Political Science 660 Proseminar on World Politics. Jim Morrow Fall ISR W 1:00-4: Walker Room

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1 Political Science 660 Proseminar on World Politics Jim Morrow Fall ISR W 1:00-4: Walker Room jdmorrow@umich.edu Office Hours: T 2:00-4:00 held in 6749 Haven and by Appointment at my ISR office This course introduces the graduate student to research in world politics. Often such a course is taught by reading and reviewing the most prominent books in the recent history of the field. I have chosen to conduct this seminar instead by reading recent research grouped into important areas of interest throughout the field. For each week s readings, our object is to discuss where the field is in that area, and identify what novel research could and should be done in the area. The central question to ask is not what is wrong with this research?; it is how could we do this better? or what should we look at next? One consequence of my approach to this course is that many important topics cannot be covered within a semester course. Some examples of omitted topics are ethnic conflict, crossnational nonstate actors, international environmental affairs, and effects of international outcomes on domestic politics. I hope that the topics we do cover will help you think about these other topics should you be interested in them. The primary requirements of the course are four short papers (1-2 pages) and one long paper (5-15 pages). The four short papers should draw on a week s readings to present a proposed research design, brief statistical tests of hypotheses, or extensions of arguments and models drawn from the readings. These papers are for you to try out ideas for research projects. They are due enough in advance of class that I may grade them and return them to you for you to present as part of our discussion in class; the deadline for a paper is 9:00 am the day of class. The long paper should present a research design for a larger project and is due at the end of the term. This paper needs to explain how the proposed research relates to some theory in the field, lays out the relevant hypotheses, discusses the availability of data or ease of collection of data, and predicts how the results would falsify or support the hypotheses. In both types of papers, I am looking for creativity of ideas matched with practicality of design and theoretical fruitfulness. The following books are required for the course: Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Keohane, After Hegemony. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Milner, Interests, Insititutions, and Information. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Simmons, Who Adjusts? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

2 I have not ordered these books; I recommend you use Amazon or another web seller for them. The other readings are drawn from political science journals and edited volumes. Electronic versions of most of the journals can be found at the University Library website in the Electronic Journals and Newspapers section. Those readings which cannot be purchased and are not available will be made available through the course CTools site; they are marked on the reading list with an asterisk. The syllabus is broken into required readings and other readings. Everyone is expected to read all of the required readings for each week. The other readings will be assigned to students to present in class. These presentations should be brief, no more than 5 minutes, and explain the argument and results of the paper to the class. Many of the readings use statistical methods or game theoretic models. I do not expect you to have taken courses in either area. Consequently, most of the first class will be devoted to an introduction to the basic ideas underlying these techniques and some guidance in how to read such pieces critically. Week 1 (September 9): Introductory Meeting: Introduction to Models and Statistics Background Reading: Powell, In the Shadow of Power, Ch. 1, Appendix 1* Week 2 (September 16): Systemic Theories of International Politics Required Readings: Waltz, The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory, pp in Rotberg and Rabb, The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars.* Lemke and Kugler, The Evolution of the Power Transition Perspective, pp in Kugler and Lemke, Parity and War.* Powell, War as a Commitment Problem, International Organization 60(2006): Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, World Politics 30(1978): Van Evera, Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War, International Security 22,4(Spring 1998):5-43. Recommended Readings: Snyder, Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984, International Security 9,1(Summer 1984): Levy, The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology, International Studies Quarterly 38(1984): Glaser, Political Consequences of Military Strategy, World Politics 44(1992): Gortzak et al., Offense-Defence Theory: An Empirical Assessment, Journal of Conflict Resolution 49,1(2005): Week 3 (September 23): Bargaining and Conflict Required Readings: Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War." International Organization

3 49(1995): Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes." American Political Science Review 88(1994): Powell, Bargaining Theory and International Conflict. Annual Review of Political Science 5(2002):1-30. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model." Journal of Conflict Resolution 38(1994): Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, War and the Survival of Political Leaders, American Political Science Review 89(1995): Recommended Readings: Sartori, The Might of the Pen, International Organization 56(2002): Guisinger and Smith, Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises, Journal of Conflict Resolution 46(2002): Wagner, R. Harrison. Bargaining and War, American Journal of Political Science 44,3(2000): Fortna, Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace, International Organization 57,2(2003): Werner and Yuen, Making and Keeping Peace, International Organization 59,2(2005): Levento lu and Tarar, Prenegotiation Public Commitment in Domestic and International Bargaining. American Political Science Review 99(2005): Kurizaki, Efficient Secrecy: Public versus Private Threats in Crisis Diplomacy, American Political Science Review 101(2007): Week 4 (September 30): Democratic Peace Required Readings: Ray, "Does Democracy Cause Peace?," Annual Review of Political Science 1(1998): Doyle, Liberalism and World Politics, American Political Science Review 80(1986): Bueno de Mesquita et al, "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace," American Political Science Review 93(1999): , or Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival, Ch. 6.* Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy, Ch Reiter and Stam, Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory, American Political Science Review 92(1998): Rosato, The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory, American Political Science Review 97(2003): Recommended Readings: Farber and Gowa, Polities and Peace, International Security 20(1995): Mansfield and Snyder, Incomplete Democratization and the Outbreak of International

4 Disputes, International Studies Quarterly 46(2002): Ward and Gleditsch, Democratizing for Peace, American Political Science Review 92(1998): Peceny et al., Dictatorial Peace? American Political Science Review 96(2002): Cederman, Back to Kant, American Political Science Review 95(2001): Gelpi and Griesdorf, Winners or Losers? Democracies in International Crisis, , American Political Science Review 95,3(2001): Gelpi and Grieco, Attracting Trouble, Journal of Conflict Resolution 45(2001): Weeks, Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Behavior. International Organization 62(2008): Week 5 (October 7): Alliances and Arming Required Reading: Walt, Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power, International Security 9,4(Spring 1985):3-43. Morrow, Alliances and Asymmetry, American Journal of Political Science 35(1991): Fearon, Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs, Journal of Conflict Resolution 41(1997): Christensen and Snyder, Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks. International Organization 44(1990): Morrow, "Arms Versus Allies," International Organization 47(1993): Leeds et al., Reevaluating Alliances Reliability, Journal of Conflict Resolution 44(2000): Lake, "Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations," International Organization 50(1996):1-34. Recommended Readings: Gowa and Mansfield, Power Politics and International Trade, American Political Science Review 87(1993): Leeds, Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes, American Journal of Political Science, 47,3(2003): Leeds, Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties, International Organization 57,4(2003): Gibler, The Costs of Reneging. Journal of Conflict Resolution 52(2008): Week 6 (October 14): International Dimensions of Internal Conflict Required Readings: Fearon and Laitin. Explaining Interethnic Cooperation, American Political Science Review 90,4(1996): Fearon and Laitin, Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War, American Political Science Review 97,1(2003):75-90.

5 Lake and Rothchild. Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict, International Security 21,2(1996): Walter, The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement, International Organization. 51,3(1997): Bueno de Mesquita, Conciliation, Counterterrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence, International Organization 59,1(2005): Bueno de Mesquita, Politics and the Suboptimal Provision of Counterterror, International Organization 61(2007):9-36. Symposium on Understanding Suicide Terror, Perspectives on Politics, 5,1(2007): Recommended Readings: Regan, Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts, Journal of Conflict Resolution 46,1(2002): Doyle and Sambanis, International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis, American Political Science Review 94,4(2000): Humphreys and Weinstein, Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil War, American Political Science Review 100(2006): Week 6 (October 21): International Political Economy: Systemic Approaches nd Required Readings: Kindleberger, The World in Depression, , 2 ed., Ch. 14.* Keohane, After Hegemony, Ch. 1-7, 11. Krasner, State Power and the Structure of International Trade, World Politics 28(1976): Lake, Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy, International Studies Quarterly 37(1993): Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, International Organization 36(1982): Week 7 (October 28): International Institutions: Design and Purpose Required Readings: Axelrod and Keohane, Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy, World Politics 38(1985): Simmons and Martin, International Organizations and Institutions, pp in Carlsnaes et al., Handbook of International Relations.* Koremenos et al., The Rational Design of International Institutions, International Organization, 55(2001): Downs et al., Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism, International Organization 52(1998): Chayes and Chayes, On Compliance, International Organization 47(1993): Downs et al., "Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?," International Organization 50(1996): Raustiala., Compliance and Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation,

6 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 32,3(2000): Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power," World Politics 43(1991): Morrow, "Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation," International Organization 48(1994): Fearon, "Bargaining, Enforcement and International Cooperation," International Organization 52(1998): Recommended Readings: Gilligan, Is There a Broader-Deeper Trade-off in International Multilateral Agreements? International Organization 58(2004): Koremenos, Loosening the Ties that Bind, International Organization 55(2001): Voeten, Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action, American Political Science Review 95(2001): Thompson, Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission, International Organization 60(2006):1-34. Abbott and Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations, Journal of Conflict Resolution 42(1998):3-32. Johns, A Servant of Two Masters: Communication and the Selection of International Bureaucrats, International Organization 61(2007): Verdier, Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Exclusion in the Nuclear Proliferation Regime. International Organization 62(2008): Mansfield and Pevehouse, Democratization and the Varieties of International Organizations. Journal of Conflict Resolution 52(2008): Week 8 (November 4): International Institutions: Norms and Sovereignty Required Readings: Wendt, The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory, International Organization 41(1987): Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together?, International Organization, 52(1998): Finnemore and Sikkink, International Norm Change and Political Change, International Organization, 52(1998): Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention Spruyt, Institutional Selection in International Relations, International Organization 48(1994): Recommended Readings: Krasner, Westphalia and All That, pp in Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy.* Zacher, The Territorial Integrity Norm, International Organization 55(2001): Bueno de Mesquita et al, The Logic of Political Survival, Ch. 9* Reus-Smit, The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions, International Organization 51(1997): Fazal, State Death in the International System, International Organization 58(2004):

7 Week 9 (November 11): International Law Required Readings: Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, Yale Law Journal, 106(1997): Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules, Ch. 1-3.* Guzman, International Law: A Compliance Based Theory, California Law Review, 90(2002): Abbott and Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, International Organization, 54(2000): Simmons, International Law and State Behavior, American Political Science Review, 94(2000): Morrow, When Do States Follow the Laws of War? American Political Science Review 101(2007). Huth and Allee, Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover, American Political Science Review 100(2006): Recommended Readings: Morrow, The Institutional Features of the Prisoners of War Treaties, International Organization, 55(2001): Von Stein, Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance, American Political Science Review 99(2005): , and reply by Simmons and Hopkins. Grieco et al., When Preferences and Commitments Collide: The Effect of Relative Partisan Shifts on International Treaty Compliance, International Organization 63(2009): Goldstein, International Law and Domestic Institutions, International Organization 50(1996): Vreeland, Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture. International Organization 62(2008): Hafner-Burton, Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem, International Organization 62(2008): Week 10 (November 18): International Political Economy: Policy Preferences of Domestic Groups Required Readings: Rogowski, Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade, American Political Science Review 81(1987): Hiscox, Class versus Industry Cleavages, International Organization 55(2001):1-46. Alt and Gilligan, The Political Economy of Trading States, Journal of Political Philosophy 2(1994): Grossman and Helpman, Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84(1994): Frieden, Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of

8 Global Finance, International Organization 45,4(1991): Rajan and Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the Twentieth Century. Journal of FinancialEconomics 69(2003):5-50. Scheve, Public Inflation Aversion and the Political Economy of Macroeconomic Policymaking, International Organization 58,1(2004):1-34. Recommended Readings: Walter, A New Approach for Determining Exchange-Rate Level Preferences. International Organization 62(2008): Brooks and Kurtz, Capital, Trade, and the Political Economy of Reform, American Journal of Political Science 51(2007): Week 11 (November 25): International Political Economy: Domestic Institutions and Policy Formation Required Readings: Milner, Interests, Insititutions, and Information, Ch. 1-4 Clark and Hallerberg, Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy, American Political Science Review 94,2(2000): Bernhard and Leblang, Democratic Institutions and Exchange-Rate Commitments, International Organization 53(1999): MacIntyre, Institutions and Investors: The Politics of the Economic Crisis in Southeast Asia. International Organization 55(2001): Milner with Kubota, Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries. International Organization 59(2005): Recommended Readings: McGillivray and Smith, The Impact of Leadership Turnover on Trading Relations between States, International Organization 58,3(2004): Kono, Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency, American Political Science Review 100(2006): Ehrlich, Access to Protection: Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy in Democracies, International Organization 61(2007): Pinto and Pinto, The Politics of Investment Partisanship and the Sectoral Allocation of Foreign Direct Investment. Economics and Politics 20(2008): Mosley and Singer, Taking Stock Seriously, International Studies Quarterly 52(2008): Week 12 (December 2): International Political Economy: International Interactions of Policies Required Readings: Simmons, Who Adjusts?, Ch. 1-4, 6, 7 Goldstein et al., Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and WTO on World Trade, International Organization 61(2007): Elkins et al., Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties,

9 International Organization 60(2006): Kucik and Reinhardt, Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime. International Organization 62(2008): Kerner, Why Should I Believe You? The Costs and Consequences of Bilateral Investment Treaties, International Studies Quarterly 53(2009): Recommended Readings: Davis, International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization, American Political Science Review 98(2004): Busch, Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade. International Organization 61(2007): Dreher et al., Development Aid and International Politics: Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence World Bank Decisions? Journal of Development Economics 88(2009): Week 13 (December 9): Wrap Up Required Readings: Eichengreen, Dental Hygiene and Nuclear War: How International Relations Looks from Economics, International Organization 52(1998): Morrow, International Conflict:: Assessing the Democratic Peace and Offense-Defense Theory, pp in Katznelson and Milner, State of the Discipline.* Bennett and Stam, Conclusion, pp in Bennett and Stam, The Behavioral Origins of War.* Wight, Philosophy of Social Science and International Relations, pp in Carlsnaes et al., Handbook of International Relations.* Fearon and Wendt, Rationalism vs. Constructivism: A Skeptical View, pp in Carlsnaes et al., Handbook of International Relations.*