Formal Political Theory II: Applications

Transcription

1 Formal Political Theory II: Applications PS 526, Spring 2007, Thursday 3:30-6:00 p.m., Room: Lincoln 394 Instructor: Milan Svolik Office hours: Tuesday 9 12 p.m. and by appointment, Lincoln 370 Course web page: Description: This course surveys several important topics in formal political theory and the application of key game-theoretic methods to the study of politics. This course is intended for graduate students in political science who have taken an introductory course in game theory. Course Requirements: Students are required to attend lectures, read the assigned material, write up and present an assigned article, and submit a final paper. Each student will be responsible for presenting and critiquing a piece from the syllabus; we will decide the assignment of at our organizational meeting. The presentation should consist of 1. a summary of the paper s central argument, 2. an exposition of the formal model, 3. a numerical example of a key result, 4. an evaluation and a critique. The final paper should be a short (maximum 15 page double-spaced) paper that presents a formal political argument or surveys a body of formal literature. Some useful articles on how to present mathematical arguments correctly and intelligibly are: Minicourse on technical writing in Knuth, Donald E., Larrabeem, Tracy, Roberts, Paul M., and Reynolds, Barbara E Mathematical Writing. New York: Mathematical Association of America. How to write mathematics by Paul Halmos in Steenrod, Norman E., Halmos, Paul, Schiffer, Menahem M., and Dieudonné, Jean A How to write mathematics. New York: American Mathematical Society. 1

2 Boas, R. P Can We Make Mathematics Intelligible? American Mathematical Monthly, 88. And here is a paper on how to build models: Varian, Hal R How to build an economic model in your spare time. In Michael Szenberg, editor, Passion and craft: Economists at work. University of Michigan Press. Grading: The final grade will be composed as follows: presentation (40%), final paper (40%), and participation (20%). Readings: There is no course textbook. I will use Osborne, Martin J An Introduction to Game Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press for introductory exposition of some topics. recommend for political Political Game Theory: An Introduction (Analytical Methods for Social Research) by Nolan McCarty fudenberg as reference and myerson as unified exposition of fundamental results Course Outline: ( ) denotes presentation papers. Introduction and Organization Some useful writings on the history, philosophy, and role of formal models in political science are: What Is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish? by Robert Aumann in Arrow, K. and Honkapohja, S Frontiers of Economics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Clarke, Kevin A. and Primo, David M Modernizing political science: A model-based approach. Perspectives on Politics, 5(4): The Methodology of Positive Economics in Friedman, Milton Essays In Positive Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kreps, David M Game Theory and Economic Modelling. New York: Oxford University Press. 2

3 Myerson, Roger B On the value of game theory in social science. Rationality and Society, 4: Myerson, Roger B Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory. Journal of Economic Literature, 37: The Role of Formal Models in Chapter 1 in Powell, Robert In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Rubinstein, Ariel Comments on the interpretation of game theory. Econometrica, 59: Collective Action Topics: Public Goods, Voter Participation, Revolts, Global Games ( ) Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard Participation and the provision of discrete public goods: a strategic analysis. Journal of Public Economics, 24: ( ) Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty. American Political Science Review, 79: ( ) Lohmann, Susanne A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action. American Political Science Review, 87: Myatt, David P., Shin, Hyun Song, and Wallace, Chris The assessment: Games and coordination. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 18(4): Signaling Games Topics: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Entry Deterrence, Crisis Escalation, War of Attrition Sections in Osborne (2004). ( ) Epstein, David and Zemsky, Peter Money Talks: Deterring Quality Challengers in Congressional Elections. American Political Science Review, 89: ( ) Fearon, James D Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. American Political Science Review, 88(3):

4 ( ) Schultz, Kenneth A Domestic opposition and signaling in international crises. American Political Science Review, 92(4): Games with Communication Topics: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Cheap Talk, Legislative Organization Sections 10.8 and 10.9 in Osborne. Farrell, Joseph and Rabin, Matthew Cheap Talk. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10: Repeated Games Topics: Cooperation in the Prisoner s Dilemma, Folk Theorem, Non-Nash Reversion, Interethnic Cooperation, Trade Wars, Markov Perfect Equilibrium Chapters 14 and 15 in Osborne (2004). ( ) Greif, Avner, Milgrom, Paul, and Weingast, Barry R Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild. Journal of Political Economy, 102: Agency Theory and Mechanism Design Topics: Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, Revelation Principle, Sequential Equilibrium ( ) Ferejohn, John Incumbent performance and electoral control. Public Choice, 50:5 26. ( ) Fearon, James D Electoral accountability and the control of politicians: Selecting good types versus sanctioning poor performance. In Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski, and Susan Stokes, editors, Democracy, Accountability and Representation, pages Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ( ) Epstein, David and O Halloran, Sharyn Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion. American Journal of Political Science, 38: ( ) Myerson, Roger B Federalism and Incentives for Success of Democracy. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 1:

5 Bargaining Topics: Crisis Bargaining, Bargaining in Legislatures, Dynamic Bargaining Chapter 16 in Osborne (2004). ( ) Fearon, James D Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization, 49(3): ( ) Baron, David P. and Ferejohn, John A Bargaining in Legislatures. American Political Science Review, 83: