SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS EGYPT

Transcription

1 SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS EGYPT

2 SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS EGYPT Karen Dawisha Lecturer in Political Science University of Southampton

3 Karen Dawisha I 979 So ftc over reprint of the hardcover 1st edition All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without permission First published 1979 by THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD London and Basingstoke Associated companies in Delhi Dublin Hong Kong Johannesburg Lagos Melbourne New York Singapore Tokyo British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Dawisha, Karen Soviet foreign policy towards Egypt 1. Russia- Foreign relations- Egypt 2. Egypt-Foreign relations- Russia 3 Russia-Foreign relations I. Title '062 DK67.5 E/ ISBN ISBN (ebook) DOI / This book is sold subject to the standard conditions if the Net Book Agreement

4 For my mother, and my father

5 Contents List of Figures and Tables Preface PART ONE: THE DYNAMICS OF SOVIET EGYPTIAN RELATIONS 2 The Historical Foundations of the Policy 2 Soviet-Egyptian Relations Under Khrushchev, I955- ~ 9 I I958-6I 2I Ig Soviet-Egyptian Relations Under Brezhnev and Kosygin, I The I967 Crisis 37 The Growth of Soviet Influence 43 The Arab-Israeli Front: Activity without Progress 49 4 Soviet-Egyptian Relations Under Sadat, I97o The Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Failure to Find a Solution 56 The Downfall of the Ali Sabri Group 59 The Soviet-Egyptian Treaty 6I The Expulsion of Soviet Personnel 63 The Soviet Union and the October War 65 The Exclusion of Soviet Influence 7 I PART TWO: THE MAKING OF SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS EGYPT 83 5 The Research Design 85 6 The Influences on Soviet Policy 9 I Military Capability gi IX XI 2 3 VII

6 Vlll Contents Demographic Influences 94 Economic Capability 98 Ideological Influences I I I Influences from the External Environment I2I 7 Soviet Decision-making Structures and Processes I3I The Political Structure I32 Competing Elites and Interest Groups I42 8 Soviet Objectives Towards Egypt I5I Political and Strategic Objectives Economic Objectives I 52 I6I 9 The Instruments of Soviet Policy I66 Diplomacy I66 Economic Aid I68 Trade The Military Instrument I74 q8 Propaganda I86 The Cultural Instrument I9I Clandestine Activities I98 Effects 204 IO Outcomes and Consequences 207 Notes and Riferences Bibliograplry 2I6 24I Index 265

7 List of Figures and Tables Map Figure 5.1 Figure 5.2 Figure 7.1 Figure 7.2 Table 6.1 Table 6.2 Table 6.3 Table 6.4 Table 6.5 Table 6.6 Table g.i Table g.2 Table 9 3 Table 9 4 The Soviet Union and the Middle East XIV Model of Policy Formulation and Bilateral Interaction 86 Brecher's Research Design go Institutional Inputs into the Soviet Foreign Policy Process 133 Soviet-Egyptian Action Channel 197o Middle Eastern Nationalities in the USSR, 1959 and Basic Indices of Soviet Economic Growth, Average Annual Growth Rates of Soviet Gross National Product (GNP), in Five-year Periods from oo Average Annual Output ofkey Raw Materials in Periods from , USSR and USA Soviet Oil Production, Consumption and Trade, I in millions of tons 105 Soviet and American Gross National Product (GNP) and Defence Spending, I955-75, in billions of current dollars and roubles I og Bilateral Commitments of Capital by Centrally Planned Economies to Developing Countries, I (in millions US dollars) 169 Soviet Financial Contribution to the Construction of the Aswan High Dam (in millions US dollars) I 71 Equipment and Materials Supplied for Works Built in Egypt through Soviet Assistance, I (in millions US dollars) I 72 Foreign Trade of the USSR I (in millions US dollars) 175 IX

8 X Table 9 5 Table 9.6 Table 9 7 Table 9.8 Table 9 9 Table 9.10 List of Figures and T abies Soviet and Egyptian Arms Trade, (in millions US dollars at constant 1968 prices) Major Military Equipment Holdings by Egypt, Soviet Naval Presence in the Mediterranean, Tourists in Egypt, Imports of Printed Matter and Films by Egypt, Egyptian Students Abroad,

9 Preface When the Soviet Union negotiated its first arms deal with Egypt in 1955, its influence in the Middle East and the Third World was practically non-existent. In the fifteen years following that deal, its involvement grew until, by the early 1 97os, the Soviet role in the determination of Egypt's domestic and foreign policy was decisive. Now, in the eighth year of President Sadat's rule, the Soviet position in Egypt has been reduced to one of little more than an interested bystander. The rift with Egypt has had far-ranging repercussions on Soviet foreign policy. Thus, the exclusion from Egyptian Red Sea and Mediterranean ports has necessitated the reassessment of Soviet strategy in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, the failure of Egypt to continue its progress toward the establishment of a socialist system has led to the questioning of Soviet ideological assumptions, while the refusal of the Sadat regime to repay its economic and military debts to the USSR has given rise to debates amongst Soviet decision-makers over the diminishing returns of its aid programme to Egypt and other countries with similarly unpredictable leaders. The study of Soviet relations with Egypt, therefore, is important not only in itself, but also in so far as it highlights both the potential of Soviet influence and the impotence of Soviet power. The objectives of this study are two-fold. In the first part of the book, the history of Soviet-Egyptian relations is analysed; and attention is focused in particular on the extent of Soviet influence, the impact of such external factors as inter-arab rivalries, the Arab Israeli conflict and East-West relations, and the decisive role of personality in affecting the outcome of Soviet policy. Part Two goes beyond the constraints imposed by a purely chronological account and sets Soviet-Egyptian relations within the broader context of Soviet foreign policy as a whole. In doing so, this section assesses the various external and internal influences operating on the formulation of policy towards Egypt and outlines the main features of the decision-making process, including the role of interest groups and competing elites. The objectives pursued by the Soviet Union XI

10 xu Preface are counterposed with the instruments used to achieve these aims, thus highlighting both the depth of the Soviet commitment to Egypt and the difficulties for the decision-makers in achieving the desired correlation between inputs and outcomes, or between aid and influence. The final chapter then considers the record of Soviet relations with Egypt and suggests the reasons for the various successes and failures of Soviet policy. In acknowledging my debt to those individuals and institutions who, in both direct and indirect ways, contributed to the ideas expressed in the book and in the preparation of the manuscript itself, my first thanks must go to Geoffrey Stern of the London School of Economics, who painstakingly read the manuscript in all of its many phases and provided invaluable advice and encouragement at every juncture. I would also like to thank Professor Philip Reynolds of the University of Lancaster who made it possible for me to transfer my studies from the United States to his department and who subsequently, through his teaching, led me to appreciate the value of analytical thinking. Similar thanks go to Professor Joseph Frankel of Southampton University and Professor Geoffrey Goodwin of the London School of Economics who both made incisive comments on various parts of the manuscript and who helped to shape the framework used in the study. For the many discussions on strategy and Soviet capabilities, I also am indebted to my colleague at Southampton, Dr. John Simpson. This book would not have been possible without the help of the following: Professors Peter Richards and Kenneth Hilton of the University of Southampton for promoting my application for study leave and financial assistance; to the University of Southampton and the British Council for supporting my research in the Soviet Union; and to Professor Fred Northedge and the Department of International Relations at the London School ofeconomics where I was fortunate to be an Academic Visitor during In Moscow, Barbara Hay and Jenny Diamond of the British Embassy and Dick Miles of the American Embassy were instrumental in making a success of my visit. My thanks also go to the staff of the Institute oforientology in Moscow for the use of their facilities and especially to Dr B. M. Potskhveriya for all the time and effort he devoted to arranging interviews for me. Considerable insight into the Soviet policy process and Soviet objectives in Egypt was gained through the long and informative discussions I had with many research workers, including Dr G. K. Shirokov, the Director of the

11 Preface Xlll Institute oforientology, Professor G. I. Mirskiy of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Professor L. D. Freedman of the Institute of Asia and Africa, Dr A. Kislov of the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada, Dr Ludmila Zvereva and Dr I. Usupov of the Institute of Africa, and with officials of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Egyptian, Iraqi, Syrian, Lebanese and Tunisian embassies in Moscow. A special thanks must also go to the staff of the main and press libraries of the Royal Institute of International Affairs whose unrivalled expertise and diligence made my research both more productive and more enjoyable. Similarly, my gratitude goes to the secretaries of the Department of Politics at the University of Southampton, who have valiantly struggled against overwhelming odds to meet impossible deadlines in the past, and who no doubt will continue to do so in the future! A special mention must also be reserved for Macmillan's staff, for their helpfulness, efficiency, and their flexible and dynamic editorial policy. Finally, I would like to thank both my husband's family, for their continual support, and last, but never least, my husband, Adhid, whose relentless encouragement and vigorous sense of humour kept me working when the will was weak. London April 1978 Karen Dawisha

12 THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MIDDLE EAST