based on theoretic assumptions. In italics cases which are solely covered by this path. If I recode Ireland, which seems very plausible, as being a country with an electoral and constitutional tradition pre World War I due to the British rule only two paths would be left.