Political Economics of Conflict and International Relations Spring 2016 Professor: Massimo Morelli

Transcription

1 Political Economics of Conflict and International Relations Spring 2016 Professor: Massimo Morelli Contact: office 3b1-06. Course Description: The first part of the course will be on the rationalist explanations of bargaining breakdown and bilateral conflict; on the analysis of leaders selection, strategic militarization, and other variables at the boundary between domestic and international choices; and on the recent working papers on multilateral conflict and dynamics of power and wars. The second part will be on the relationship between conflict risk and economic structure, with particular focus on the role of natural resources. I will also present some models and useful frameworks to study the functioning of international organizations and their development in an anarchic system. Prerequisites: Basic game theory knowledge is required. This means having the basic knowledge of key concepts like Nash Equilibrium and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, plus basic notions of Bayesian updating. Requirements: The students are expected to do the readings in advance, in order to facilitate class discussion. The main two requirements (equal weight) will be (1) a take-home problem set in the middle of the course and (2) a proposal of a paper, by the end of the semester. The paper proposal will be graded on the basis of its potential and feasibility. Early discussions about the research paper are strongly encouraged. Weekly plan: 1. Lecture 1: Introduction and exchange of research ideas. Readings: Fearon, James (1995): Rationalist Explanations of War, International Organization; Jackson M.O. and Massimo Morelli (2010): The reasons for War. 2. Lecture 2: cost-benefit analysis of conflict from Leaders point of view. Agency models of war. Political bias theory and selectorate theory. 3. Lecture 3: Information asymmetries, uncertainty and war. Schelling, Baliga and Sjostrom RES. 1

2 4. Lecture 4: Entire lecture on all the other conflict related papers by Baliga and Sjostrom that relate to uncertainty and information communication. 5. Lecture 5: Political regimes and conflict: some papers on democratic peace and Baliga, Lucca and Sjostrom paper on transition democracies. 6. Lecture 6: Strategic militarization: Meirowitz and Sartori, Powell 93, Jackson and Morelli 2009, Meirowitz, Morelli, Ramsay and Squintani (2014). 7. Lecture 7: Commitment based theories of war. Powell 2004, Chassang and Padro QJPS and Morelli and Rohner Lecture 8: Natural resources, geography, factionalization and conflict: Caselli, Morelli and Rohner (2015) and recent paper by Bueno de Mesquita. 9. Lecture 9: Multilateral conflict: Niou and Ordeshook on ISQ 38-2; Hodler on ethnic fragmentation, Esteban and Ray Lecture 10: Acemoglu Egorov and Sonin: Coalition formation in political games; 11. Lecture 11: Dynamic models of war Powell AJPS 2012, Slantchev s papers, Yared Lecture 12: International cooperation without enforcement. Maggi Morelli and Harstad. References [1] Acemoglu, D., D. Ticchi, and A. Vindigni (2009) Persistence of Civil Wars, mimeo: [2] Acemoglu et al, Coalition Formation in Political Games [3] Baliga, Sandeep and Tomas Sjöström (2004): Arms Races and Negotiations, Review of Economic Studies, 71(2), [4] Baliga, S. and T. Sjstrm (2009) The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict, [5] Bevia, C. and L. Corchon (2009) Peace Agreements without commitment [6] Baliga, S., D. Lucca and T. Sjöström (2007): Domestic Political Survival and International Conflict: Is Democracy Good for Peace? [7] Besley, Timothy and Torsten Persson, 2009, The Logic of Political Violence, mimeo, London School of Economics and Stockholm University. 2

3 [8] Besley, Timothy, and Torsten Persson (2010): State capacity, conflict, and development. Econometrica, 78 (1):1-34. [9] Blainey, Geoffrey. (1973): The Causes of War, New York: the Free Press. [10] Bloch, F., S. Sanchez-Pages, and R. Soubeyran (2006) When does Universal Peace Prevail? Secession and Group Formation in Conflict, Economics of Governance, Vol. 7, [11] Brito, D.L. and M.D. Intriligator (1985) Conflict, War, and Redistribution, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 79, No. 4, [12] Bueno de Mesquita, B., J.D. Morrow, R.M. Siverson and A. Smith (2003): Logic of Political survival, MIT Press. [13] Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce., and Randolph M. Siverson (1995): War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability, American Political Science Review, 89(4), [14] Caselli, Francesco, Massimo Morelli and Dominic Rohner (2015): The Geography of Interstate Resource wars, Quarterly Journal of Economics; [15] Chassang, Sylvain, and Gerard Padró i Miquel, 2010, Conflict and Deterrence under Strategic Risk, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(4): , November. [16] Chassang, S. and G. Padr i Miquel (2009) Economic Shocks and Civil War, Quarterly Journal of Political Science. [17] Clausewitz, Carl von (1832)[1976]: On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press. [18] Conconi, P., N. Sahuguet, and M. Zanardi (2009) Democratic Peace and Electoral Accountability, mimeo: ECARES and CEPR. [19] Downs, George W. and David M. Rocke (1994): Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for Resurrection: The Principal-Agent Problem Goes to War, American Journal of Political Science, 38(2), [20] Ellingsen, T., and T. Miettinen (2008), Commitment and Conflict in Bilateral Bargaining, American Economic Review 98, [21] Esteban, J. and D. Ray (2008) On the Salience of Ethnic Conflict, American Economic Review, 98,

4 [22] Esteban, Joan and Debraj Ray, 2011, Linking Conflict to Inequality and Polarization, American Economic Review, 101: [23] Esteban, Joan, Massimo Morelli, and Dominic Rohner (2015): Strategic Mass Killings, Journal of Political Economy [24] Fearon, J.D. (1995) Rationalist explanations for war, International Organization, 49:3, [25] Fearon, J.D. (1996) Bargaining over Objects that Influence Future Bargaining Power, mimeo. [26] Fearon, James, and David Laitin (2003): Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War, American Political Science Review [27] Fearon, J.D. (2008) A Simple Political Economy of Relations among Democracies and Autocracies, mimeo: Stanford University. [28] Garfinkel, M. (1990): Arming as a Strategic Investment in a Cooperative Equilibrium, American Economic Review, Vol. 80-4, [29] Garfinkel, Michelle R. and Stergios Skaperdas (2000): Conflict without Misperceptions or Incomplete information: how the Future Matters, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 44-6, [30] Harstad B. Majority Rule and Incentives; [31] Hess, G. and A. Orphanides (2001) War and Democracy, Journal of Political Economy, 2001, vol. 109, no. 4, [32] Hess, G. and A. Orphanides (2001b) Economic Conditions, Elections, and the Magnitude of Foreign Conflicts, Journal of Public Economics, 80:1, [33] Hodler Roland and Hadi Yektas, 2012, All-Pay War, Games and Economic Behavior, 74: [34] Humphreys, Macartan, 2005, Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms, Journal of Conflict Resolution 49: [35] Jackson, M.O. and M. Morelli (2007) Political Bias and War, American Economic Review, 97:4, [36] Jackson, Matthew O. and Massimo Morelli, 2011: The Reasons of Wars - An Updated Survey, in Handbook on the Political Economy of War, edited by Chris Coyne, Cheltenham UK, Edward Elgar Publishing. 4

5 [37] Jackson, M.O., and M. Morelli (2009): Strategic Militarization, Deterrence and Wars, Quarterly Journal of Political Science [38] Jervis, Robert (1978): Cooperation under the Security Dilemma, World Politics, 30(2), [39] Jones, D.M., S.A. Bremer, and J.D. Singer (1996) Militarized Interstate Disputes, : Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns, Conflict Management and Peace Science, VOL. 15, NO. 2, [40] Kydd, Andrew H. (1997). Game Theory and the Spiral Model, World Politics Vol. 49(3), [41] Maggi, G., and M. Morelli (2006): Self-Enforcing Voting in International Organizations American Economic Review, Vol. 96-4, ; [42] Manzini and Mariotti (2007): Alliances and negotiations: An incomplete information example. [43] Meirowitz, A.H. and A.E. Sartori (2007) Secrecy and War: The Origins of Private Information, Quarterly Journal of Political Science. [44] Meirowitz, Adam, Massimo Morelli, Kris Ramsay and Francesco Squintani (2014): Dispute Resolution Mechanisms and Strategic Militarization, mimeo; [45] Morelli, M. and D. Rohner (2015) Resource Concentration and Civil War, Journal of Development Economics under resubmission; [46] Niou, Emerson M.S., Peter C. Ordeshook, and Gregory F. Rose (1989): The Balance of Power; Stability in International Systems. Cambridge University Press. [47] Niou and Ordeshook, Alliances in Anarchic International Systems. ISQ [48] Padró i Miquel, Gerard, and Pierre Yared, 2012, The Political Economy of Indirect Control, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127: [49] Powell, R. (1993) Guns, Butter and Anarchy, American Political Science Review, 87, ; [50] Powell, Robert (1996): Uncertainty, Shifting Power, and Appeasement, American Political Science Review 90: [51] Powell, R. (2004) The inefficient use of power: Costly conflict with complete information, American Political Science Review 98(2),

6 [52] Powell, R. (2006) War as a Commitment Problem, International Organization, 60, [53] Powell, Robert (2012): Shifting Power and Persistent Conflicts, American Journal of Political Science, 56: [54] Powell, R. (2009) Persistent Fighting to Forestall Adverse Shifts in the Distribution of Power, mimeo: UC Berkeley. [55] Ray, D. (2009) Costly Conflict under Complete Information, mimeo: NYU. [56] Sanchez-Pages, S. (2005): Conflict as a Part of the Bargaining Process, Economic Journal. [57] Schelling, Thomas C. (1963): The Strategy of Conflict, London and New York, Oxford University Press. [58] Schelling, Thomas C. (1966): Arms and Influence, New Haven and London, Yale University Press. [59] Schultz, K. (1998) Domestic opposition and signaling in international crises, American Political Science Review 92 (4), [60] Schwarz, M. and K. Sonin (2008) A Theory of Brinkmanship, Conflicts, and Commitments, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 24(1): [61] Slantchev, B. (2003) The power to hurt: Costly conflict with completely informed states, American Political Science Review 97 (1), [62] Slantchev, B. (2005) Military coercion in interstate crises, American Political Science Review, 99 (4), [63] Smith, A. (1998): Fighting Battles, Winning Wars; Opening up the Black Box of War: Politics and the Conduct of War. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 3, [64] Smith, A. and A. Stam (2003) Bargaining and the Nature of War, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 20:10, [65] Wagner, R. H. (2000) Bargaining and War, American Journal of Political Science, 44(3), [66] Yared, Pierre, 2010, A Dynamic Theory of War and Peace, Journal of Economic Theory 145,