Index. accountability, 67-9 agenda control Argentina and Chile, as determinant of regulatory predictability,

Transcription

1 accountability, 67-9 agenda control Argentina and Chile, as determinant of regulatory predictability, Alfonsin Administration, Argentina, 162, 164, 170, 173-6, Allende, Salvador, 115 Arellano, Jose Pablo, I2ini3, 125-6, 130, 146 Argentina case study of policy outcomes, as "delegative democracy," Law of Convertibility, i6$nz6 party-centered election rules, 86, 88 presidential decree power, 74-5 presidential power over legislation, 78-9 as presidential system, 8 separation of purpose in, 92-3 authoritarian system, Chile, 108, , authoritarian system, Taiwan democratization ( ), 268- political institutions, constituencies, and external checks ( ), role of elections under, during transition to democracy, , 192 Aylwin, Patricio, 129 balance of powers, 78 Baldez, Lisa, 76-7, 86, 210 balkanization, 28, 62, 65 Bilbao, Josefina, 144 Boeninger, Edgardo, Buchanan, James M., 27-8 budget process outcome using item veto, outcome using package veto, budget process, Argentina congressional role, 153-8, 160-5, drafting of estimates, execution of budget, executive branch role, 152 institutional rules and actions, statistical analysis of allocation, budget process, Chile amendments, compared to package and item veto formats, congressional role, 121-2,139,141-4 creation of rules for, executive role, negotiation of, oversight and audit, policy outcomes for three different procedures,

2 budget process, Chile (cont.) promulgation of budget law, reversion, spending policy, budget process, Taiwan committee review of the budget, Director-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS), 213 institutional changes, Cain, Bruce E., 38m6, 39 Carey, John, 69, 76-7, 86, 210 case studies comparative, 8-9 country cases, 13 variables, 9-13 Cheng, Tun-Jen, 77-8 Chiang Ching-kuo, 190, 197, 268, 269 Chiang Kai-shek, 260 Chicago Boys, 115 Chile candidate-centered election rules, 86 fiscal surpluses, presidential powers, 78-9 as presidential system, 8 separation of purpose in, 92, 94 See also budget process, Chile; electricity sector, Chile; Pinochet regime Chu Yun-han, 202, 208 coalitions, Chile Concertacion, 94^4, 115, , 127, 129, 254 distribution of seats in Congress, formation under electoral system, separation of purpose across, competition, intraparty electoral, 43-4,48 Congress, Argentina composition, role in budget process, Congress, Chile major coalitions in, 118 participation in budget process, structure and powers of, Congress, Taiwan. See Legislative Yuan, Taiwan Constitution, Argentina amendments and executive branch reform (1994), 153, budget process, 160, i6ini8, 162 pre- and post-reform electoral system, Constitution (1980), Chile amendment process, 120 budget and fiscal policy provisions, 107-8, , electoral cycle provision, reforms, 116, n8nn regulatory regime provisions, separation of powers system, 115, 120, 253 Constitution, Taiwan elections prior to revisions, reform ( ), 190-1, i93n 4 revision (1997), Costa, Rossana, 125, 135, 141 Cox, Gary W., 56, 57, 292, 317 credible commitments, 31 Czechoslovakia electoral system in transition from communism, indicators of transition, parliamentary elections (1990, 1992), as parliamentary system, 16, 291 reform and privatization of SOEs in, 16, SOE governance under communism, transition from communist government, Czech Republic mass privatization program, 314 unity of purpose in,

3 decisiveness defined, 26 with divided powers, 33-6 of policy, 96-7, tradeoffs with resoluteness, 6-7 See also indecisiveness decree power defined, 72-3 presidential, 72-5, as proactive power, source of authority, 74 use and abuse, 322 delegation of power by institutions, 21-2 internal, 22n2 by legislative parties, democracy, Taiwan democratization (1986 to present), phases in transition to, , 192, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Taiwan, 19, , 269 division of power. See separation of power division of purpose. See separation of purpose electoral districts defined, 36 districting schemes and votes, district magnitude in Japan, 199 district magnitude in Taiwan, 199 electoral formulas, 36 candidate-centered, 85-8 party-centered, 85-8 electoral system candidate-centered, 44-5, 49, 85-8, 270 district, 36 effect of rules on party systems, 44-7, impact on policy formation of different, 49 laws in Taiwan, party-centered, 44-5, 85-8 party seat allocation and economies of scale, promoting intraparty competition, 43-4, 48-9 rules for cycles, staggering, and proportionality, strong and feeble, 42, 44-5 threshold of exclusion, 40 electoral system, Argentina reforms (1990s), separation of purpose created by, 150 electoral system, Chile properties relating to budget, two-member district system, electoral system, Taiwan direct elections initiated (1991), effect of reform, fiscal outcomes and reform of, party role in nominations, single nontransferable vote system, 190-2, 197, 198, 200, 203, 207, 210, 270, 321 electricity sector, Argentina consumption and profitability ( ), investment ( ), monopoly status of regional, pre- and post-privatization rates, price setting, regulation and privatization, electricity sector, Chile generation ( ) price setting, profitability ( ), 249 reform outcomes, regulation of, 249 electricity sector, Taiwan cost of service by customer class ( ),

4 electricity sector, Taiwan (cont.) evolution of rate structure by customer class (1980s), legislation revised (1961), 267 preferential rates ( ), rate setting and investment, services and outages, U.S. influence and veto, executive branch limits on impoundment power, 29 under presidentialism, 64 Executive Yuan, Taiwan appropriation of government funds, 223 bargaining with Legislative Yuan, Planning and Budget Review Group (PBRG), powers related to budget, , 217 factions/factionalism defined, 43 effect in Taiwan on fiscal policy, electoral structures affect number of, 43 with intraparty competition, 43-4 within parties in Taiwan, and party systems, 43-7 federalism effects on presidential rule, 3 24 political compromises under, 49 separation of power under, Feliu, Olga, 123, 141-2, Ferejohn, John, 38ni6, 39 Fiorina, Morris, 38m 6, 39 fiscal policy, Chile, 107-8, , See also budget process, Chile fiscal policy, Taiwan effect of factionalism on, with separation of powers, fiscal pork, 47-8 Frei, Eduardo, 119 Frydman, Roman, 313 Fukai, Shigeru, 208 Fukui, Haruhiro, 208 gatekeeping, 77-8 See also veto gates government decisiveness v. resoluteness of, 26-7 definition of divided, 24 division as source of separation of purpose, 82 ungovernability, See also subgovernments Haggard, Stephan, 77-8 Harris, Fred R., 32 Hau Pei-tsun, 200-1, Heller, William B., 74 indecisiveness, 22, 29 institutions checks and balances in design of, 2-3 delegation of power by democratic, 21-2 as determinants of regulatory predictability, index of unity or separation of purpose, 91-5 new institutionalism, 319 principal-agent relationships in democratic, 21-2 separating power and purpose in democratic, 21-2, 62 See also electoral system interest groups bargaining with legislators, 37-9 influence on policy outcomes, 53-4 and rent seeking, 54 See also factions/factionalism investment electricity sector in Argentina ( ), incentives in Chilean electricity sector, related to reversionary policy, 245 iron triangles formation,

5 interest group competition within, 54 irresoluteness, 6, 23, 31 item veto in budget process, budget process in Chile, defined, 75 president's use of, 101 Jones, Mark P., 74, 76, 88 judicial system, 32-6 Jurgensen, Harry, Kaldor-Hicks criterion, 50, 62-3 Kharas, Homi, 311 Kiewiet, D. Roderick, 57 Klaus, Vaclav, 302, 303, 306 Kuomintang (KMT), Taiwan authoritarianism of, 260-1, 271 Central Standing Committee (CSC), 194, 211 electoral success, 270 enterprise ownership, 196 link to private sector, Party Congress, 194 party split (1993), z6 9, 2.70m 5 Kuschel, Carlos, Lee Teng-hui, 190, 200-1, legislative branch how actors control vetoes in, 36 under presidentialism, 64 Legislative Yuan, Taiwan bargaining with Executive Yuan, Committee of All Committees, 214, committee review of the budget, reform of committee structure, spending authorization, 223 legislators demand for and supply of pork, 48-5* effect of separation of survival among, 85 incentives in presidential systems, 82-8 motivations, 56-8 personal votes of, 37-9 in presidential and parliamentary systems, 8 responses under unity or separation of purpose, 91-5 Levy, Brian, 5411x6 Lien Chan, 206 Lijphart, Arend, 8, io2n37 Linz, Juan J., 70 Loveman, Brian, 33 McCubbins, Mathew D., 30, 56, 57, 74, 292, 317 Madison, James, 2-3, 5 Mainwaring, Scott, 32, 99m 6 Martorell, Luis Viana, 254 Menem, Carlos Saul, 150, Menem Administration, Argentina, 153, 157, 162-3, , 172-6, 181 military sector appropriations for Chilean, Argentina, I52n2 fiscal policy in Taiwan related to, military dictatorship in Chile, , 133 in separation of powers, 33-6 veto of, 3 3 Millard, Frances, 305m 5 Milor, Vedat, 315, 3i6n26 mirroring principle, 235n2, 236, 240 New Party, Taiwan, 191, 199, 200, 201-2, 217, 270 Noll, Roger, 54-5 Orpis, Jaime, 131, 141-2, package veto in budget process, budget process in Chile, defined, 75 Palma, Andres, 122, 126,

6 parliamentary system advantages of, 3 20 cabinet accountability, 67-9 incentives for legislatures, 84-5 Japan, 199 legislators in, 8 policy making, separation of powers in, 3 source of executive authority, 83-4 veto gate, 70 particularism, 96, 99, 100-1, 322 Partido Justicialista, party system creation of factions in, 43-7 effect on separation of purpose, 94-5 electoral alliances and seat allocation, factionalism in Taiwan's, legislative delegation of power, 56-8 number in feeble electoral system, 45 overrepresentation in Chilean system, See also coalitions; factions/factionalism; Kuomintang (KMT), Taiwan PFC (Provision para Financiemientos Comprometidos), 139, Pinochet, Augusto, 108, Pinochet regime economic liberalization and political stability under, reversion and utility regulation, Pion-Berlin, David, i63n24 Poland electoral system, 291 electoral system in transition from communism, indicators of transition, Law on National Investment Funds and their Privatization (1993), 3i4 Law on Privatization (1990), Law on State Enterprises (1981), parliamentary elections (1991), 302 as premier-presidential system, 8, 7ini4, 291 privatization policy, reform and privatization of SOEs in, 16, transition from communist government, unity of purpose manufactured in, policy making effect of institutional arrangements on, 3-4 impact of different electoral systems on, 49 interaction of separation of power and purpose in, subgovernment domination of, 53-6 pork associated with SNTV in Taiwan, 203, 210 demand for and supply of, 7m 2, 47-5* rents as, 48 Power, Timothy J., 73 premier-presidential systems, 69-70, 84, 195 policy making, president as veto player in, 84 Taiwan as, 192 president decree power of, 72-5 gatekeeping and agenda setting, 77-8 power in "delegative democracy," 150 proactive and reactive powers, separation of origin in election of, 68-9 as source of particularism, 101 strength related to unity of purpose, veto and override powers, 67,

7 presidentialism. See presidential system presidential powers Argentina, Chile, and Taiwan, 78-9, decree power, 72-5 gatekeeping and agenda-setting, 77-8 proactive and reactive, 7-8, 72, veto and override, 67, 75-7 presidential systems cabinet accountability, 67-9 central features of, 102 dimensional comparison, 97-9 election cycles, failings of, 320 gridlock, 30 incentives for legislators, 84 independent tenure of executive and legislative branches, 64-5 index of presidential powers, law-making powers, 72 legislators in, 8 particularism in, 322 policy making in, 85, president as veto gate, 71 separation of powers in, 3, 31-6, 64-6, 78 separation of purpose in, 64-6, 81- Taiwan, 193, 269 unity of purpose, principal-agent relationships, 21-2 privatization conditions in public policy for, 48 of electricity sector in Argentina, 236-9, electricity sector in Chile, 253 of SOEs in Poland and Czechoslovakia, 16, 293-8, public goods collective action problem, 57 legislators' provision of, 84 supply in candidate-centered elections, 49 public policy effect of institutions on reform of, 65-6 particularism, policy making in executive branch structure, tradeoffs in public- and privateregarding, 6-7, 23, 28 transaction costs to change, 27 used for private gain, See also economic policy; policy making; tradeoffs regime stability defined, 230 determinants of, as factor in regulatory policy change, 230 regulation Chicago School models of, 54 distinct from laws, 73m electricity sector, Chile, structure of regulatory institutions, Taiwan, of utilities in Chile, of utility and electricity sector in Argentina, regulatory policy determinants of, likelihood of change in, 230 predictability, reversionary, 230 regulatory regime, Argentina reversionary pricing policy, stability, regulatory regime, Chile, stability under Pinochet administration, rents as pork, 48 rent seeking, 49, 54 resoluteness defined, 26-7 with divided powers, 33-6 of political system, 6 tradeoff with decisiveness, 6-7 See also irresoluteness 357

8 reversionary policy Argentinean electricity pricing, 239- Chile, , 124-6, 248-9, 252-3, 322 as determinant of regulatory predictability, investment related to, 245 Taiwan, 322 veto players' role, willingness to invest as function of, 245 separation of origin, 68 separation of power achieving, 31-6 in Argentina, 243 under bicameralism, 32-6 combinations of separation of purpose and, 3-4 to create checks and balances, 3 definition and source, 64 as determinant of regime stability, implications for public policy, 320 interaction with separation of purpose, in legislative, administrative, and judicial procedure, 52 measuring degree of, 5 Poland, 324 in presidential systems, 3, 78 separation of purpose with, 3, tradeoffs implied by, 26-8 See also vetoes; veto players separation of power, Chile conflict related to budget process, 139,141-4 established in Constitution, 120 separation of power, Taiwan budget deliberation in Legislative Yuan, in drafting of budget bill, effect of party organization changes, Executive Yuan budget options, with institutional reform, separation of purpose achieving, Argentina, 150, 321 combination of separation of powers and, 3-4 conditions for, 64 degrees of, 23-4 divisions related to fiscal policy, under federalism, 90-1 implications for shaping public policy, 320 interaction with separation of powers, at legislative, administrative, and judicial levels, 52 Poland, 304-7, 324 policy process with, 96-j in presidential systems, in separation-of-power system, 23 state's ungovernability under, 28-3i See also coalitions separation of purpose, Taiwan with institutional reform, president's limits on, 192 in transition phase to democracy, separation of survival, 85 Shugart, Matthew Soberg, 69, 82, 89, 99ni6 single nontransferable vote (SNTV), Taiwan, 86-8, 190-2, 197, , 203, 207, 210, 270, 321 Spiller, Pablo, 54n26, 254 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Czechoslovakia, in Poland, privatization policy in Poland and Czechoslovakia, reform in Poland and Czechoslovakia, subgovernments circumstances leading to,

9 committee government, 53-6 corporatist, 55-8 parliamentary parties, 5 5 Taiwan candidate-centered election rules, 86-8 index of presidential power, 80-1 influence of United States, as premier-presidential system, 8, presidential powers, 78-9 separation of purpose in, 92, 94 Six-Year National Development Plan, See also authoritarian system, Taiwan; Executive Yuan, Taiwan; Kuomintang (KMT), Taiwan; Legislative Yuan, Taiwan threshold of exclusion, 40 tradeoffs between decisiveness and resoluteness, 6-7, 22, 26-8 in delegation of powers, 22 established by separation of power and purpose, 22 between indecisiveness and irresoluteness, between public- and privateregardedness of policy, 6-7, 23, 28 transaction costs with increased effective number of vetoes, 27 internal and external costs, 27-8 Tsebelis, George, 3, 32 Tullock, Gordon, 27-8, 38m7 ungovernability, unilateralism conditions for and effect of, 95-6 defined, 29 unity of purpose Czech Republic, as determinant of regime stability, in Poland, in presidential systems, 65, 9 strength of president in system with, Taiwan, 201 See also separation of purpose veto actors. See veto players vetoes by Argentine president, by Chilean president, full item or partial veto, j6 held by a collectivity, 24-5 increase in effective number of, 31 of judiciary, 32-3 of military, 3 3 of president in Taiwan, 218 as reactive power, 75-6, 321 weak, 97 See also item veto; package veto; veto gates; veto players veto gates as determinant of regulatory predictability, in executive branch structure, 58 in parliamentary and presidential systems, 70-1, 97 in regulatory process, veto players bargaining among, 7, 28, 30 counting, 25-6 defined, 24-5 demands related to number of, 58- in dictatorship, 5-6 groups in multilateral veto game, 62 in regulatory process, 230 reversionary policy role, in unanimous rule system, 5-6 voting, strategic district magnitude, 42 incentives, 41 instrumentally rational voters, 41 principle of seat allocation, 41-2 Weingast, Barry, 38m 7 359