Temple University Department of Political Science. Political Science 8103: Legislative Behavior. Spring 2012 Semester

Transcription

1 Temple University Department of Political Science Political Science 8103: Legislative Behavior Spring 2012 Semester Instructor Ryan J. Vander Wielen, Ph.D. Office: 457 Gladfelter Hall Office Phone: WWW: Office Hours: By appointment Class Schedule R 5:40-8:10 PM 613 Gladfelter Hall Course Objective: This course provides an overview of the theoretical and empirical studies of legislative politics. The title of this course (not of my choosing) is somewhat misleading, as the course will place a particular emphasis on rational choice institutional perspectives. Briefly, this paradigm suggests that individual-level strategic calculations are paramount in understanding political phenomena, and institutions both emerge from and serve to constrain these rational, utility maximizing political actors. While the main focus of the course is the U.S. Congress, much of what we cover will have direct relevance to the study of legislatures more generally (both cross-nationally and the American state legislatures). We will discuss congressional elections, the nature of congressional representation, positive theories of congressional organization, political parties, the committee system, institutional change, bicameralism, inter-branch relations, and comparative legislatures. Course Evaluation: Grading will be done on the basis of four components. Class participation will account for 50%, two literature critiques will be worth 10% each, and a final project will constitute 30% of the final grade. Seminar Participation: Your primary responsibility in this course is to complete the readings and to actively participate in seminar discussions each week. Participation is critical to making this seminar a useful learning 1

2 experience. As such, the success of this seminar relies on the preparedness of its participants. Each week, two individuals will lead discussion. As a discussion leader, you are required to submit a list of questions and/or discussion topics by 5:00 pm on Wednesday. These questions/topics should reflect a critical reading of the weeks assigned readings. Second, for sessions in which you are a discussion leader, you will be responsible for presenting a set of articles from the assigned readings (the two discussion leaders may divide the readings as they see fit). These presentations should: Describe the main themes of the reading. Explain what its contributions are to our understanding of legislative politics. Provide specific criticisms of the study (e.g., its theoretical argument, hypotheses, evidence, analysis, etc.). Raise questions about specific theoretical or empirical issues that you did not understand. Literature Critiques: For two of the topics on which you are a discussion leader, you will be required to write a literature critique. In writing the literature critique, you will evaluate the theoretical and empirical arguments of one or more of the readings contained in that unit. Each essay should be approximately 3-4 pages in length and is due no later than one week following the seminar on that topic. Final Project: You will be required to write a research paper (or research design) approximately 15 pages in length. This project will ideally lay the foundation for the completion of a piece that may eventually be publishable. All topics must first be cleared with me. Final projects are to be submitted to your classmates and me on April 19, You will present your paper to the class the following week and will be responsible for serving as a discussant on one of the other papers presented. Required Texts: All required texts are available at the Temple University Bookstore and on-line. In addition to the texts, we will be reading several articles. Most of these articles are available through JSTOR. If an article cannot be found on-line, I will post it on Blackboard. The required texts are as follows: Binder, Sarah A Minority Rights, Majority Rule. New York: Cambridge University Cameron, Charles Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power. New York: Cambridge University Fiorina, Morris Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment. New Haven: Yale University Kam, Christopher J Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics. New York: Cambridge University 2

3 Krehbiel, Keith Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Lawless, Jennifer L. and Richard L. Fox It Still Takes a Candidate: Why Women Don t Run for Office, Revised edition. New York: Cambridge University Mayhew, David (original 1974). Congress: The Electoral Connection, 2 nd Ed. New Haven: Yale University Smith, Steven S Party Influence in Congress. New York: Cambridge University Tsebelis, George and Jeannette Money Bicameralism. New York: Cambridge University Important Note: I assume that class participants have a working understanding of Congress. For anyone looking for an accompanying text, I recommend Smith, Roberts, and Vander Wielen, The American Congress, 7 th Ed. (Cambridge). This text offers an overview of Congress and incorporates discussion of relevant scholarly research. For those looking for a more theoretical (rational choice) approach, I would recommend Stewart, Analyzing Congress (W.W. Norton). As an accessible reference on congressional procedure, I recommend Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process, 8 th Ed. (CQ Press). Course Outline: Week 1. Representation (1/26) Mayhew, David Congress: The electoral Connection, 2 nd Edition. New Haven: Yale University (All) Fenno, Richard U.S. House Members in Their Constituencies: An Exploration. American Political Science Review 71: Rothenberg, Lawrence and Mitchell Sanders Severing the Electoral Connection: Shirking in the Contemporary Congress. American Journal of Political Science 44: Canes-Wrone, Brandice, David Brady, and John Cogan Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members Voting. American Political Science Review 96: Carson, Jamie L., Gregory Koger, Matthew J. Lebo, and Everett Young The Electoral Costs of Party Loyalty in Congress. American Journal of Political Science 54: Recommended Readings: Arnold, Douglas The Logic of Congressional Action. New Haven: Yale University 3

4 Fenno, Richard Home Style: House Members in their Districts. Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, and Co. Week 2. Candidates in Congressional Elections (2/2) Stone, Walter and Sandy Maisel The Not-So Simple Calculus of Winning: Potential U.S. House Candidates Nomination and General Election Prospects. Journal of Politics 65: Rohde, David Risk-Bearing and Progressive Ambition: The Case of Members of the United States House of Representatives. American Journal of Political Science 23: Jacobson, Gary C Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of U.S. House Elections, American Political Science Review 83: Downs, Anthony An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Addison-Wesley. (Chapter 8) Ansolabehere, Stephen, James Snyder, and Charles Stewart Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections. American Journal of Political Science 45: Lindstädt, René and Ryan Vander Wielen Timely Shirking: Time-Dependent Monitoring and Its Effects on Legislative Behavior in the U.S. Senate. Public Choice 148: Recommended Reading: Carson, Jamie and Jason Roberts Strategic Politicians and U.S. House Elections, Journal of Politics 67: Week 3. Districting and the Incumbency Advantage (2/9) Fiorina, Morris Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment. New Haven: Yale University (All) Ansolabehere, Stephen, James Snyder, and Charles Stewart Old Voters, New Voters, and the Personal Vote: Using Redistricting to Measure the Incumbency Advantage. American Journal of Political Science 44: Cox, Gary W. and Jonathan N. Katz Why Did the Incumbency Advantage in the U.S. House Elections Grow? American Journal of Political Science 40: Carson, Jamie L., Erik J. Engstrom, and Jason M. Roberts Candidate Quality, the Personal Vote, and the Incumbency Advantage in Congress. American Political Science Review 101: Brunell, Thomas Rethinking Redistricting: How Drawing Uncompetitive Districts Eliminates Gerrymanders, Enhances Representation, and Improves Attitudes toward Congress. PS: Political Science & Politics 39:

5 Lee, Frances Senate Representation and Coalition Building in Distributive Politics. American Political Science Review 94: Week 4. Race, Gender, and Representation (2/16) Lawless, Jennifer L. and Richard L. Fox It Still Takes a Candidate: Why Women Don t Run for Office, Revised edition. New York: Cambridge University Cameron, Cameron, David Epstein and Sharyn O Halloran Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress? American Political Science Review 90: Cannon, David Race, Redistricting, and Representation: The Unintended Consequences of Black Majority Districts. Chicago: University of Chicago (Chapters 3, 4, and 6) Lublin, David Racial Redistricting and African-American Representation. American Political Science Review 93: Mansbridge, Jane Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent Yes. Journal of Politics 61: Week 5. Positive Theories of Legislative Organization: Distributive and Informational Approaches (2/23) Rational Choice Approaches: Background Riker, William A Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven: Yale University (Excerpts) Olson, Mancur The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University (Excerpts) Shepsle, Kenneth and Mark Boncheck Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions. New York: W. W. Norton. (pgs , 83-89, , ) Krehbiel, Keith Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking. Chicago: University of Chicago (Chapters 1 and 2) Shepsle, Kenneth and Barry Weingast Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions, In Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast (Eds.), Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (5-36). Distributive and Informational Approaches 5

6 Shepsle, Kenneth Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models. American Journal of Political Science 23: Note: This paper is mathematically dense, but the general argument is straightforward. It is recommended that you master the material in the background readings on structureinduced equilibrium, and then peruse this article. Weingast, Barry and William Marshall The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets. Journal of Political Economy 96: Krehbiel, Keith Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan (Chapters 1-3) Week 6. Positive Theories of Legislative Organization: Partisan Perspectives (3/1) Cox, Gary and Mathew McCubbins Legislative Leviathan, 2 nd Edition. New York: Cambridge University (Chapters 4-5) Cox, Gary and Mathew McCubbins Setting the Agenda. New York: Cambridge University (Chapter 3) Cooper, Joseph and David Brady Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The House from cannon to Rayburn. American Political Science Review 75: Aldrich, John and David Rohde The Consequences of Party Leadership in the House: The Role of the Majority and Minority Parties in Conditional party Government. In Jon Bond and Richard Fleisher (Eds.), Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in a Partisan Era. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press (31-72). Krehbiel, Keith Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking. Chicago: University of Chicago (Chapter 8) Lawrence, Eric, Forrest Maltzman, and Steven Smith Who Wins? Party Effects in Legislative Voting. Legislative Studies Quarterly 31: Highly Recommended Reading: Aldrich, John Why Parties?: The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Week 7. Search for Party Effects (3/15) Smith, Steven S Party Influence in Congress. New York: Cambridge University (All) Krehbiel, Keith Wheres the Party? British Journal of Political Science 23:

7 Krehbiel, Keith Cosponsors and Wafflers from A to Z. American Journal of Political Science 39: Binder, Sarah, Eric Lawrence, and Forrest Maltzman Uncovering the Hidden Effects of Party. Journal of Politics 61: Sinclair, Barbara Do Parties Matter? In David Brady and Mathew McCubbins (Eds.), Party, Process, and Political Change in Congress. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press (36-63). Recommended Readings: Snyder, James and Tim Groseclose Estimating Party Influence in Congressional Roll-Call Voting. American Journal of Political Science 44: Ansolabehere, Stephen, James Snyder, and Charles Stewart The Effects of Party and Preferences on Congressional Roll-Call Voting. Legislative Studies Quarterly 26: Week 8. Roll Call Voting (3/22) Kingdon, John Congressmens Voting Decisions. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan (Chapters 3, 9, and 11) Poole, Keith and Howard Rosenthal Patterns of Congressional Voting. American Journal of Political Science 35: Clinton, Joshua, Simon Jackman, and Douglas Rivers The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data. American Political Science Review 98: Martin, Andrew and Kevin Quinn Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, Political Analysis 10: Poole, Keith Spatial Models of Parliamentary Voting. New York: Cambridge University (Excerpt) Poole, Keith and Howard Rosenthal Congress: A Political Economic History of Roll Call Voting. New York: Oxford University (Excerpt) Week 9. Institutional Change (3/29) Binder, Sarah A Minority Rights, Majority Rule. New York: Cambridge University (All) Polsby, Nelson The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives. American Political Science Review 62: Gamm, Gerald and Kenneth Shepsle Emergence of Legislative Institutions: Standing Committees in the House and Senate: Legislative Studies Quarterly 14:

8 Katz, Jonathan and Brian Sala Careerism, Committee Assignments, and the Electoral Connection. American Political Science Review 90: Recommended Readings: Polsby, Nelson How Congress Evolves: Social Bases of Institutional Change. New York: Oxford University Gamm, Gerald, and Steven S. Smith Policy Leadership and the Development of the Modern Senate. In David W. Brady and Mathew D. McCubbins (Eds.), Party, Process, and Political Change in Congress. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press ( ). Week 10. Committees (4/5) Fenno, Richard Congressmen in Committees. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. (Chapters 1-4) Maltzman, Forrest and Steven Smith Principals, Goals, Dimensionality, and Congressional Committees. Legislative Studies Quarterly 19: Shepsle, Kenneth and Barry Weingast The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power. American Political Science Review 81: Smith, Steven S An Essay on Sequence, Position, Goals, and Committee Power. Legislative Studies Quarterly 13: Vander Wielen, Ryan J The Influence of Conference Committees on Policy Outcomes. Legislative Studies Quarterly 35: Krehbiel, Keith Are Congressional Committees Composed of Preferences Outliers? American Political Science Review 84: Londregan, John and James Snyder Comparing Committee and Floor Preferences. Legislative Studies Quarterly 19: Week 11. Bicameralism (4/12) Tsebelis, George and Jeannette Money Bicameralism. New York: Cambridge University Vander Wielen, Ryan J. Why Conference Committees?: A Theory of Conference Use in Structuring Bicameral Agreement. Forthcoming in Journal of Theoretical Politics. Rogers, James An Informational Rationale for Congruent Bicamerlaism. Journal of Theoretical Politics. 13: Gailmard, Sean and Thomas Hammond Intercameral Bargaining and Intracameral Organization in Legislatures. Journal of Politics 73:

9 Week 12. Congress and the Executive (4/19) Cameron, Charles Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power. New York: Cambridge University (All) Krehbiel, Keith Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking. Chicago: University of Chicago (Chapter 6) Moe, Terry and William Howell The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15: Binder, Sarah The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, American Political Science Review 93: Canes-Wrone, Brandice, and Scott de Marchi Presidential Approval and Legislative Success. Journal of Politics 64: Week 13. Comparative Perspectives (4/26) Kam, Christopher J Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics. New York: Cambridge University Carey, John M Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting. American Journal of Political Science 51: Alvarez, R. Michael, Frederick J. Boehmke, and Jonathan Nagler Strategic Voting in British Elections. Electoral Studies 25: Huber, John D The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies. American Political Science Review 90: Carey, John M. and Matthew Shugart Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas. Electoral Studies 14: Recommended Readings: Figueiredo, Argelina Cheibub and Fernando Limongi Presidential Power, Legislative Organization, and Party Behavior in Brazil. Comparative Politics 32: Londregan, John B Legislative Institutions and Ideology in Chile. New York: Cambridge University Carey, John M Legislative Voting and Accountability. New York: Cambridge University McGillivray, Fiona Party Discipline as a Determinant of the Endogenous Formation of Tariffs. American Journal of Political Science 41: PRESENTATION OF FINAL PROJECTS 9