Syllabus. University of Rochester Political Science. Formal Models in Political Science Fall 2004

Transcription

1 University of Rochester Political Science Psc 281 Prof. Mark Fey Formal Models in Political Science Fall 2004 Office: Harkness 109E Phone: x Office Hours: Friday, 1:30-3:00 Syllabus This course is an introduction to the use of mathematical models in the study of politics. We will focus on one type of mathematical modeling, known as positive political theory, consisting primarily of social choice theory and game theory. The course rests on the premise that positive political theory (also known as formal theory, rational choice, or the economic approach to politics) can offer insights to those who want to better understand why and how political actors behave the way they do. Political phenomena are almost always situations in which the behavior of one person or country depends on what that person or country expects others to do. Thus, tools such as game theory that tell us something about strategic behavior can help us understand these events. I have set two goals in teaching this course. First, I want to introduce students to the tools of positive political theory using a number of classic political situations ranging from voting, legislative politics, and political campaigns to the comparison of electoral systems, the evolution of cooperation, and international relations. Second, and as important, I want to show students how positive political theory allows us to sharpen our intuitions and provides us with new ways of looking at familiar topics. In short, this course will try to offer those interested in politics a new way of thinking about political institutions and political behavior, and show those interested in positive political theory a broad and fertile area in which its tools have many applications. While there are no formal mathematical prerequisites for the course, some familiarity with mathematical reasoning and logic is helpful. Course Meetings: Lectures for the course will be twice weekly, Tuesday and Thursday at 2:00 in Meliora 221. Course Work: Positive theory, as with most mathematical topics, is best learned by doing, rather than reading. Thus, there will be problem sets 1

2 Prof. Mark Fey Syllabus 2 assigned (more or less) every other week covering the lecture material and readings. Due dates for the problem sets will be announced and late work will not be accepted. However, I will drop the lowest score from the problem sets over the semester in calculating the final grade. The components of the final grade are: final exam (50%), midterm exam (20%), problem sets (20%), and class participation (10%). Course Readings: The two required texts for the course are available at the campus bookstore. Additional readings will be distributed during the semester. The two required texts are Analyzing Politics, by Ken Shepsle and Mark Bonchek, and Games of Strategy, by Avinash Dixit and Susan Skeath. Below are the scheduled readings for the course. Naturally, this schedule may change as the semester unfolds. Sept. 2 No class. I am out of town. Sept. 7 Introductory Lecture Shepsle & Bonchek, Chapter 1 (pp. 5 14) Sept. 9 Individual Preference Shepsle & Bonchek, Chapter 2, pp , pp Sept. 14 & 16 Voting Rules and Electoral Systems Shepsle & Bonchek, Chapter 3 (pp ) and Chapter 7 (pp ) Dan Felsenthal, Zeev Maoz, and Amnon Rapoport, 1993, An Empirical Evaluation of Six Voting Procedures: Do They Really Make Any Difference?, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp Alan D. Taylor, Mathematics and Politics, New York: Springer-Verlag, 1995, secs & Sept. 21 & 23 Cyclical Majorities, Agenda Control, and Voting Paradoxes Shepsle & Bonchek, Chapter 4, pp

3 Prof. Mark Fey Syllabus 3 8, pp Sept. 28 & 30 Thinking Abstractly about Voting: Arrow and May Shepsle & Bonchek, Chapter 4, pp Donald Saari, Decisions and Elections: Explaining the Unexpected, Cambridge University Press, 2001, Chapter 2. Oct. 5 Misrepresentation of Preferences, Strategic Voting and Logrolling Shepsle & Bonchek, Chapter 6 (pp ) selections from Chaotic Elections!, by Donald G. Saari, American Mathematical Society, May Oct. 7 The Spatial Model of Voting with a Single Issue Shepsle & Bonchek, Chapter 5, pp and pp , pp Oct. 12 The Spatial Model of Voting with Several Issues Shepsle & Bonchek, Chapter 5, pp Oct. 14 & 19 Applications of Spatial Voting: The Setter Model and Models of Legislatures, the End of the Cold War, Bush v. Gore Shepsle & Bonchek, Chapter 5, pp , pp Abramowicz and Stearns, Beyond Counting Votes: The Political Economy of Bush v. Gore, 2001, George Mason Law and Economics Research Paper No Oct. 21 Utility Theory and Applications to Voting, Cheating, Terrorism, and Christopher Columbus Shepsle & Bonchek, Chapter 2, pp

4 Prof. Mark Fey Syllabus 4 Matthew Woessner, Beating the House: How Inadequate Penalties for Cheating Make Plagiarism an Excellent Gamble, PS Political Science and Politics, April Frey and Luechinger, Decentralization as a disincentive for terror, European Journal of Political Economy Volume 20, Issue 2, June 2004, pp , pp Oct. 26 In-class Midterm Oct. 28 Representing Political Processes as Games Dixit & Skeath, Chapters 1 & 2, pp Nov. 2 Extensive Form Games Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 3, pp , pp Nov. 4 Dominant Strategy Equilibria and Nash Equilibria Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 4, pp Barbara Geddes, A Game Theoretic Model of Reform in Latin American Democracies, American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 2. (Jun., 1991), pp Todd Sandler and Walter Enders, An economic perspective on transnational terrorism, European Journal of Political Economy Volume 20, Issue 2, June 2004, Pages Nov. 9 Mixed Strategies Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 5, pp George Tsebelis, The Abuse of Probability In Political Analysis: The Robinson Crusoe Fallacy, American Political Science Review, Vol. 83, No. 1. (Mar., 1989), pp Nov. 11 Cooperation and Repeated Games

5 Prof. Mark Fey Syllabus 5 Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 8, pp Shepsle & Bonchek, Chapter 8 (pp ) Robert Axelrod. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books, 1984, chaps Nov. 16 Commitment, Credibility, and Coordination Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 9, pp , pp Nov. 18 & 23 Collective Action and Public Goods Shepsle & Bonchek, Chapter 9 (pp ) and Chapter 10 (pp ) Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 11, pp Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, Science, New Series, Vol. 162, No (Dec. 13, 1968), pp Nov. 25 Happy Turkey Day! Nov. 30 Collective Action in Politics Dennis Chong, Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement, Chapters 1 3 and 6. Rasma Karklins and Roger Petersen, Decision Calculus of Protesters and Regimes: Eastern Europe 1989, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 55, No. 3. (Aug., 1993), pp , pp Dec. 2 & 7 Games and Information Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 12, pp Dec. 9 Final Thoughts