Part 1B Paper 7: Political Philosophy - Democracy Lecture 4: The paradox of democracy. Chris Thompson

Transcription

1 Part 1B Paper 7: Political Philosophy - Democracy Lecture 4: The paradox of democracy Chris Thompson cjt68@cam.ac.uk 1

2 Overview of the lectures 1. Jus>fica>ons for democracy 2. Epistemic democracy 3. Delibera>ve democracy 4. The paradox of democracy 2

3 Overview of the lectures 1. Jus>fica>ons for democracy 2. Epistemic democracy 3. Delibera>ve democracy 4. The paradox of democracy 3

4 Readings BARRY, B., Poli%cal Argument (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965). ESTLUND, D., 'The Persistent Puzzle of the Minority Democrat', American Philosophical Quarterly, 26 (1989): HONDERICH, T., 'A Difficulty with Democracy', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 3 (1974): WOLLHEIM, R., 'A Paradox in the Theory of Democracy', in P. Lasled and W.G. Runciman, eds., Philosophy, Poli%cs and Society: Second Series (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), pp

5 The taxonomy Aggrega>on Delibera>on Procedural Non- procedural Pref. Non- procedural Bel. 5

6 The taxonomy Aggrega>on Delibera>on Procedural Non- procedural Pref. Non- procedural Bel. Lecture 4 6

7 Summary 1. The paradox of democracy (Wollheim) 2. Wollheim s solu>on 3. Other solu>ons 4. Final thoughts 7

8 Summary 1. The paradox of democracy (Wollheim) 2. Wollheim s solu>on 3. Other solu>ons 4. Final thoughts 8

9 1. The paradox of democracy Wollheim why should someone who has fed his choice into the machine [the aggrega>on procedure] and then is confronted by the machine with a choice non- iden>cal with his own, feel any obliga>on to accept? 9

10 1. The paradox of democracy The paradox 1. Agent i thinks alterna>ve A ought to be the case 2. Alterna>ve B (= not- A) is the majority winner 3. Agent i is a believer in democracy 4. Therefore Agent i believes that B ought to be the case 10

11 1. The paradox of democracy The paradox We have a contradic>on: 1. A ought to be done (because I think so) 4. B ought to be done (because a majority thinks so) We have three poten>al ways for resolving the paradox: Modify (1) Modify (4) Deny that (1) and (4) conflict 11

12 1. The paradox of democracy Deny (1) We might deny that agent i is commided to A It is only an interim commitment I think A ought to be enacted, given that sufficiently many other people agree with me Agent i then withdraws his support for A once it becomes clear that the antecedent does not hold. 12

13 1. The paradox of democracy Deny (1) But Many votes are not hypothe>cal. We osen vote knowing full well that we will lose. People s views are osen independent of what other people think. The rightness of a policy does not necessarily depend on what the majority want If votes were uncondi%onal then it would make sense to aggregate them. But how can we aggregate condi>onal votes? 13

14 1. The paradox of democracy Deny (1) But We can t take i s vote literally. It means that no voter actually speaks his mind, whereas majority verdicts are supposed to have some authority. The voter might as well have voted for B, since presumably he thinks B should be enacted given the majority verdict Doesn t an agent s condi>onal vote imply that the agent believes a different alterna>ve ought to be enacted under a different antecedent? E.g. I also think A ought to be enacted, given that sufficiently many other people agree with me 14

15 1. The paradox of democracy Deny (4) We might deny that i is commided to B (the majority verdict). Democracy is about compromise. Democracy only gives us the most sensible choice. There is no obliga>on to accept it. 15

16 1. The paradox of democracy Deny (4) But It seems that accep>ng a majority verdict is more than merely being prudent or prac>cal. To be a democrat is to accept the majority verdict as legi>mate, that these decisions ought to be enacted. To deny (4) is to deny democra>c legi>macy. 16

17 Summary 1. The paradox of democracy (Wollheim) 2. Wollheim s solu>on 3. Other solu>ons 4. Final thoughts 17

18 2. Wollheim s solu>on Deny any inconsistency Direct moral principles e.g. murder is wrong. Oblique moral principles e.g. what is commanded by the sovereign is right. There is no paradox because one of the statements is direct and the other is oblique. A ought to be enacted is a direct principle. B ought to be enacted as the will of the people is an oblique principle, it is a deriva>on from an direct principle (the principle of democracy). 18

19 2. Wollheim s solu>on Deny any inconsistency But two possible objec>ons The two statements are just incompa>ble: But it is different to say Jews should be given special treatment vs. In the 1930s Jews should be given special treatment in light of being vic>ms of persecu>on. A and B cannot both be implemented But there is a difference between saying something ought to be the case and commivng yourself to implemen>ng it. 19

20 Summary 1. The paradox of democracy (Wollheim) 2. Wollheim s solu>on 3. Other solu>ons 4. Final thoughts 20

21 3. Other solu>ons Barry Barry (deny 1) A vote for A is a primary judgement. This is a qualified asser>on, expressing the way in which the person making it intends to exert his influence on the result, rather than as a wish for that to be the result. An acceptance of B is a secondary judgement, taking into account the views of others. A corrected judgement. E.g. someone who tries as hard as possible to win, but wants the best team to win. This explains why you might vote against your interests if you know that other people are abstaining. But why should the secondary judgement take precedence over the first? 21

22 3. Other solu>ons Schiller Schiller (deny 4) A voter is commided to a decision procedure, and commitments to B piggy back on this. But this seems like a light load if we are not commided to the consequences of accep>ng the decision procedure. 22

23 3. Other solu>ons Golds>ck Golds>ck (deny 4) Two possible interpreta>ons for (4): (1) Those cons>tu>onally responsible for puvng B into execu>on ought to do so. (2) The majority is right to feel that the righwul sovereign ought to see to it that B is implemented. A voter is commided to 1 but not 2 But this does not make him a proper democrat. And why is 1 consistent with the voters ini>al judgement? 23

24 3. Other solu>ons Honderich Honderich (deny 1) An agent s vote carries a number of judgments, of which the most important are these: (i) Policy A being enacted with majority support is preferable to policy B being enacted with majority support. (ii) If policy A has majority support, it ought to be enacted. (iii) If policy B has majority support, it ought to be enacted. But how is this different to the earlier proposals? 24

25 Summary 1. The paradox of democracy (Wollheim) 2. Wollheim s solu>on 3. Other solu>ons 4. Final thoughts 25

26 4. Final thoughts Agents expressing beliefs 1. Agent i thinks alterna>ve A is correct. 2. Alterna>ve B (= not- A) is the majority winner. 3. Agent i is a believer in democracy, and the CJT. 4. Therefore Agent i believes that B is correct. There is no conflict if Agent i rejects their earlier belief that A is correct. 26

27 4. Final thoughts Agents expressing preferences [Channeling Estlund] Voters may instead be expressing their preferences. The general will: The general will as discovered by votes The general will as cons>tuted by votes 27

28 4. Final thoughts The general will as discovered by votes 1. Agent i thinks alterna>ve A is the general will. 2. Alterna>ve B (= not- A) is the majority winner. 3. Agent i is a believer in democracy, and the CJT. 4. Therefore Agent i believes that B is the general will. Agent i can reject (4) if they also reject (3). Or, agent i can reject (1), if they accept (3) and therefore (4). 28

29 4. Final thoughts The general will as cons>tuted by votes 1. Agent i prefers alterna>ve A. 2. Alterna>ve B (= not- A) is the majority winner. 3. Agent i is a believer in democracy, and Rae- Taylor theorem. 4. Therefore Agent i believes that B is the general will. (1) and (4) are not inconsistent. There is a difference between selfish and other- regarding preferences. 29

30 Next week No lecture. 30