THE SOCIALIST OFFENSIVE,

Transcription

1 THE SOCIALIST OFFENSIVE,

2 By the same author THE INDUSTRIALISATION OF SOVIET RUSSIA 2: THE SOVIET COLLECTIVE FARM, THE INDUSTRIALISATION OF SOVIET RUSSIA 3: THE SOVIET ECONOMY IN TURMOIL, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET BUDGETARY SYSTEM FOUNDATIONS OF A PLANNED ECONOMY, , Volume One (with E. H. Carr) SCIENCE POLICY IN THE USSR (with E. Zaleski and others) THE SOVIET UNION (editor) THE TECHNOLOGICAL LEVEL OF SOVIET INDUSTRY (editor with R. Amann andj. M. Cooper)

3 THE INDUSTRIALISATION OF SOVIET RUSSIA I THE SOCIALIST OFFENSIVE THE COLLECTIVISATION OF SOVIET AGRICULTURE, R. W. DAVIES Professor of Soviet Economic Studies University of Birmingham M MACMILLAN PRESS

4 R. W. Davies I98o All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright Act I956 (as amended), or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 33-4 Alfred Place, London WCIE 7DP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. First edition I98o Reprinted I989 Published by THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG2I 2XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Davies, Robert William The industrialisation of Soviet Russia I: The socialist offensive, I929-I930 I: Russia-Industries-History 2. Russia-Economic conditions I9I8-I945 I. Title II. Socialist offensive, I929-I '.094I HC335.2 ISBN (hardcover) ISBN ISBN (ebook) DOI /

5 In memory of my father WILLIAM DAVIES

6 CONTENTS Preface xm Technical.Note xrx THE PEASANT EcoNOMY AND THE SoviET SYsTEM, I (A) The Bolsheviks and the Peasantry, I9I7-2I (B) The Peasant Economy in the mid-i920s 4 (i) Farming and technology 6 (ii) The peasant and the market II (iii) Regional problems I8 (iv) Economic differentiation 23 ( v) The unstable link 28 (c) The Bolsheviks and the Peasantry in the mid- 192os 31 (n) The Grain Crisis of (E) The Crisis of the Peasant Economy, I928-g 4I (F) The Regime and the Countryside 51 2 THE GRAIN CoLLECTIONs of I (A) The Grain Crisis of 1928/29 56 (B) The Collection Plan for the Harvest 6o (c) The Campaign 7I (i) The organisation of the campaign 7I (ii) The reaction of the peasantry 82 (iii) The enforcement of the grain plan 89 (D) The Results of the Collections I 04 3 THE EvE OF MAss CoLLECTIVISATION, june- SEPTEMBER (A) The Background 109 vii

7 Vlll Contents (B) The First Phase of Mass Collectivisation 116 (c) The Problem of the Kulak THE NEw STAGE OF CoLLECTIVISATION, OcTOBER 1929-jANUARY 5, (A) Towards the New Stage, October (B) The November Plenum 155 (c) The Drive for Comprehensive Collectivisation, November-December (n) The Drive Against the Kulaks, November- December (E) The Politburo Commission, December (F) The Collectivisation Resolution of January 5, THE ALL-OUT DRIVE, january-february 1930 (A) The Process of Collectivisation (B) 'Spontanecius Dekulakisation', January 1930 (c) The Legislation on the Kulaks (n) Policy Vacillations, January so-february 1930 (E) Expropriation of the Kulaks, February 1930 (F) The Situation in the Countryside, February 1930 (G) The Shift in Policy, February 11-28, CoLLECTIVISATION IN RETREAT, MARCH-juNE 1930 (A) The Restoration of the Voluntary Principle (B) The Spring Sowing of THE CRISIS IN THE PARTY, MARCH-jULY (A) The Diagnosis of Error, March-June (B) The XVI Party Congress, june 26-july 13, THE HARVEST OF (A) The Harvest 337 (B) The Grain Collections 340 (i) The contracts campaign 340 ( ii) The collection plan 344 (iii) The campaign 350 (iv) The results of the collections 359 (c) Other Collections 361

8 Contents lx 9 THE REsUMPTION of CoLLECTIVISATION THE MECHANISATION OF AGRICULTURE 382 I I CoNcLUSIONs 397 Tables 417 Glossary of Russian Terms and Abbreviations used in Text 449 Abbreviations rif Titles of Books and Periodical Publications used in Footnotes 453 Bibliography 455.Name Index 466 Subject Index 471

9 LIST OF TABLES 1. Agricultural production in physical terms, Number of animals, Gross agricultural production by branch of agriculture, 1929 and Sown area by social sector for 1929 and 1930 harvests Plans in 1928 and 1929 for marketed production of grain by social sector, Production, marketings and collections by type of product, (a) Crops 424 (b) Meat and dairy products Peasant extra-rural money income and expenditure, 1928/ Grain collections, 1926/ / (a) By type of collection 427 (b) By type of grain 428 (c) Production and collections by social sector, 1929/ / (d) By months 429 (e) Production and collections, by area supplying grain, 1928/ / Grain allocation, 1926/ / (a) All planned turnover by main uses 432 (b) Allocation to population by type of allocation, 1929/ / (c) Allocation to industry by type of industry, 1928/ / (d) Centralised stocks by main types of grain, july 1, 1927-July 1, Quarterly livestock collections, 1928/ / Households penalised for failure to deliver grain, Autumn XI

10 Xll List of Tables 12. Grain production by social sector: plan and result, 1930 harvest Grain collections: plan and result, 1930 harvest Grain yields by social sector, Grain production and collections per household and per hectare, by social sector, Number of households collectivised, Percentage of peasant households collectivised in selected regions, June 1928-January Planned districts of comprehensive collectivisation in RSFSR, summer Elimination of kulak households, Tractors supplied to agriculture, 1928/ (a) Annual supply (b) Tractor draught-power as percentage of tractor and animal draught-power, by social sector, (c) Total mechanical and animal draught-power,

11 PREFACE Between 1929 and 1936, the Soviet Union was transformed into a great industrial power; in its speed and scale, the Soviet industrial revolution has neither precedent nor successor anywhere in the world. This was not intended, exclusively or even primarily, as an economic transformation. The Soviet Communists saw industrialisation as a prerequisite for achieving their central objective-the establishment, in a largely peasant country, isolated in a hostile capitalist world, of a socialist economy and society; and by 1936, with the collectivisation of agriculture, and the elimination of the private hire oflabour for profit, a kind of socialist economy had been created. This formidable and heroic effort of men and women to shape their own destiny by a comprehensive state plan acquired tragic and ironic qualities. The outcome of Soviet policies was neither the systematic economic development nor, in several major respects, the kind of socialist economic system envisaged in the Soviet party at the end of the 1920s. The hopes for higher food production-which would have brought about an improved standard of living in both town and country-were entirely frustrated; the fortunes of agriculture, and the relation between the regime and the peasantry, reached their nadir during the famine of And, although the economy was largely state-owned and centrally planned, Soviet socialism retained or developed unforeseen attributes. Until 1930, it was assumed by Soviet marxists that socialism would be based entirely on moneyless product-exchange. Instead, the Soviet economy remained a monetary economy, with a substantial free peasant market. In place of the expected growing equality of incomes, income differentials greatly increased. The use of forced labour relentlessly expanded. Simultaneously, the political dictatorship, intended as an instrument for advancing the Soviet economy and establishing a free classless society, soon assumed its own mode of behaviour, and followed its own laws of growth. The final instalment of E. H. Carr's history of Soviet Russia, xiii

12 XIV Priface Foundations of a Planned Economy, , recounts the background to these events, culminating, in the spring of 1929, in a profound crisis of confidence between the regime and the peasantry, and in the consolidation ofstalin's dictatorship. After collaborating with Dr Carr on the economic volume of Foundations with such pleasure and profit, I was unable to resist the temptation to carry forward the story into the 1930s. In the first stages of research it soon became clear that, while the materials available for the study of political decision-making at the centre are wholly inadequate after 1929, and while many gaps in our knowledge of the economy cannot be filled, abundant information on many aspects of economic policy and development is available in Soviet economic and political journals, daily newspapers and statistical publications, and in accounts by Western eye-witnesses. Moreover, since the death of Stalin a great deal of previously unknown material has been reproduced from the archives in Soviet publications, though unfortunately, in common with other Western historians, I have not yet been permitted to use Soviet archives relating to this period. The focus of interest in the present series of volumes, The Industrialisation of Soviet Russia, is the mutual impact of economic policy, economic and political institutions, and the economic and social environment. Two aspects of the study may be of special interest to the general reader. First, I would hope that better understanding of Soviet triumphs and failures in planning economic development might prove relevant to the planned industrialisation on which all developing countries have to a greater or lesser degree embarked. Secondly, improved knowledge of the processes by which the Soviet economic system emerged may assist our understanding of its present operation: the first half of the 1930s was the formative period for the Soviet system, and the main features which it then acquired still remain at the present day. The series is provisionally planned as five or six volumes. The present volume deals with the relationship between the state, the peasantry and agriculture betweenjune 1929 and the end of This is the obvious starting point in an economic history of the 1930s: it was the period of the first collectivisation drive, as momentous in its impact on Russian history as the Bolshevik revolution of October 1917, and often described as the third Russian revolution. A second briefer volume, published simultaneously, The Soviet Collective Farm, 192!)-1930, examines the emergence of the collective farm (kolkhoz) as the predominant economic unit in

13 Priface agriculture (this volume is referred to here as 'vol. 2'). The third volume in the series, now in preparation, will discuss developments in industry and planning during this period. Further volumes will deal with the economic crisis of , which turned on the difficulties in agriculture, and with the triumph of planned industrialisation and the consolidation of the economic system from 1934 onwards. XV The main narrative in the present volume, concerned with developments from June I 929, is preceded by a long introductory chapter setting the scene ( ch. I). From the autumn of I 92 7, the market relation between town and country which was at the heart of the New Economic Policy (NEP) was increasingly undermined, and by June I 929 there was a profound crisis of confidence between regime and peasantry. The present volume does not undertake a substantially new investigation of these developments, but in view of their importance to an understanding of collectivisation itself I attempt in chapter I to summarise the present state of our knowledge. The grain crisis of the autumn of I927 was the dramatic moment when the delicate balance ofnep was upset (see pp below). Even more important than the grain crisis itself was the reaction to it of the Soviet authorities. From the beginning of I928, policy towards the peasantry turned on the profound conviction of a section of the Soviet leadership that industrialisation must be forced ahead at a rapid pace, even at the expense of the abandonment in practice of the market relation with the peasants. The policies pursued were not the only possible industrialisation strategy; the argument that no industrialisation at all was possible within the framework ofnep seems to me untenable. Eut I would argue, and will try elsewhere to demonstrate, that industrialisation at the extraordinary pace actually achieved in was quite incompatible with a market relation with the peasantry. How did the party come to adopt this breakneck pace of industrialisation in I 928-g? I summarise the existing state of our knowledge of the political, social and economic factors involved on pp By June 1929, the party leadership had not yet determined how to resolve the crisis. But between the summer of I929 and February I 930 collectivisation was forced through at an increasing pace, and much of the present volume is concerned with explaining how this came about. Our account begins with the grain collections of the

14 XVI Priface summer and autumn of I929, the immediate prelude to collectivisation (ch.2). The acceleration of the collectivisation drive in the winter of I is then examined in detail (chs 3-5); some conclusions about the causes and.nature of this drive are drawn on pp. 405-IO. An account of the retreat from collectivisation in February-July I930, and the crisis in the party associated with it (cbs 5-7), is followed by a review of the results of the first harvest after collectivisation, which was remarkably successful ( ch. 8, and pp. 4Io-I4). The narrative concludes with the resumption of collectivisation at a more cautious pace in the autumn of I930 (ch. 9). The problems associated with the mechanisation of agriculture in this period are discussed separately in chapter IO. The party, passionately convinced that modern technology was essential to the construction of socialism, nevertheless embarked on collectivisation prior to mechanisation: this paradox encapsulates the difficulties and the policies of those stormy years. The exciting and fashionable question of the extent to which collectivisation facilitated industrialisation has been reserved for treatment in a later volume. Many people have provided advice and assistance in the preparation of the first two volumes. I owe a special debt of gratitude to E. H. Carr, who has freely given advice and encouragement over many years; the sections of his history which deal with agriculture in the I920s have provided much intellectual stimulation and information, and I am proud to be able to continue, however inadequately, one aspect of his work. Moshe Lewin, whose forthcoming social history of the I 930s promises to be a major contribution to our knowledge, has provided similar assistance; his indispensable work, Russian Peasants and Soviet Power, which examines developments up to the end of I929, was a constant source of ideas and information on the first half of the period covered by the present volume. Yuzuru Taniuchi, whose major study of this period is unfortunately available only in Japanese, commented in detail on several chapters, and provided much additional information. I am also conscious of my intellectual debt to other Western scholars: the publications of Baykov, Dobb, Erlich, Fainsod, Jasny, Male, R. F. Miller, Nove, Shanin and others were frequently consulted with much profit. Stephen Wheatcroft, who has been working with me for the past five years on the economic history of the I 920s and I 93os, has

15 Priface xvn acquired an unparalleled depth of knowledge ofsoviet agricultural statistics, their problems and their economic implications, which he has placed freely at my disposal; his ruthless comments and practical advice on my first draft, and particularly on chapters I and 8, have been invaluable, and I am most grateful to him. R. A. Lewis provided much useful material for chapter 2. Valuable comments on individual chapters, and other assistance, were received from Donald Filtzer, Mark Harrison, Jonathan Haslam, Teodor Shanin and Leslie Symons. In the pursuit of material for this and subsequent volumes I visited the USSR on four occasions between I969 and I974, attached to the Faculty of Economics ofleningrad University, the Faculty of History of Moscow University and the Institute of History of the USSR of the Academy of Sciences; the Lenin and Saltykov-Shchedrin Libraries were rich sources of material. I was able to have valuable exchanges of views with many Soviet colleagues during my visits; among many others, I must particularly mention Yu. A. Polyakov, V. P. Danilov, V. Z. Drobizhev and I. N. Olegina. On the contentious subject of collectivisation the usual caveat that these Soviet colleagues, and their Western counterparts, bear no responsibility for my conclusions and my errors is patently redundant. The Baykov Library of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies at Birmingham University provided most of my material, and our indefatigable librarian, Ms J. J. Brine, was an unfailing source ofhelp. The Library of the Glasgow Institute of Soviet and East European Studies and its former librarian, Dr Large, should also be particularly mentioned. Hugh Jenkins undertook the arduous task of preparing the indexes of these two volumes. Jean Fyfe again bore the main burden of accurately transcribing drafts which were in principle indecipherable, often typing at a feverish speed exacted by an impatient author who acquired some of the characteristics of the enthusiastic collectivisers described in his text. Others who typed part of the manuscript included Ruth Ferguson, Olga Griffin, Karen Witherford and Anthea Roth, who as Centre Secretary in I 97 I -8 also assisted the progress of the work in other ways. My friend Geoffrey Barker, who died tragically in September I 977, selflessly relieved me from administrative burdens over many years; and I am most grateful to Ron Amann, who shouldered the acting Directorship of our Centre at short notice for the session I977/78, and, supported by John Dunstan and all my other

16 XVlll Preface colleagues, provided me with a year of peaceful research. Mr Tim Farmiloe, of Macmillan Press Ltd, offered much encouragement and advice. But the sine qua non of these volumes were my wife Frances, and our children Maurice and Cathy, who showed exemplary patience with a nervous author, and provided much comfort, throughout the lengthy gestation of this book. Work on these volumes has been assisted by the funds provided by the British Social Science Research Council for the Birmingham project on 'The Social and Economic History of the USSR during Industrialisation'. These funds made it possible to employ Mr Wheatcroft (whose work on agricultural statistics is being published separately), supported the purchase of books and microfilms, and travel to the USSR, and enabled me to devote an academic session (I 977/78) full-time to these studies. February 1979 R. w. DAVIES On the occasion of the reprinting of the present volume I have taken the opportunity to correct some errors and misprints. The most important changes are on pages 64-65, where Soviet archival data have enabled greater accuracy about the harvest estimates, and on page 375 where I have corrected the date of Syrtsov's critical speech about economic policy from October to 30 August I930. January 1988 R.W.D.

17 TECHNICAL NOTE This Note summarises some of the conventions used in this volume, and briefly explains the Soviet administrative structure in this period. ( 1) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was divided at this time into six 'Union republics'; the USSR and the Union republics all had their own government headed by a Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom), each with its own People's Commissariats (Narkoms) (i.e. Ministries). Some Narkoms (e.g. for War and Transport) existed only at the USSR, or 'all-union', level; a second category (e.g. for Finance and Industry) existed at both the 'all-union' and the 'republican' level; a third category (e.jr. for Education) existed only in the republics. Agriculture was served only by republican Commissariats (Narkomzems) until December 1929, when the all-union Narkomzem was formed: agriculture thus moved from the third to the second category. For brevity, the convention has been adopted in this volume of referring to all Union commissariats or other agencies without adding 'of the USSR': thus 'Narkomfin' refers to the People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR, and the equivalent Commissariat for the Russian Republic is referred to as 'Narkomfin of the RSFSR'; the Sovnarkoms of the USSR and the republics are handled similarly. Where no all-union agency exists, the agency for the Russian republic is referred to in this volume by the short title. Thus, until December 1929 the People's Commissariat for Agriculture of the RSFSR is simply referred to as 'Narkomzem', but after December 1929 'Narkomzem' refers to the all-union agricultural commissariat, and the agricultural commissariat of the Russian republic is referred to as 'Narkomzem of the RSFSR'. (2) Traditionally, the main unit of local government in the larger republics was the province (guhemia), in turn subdivided into uezdy (counties) and volosti (rural districts); the selo (village) was the lowest administrative unit. By 1929 the transition to a new division was almost complete. The principal unit was theohlasf or krai; these xix

18 XX Technical Note both had the same status, and so are both translated here as 'region'. Each region included several former provinces or parts of provinces. The difference between the oblast' and the krai was simply that the latter had autonomous regions subordinate to it; confusingly, 'autonomous republics' (ASSRs) had approximately the same status as regions (oblasti or krai), and 'autonomous regions' were subordinate to krai. The regions were divided into okruga (referred to here simply as okrugs, but in E. H. Carr's history as 'departments'); these were in turn divided into raiony (districts); the selo (village) remained the lowest administrative unit. Towns fitted into the structure at various levels according to their importance. In the summer and autumn of I930, okrugs were abolished, so the basic structure was Union republic (SSR) -region (oblast' or krai) district (raion) -village. Just before the abolition of the okrugs, there were I 3 regions, 207 okrugs, 2,8 I I districts and 7 I, 780 village soviets in the USSR, for a rural population of I 20 million or so: thus the population of the average district was over 4o,ooo persons (about 8,ooo households), of the average village soviet about I,700 persons (about 350 households). There were also I5 ASSRs and I7 autonomous regions. 1 (3) The party structure was, broadly speaking, parallel to, though effectively superior to, the governmental structure. At the top, the party congress elected a central committee which in turn appointed a Politburo headed by a general secretary (Stalin); in the governmental (soviet) structure, the congress of soviets elected an intermediate Central Executive Committee (TsiK), which in turn appointed Sovnarkom, headed by a chairman (Rykov). The Politburo and Sovnarkom were the effective central working bodies of party and government. Below the all-union level, every republic had its own Politburo, central committee, TsiK and Sovnarkom; and in every region, okrug, district, town and village the principal officials were the secretary of the party committee and the chairman of the soviet executive committee. (4) In I a soviet congress met only in May I929 (the fifth); the central executive committee (TsiK) only in December I929; and the party congress (the sixteenth) only injune-july I930 (the 1 PKh, 6, 1930, 94-5; 75 counties and 435 rural districts lingered on from the old system. The Union republics and the regions varied so much in population that an average would be meaningless.

19 Technical Note sixteenth party conference met in April 1929); plenums (full meetings) of the central committee were held in April and November 1929, and in july and December 1930 (the July 1930 plenum was formal, associated with the party congress). The Politburo and Sovnarkom met frequently, at least weekly. Resolutions by the Politburo were published as from the 'central committee' of the party, and are described thus in this volume, but it should be borne in mind that normally they were in fact Politburo decisions. (5) The central committee (in practice, the Politburo) was supported by central committee departments consisting of full-time party officials. In the spring of 1928 a 'department for work in the countryside' was formed, headed at various times by Bauman or Molotov. This department, referred to in the present volume simply as the 'rural department' of the central committee, was abolished in January (6) The agricultural year ran from July 1 to June 30 of the succeeding year, and the economic year from October 1 to September 30. The economic year 1929/30 was followed by the 'special quarter', October-December 1930, after which the economic and the calendar year coincided. Following Soviet practice, economic and agricultural years are indicated in this volume by a diagonal line: '1928/29' and '1929/30', not '1928-9', ' ', which refer to calendar years. XXl