Part 1B Paper 7: Political Philosophy - Democracy Lecture 1: Justifications for democracy. Chris Thompson
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1 Part 1B Paper 7: Political Philosophy - Democracy Lecture 1: Justifications for democracy Chris Thompson cjt68@cam.ac.uk 1
2 Overview of the lectures 1. Jus>fica>ons for democracy 2. Epistemic democracy 3. Delibera>ve democracy 4. The paradox of democracy 2
3 Overview of the lectures 1. Jus>fica>ons for democracy 2. Epistemic democracy 3. Delibera>ve democracy 4. The paradox of democracy 3
4 Readings COPP, D., J. HAMPTON, and J.E. ROEMER, eds., The Idea of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). [Especially chs. by Arneson, Chris>ano, and Estlund] 4
5 Summary 1. A taxonomy of jus>fica>ons for democracy 2. Aggrega>on procedures 3. Procedural jus>fica>ons 4. Outcome preference jus>fica>ons 5. Some problems with majority rule 5
6 Summary 1. A taxonomy of jus>fica>ons for democracy 2. Aggrega>on procedures 3. Procedural jus>fica>ons 4. Outcome preference jus>fica>ons 5. Some problems with majority rule 6
7 1. A taxonomy of jus>fica>ons for democracy Clarifica>ons We are concerned with democra>c decision making. Other virtues associated with democracy the rule of law, individual liber>es, a free press we will put to one side. Sen: no famine has ever occurred in a democracy. Popper: bloodless coups. Riker: liberalism vs. populism. Autonomy? 7
8 1. A taxonomy of jus>fica>ons for democracy First dis>nc>on Aggrega>on vs. delibera>on Aggrega>ve concep>ons of democracy focus on how a social choice is generated from individual votes. Majority rule is the default democra>c aggrega>on procedure. Delibera>ve concep>ons of democracy focus on the importance of discussion, debate, and reason giving for democracy. The ideal is reasoned consensus. 8
9 1. A taxonomy of jus>fica>ons for democracy Second dis>nc>on Procedural (intrinsic) vs. non- procedural (instrumental) jus>fica>ons. Procedural jus>fica>ons focus on the virtues of the decision- making process itself. C.f. procedural jus>ce in criminal trials. Non- procedural jus>fica>ons focus on the outcome of decision- making process. C.f. just outcomes in criminal trials. 9
10 1. A taxonomy of jus>fica>ons for democracy Third dis>nc>on Preference or belief non- procedural accounts. Some jus>fica>ons for democracy claim that democra>c decision- making procedures maximise the sa>sfac>on of preferences. Other jus>fica>ons for democracy claim that people share their beliefs with the group and democra>c decision- making procedures are reliable at making correct decisions. 10
11 1. A taxonomy of jus>fica>ons for democracy The taxonomy Aggrega>on Delibera>on Procedural Non- procedural Pref. Non- procedural Bel. 11
12 1. A taxonomy of jus>fica>ons for democracy The taxonomy Aggrega>on Delibera>on Procedural Non- procedural Pref. Lecture 1 Non- procedural Bel. 12
13 1. A taxonomy of jus>fica>ons for democracy The taxonomy Aggrega>on Delibera>on Procedural Non- procedural Pref. Non- procedural Bel. Lecture 2 13
14 1. A taxonomy of jus>fica>ons for democracy The taxonomy Aggrega>on Delibera>on Procedural Non- procedural Pref. Lecture 3 Non- procedural Bel. 14
15 1. A taxonomy of jus>fica>ons for democracy The taxonomy Aggrega>on Delibera>on Procedural Non- procedural Pref. Non- procedural Bel. Lecture 4 15
16 Summary 1. A taxonomy of jus>fica>ons for democracy 2. Aggrega>on procedures 3. Procedural jus>fica>ons 4. Outcome preference jus>fica>ons 5. Some problems with majority rule 16
17 2. Aggrega>on procedures Aggrega>on procedures Input (Individual votes: preferences or beliefs) Aggrega>on procedure (vo>ng rule) Output (Group decision/ social choice) List (2008) 17
18 2. Aggrega>on procedures Aggrega>on procedures Suppose there are three voters, and these people vote either 1 or 0. How many possible combina>ons of votes are there? 18
19 2. Aggrega>on procedures Aggrega>on procedures Voter 1 Voter 2 Voter (1,1,1) (1,1,0) (1,0,1) (1,0,0) (0,1,1) (0,1,0) (0,0,1) (0,0,0) 19
20 2. Aggrega>on procedures Aggrega>on procedure An aggrega>on procedure (vo>ng rule) generates a group decision as a func>on of the profile of votes. E.g. (1,1,0) Unanimity rule: no answer Dictatorship of agent 3: 0 Majority rule: 1 20
21 2. Aggrega>on procedures Simple pair- wise majority rule We have an agenda with two alterna>ves (candidates), e.g.: Obama/ Romney Guilty/ innocent Replace Trident/ lose nuclear deterrent Agents cast a vote for one of the alterna>ves: As an expression of their belief; or As an expression of their preference. The group judgement or social choice will be the alterna>ve that receives strictly more than half of all votes. 21
22 Summary 1. A taxonomy of jus>fica>ons for democracy 2. Aggrega>on procedures 3. Procedural jus>fica>ons 4. Outcome preference jus>fica>ons 5. Some problems with majority rule 22
23 3. Procedural virtues Procedural virtues Procedural jus>fica>ons focus on the virtues of the decision- making process itself. C.f. procedural jus>ce in criminal trials. What are the procedural virtues we want from a democra>c vo>ng rule? 23
24 3. Procedural virtues May s Theorem Simple pair- wise majority rule is the only social choice func>on over two alterna>ves that sa>sfies the following condi>ons: Universal domain: any possible combina>on of votes is OK as an input. Anonymity: every voter is treated equally (every voter gets exactly one vote). Neutrality: each of the alterna>ves is treated equally (each candidate requires the same number of votes to win). Posi>ve responsiveness: if x wins by one vote, and someone changes their vote to - x, - x will win (a technical requirement). 24
25 Summary 1. A taxonomy of jus>fica>ons for democracy 2. Aggrega>on procedures 3. Procedural jus>fica>ons 4. Outcome preference jus>fica>ons 5. Some problems with majority rule 25
26 4. Outcome preference jus>fica>ons Outcome preference sa>sfac>on We are dealing with an aggrega>ve account, and focusing on the outcome of the decision, not the way in which it is made. Some jus>fica>ons for democracy claim that democra>c decision- making procedures maximise the sa>sfac>on of preferences. What would be an example of a poli>cal decision such as this? 26
27 4. Outcome preference jus>fica>ons Rae- Taylor Theorem Simple majority rule is the unique decision rule which minimised the probability that a typical member will support a mo>on which the commikee rejects or oppose a mo>on which is accepted, if he assumes that future preferences are unknown and that members vote (for or against) independently. Simple majority rule maximises the sa>sfac>on of preferences. 27
28 Summary 1. A taxonomy of jus>fica>ons for democracy 2. Aggrega>on procedures 3. Procedural jus>fica>ons 4. Outcome preference jus>fica>ons 5. Some problems with majority rule 28
29 5. Some problem with majority rule Problems 1. Paradox of democracy (lecture 4) 2. Mul>ple alterna>ves/ candidates 3. Tyranny of the majority 4. Median voter 29
30 Next week 2. Epistemic democracy. 30
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