PAKISTAN UNDER BHUTTO,

Transcription

1 PAKISTAN UNDER BHUTTO,

2 Also by Shahid}aved Burki A STUDY OF CHINESE COMMUNES PAKISTAN: A NATION IN THE MAKING HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF PAKISTAN PAKISTAN'S DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES: CHOICES FOR THE FUTURE (with Robert LaPorte,jun.)

3 PAKISTAN UNDER BHUTTO, Shahid Javed Burki Second Edition M MACMILLAN PRESS

4 Shahid javed Burki 1980, 1988 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright Act 1956 (as amended}, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 33-4 Alfred Place, London WClE 7DP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. First edition 1980 Second edition 1988 Published by THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 2XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Burki, Shahidjaved Pakistan under Bhutto, nd ed. I. Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali 2. Pakistan Politics and government Title 954.9' 105'0924 DS384 ISBN ISBN (ebook) DOI /

5 Contents Preface to the First Edition Preface to the Second Edition Vll XI 1 Introduction PART I The Backdrop 2 Insiders and Outsiders 3 The Search for a New Constituency 4 Rise to Power PART II The Regime in Power, Restructuring Institutions 6 Redirecting Economic Development: Management by the PPP Left 7 Economic Decision-making Without Constraints: PART III The Fall from Power 8 Preparing for Elections in The 1977 Elections The Bhutto Legacy Notes Selected Bibliography Name Index Subject Index PART IV The Bhutto Legacy

6 To Maryam, my mother and ]ahanara, my wife

7 Preface to the First Edition In 1970 Professor Samuel Huntington of HaiVard University invited me to join a group of scholars who were studying the process of change in developing countries. This group of political scientists and economists represented a number of very different points of view about not only the nature and dynamics of the development process but also about the motivation behind it. 1 Within this group, my task was to study Pakistan. The only reason for studying Pakistan was that the Cambridge group was intrigued by an article that I was about to publish in Public Policy. 2 In this article, I had analysed West Pakistan's massive public works programme not in terms of its economic results but in terms of the motivation of the decision-makers that had launched it. The main conclusion that I had drawn from this article was a simple one: even in those societies in which interaction between individuals and groups of individuals is not encouraged, the decisionmakers have only a limited range for manoeuvre; there are social, political and cultural boundaries that cannot easily be crossed. At least in theory, I could distinguish between three different types of reactions on the part of leadership groups to these societal constraints. Some leaders can be expected to respect these boundaries. Not always familiar with the nature and extent of the constraints imposed on them, it is possible for these leaders to take actions that would be resented by some powerful elements in the society. In that case, these leaders would respect the society's constraints and be quite content to draw back into the area of permitted discretion. But not all leaders and leadership groups behave so passively. Some will use charisma, moral suasion or political intrigue to expand this area of permitted discretion, to create a little more room in which they could move and manoeuvre. Others may refuse to be inhibited at all by societal constraints. This latter group is likely to use force to change the rules of the game, to demolish the boundaries that society erects against radical behaviour.

8 Vlll Pakistan under Bhutto, During my year at Harvard, I applied this analysis to understanding the dynamics of decision-making in Pakistan. As I reflected on the important decisions that had shaped Pakistan's history, I came to realise that group conflict and conflict between individuals is a novel- and in my opinion, better- perspective to understanding change in Pakistan. Politics in Pakistan had been dominated by a succession of powerful personalities. Some of these men had wielded power because of their exceptional ability and charisma. Some had gained power because of their ability to reconcile or manipulate group interests. Many had been exceptionally conservative in the choices they had made for the society. Only two- Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Mohammad Ayub Khan -had made any attempt to expand the area of discretion available to them. Not one of them had been a revolutionary. All of them had had a profound impact on making Pakistan's history. But, as I searched for the motivation behind the decisions and actions that had made Pakistan's history and as I began to understand their implications, I also came to realise how easy it was to exaggerate the role of strong men in Pakistan's history and how important it was to recognise the part played by social and economic groups. It was all too easy to identify Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the Quaid-i-Azam (the Great Leader) of Pakistan, with the movement that led to the creation of a separate homeland for the Muslim community of British India. But could the Quaid have succeeded without the help of the Muslim urban middle-classes who saw a better economic and social future in a nation whose destinies they would control rather than in a country in whose management they would have to be content with the role of a junior partner? Was the Industrial Policy of 1948 Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan's master stroke to gain economic independence from India or the product of pressure from a group of merchants who had migrated from India to Pakistan in search of new investment opportunities? Governor General Ghulam Mohammad's dismissal of the Constituent Assembly could be interpreted as the action of a strong man determined to preserve power in his hands. Or, it could be seen in terms of an attempt by Pakistan's indigenous leadership groups to recapture some of the power that they had lost to the refugee groups from India. And so on. There has been a tendency among economic and political historians of Pakistan to view the past as a series of unrelated events. My own approach to understanding events taught me not

9 Priface to the First Edition to treat them as isolated occurrences with little connection to the past or with little relevance for the future. As I searched for meaning in the events that had shaped Pakistan's history, I became convinced that this history was not made up of loosely connected periods, the Jinnah-Liaqat era, the Ayub era, the Yahya interregnum and the Bhutto period. It should be viewed, instead, in terms of the forces, social, economic and political, that made Jinnah, Liaqat, Ayub, Yahya and Bhutto possible. I was still engaged in this reinterpretation of Pakistan's history when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto fell from power. In the eyes of many in the West, the movement that led to Bhutto's fall was unexpected and undeserved. In the opinion of many in Pakistan, the Prime Minister deserved not only to be thrown out of power but also the treatment that he received once he was deposed. In both cases, Bhutto's fate was interpreted as that of a man with some exceptional qualities, good and bad. However, by now I knew that the political turmoil that resulted in the exit from power of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in July 1m was not simply a reaction to some personal quirks or whims of leadership. It was a reaction from a number of social and economic groups who had been hurt by Bhutto's pursuit of Bhuttoism. I decided to attempt an explanation of Bhuttoism, the circumstances that had produced it and the consequences that followed from its application to Pakistan's polity, society and economy. This book is the result of that attempt. I was helped in this effort by a number of people, friends and colleagues. Shahid Yusuf and Paul Streeten- sometimes to help sustain my argument and sometimes to refute what I was sayingintroduced me to a body of literature from various disciplines that I was unlikely to have encountered without their help. Shuja Nawaz, Manfred Blobel and Robert LaPorte read a number of chapters of my draft and helped improve my presentation as well as my analysis. Josephina Valeriano diligently kept track of the sources I used and prepared the bibliography. Fely Favis typed and retyped- patiently deciphering foreign names from handwritten drafts that became increasingly more illegible. Jahanara, my wife, read through all the drafts and discussed with me their content, never failing to point out when I slipped from analyses to assertions. To all these I owe many thanks. lx to july 1979 SHAHID JAVED BURKI

10 Preface to the Second Edition The first edition of this book was published eight years ago. Since then a number of developments have occurred in Pakistan that warrant another look at the concluding section of the book. First, General Ziaul-Haq stayed in office much longer than anybody - including the general himself - thought was possible. Second, after having been thoroughly condemned and then ostracized by the international community for permitting Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's execution, General Zia and his government gained the support and respect of the Western nations and re-established close contacts with the countries of the third world. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 certainly helped in raising General Zia's stock but there were some other reasons that also made a contribution. Third, in December 1985, martial law was lifted after a civilian government headed by Mohammad Khanjunejo as Prime Minister had been in office for nine months. General Zia stayed on as President and retained the job of the Army Chief of Staff. Once again, the common wisdom was that this experiment in powersharing between the army and the politicians will not succeed. While it is too early to pronounce the experiment a success, the Zia-Junejo government has not only survived but the political system which supports it seems to be winning acceptance from the opposition, including the Pakistan People's Party of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Fourth, and finally, the Bhutto phenomenon- some called it the Bhutto factor while others have dubbed it Bhuttoism - continues to influence the course of political development in Pakistan. I have added some material to the first edition of the book to deal with these developments. Analysing the forces that sent Bhutto out of office and made it possible for General Zia to fill the vacuum left by Bhutto's departure persuaded me that the events of were not dictated by the personal whims and ambitions of one man- or even a group of men, the military junta that ruled Pakistan for several years after 5 July There were deeper forces at work that very few people comprehended then and were only dimly perceived by General Zia. Additions to Chapter 9 of the book analyse the nature of these

11 xu Pakistan under Bhutto, forces and the impact they have left on Pakistan's political and economic development. Part IV of the new edition deals with Bhutto's legacy and its meaning for Pakistan's future. Bhutto was a complex man who, during the five and a half years he spent in office, dealt with a complex situation. He has, therefore, left a legacy of which the full implication is difficult to comprehend even a decade after his removal from office. In fact, what he bequeathed to the people of Pakistan cannot be encompassed under one definition as his followers are inclined to do. Bhuttoism means different things to different people. This addition to the book seeks to explore these different meanings of Bhuttoism. SHAHID JAVED BURKI January 1988 Potomac, Maryland