S/HS DEPARTMENT OF STATE. Washington. D.C ( I. :. -...::.~--.-a-, ~.1 A 'tl.. ( ; di: ;~! ~ ( I NoMesponsi'/einfa

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1 S/HS DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington. D.C. 252 Dear Cy: ( I. :. -...::.--.-a-,.1 A 'tl.. ( ; di: ;! ( I NoMesponsi'/einfa Peburry ]5, 198 REVIEWED by /J?:r= ""'Ol. =.OfPAexen:ptions. ls:m!lm:-. ( ) o.assify as ' vn.v, ( )OOWNGRADETSto()Sorl )C.OADP This is a purely personal think-piee on the present state of our relations with the Soviet Union, for whatever value it may have toward your own thinking. The first part is bakground analysis; the seond part draws some poliy impliations. I. Bakground: - Some observations on present Soviet outlook. 1. The urrent state of mind of the Soviet leadership: a) Whether or not the Soviet leaders aknowledge that any misalulations were involved in their deisions on Afghanistan (and urely there were), they do not have any sense of ulpability for what they have done. They feel that what they did 111as justified, and they feel aggrieved at the reation they have reaped.' '5 "' b) ) They probably genuinely believe that the sale of outside help to the Afghan insurgents justified and required the Soviet intervention. It may be that the reports from the field magnified this outside help, as an explanation of the disintegrating situation. In any ase, present reports of post-invasion aid to the insurgents will fortify their earlier onvitions. They also believe that the u.s. reation to Afghanistan is mainly motivated by preeletion politis. They feel that the alarms raised about Pakistan, Iran, and Yugoslavia are similarly motivated. RDS-3 2/15/ (SHULHAN, Harsl1all D.) _ """''''' v- -',.,, _._,,, r:-.._

2 .. :'...,.. ::.. ". :- ' 2. j) e) 2- ::::l...ly :,avu 1--r<-b.b_y wrltte.1.j f..m:, t..xi-e..tation of an improvement of reations with the U.S. until after the eetion and (if Carter is re-eleted) perhaps beyond. They ame to this onlusion before Afghanistan The most important fators in their minds were: the Soviet troops in Cuba issue,_ the TNF deision the moves toward China; the delay in ratifiation of SALT, aompanied by higher military budgets and the I4X deis.ion. They believe the U. S. deliberatey sought to suttle detente, for domesti politial reasons. The attitude of the Soviet leadership to\'lard! the U.S. at the time the deision on Afghanistan was made was probably one of anger, frustration, emotionalism.. The Soviet deision to invade Afghanistan: a) They probably exaggerated both the likelihood and the impliations of a politial and military setbak if they failed.to at.,_ l! ) ::t: b) ) d) It is unlikely that e Soviet leadership saw its ation as a signifiant qualitative departure from previous poliy, or realied that it would be seen as suh. In their eyes, it represented a ontinuation of previous poliy, even though in earlier ase outside the blo, they worked through Cuban troops rather than their own. In onsidering the effet of this ation on Third World states, the Soviet leaders probably judged that a deisive use of military power would have a salutary intimidating effet, if any. In the period during whih the invasion was planned, the Soviets probably believed the U.S. might be involved in some limited military ation in Iran, and that this would modify w;:>rld r2a.on t o tteir owr. me-r;.!::>ecri:.t E.,;;

3 -3-3. Dor.. es ti re.pe.rus.ji.jns ::.n tl:e UfSR: Despite all the foregoing onsiderations, the effets df the Afghan adventure must have been powerfully disturbing to the Soviet leadership. Although the leadership may be in a truulent frame of mind, they will have to ope with serious domesti onsequenes: o' a) Eonomi planning will have to be adjusted substantially, to take aount of agriultural and industrial disloations. Inputs from abroad will be lower. Strains on hard urreny will be greater. Military expenditures will be greater. All this omes on top of reent reports of unsatisfatory eonomi performane in It is possible that the large unertainties now faing Soviet foreign eonomi relations may strengthen tendenies toward a return to autarky. ;;:: b) Domesti ontrols on ultural and politial dissidene wlll be tightened, without regard to their impat abroad. The dissident movement will be subjet to harsher measures. Jewish emigration is likely to be further redued. Strong propaganda measures will be needed to offset the impat of military asualties on foreign soil. 4. Foreign poliy effets: a) Although the offiial Soviet position is that the Soviet ommitment to "detente" remains unhanged, the tone of Soviet propaganda regarding the u.s. has beome sharper, while the Soviet effort to ultivate relations with Western Europe intensifies. b) For the present, the Soviet Union autiously seeks to avoid measures that will inrease international tension, but it may be tempted to exploit opportunities to inrease U.S

4 4 difiulties in tne M1ddle ast, anu to explqit a breakdown of the arrangements in southern Afria. ) Tere are tentative signs that the Bulgarians may be testing Yugoslavia's nerve by floating trial balloons, perhaps at the instigation of the Soviet Union. d) The Sovet Union has urbed Western ontats with Eastern Europe, to prevent the exploitation of intra-blo tensions. i Q... : :;; 5. Lpnger-term effet: a) While it is possible that in their present mood of truulene, the Soviet leadership may onlude that the entire Brehnev "peae poliy" has failed, and that we may have a period of greater assertiveness in the exploitation of their inreased military apabilities, the logi that led them to seek to advane their interests through low-tension poliies is likely to assert itself again in time. This logi is based upon the following fators: i) the Soviet eonomy requires tehnology from abroad; the alternative is a major strutural hange; ii) a low-tension poliy is more likely to apitalie on politial trends abroad whih they believe will be advantageous to them; iii) v7hile they have not shown restraint in the nulear ompetition, they are onerned about the risks of a nulear arms rae; iv) despite their onventional military build-up, they ontinue to have a SEC<ET

5 .:- :. '.. "' prudent fear of the risk of esalation in loal onflits; v) further inreases in their diversion of resoures to the military setor will postpone and ompliate their efforts to retify fundamental eonomi problems. II. Some poliy impliations for the U.S. 1. Near-term:... "' : il: a) b) ) If the measures we are taking are to have the effet we desire on the Soviet Union, it is essential that \-Te try to take these measures out of the pre-eletion ontext as muh as possible. The broader the national base of support for our poliies toward the Soviet Union, the more seriously the Soviet Union will take them, and the readier they will be to believe that we an sustain these measures as long as neessary--even beyond the eletion. It is also ruial to maintain Alliane solid- arity at all osts, and with whatever resiliene o. may be required, to prevent the Soviet Union from opening up divergenies for manipulation. Although it is not likely that the Soviet Union will be able soon to stabilie the situation in Afghanistan to ontemplate a substantial redution in its military presene, we should ontinue to make our position lear that a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan is a neessary first step toward an improvement in relations, and that we remain 'illing to see a neutral, non-aligned Afghanistan. How the Soviets reah this point is.a problem only they an solve, but our level of assistane to the insurgents should be alibrated with il: a E 5i <>: -< > ;;:: :::> "' "' "" -< SESRET -. _..,...,-:

6 -sthis.objetive in mind. It is learly preferable from the point of view of our interests in the Persian Gulf area to have the Soviet fores in Afghanistan reduing rather than building up. d) lile it may be many months before any pratial movement toward a politial solution is feasible, it is neessary to make lear to them from the outset the diretion we want to go. e) For this reason,.it is in our interest to see a proposal for the neutraliation of Afghanistan emerge--preferably under nonaligned sponsorship. Suh a proposal would hold out the promise of an internationallysupervised ban on assistane to the insurgents from the outside in return for omplete Soviet withdrawal and establishment of a broadlybased government. f) Soviet dislaimers of aggressive intent toward Iran, Pakistan, and Yugoslavia annot, of ourse, be taken at fae value. It is nevertheless useful to extrat suh ommitments on their part in disussions about their ation in Afghanistan. g) Further punitive measures would be ounterprodutive in terms of our relationship with the Allies as well as the Soviets. Both ould see a ontinuation of new punitive steps as _ stemming from basi anti-soviet motives. We should keep the framework of our relationship in plae, ontinuing to avoid abrogation or violation of existing bilateral agreements. In.partiular, this would mean proeeding with the minimum required eight-million-ton grain sale this year. We would not, however, proeed to negotiate new agreements in the absene of soviet withdrawal--inluding renewal of the grains.agreement whih would otherwise be negotiated in the seond half of this year. g

7 7'- h) The most serious pratial onsequene of the deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union is the possible destrution of the framework of arms ontrol negotiations--partiularly in regard to strategi weapons. It is neessary to reiterate with onvition our intent to move toward SALT ratifiation when onditions permit, in late 19.8 if possible. 2. Longer-term: a) Although detente in the 1972 sense of the word is not re-reatable, it would be useful both for our relations with our Allies and for its effet upon the Soviet leadership if we made it lear at responsible levels that our long-term interest in a more onstrutive relationship with the Soviet Union remains a firm ommitment of the U.S. Government. b) The key word in-affirming this ommitment is realisti. It has to be free of the ambiguities that have been assoiated with the word "detente." It has to be based upon a realisti view of the nature of the Soviet system, and of Soviet poliy, and of the ompetitive elements of the relationship. ) One essential element in projeting this poliy ommitment is to get aross to the Soviet Union the message that their mvn ommitmentto the exploitation of loal onflit situations (in the name of support for national liberation movements) inevitably prevents a low-tension relationship \vith us. This has been a ontradition in their poliy whih they have to be brought to fae. A realisti poliy of moderated tension requires onrete and speifi restraints in the ondut of the ompetition. SLCRE'l

8 . 8- d) e) For our part, a realisti poliy also implies onsisteny between our atual poliy and our delaratory poliy. The Soviets will not move in the diretion of aeptane of greater restraint if they pereive that, despite our words, t-re. are ommitted to a relationsl\ip of maximum onfrontation on all fronts. The priority element in a relationship of _ moderated tension remains the effort. to stabilie the strategi military ompetition. We. need to reassert our self-interest in resuming the SALT proess and making it more effetive than it has been... " 2 " " 3: f) An essential onomitant of a relatioship of 3: moderated tension with the Soviet Union is a more effetive understanding on our part of the many soures of politial instability in the developing world. Regional military balanes are.essential, but by themselves they will not onstitute an adequate answer to the internal tensions that have arisen in many areas as a result of the ollision between moderniation and suh traditional value systems as Islam. Marshall CC l1r. Christopher Mr. Newsom Mr. Lake

9 llrhiue of the President of the Ruuian Federation Fond llo. 3 Opis' llo. 12 File llo Page llo. 31,

International Migration, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) and the Money Metric of Welfare Gains

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