Behavioral Public Choice. Professor Rebecca Morton New York University

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1 Behavioral Public Choice Professor Rebecca Morton New York University Reading List Ali, Nageeb, Jacob Goeree, Navin Kartik, and Thomas Palfrey. 2008a. Information Aggregation in Ad Hoc and Standing Committees. American Economic Review. 98(2): Aragones, Enriqueta and Thomas R. Palfrey The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study. American Political Science Review. 98, Austen Smith, David and Jeffrey Banks Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem. American Political Science Review. 90, Baron, David P. and John A. Ferejohn Bargaining in Legislatures. American Political Science Review. 83, Battaglini, Marco, Rebecca Morton, and Thomas Palfrey. 2008a. Efficiency, Equity, and Timing in Voting Mechanisms. American Political Science Review. 101(3): Battaglini, Marco, Rebecca Morton, and Thomas Palfrey The Swing Voter s Curse in the Laboratory. Review of Economic Studies. 77: Battaglini, Marco, RebeccaMorton, and Thomas Palfrey. 2008b. Information Aggregation and Strategic Abstention in Large Laboratory Elections. American Economic Review. 98(2): Battaglini, Marco, Salvatore Nunnari, and Thomas Palfrey Political Institutions and the Dynamics of Public Investment, Social Science Working Paper #1318, California Institute of Technology. Battaglini, Marco, Salvatore Nunnari, and Thomas Palfrey Legislative Bargaining and the Dynamics of Public Investment, Social Science Working Paper #1352, California Institute of Technology. Battaglini, Marco and Thomas Palfrey The Dynamics of Distributive Politics. Econommic Theory. in press. Casella, Alessandra Storable Votes. Games and Economic Behavior 51(May):

2 2 Casella, Alessandra. 2011, Storable Votes: Protecting the Minority Voice, Oxford University Press. New York. Casella, Alessandra. 2011, Agenda Control as a Cheap Talk Game. Theory and Experiments with Storable Votes, Games and Economic Behavior, 72(May): Casella, Alessandra, Andrew Gelman, and Thomas R. Palfrey An Experimental Study of Storable Votes. Games and Economic Behavior, 57(1), Casella, Alessandra, Thomas R. Palfrey and Raymond Riezman Minorities and Storable Votes Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 3(2): Diermeier, Daniel and Sean Gailmard (2006) "Self Interest, Inequality, and Entitlement in Majoritarian Decision Making," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 1: Diermeier, Daniel and Rebecca Morton (2006) "Experiments in Majoritarian Bargaining," in Social Choice and Strategic Decisions: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey S. Banks, D. Austen Smith and J. Duggan eds. Springer: Heidelberg: Duffy, John and Margit Tavits (2008). "Beliefs and Voting Decisions: A Test of the Pivotal Voting Model." American Journal of Political Science, 52(3): Feddersen, Timothy and Pesendorfer Wolfgang, The Swing Voter s Curse, American Economic Review. 86(3), pp Feddersen, Timothy and Pesendorfer Wolfgang, Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information. Econometrica. 65, pp Feddersen, Timothy and Wolfgang Pesendorfer Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts. American Political Science Review. 92, Feddersen, Timothy and Pesendorfer Wolfgang, Absetention in Elections with Asymmetric Information and Diverse Preferences. American Political Science Review. 93(2), pp Forsythe, Robert, Roger Myerson, Thomas Rietz, and Robert Weber An Experiment on Coordination in Multi candidate Elections: The Importance of Polls and Election Histories. Social Choice and Welfare. 10, *Forsythe, Robert, Roger Myerson, Thomas Rietz, and Robert Weber An Experimental Study of Voting Rules and Polls in Three Way Electins. International Journal of Game Theory. 25,

3 3 Frechette, Guillaume, John H. Kagel and Steven F. Lehrer (2003) Bargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of Open versus Closed Amendment Rules, American Political Science Review, 97(May): Frechette, Guillaume, John H. Kagel and Massimo Morelli (2005a) Gamson s Law versus Non Cooperative Bargaining Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, 51(May): Frechette, Guillaume, John H. Kagel and Massimo Morelli (2005b) Nominal Bargaining Power, Selection Protocol, and Discounting in Legislative Bargaining, Journal of Public Economics, 89(August): Frechette, Guillaume, John H. Kagel andmassimomorelli (2005c) Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers, Econometrica, 73 (October): Frechette, Guillaume, John H. Kagel andmassimomorelli (2011) Pork Versus Public Goods: An Experimental Study of Public Good Provision Within a Legislative Bargaining Framework." Economic Theory, In press. Gerber, Elisabeth, Rebecca Morton, and Thomas Rietz Minority Representation in Multimember Districts. American Political Science Review. 92, Goeree, Jacob and Leeat Yariv An Experimental Study of Collective Deliberation. Econometrica 79(3): Grosser, Jens and Arthur Schram Neighborhood Information Exchange and Voter Participation: An Experimental Study. American Political Science Review. 100(2), Grosser, Jens and Arthur Schram Public Opinion Polls, Voter Turnout, and Welfare: An Experimental Study. American Journal of Political Science 54(3): *Guarnaschelli, Serena, Richard D. McKelvey, and Thomas R. Palfrey An Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules. American Political Science Review. 94(2), Hortala Vallve, Rafael and Aniol Llorente Saguer A Simple Mechanism for Resolving Con ict. Games and Economic Behavior, 70: Hung, Angela and Charles R. Plott. 2001, Information Cascades: Replication and an Extension to Majority Rule and Conformity Rewarding Institutions. American Economic Review, 91(5),

4 4 Levine, David and Thomas R. Palfrey The Pardox of Voter Participation American Political Science Review. 101(1), McKelvey, Richard D An Experiment Test of a Stochastic Game Model of Committee Bargaining. In Contemporary Laboratory Research in Political Economy (ed. T. Palfrey). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. McKelvey, Richard D., and Peter C. Ordeshook (1990a) Information and Elections; Retrospective Voting and Rational Expectations, in Information and Democratic Processes, edited by J. Ferejohn and J. Kuklinski, Urbana Champaign: University of Illinois Press, McKelvey, Richard D. and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1990b. A Decade of Experimental Research on Spatial Models of Elections and Committees. In Government, Democracy, and Social Choice, Melvin J. Hinich and James Enelow, eds. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. retical Politics. 19: Morton, Rebecca and Jean Robert Tyran Let the experts decide? Asymmetric Information, Abstention and Coordination in Standing Committees Games and Economic Behavior Morton, Rebecca and Thomas Rietz Majority Requirements and Minority Representation, NYU Annual Survey of American Law, 63: Morton, Rebecca and Kenneth Williams Information Asymmetries and Simultaneous versus Sequential Voting. American Political Science Review. 93, Morton, Rebecca and Kenneth Williams Learning by Voting. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Myerson, Roger Thomas Rietz, and Robert Weber Campaign Finance Levels as Coordinating Signals in Three Way, Experimental Elections. Economics and Politics, 10, 3, Palfrey, Thomas R. and Howard Rosenthal A Strategic Calculus of Voting. Public Choice. 41: Palfrey, Thomas R. and Howard Rosenthal Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty. American Political Science Review. 79, Rietz, Thomas Three way Experimental Election Results: Strategic Voting, Coordinated Outcomes and Duverger s Law. In The Handbook of Experimental Economics Results.. Charles Plott and Vernon Smith, eds. Elsevier:Amsterdam. In Press.

5 5 Rietz, Thomas, Roger Myerson, and Robert Weber Campaign Finance Levels as Coordinating Signals in Three Way, Experimental Elections. Economics and Politics, 10, 3, Schram, Arthur and Joep Sonnemans. Voter Turnout as a Participation Game: An Experimental Investigation. International Journal of Game Theory. 25, Schram, Arthur, and Joep Sonnemans (1996) Why People Vote: Experimental Evidence, Journal of Economic Psychology, 17:4 (August),