POL-GA Comparative Government and Institutions New York University Spring 2017

Transcription

1 POL-GA Comparative Government and Institutions New York University Spring 2017 Professor: Hande Mutlu-Eren Class Time: Tuesday 2:00-3:50 PM Office: 303 Class Location: 435 Office hours: Tuesday 12:00-2:00 PM I. Course Description This course provides a systematic analysis of comparative democratic processes with an emphasis on the political determinants and policy consequences of institutions. The course is organized around major themes in comparative institutions literature. We will start with the basic classification of constitutional regimes into parliamentary, presidential and semi-presidential systems. We will then examine how the executive comes to power and remains in power, which requires a close study of electoral institutions as well as the dynamics of executivelegislative relations. Finally, we will examine the role played by different government institutions in determining various political outcomes, such as representation, accountability, corruption, growth, and economic policy. Some of the questions we will address in this course include: How do presidential and parliamentary systems differ and what are the consequences of these differences? How do electoral rules shape party systems and the nature of political representation? Why are some institutions more likely than others to produce desirable social outcomes such as accountability, representativeness, redistribution, and political stability? Where do institutions come from in the first place? The core theme of the course is that political institutions create incentives that influence the strategic choices made by political actors. By the end of the semester, students should be able to conceptualize the tradeoffs involved in various institutional arrangements and assess them empirically. 1

2 II. Course Requirements and Grading The final grade for this course will have the following components: Class participation (20%) Students are expected to attend class and participate in class discussions. Students should do the assigned readings before the lecture and come to class prepared to participate in discussions. Review papers (30%) Students are required to write THREE review papers (2-3 pages, single-spaced) on course readings. The review papers are think pieces that critically assess the reading. A good review should: identify the central research question and/or key puzzle, briefly summarize the causal propositions, and critically evaluate the theoretical and empirical strengths and weaknesses (Are the assumptions and the logic behind them reasonable? Are the key theoretical propositions logically persuasive? Are the methods and research design appropriately employed in answering the research questions? Does the evidence fully support the conclusions? What could be improved about the paper? etc.) and discuss potential directions for future research. The review papers are due by 5pm on Tuesdays before the class. The assignment of the students to the readings will be made on the first class. Students writing a review paper in a particular week are also expected to lead the discussion. Final research paper (50%) Each student is required to write a research paper limited to double-spaced pages (including footnotes but excluding tables, figures, and references) due on May 9, noon. The paper will include a statement of a research question or puzzle, a review of the literature related to the topic, theoretical arguments in order to provide an answer to the question, empirically testable hypotheses drawn from these theories, and possibly a description of the data followed by some initial analysis. More information on the expectations will be provided in class. No late submissions will be accepted except for emergency situations, which require documentation. Students are expected to come up with a topic for their paper and submit a oneparagraph description on Feb. 28. A one-page outline, which accounts for 10% of your overall grade, is due in class on Mar. 28. This outline will include the research question, a list of hypotheses and the theoretical logic behind each, and a brief description of the data or ideas about methods that will be used. Students will give a 30-minute presentation of their paper in the last two weeks of the course (Apr. 25 & May 2). This is a great opportunity to receive feedback before finalizing and submitting the paper and accounts for 10% of your paper grade. 2

3 III. Required Readings There is no required textbook. The articles and book chapters will be accessible from the class website on NYU Classes. IV. Class Schedule Jan. 24: Introduction: Approaches and Topics No assigned reading. Jan. 31: Methods in Comparative Politics Fearon, James Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science. World Politics 43: Diermeier, Daniel and Keith Krehbiel Institutionalism as a Methodology. Journal of Theoretical Politics 15(2): Gerring, John What is a Case Study and What is It Good for? American Political Science Review 98(2): Feb. 7: Organization of the Executive I Alfred, Stepan, and Cindy Skach Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Presidentialism versus Parliamentarism. World Politics 46(1): Tsebelis, George Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism. British Journal of Political Science 25(3): Huber, John D The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies. American Political Science Review Feb. 14: Organization of the Executive II Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins Political Structure and Economic Policy: The Institutional Determinants of Policy Outcomes. In Stephan Haggard, and Mathew D. McCubbins, eds., Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3

4 Hellwig, Timothy, and David Samuels Electoral Accountability and the Variety of Democratic Regimes. British Journal of Political Science 38(1): Cheibub, Jose Antonio Presidentialism, Electoral Identifiability, and Budget Balances in Democratic Systems. American Political Science Review 100(3): Feb. 21: Government Formation Volden, Craig, and Clifford J. Carrubba The Formation of Oversized Coalitions in Modern Parliamentary Democracies. American Journal of Political Science 48(3): Golder, Matt, Sona Golder, and David A. Siegel Modeling the Institutional Foundation of Government Formation. Journal of Politics 74(2): Laver, Michael, Scott de Marchi, and Hande Mutlu Negotiations in Legislatures over Government Formation. Public Choice 147: Feb. 28: Cabinet Governance Martínez-Gallardo, Cecilia, and Petra Schleiter Choosing Whom to Trust: Agency Risks and Cabinet Partisanship in Presidential Democracies. Comparative Political Studies 48(2): Indridason, Indridi, and Christopher Kam The Timing of Cabinet Reshuffles in Five Westminster Parliamentary Systems. Legislative Studies Quarterly 30(3): Golder, Sona N., and Jacquelyn A. Thomas Portfolio Allocation and Vote of No Confidence. British Journal of Political Science 44(1): * One-paragraph research proposal is due in class* Mar. 7: Government Stability King, Gary, James E. Alt, Nancy Elizabeth Burns, and Michael Laver A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies. American Journal of Political Science 24(3): Martínez-Gallardo, Cecilia Out of the Cabinet: What Drives Defections from the Government in Presidential Systems? Comparative Political Studies 45:

5 Huber, John D., and Cecilia Martinez-Gallardo Replacing Cabinet Ministers: Patterns of Ministerial Stability in Parliamentary Democracies. American Political Science Review 102(2): Mar. 14: Spring break Mar. 21: Electoral Systems I Cox, Gary W Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems. American Journal of Political Science 34(4): Ezrow, Lawrence Parties' Policy Programmes and the Dog that Didn't Bark: No Evidence that Proportional Systems Promote Extreme Party Positioning. British Journal of Political Science 38 (3): Neto, Octavio Amorim, and Gary W. Cox Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of Parties. American Journal of Political Science 41(1): Mar. 28: Electoral Systems II Blais, André, and Marc André Bodet Does Proportional Representation Foster Closer Congruence Between Citizens and Policymakers? Comparative Political Studies 39(10): Carey, John M., and Simon Hix The Electoral Sweet Spot: Low-Magnitude Proportional Electoral Systems American Journal of Political Science 55(2): Chang, Eric. C.C., and Miriam A. Golden Electoral Systems, District Magnitude and Corruption. British Journal of Political Science 37(1): * One-page outline of the final research paper is due in class * Apr. 4: Choice of Electoral Systems Boix, Carles Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies. American Political Science Review 93(3): Blais, Andre, Agnieszka Dobrzynska, and Indridi H. Indridason To Adopt or Not to Adopt Proportional Representation: The Politics of Institutional Choice. British Journal of Political Science 35(1):

6 Cusack, Thomas R., Torben Iversen, and David Soskice Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems. American Political Science Review 101(3): Apr. 11: Government Spending and Redistribution Iversen, Torben, and David Soskice Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More than Others. American Political Science Review 100(2): McGillivray, Fiona Redistributive Politics and Stock Price Dispersion. British Journal of Political Science 33: Persson, Torsten, Gerard Roland, and Guido Tabellini Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 2(2): Apr. 18: Economic Development and Growth Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Chapter 3) Gerring, John, et al Democracy and Economic Growth: A Historical Perspective. World Politics 57(3): Weingast, Barry The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Federalism, Markets, and Economic Development. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11:1-31. Apr. 25: Student presentations May 2: Student presentations * Final research paper is due on May 9, noon * 6