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1 Index Accountability Electoral system and, 54, Local vs. national, 148 Agenda setting, 70, 75 Aggregative democracy, 11 Aldrich, John, 92, 106, 146 Alvarez, Michael. See Przeworski, Adam, et al. Amnesty International, 198 Anarchism, 155 Anonymity, 16 17, 18, 62 63, 89 Formal deanition of, 29 31, 39; Proportional representation and, 41 47, Arrow, Kenneth, 9, 21, 28, 122, 130 Arrow s theorem, 18 21, 63 64, 69, , Assurance game, Austen-Smith, David, and Jeffrey Banks, 64 Australia: As majoritarian democracy, 178, 187 Austria 177, 178, 182, 184, 206 Democratic breakdown in, 194 Electoral system change and, 187 Authority, democratic, 126 Axiomatic theory of democracy, 8, 16, 17 27, Formal deanition of, Electoral systems and, 38 40, 41 47, Social decision rules and, Banks, Jeffrey. See Austen-Smith, David, and Jeffrey Banks Bargaining. See coalitions; logrolling; majority-rule; negotiation Barry, Brian, 12, 15, 93, 135, 136 Majority rule based deliberative democracy and, Beitz, Charles, 14 Belgium 177, 178, 179, 182, 184, 206 Constitutional change in, 187 Benoît, Jean-Pierre, and Lewis Kornhauser, 38 Bernholz, Peter, 71, 73 Bianco, William, et al., Bicameralism Consensual democracy and, 180 Supermajoritarian nature of, 90, 182, 184, 203 Binary independence, 18 19, 21, 63, 122, 132 Formal deanition, JustiAcation of, Seat allocation rules and, 19, 24 BirchAeld, Vicki, and Markus Crepaz, , 182, 184, 189, 196 Black, Duncan, 9, 36, 63 Black, Duncan, and R. A. Newing, 64 Borda, Jean, 9, 21 Borda count, 24 JustiAcation of, Seat allocation rule, as,

2 234 Index Brams, Steven. See Riker, William, and Steven Brams Brunel-Petron, Anne, 101 Buchanan, James, and Gordon Tullock, 1, 69, 90, 93, , 136, 137, 155 Burke, Edmund, 117, 141, 143, 144 Calhoun, John, 90, 92, 155 Canada: As majoritarian democracy, 178, 187 Carey, John. See Shugart, Matthew, and John Carey Chamberlin, John, and Paul Courant, 38, 40, 47, 55 Chang, Eric. See Tsebelis, George, and Eric Chang Cheap talk, 118 Checks and balances 77, 89, See also constitutionalism; supermajority rule Cleavages, social, 25 Closed list proportional representation. See proportional representation Coalitions Axioms applied to, Coalition government, 178 Coalition negotiations, 69, 71, 81, 85, Overlapping, winning, 25 See also majority rule: cycling Cohen, Joshua, 61 Coleman, Jules, and John Ferejohn, 61, 76 80, 85 Communicative action, 157, 170. See also Habermas, Jürgen Complexity, deliberation and, 125, 126 Condorcet, Marquis de, 9, 20, 21, 63, 90, 121, 182 Congress, United States, 71, 138 Consensual democracy, 2 3, 4, 127, 152, 173, 177, Empirical outcomes and, As majority/rule proportional representation, 178, 179, , 206, 208 Theories of, See also judicial review; minority protection; rights protection Consensus Distinction between decision rule and outcome, 133 Overlapping, Problem of, and deliberative democracy, 153, 171, Problem of, and Habermas, Problem of, and Rawls, Reasonable deliberation and, Consent, unforced, , 204, 210 Consociational democracy, 140 Constituency principle, 36 Constitutional Convention, United States, 91 92, 111 Constitutionalism Majority rule, as opposed to, 2, 108 Rights protection and, 103 9, 198, Supermajoritarianism, as, 104, 184 Constitutions, classiacation of, Constitutive theory of democracy, 9, 61, 83 Constructivist theory of justice, 14, 167, 173 Cooperation. See social cooperation, terms of Core of voting game, 94 97, 99, 100, , 138, 139. See also majority rule: cycling Corruption, consensual democracy and, 196 Courant, Paul. See Chamberlin, John, and Paul Courant Crepaz, Markus, , 196. See also BirchAeld, Vicki, and Markus Crepaz Cross-cutting cleavages. See cleavages, social Cycling. See majority rule: cycling

3 Index 235 D Hondt. See electoral systems: formulae Dahl, Robert, 1, 5, 7, 8, 28, 35, 55, 60, 92 93, 104, 106, 197, 203 Decentralization, and Sen s paradox, 107 8, 126, 138, 141 Decisiveness, axiom of, 17, 18, Delegation. See decentralization, and Sen s paradox Deliberation Complexity and, 125 Consensus and, Empirical evidence on, 199, 200 Limitations of, Majority rule and, 2, 61, 69 70, 83, 84, 85, , , 204, 209 Monological vs. polylogical, Proportional representation and, Social choice and, Time and, 160 Trade-off with equality and participation, , , 205 Value of, See also deliberation democracy; reasonableness of decisions Deliberation democracy Literature, 2 3, 4, 10 11, 83 84, , 204, 210 Majority rule based theories of, Problem of consensus and. See consensus See also deliberation Democracy. See aggregative democracy; axiomatic theory of democracy; consensual democracy; constitutive theory of democracy; deliberative democracy; direct democracy; epistemic theory of democracy; minimal theory of democracy; populist theory of democracy Denmark 177, 182, 184, 206 Level of corruption in, 196 Depew amendment, 75 Dewey, John, 7, 120, 126, 136, 151 Majority rule theory of deliberative democracy, 172 Di Palma, G., 186 Direct democracy, 128, 149. See also referenda, supermajoritarian nature of Discourse ethics, 157, 158 Distributional fairness As criterion for reasonable decision, 122, 170 Majority rule and, Distributive justice, democracy as, 10, 80, 82, 197 District magnitude. See electoral system; proportional representation Divide-the-dollar game, , Division of powers, 77. See also constitutionalism; supermajority rule Dodgson, Charles, 38, 40 41, 45, 63 Downs, Anthony, 71 Dryzek, John, 125 Dryzek, John, and Christian List, 76, 85, Dummett, Michael, 21 22, 38, 46 Duverger, Maurice, 37 Dworkin, Ronald, 105, 167 Economic effects of social decision rules, Economic equality Constitutional forms and, empirical evidence, , 200, 205 Veto players and, 180 Economic performance and constitutional forms, empirical evidence on, , 200, 205 EfAciency Consensus and, 155

4 236 Index EfAciency (continued) As criterion for reasonable decisions, 136 Logrolling and, 69, , 151 Elections, free and fair, 6 Electoral democracy, 6 Electoral systems District magnitude, 48, 147 Formulae, Literature, 35, Typology of, See also accountability; mixed member electoral systems; particularism and electoral systems; party systems and electoral systems; plurality electoral systems; proportionality; proportional representation; seat allocation rules; single nontransferable vote; single transferable vote Elster, Jon, 125, 129, 170 Enelow, John, and Melvin Hinich, 64 Environmentalism, consensual democracy and, 199 Epistemic theory of democracy, 9, 61, 83 Epistemic populism, Epstein, David, 68 Equality, norm of, 121. See also economic equality; political equality; substantive equality, trade-off with formal equality Equity. See distributional fairness; economic equality; gender equity Esping-Andersen, Gøsta, 197 Estonia, democratic breakdown in, 194 Euclidean distance, assumption of, European Union, 102 Evolutionary game theory, 140 Expenditure. See government expenditure, patterns of Fair and reasonable decision process, , 174 Fairness. See constituency principle; distributional fairness; political equality; winner-take-all principle Farrell, David, 38 Fearon, James, 141 Federalism Consensual democracy and, 178, 180 Sen s paradox and, 107 Supermajoritarian nature of, 94, 182, 184, 203 See also decentralization, and Sen s paradox Federalist papers, 92, 102, 111 Feld, Scott. See Miller, Nicholas, et al. Feld, Scott, and Bernard Grofman, 38, 64 Femia, Joseph, 129 Ferejohn, John. See Coleman, Jules, and John Ferejohn Filibuster, in U.S. Senate, 89, 93, 184 Finland, as consensual democracy, 109, 184 First-past-the-post. See plurality electoral system Fishkin, James, 118, 124, 126 Folk theorem, 139 France Electoral system, 179 Fourth Republic, 178 As majoritarian democracy, 177, 187 Free and fair elections. See elections, free and fair Freedom House, 108, 198 Gender equity, 199 General Will, 3, 9, 26 Nonexistence of, 76 80, 83, 84, Generational equity, and majority rule, 103 Germany Electoral system, 41, Government expenditure in,

5 Index 237 As supermajoritarian power-sharing system, 186 Weimar constitution, 105 Glendon, Mary Ann, 106, 107 Government expenditure, patterns of, Gridlock. See stability; status quo Grofman, Bernard. See Feld, Scott, and Bernard Grofman; Miller, Nicholas, et al.; Regenwetter, Michael, et al. Group-based equality. See political equality Guardianship. See judicial review Guinier, Lani, 90, 93 Guttman, Amy, 15 Guttman, Amy, and Dennis Thompson, 119 Habermas, Jürgen, 2, 4, 15, 116, 120, 124, 151, 153, 167 Exchange with Rawls, Majority rule and, 158, 159, Problem of consensus and, , 174, 204 Time and, 160 Hare. See electoral systems: formulae Hare, R. M., 15 Harsanyi, John, 15 Hartley, Richard and D. Marc Kilgour, 68 Hazan, Reuven, 140, 147 Hinich, Melvin. See Enelow, John, and Melvin Hinich Hobbes, Thomas, 155 Hout, Eliora van der, 39 Howell, William. See Moe, Terry, and William Howell Huber, Evelyn, et al., 184 Ideal speech situation, 157, 159, , 174, 204 Immobilism. See stability; status quo Impartiality, 12, 15. See also political equality Imperfect procedural justice, and majority rule, Imperiali. See electoral systems: formulae Independence of irrelevant alternatives. See binary independence India, multiparty government in, 195 InBation, consensual democracy and, 195 Intransitivity. See majority rule Ireland, as consensual democracy, 186 Israel Cabinet stability in, 188, 205 Geographical representation in, 145 Open primaries in, 147 Semiconsociational democracy in, 140 Italy Cabinet stability in, 188, 205 Democratic breakdown in, 194 Electoral system and constitutional change, 187 As majoritarian democracy, 187 Open list PR and clientelism, 147 As supermajoritarian power-sharing system, 186 As unstable democracy, 178, 183 Japan, electoral system change in, 187 Jeliazkov, Ivan. See Bianco, William, et al. Johnson, James, 120, 170. See also Knight, Jack, and James Johnson Jose Antonio Cheibub. See Przeworski, Adam, et al. Judicial review, 7, 8, 90, 93, 102 And consensual democracy, 180 Supermajoritarian nature of, 90, 101 2, 184 See also constitutionalism Justice. See constructivist theory of justice; distributional fairness Justice as fairness, 162, 163, 166. See Rawls, John Justice as impartiality. See Barry, Brian

6 238 Index Katz, Jonathon, 38, 53 Kayser, Mark. See Rogowski, Ronald, and Mark Kayser Kemeny rule, 24 Kernell, Sam, 91 Kilgour, D. Marc. See Hartley, Richard, and D. Marc Kilgour Kitschelt, Herbert, 191 Knight, Jack, and James Johnson, 66, 77, 78, 117, 123, 132 Majority rule-based deliberative democracy, 172 Kornhauser, Lewis. See Benoît, Jean- Pierre, and Lewis Kornhauser Kunicova, Jana. See Rose-Ackerman, Susan, and Jana Kunicova Laing, James, and Benjamin Slotznick, Latner, Michael, and Anthony McGann, 145 Latvia, democratic breakdown in, 194 Lebanon, democratic breakdown in, 194 Liberal equality. See political equality Lijphart, Arend, 2, 35, 37, 38, 51, 53, 127, 140, 143, 177, , 182, 184, 188, 195, 196, 199 Limongi, Fernando. See Przeworski, Adam, et al.; Przeworski, Adam, and Fernando Limongi Lindblom, Charles, 119 List, Christian. See Dryzek, John, and Christian List Lithuania, democratic breakdown in, 194 Locke, John, 156 Logrolling Distinction with vote trading, 137 EfAciency of, 69, As evidence of cycling, Legislative, 69, , 150 Mackie, Gerry, 75 76, 85 Madison, James, 90, 91 93, 111, 208 Majoritarian democracy, Majority rule, 1, 4, 11, 203 Coalition formation, 43 Compared to supermajority rule, Consensual democracy and, , , 206 Cycling, 3, 9, 11, 24 27, 63 70, 77 79, 84, 85, 97 99, , , , 200, 202, Cycling, desirability of, 24 27, , Cycling, evidence of, Cycling and Arrow, 18 21, Cycling and consensual democracy, 181, 200, 208 Cycling and minority protection, 25 26, 89 91, 93, , , 181, 203 4, 207, 208 Cycling and uncovered set, Deliberation and, , , 174, 204 Distributional fairness and, EfAciency and, Empirical outcomes and, Habermas and, 158, 159, As imperfect procedural justice, JustiAcation of, JustiAcation of, in terms of May s theorem, 62 63, 203, 210 As pure procedural justice, As quasi-pure procedural justice, Mali, multiparty government in, 195 Manufactured majority, 43 Marley, Anthony. See Regenwetter, Michael, et al. May, Kenneth, 62 63, 80, 89, 97 Mayhew, David, 138 McKelvey, Richard, 64, 67 McLean, Iain, 35, 148 Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, et al., 196 Mill, David van, 132 Mill, John Stuart, 146 Miller, David, 130 Miller, Nicholas, 1, 3, 24 25, 67, 71, 72,

7 Index , 85, 97 98, 109, 137, 181, 194, 202 Miller, Nicholas, et al., 64 Minimal theory of democracy, 27, 61, Minority protection, 1 4, 26, 89 91, 94 97, , , 203, 206, 208 Empirical evidence on, Rights protection and, 90, Mixed electoral system Implementation of, Political equality and, Proportionality of, Moe, Terry, 94 Moe, Terry, and William Howell, 102 Monological deliberation. See deliberation Monroe, Burt, 38, 47, 55 Multidimensionality of policy space, 22 23, 26, 66, Negotiation Deliberation and, , 158, 209 See also coalitions; logrolling; majority rule Netherlands Coalition government in, , 178, 182, 184, 206 Corruption in, 196 Electoral system, 41, 45, 48, 50, 147 Geographical representation in, 145 Government expenditure in, Minority/rights protection in, Neutrality, 16 17, 29 31, 39 Coalition, 17 PR and, 41 47, Newing, R. A. See Black, Duncan, and R. A. Newing New Zealand, as majoritarian democracy, 178, 179 Nino, Carlos Santiago, 7, 105, 116, 119, 136, 146 Majority rule-based deliberative democracy, 173 Nonnegative responsiveness. See responsiveness, nonnegative/ positive Nonseparable preferences and logrolling, 73 Normative political philosophy literature, 1, 202 Norms, internal content of, 140 Norway 177, 182, 184, 206 Corruption in, 196 Nurmi, Hannu, 18, 62, 70 Open list proportional representation. See proportional representation Oppenheimer, Joe, 71 Ordinal electoral systems. See seat allocation rules Original position, 161, 165, 166, 167 Outcomes and democracy, 27 Pareto optimality, 122, 155. See also unanimity rule Participation Trade-off with deliberation and political equality, , 151, Trade-off with deliberation in representation, , 206 Value of, 124, 129, 171 Participatory democracy, self-selected, 127, Particularism, and electoral systems, 54. See also pork barrel politics Party systems and electoral systems, 54 Pateman, Carole, 124, 129 Perotti, Roberto. See Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, et al. Pitkin, Hannah, 10, 36 Plebiscitarian democracy, Pliny the Younger, 63 Plott, Charles, 64 Plurality electoral system, 2, 36, 37, 38, 93 Accountability and, See also representation

8 240 Index Plurality of reason, Political equality, 1 4, 5, 12 17, 116, 150 Classifying constitutions and, 181 Deliberative democracy and, 153, 167, 171 Empirical trade-off with deliberation, 199 Empirical trade-off with economic equality, Empirical trade-off with economic performance, Empirical trade-off with minority/ rights protection, Empirical trade-off with stability, Equivalence of liberal equality, fairness, and impartiality, Group-based equality, 13, 14, 36 Implies majority rule 62 63, 80 82, 85, 203, 210 Liberal equality, PR and, 35 59, 203, 210 Proof implies PR, 41 47, Trade-off with participation and deliberation, , 151 Popular sovereignty, 5, 12, 23, 108, 203 Popular will. See General will Populist theory of democracy, 75 76, 76 80, 83, 84, Pork barrel politics, 137, 138, 144, 196 Positive responsiveness. See responsiveness Powell, G. Bingham, 37, 45, 143, 149 Pragmatist justiacation of democracy, 27, 61, Preferences, deliberative transformation of, , 129, 135 Presidentialism Instability of, 194 Supermajoritarian nature of, 90, 184, 203 Procedural justice and majority rule. See majority rule Procedural theory of democracy, 5 8, 11, 61, 84, 171, 174, 207 8, 210 Procedures, democratic. See seat allocation rules; social decision rules Proportionality District magnitude and, 52 54, 184 Electoral rules and, Empirical outcome as opposed to PR, 52 Proportional representation, 1, 2, 4, 35 59, 93, 178 Accountability and, Classifying constitutions with, Closed vs. open list, 50, 147 DeAnition, Deliberation and, District magnitude and particularism, 147 Electoral threshold and, 50, 53, 184 Empirical outcomes and, , Implementation as electoral rule, Multitier, 51 Parties not required, Proof implied by political equality, 41 47, 55 59, 203, 210 See also representation Przeworski, Adam, 78, 118 Przeworski, Adam, et al., 188, 194, 195 Przeworski, Adam, and Fernando Limongi, 194 Public reason, 116. See also social reason Public sphere, Pure procedural justice. See majority rule Quasi-pure procedural justice. See majority rule Rae, Douglas, 2, 4, 37, 48, 53, 63, 89, 91, 92, 93, 98, 101 Problem of consensus and, 153, , 159, 162, 166, 168, 174, 204, 210

9 Index 241 Ragin, Charles. See Huber, Evelyn, et al. Rational ignorance, 118 Rational vs. reasonable, 120, 169 Rationality Individual vs. social, 26, communicative, 116 See also reasonableness of decisions; social reason; transitivity Rawls, John, 2, 4, 14 15, 61, 80, 81, 82 83, 100, 105, 119, 120, 151, 153, 167, , 172 Exchange with Habermas, Problem of consensus and, , 174 Reasonableness of decisions Consensus and, Deliberation and, Distributive fairness, 122, 136 EfAciency as criterion, 136 Majority rule and, , PR and, vs. rational, 120 Referenda, supermajoritarian nature of, 184 Regenwetter, Michael, et al., 74 75, 85 Relevant reasons. See Williams, Bernard Representation Authorized, 45, 143 Delegate vs. trustee, 142, 144 Descriptive, 36, 143, 145 Geographical, 145 National vs. parochial, 142, 144, 146 Party vs. candidate centered, 144 Theory of, 10, 35 36, 117, 125 Trade-off, deliberative vs. participatory, , 206 Typology of, Responsiveness, nonnegative/positive, 17, 18, 29 31, 41 47, 55 59, Responsiveness of electoral system, 81, See also accountability Rights protection, 7 8, 101, Empirical evidence on, 108, vs. minority protection, 90, Social rights, Riker, William, 1, 3, 4, 9, 20, 26, 27, 61, 67, 74 76, 76 80, 81, 83, 85, 122, 130, 207 Riker, William, and Steven Brams, 137, 138, 141, 151 Roemer, John, 15, 198 Rogowski, Ronald, 39 Rogowski, Ronald, and Mark Kayser, 195 Rose-Ackerman, Susan, and Jana Kunicova, 196 Rostagno, Massimo. See Milesi- Ferretti, Gian Maria, et al. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 121, 156 Rules. See procedures, democratic; seat allocation rules; social decision rules Saari, Donald, 20, 21 22, 99 Sainte Laguë. See electoral systems: formulae Scanlon, Thomas, 14, 15, 172 Scharpf, Fritz, 94 SchoAeld, Norman, 64, 67 Schumpeter, Joseph, 27 Seat allocation rules, 4, 8 12 DeAnition of, 12, Transitivity and, 24 See also Borda count; electoral system; plurality electoral system; proportional representation; single nontransferable vote; single transferable vote Self-selected participatory democracy, 125 Sen, Amartya Arrow s theorem and, 20 Decentralization and Sen s paradox, 107, 126, 138 Paretian liberal paradox, Sened, Itai. See Bianco, William, et al. Shugart, Matthew, 37. See Taagepera, Rein, and Matthew Shugart

10 242 Index Shugart, Matthew, and John Carey, 194 Shugart, Matthew, and Martin Wattenberg, 44, 50 Single member district plurality. See plurality electoral systems Single nontransferable vote, 46 Single transferable vote, 45, 53 Slotznick, Benjamin. See Laing, James, and Benjamin Slotznick Social choice literature, 1, 35, 38, 62 76, 76 80, 81, 84, 85, 116, 202 Social contract theory, Social cooperation, terms of, , 136, 161, 164 Social decision rules, 3 4, 8 12, DeAnition of, 12, See also majority rule; supermajority rule Social reason, 3, 26, 115, 116, 117, 134, 171 Individual rationality and, Transitivity and, , 210 Social welfare function, 9 11, 19, 116, 133 South Africa, as example of PR democracy, 194 Spain, electoral system of, 52 Stability Cabinet, Empirical evidence on, , 200, 205 Policy, Policy vs. social, 25 Regime, , 198 State of nature, Status quo, 98 99, 154 Tyranny of, Uncertainty about, Steiner, Jürg, 177 Stephens, John. See Huber, Evelyn, et al. Still, Jonathon, 36 StrafAn, Philip, 63 Strategic voting, 23 Strom, Kaare, 188, 199 Substantive equality, trade-off with formal equality, 15 16, 198 Supermajority rule, 62, 77, 82, 89 91, , 203 ClassiAcation of constitutions and, Consensual democracy and, Consensus and, Empirical outcomes and, Literature on, Minority protection and, 94 97, Rights protection and, Social choice theoretic analysis of, Uncertainty and, Supreme Court, United States, 102, 108 Sweden 177, 182, 184, 206 Corruption in, 196 Switzerland As consensual democracy, 178, 179, 206 Corruption in, 196 Government expenditure in, 191 As supermajoritarian power-sharing system, 186 Taagepera, Rein and Matthew Shugart, 37, 53 Taylor, Michael, 63 Thompson, Dennis. See Guttman, Amy, and Dennis Thompson Threshold, electoral. See proportional representation Time, deliberation and, 160 Transaction cost, 136 Transitivity, 18 21, 22, 24 27, 29 31, 116, 131, 132, 133 Social reason and, , Trilemma of deliberative democracy, , 151 Tsebelis, George, , , 189, 193

11 Index 243 Tsebelis, George, and Eric Chang, 189 Tsetlin, Ilia. See Regenwetter, Michael, et al. Tullock, Gordon. See Buchanan, James, and Gordon Tullock Turkey, electoral system in, 50 Turnout, voting, 199 Unanimity rule, 11, 90, 93 Pareto optimality of, 93 Uncertainty, and majority rule. See majority rule Uncovered set, 67 69, 81 Deliberation and, Normative justiacation of, Size of, United Kingdom Electoral system, 41, 149, 179 As majoritarian democracy, 177, 178, 187 Particular vs. national representation, 150 United States Electoral system, 179 Government expenditure in, As majoritarian democracy, 177, 178 Right protection in, 108 As supermajoritarian winner-takeall system, 187 See also Supreme Court, United States; Congress, United States; Constitutional Convention, United States Veil of ignorance, 100, 161, 162 Veto Mutual, Offensive use of, 93 94, 135 Stochastic, Veto players, theory of, , , , 193 Vote of investiture, 85 Vote of no conadence, 70, 85 Vote trading. See logrolling Ward, Hugh, 38 Warren, Mark, 27, 119, 126, 129 Wattenberg, Martin. See Shugart, Matthew, and Martin Wattenberg Weber, Max, 27 Weingast, Barry, 92, 146 Welfare state, 193 Williams, Bernard, 12, 16 Williamson, Oliver, 125 Wilmot proviso, 75 Winner-take-all principle, 36 Young, H. Peyton, 26

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