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1 Voting Systems

2 Main idea: Voting systems matter.

3 Electoral College Winner takes all in most states (48/50) (plurality in states) 270/538 electoral votes needed to win (majority) If 270 isn t obtained - a run-off election between top two vote getters It is nearly impossible for a 3 rd party candidate to win however there can be a spoiler effect We have evolved into a 2 party system Leads to stability but limits options

4 Proponents of the Electoral College system normally defend it on the philosophical grounds that it: contributes to the cohesiveness of the country by requiring a distribution of popular support to be elected president enhances the status of minority interests, contributes to the political stability of the nation by encouraging a two-party system, and maintains a federal system of government and representation.

5 Arguments Against the Electoral College Those who object to the Electoral College system and favor a direct popular election of the president generally do so on four grounds: the possibility of electing a minority president the risk of so-called "faithless" Electors, the possible role of the Electoral College in depressing voter turnout, and its failure to accurately reflect the national popular will in all states.

6 All states are not the same Influence- swing states.

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8 Presidential Campaign visits in 2012 (Romney in red Obama in blue) by Candidates in 2012

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10 Relate the law of supply to the Electoral College.

11 Is this system Fair?

12 Should the system be change?

13 Fairness Criteria What is meant by fair? Over the years, those who study voting theory have proposed numerous criteria which most people would expect a 'fair' preferential election method to satisfy. In this lesson, we will consider four Fairness Criteria. (There are others but we will only consider these four.)

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15 Majority Rules Majority Rules satisfies all criteria if there are only two candidates and there is an odd number of votes. If there are more than two candidates, it is possible that none of the candidates receives a majority and thus no winner could be determined by majority rules. When we have more than 2 candidates, we must use other methods of voting, even though a majority could still occur with more than 2 candidates. Unfortunately, there is no method of voting that will satisfy all of the fairness criteria stated. Kenneth Arrow s impossibility theorem states that is impossible to make a method of voting that will satisfy all the voting criteria when there is more than 2 candidates. Elections with more than 2 candidates can lead to fairness questions.

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17 You will be voting on the new location of the state capital. Assumption 1: Voters want the capital to be located in the city that is the closest proximity to them. Assumption 2: Proximity is a consistent preference amongst all voters Assumption 3: The capital can only be located in one city. Assumption 4: The percent of the population shown accounts for all members in the population who consider that specific city their home city Assumption 5: Using the fairest voting method is desirable.

18 Plurality/majority voting This plurality/majority family of voting systems is undoubtedly the one most familiar to Americans. They are the winner-take-all systems we most often use to elect officials to our local, state, and federal legislatures. These systems all require the winning candidate to garner either a plurality or a majority of the votes Use the Plurality voting system to determine where the capital is to be located. Assume that all city members will vote in a manner that is consistent the assumptions. Who wins?

19 Plurality Vote Southville- 65 Westlake- 50 Northview - 45 Easton - 40

20 Was this fair? Why yes and no Would you recommend a plurality voting system over the electoral college system? Why or why not?

21 What is the flaw with plurality voting? Or Is it flawless? If so explain why.

22 Flaws To win a plurality of the vote means to have the most votes (more than any other candidate). To win a majority means to have more than 50% of the vote. A majority is automatically a plurality but a plurality is not always a majority.

23 Open to tactical voting People are not voting with true preference Example Northview votes for Easton in order to allow Easton to beat out Southville.

24 Condorcet Method In the Condorcet election method, voters rank the candidates in order of preference. The vote counting procedure then takes into account each preference of each voter for one candidate over another. It does so by conceptually breaking the election down into a series of separate races between each possible pairing of candidates, hence it is sometimes referred to as a "pairwise" method. If one of the candidates beats each of the other candidates in their one-onone race, then that candidate wins. Otherwise, the result is ambiguous and a standard procedure is used to resolve the ambiguity. Unlike conventional plurality voting, Condorcet voting gives voters little incentive to falsify their true preferences. If there were a series of elections between two cities, is there a city that would win all head to head contest?

25 Condorcet Method If there was a series of elections between two towns, is there a town that would win all head to head contest? If so, that town is the Condorcet winner. Who is the Condorcet winner? Figure out the winners by adding up the votes Northview vs Easton Northview vs Westlake Northview vs Southville Easton vs Southville Easton vs Northview Easton vs Westlake Southville vs Westlake Southville vs Easton Southville vs Northview Westlake vs Southville Westlake vs Easton Westlake vs Northview

26 Condorcet Method If there was a series of elections between two towns, is there a town that would win all head to head contest? If so, that town is the Condorcet winner. Who is the Condorcet winner? Figure out the winners by adding up the voting percentages Northview 45 vs Easton 155 Northview 85 vs Westlake 115 Northview 135 vs Southville 65 Easton 135 vs Southville 65 Easton 155 vs Northview 45 Easton 85 vs Westlake 115 Southville 65 vs Westlake 135 Southville 65 vs Easton 135 Southville 65 vs Northview 135 Westlake 135 vs Southville 65 Westlake 115 vs Easton 85 Westlake 115 vs Northview 85

27 Was this fair? Would you recommend a Condorcet voting system over the electoral college system? Why or why not?

28 Are there any potential flaws with the Condorcet voting system? Or Is it flawless? If so explain why.

29 1. The system still relies on majority rules and it is possible that no single candidate earns the majority vote. 2. In real life there can also be a Condorcet Paradox since different voters can have different sets of preferences. The situation emerges when, once all votes have been added up, the preferences of all voters can form a circle in which every candidate is beaten by at least one other candidate. Think of it like Candidate rock beats Candidate scissors Candidate scissors beats Candidate paper Candidate paper beats Candidate Rock 3. It is possible for two candidates to tie while defeating all other candidates.

30 Did you notice that the first place winner in the plurality vote was last place in the Condorcet system?

31 The Borda count is a single-winner election method in which voters rank options or candidates in order of preference. The Borda count, BC, determines the outcome of a debate or the winner of an election by giving each option or candidate a certain number of points corresponding to the position in which it, or he or she, is ranked by each voter. Once all votes have been counted the option or candidate with the most points is the winner. Because it sometimes elects broadly acceptable options or candidates, rather than those preferred by the majority, the Borda count is often described as a consensus-based voting system, rather than a majoritarian one. Each city will receive a certain amount of points based on their ranking. The city with the largest amount of points is the winner. Determine the city s preference top receives (3) the lowest receives a (0) Multiple the number by the population to get total points awarded by each city. Example: Northview gives themselves a 3 and has a population of 45= 135 points

32 Candidate: Northview Candidate: Westlake Candidate: Easton Candidate: Southville Northview (45 votes) Westlake (50 votes) Easton (40 votes) Southville (65 votes) Total

33 Candidate: Northview Candidate: Westlake Candidate: Easton Candidate: Southville Northview (45 votes) points points 90 points 0 points Westlake (50 votes) 1 50 points points points 0 0 points Easton (40 votes) 2 80 points 1 40 points points 0 0 points Southville (65 votes) 0 0 points points 65 points 195 points Total 265 points 365 points 375 points 195 points

34 Was this fair? Would you recommend a Borda count voting system over the electoral college system? Why or why not? Would this prevent the spoiler effect?

35 Are there any potential flaws with the Borda voting system? Or Is it flawless? If so explain why.

36 Tactical Voting!!! Lets assume that the people of Southville realize that there is no way that they will win the election. The also realize that the second best option (Westlake) is in a dead heat with Easton. If they mount a strong campaign to encourage voters to name Easton as their bottom preference what will happen? A vote for Easton is a vote against Southville!!

37 Candidate: Northview Candidate: Westlake Candidate: Easton Candidate: Southville Northview (45 votes) points points 90 points 0 points Westlake (50 votes) 1 50 points points points 0 0 points Easton (17 votes) 2 80 points 1 40 points points 0 0 points Southville (65 votes) 1 65 points points 0 points 195 points Total 330 points 365 points 310 points 195 points

38 The Borda count may also fail the Irrelevant alternatives criteria. Lets assume that people of Northview elect to drop out of the race. After the orginal Borda count the town came in 3 rd and was 100 points behind the 2 nd place finisher. They should be irrelevant if there was another election. But are they?

39 Borda Count (after Northview dropped out)

40 Instant run-off election or transferable vote Voters will rank the candidates in order of preference rather than voting for a single candidate. Ballots are initially distributed based on each elector s first preference. If a candidate earns a majority of the votes cast, the candidate wins. If no majority is reached the candidate with the least amount of votes is eliminated and their ballots are recounted and reassigned to the remaining candidates who rank next in order of preference on each ballot. The process continues until there is a candidate who wins more than half of the votes.

41 What city wins if the IRV system is used? Ranking order Northview (45) Westlake (50) Easton (40) Southville (65) 1 Northview Westlake Easton Southville 2 Easton Easton Northview Westlake 3 Westlake Northview Westlake Easton 4 Southview Southville Southville Northview Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Southville (65) Westlake (50) Northview (45) Easton (40)

42 What city wins if the IRV system is used? Ranking order Northview (45) Westlake (50) Easton (40) Southville (65) 1 Northview Westlake Easton Southville 2 Easton Easton Northview Westlake 3 Westlake Northview Westlake Easton 4 Southview Southview Southville Northview Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Southville (65) Northview (85) Westlake (50) Southville (65) Northview (45) Westlake (50) Easton (40)

43 What city wins if the IRV system is used? Ranking order Northview (45) Westlake (50) Easton (40) Southville (65) 1 Northview Westlake Easton Southville 2 Easton Easton Northview Westlake 3 Westlake Northview Westlake Easton 4 Southview Southview Southville Northview Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Southville (65) Northview (85) Northview (135) Westlake (50) Southville (65) Southville (65) Northview (45) Westlake (50) Easton (40)

44 Was this fair? Would you recommend an Instant runoff election system over the electoral college system? Why or why not?

45 Are there any potential flaws with the Instant Run-off election voting system? Or Is it flawless? If so explain why.

46 Tactical voting

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48 If it came down to deciding what voting system to use What would be "fair" according to the people of Southville? Northview? Westlake? Easton? Voting systems matter Why would Republicans in Pa. suggest a proportional electoral vote or a district vote Why would some suggest for popular votes?

49 When there are elections between 3 or more candidates Voting systems matter No system is perfect There will always be claims of under and over representation This is why the 2 party system has led to stability.

50 Be careful of those who claim that they have the answer that will fix the electoral college system. They probably do have an answer but it may not be the answer that you are looking for.

51 2000 Presidential Election Using the Electoral College Winner- George Bush.

52 2000 Presidential Election But what if...? Note: Because it is impossible to know preferences the following results are based on tactical voting. Assumption: Supporters for both Bush and Gore assume that their main challenge will come from the opposite major party. The tactical vote is to negate their power as much as possible.

53 2000 Presidential Election But what if we used plurality voting? Winner- Al Gore.

54 2000 Presidential Election But what if we used the Condorcet voting system? Winner- Ralph Nader.

55 Number of votes in millions Bush 50.5 vs Gore 53.9 Bush 50.5 vs Nader 53.9 Gore 53.9 vs Bush 50.5 Gore 51 vs Nader 53.4 Nader 53.4 vs Gore 51 Nader 53.9 vs Bush 50.5

56 2000 Presidential Election But what if we used the Borda Count voting system? Winner- Ralph Nader.

57 Candidate: Bush Candidate: Gore Candidate: Nader Bush (50.5 votes) points points 50.5 points Gore (51 votes) 0 0 points points 1 51 points Nader (2.9 votes) 0 0 points points points Total 101 points points points

58 2000 Presidential Election But what if we used the IRV voting system? Winner- Al Gore.

59 Bush (50.5) Gore (51) Nader (2.9) Bush Gore Nader Nader Nader Gore Gore Gore Bush Round 1 Round 2 Gore (51) Gore 53.9 Bush (50.5) Bush 50.5 Nader (2.9)

60 Relate the law of supply to the Electoral College.

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67 Relate the law of supply to a national popular vote.

68 Its your turn. Create a system to elect the President of the United States. Consider the following items: The fairness criteria Our principles such as Federalism Some systems that you have witnessed in this lesson

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