3. Public Choice in a Direct Democracy
|
|
- Marion Burke
- 6 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a 3. Public in a Direct I. Unanimity rule II. Optimal majority rule a) Choosing the optimal majority b) Simple majority as the optimal majority III. Majority rule a) Exploitation of the minority b) Cyclical preferences c) Multidimensional issues IV. Log-rolling V. genda manipulation VI. lternatives to the majority rule VII. Exit, voice and disloyalty VIII. Summary: normative properties of majority rule asic Literature is Mueller, 2003, pp Freytag
2 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a For decision making in a direct democracy, the choice of a voting rule seems decisive. Where can the voting procedure be of relevance in today s world? clubs, parliament (onn-erlin decision), EU (treating member states as individuals), Two rules (Rousseau) for setting the voting rule: import topics demand unanimity, and fast decisions demand minimal majorities. Freytag
3 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a I. Unanimity rule To reach Pareto-optimal results for public decisions, unanimity is needed for. Otherwise, single individual preferences would be neglected, and the decision would leave losers. See following slides and Mueller (2003), pp n important implication is that the rule determines whether or not and if so where, a Pareto optimum can be met. Shortcomings of the unanimity rule: much information needed, much time needed, and strategic behaviour possible. Freytag
4 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a X X U U The unanimity rule = = = U = U Y Y ( Y ( Y tg ( 1 t) G tg, G) (1 t) G, G) U U U = X U = X U U ( t) dg + dg + ( G) dt G X U U ( 1+ t) dg + dg + ( G) dt G X 3.3 Freytag
5 Freytag ) / ( / ) (1 / ) ( ) / ( / / ) ( X U G X U t G U dg dt X U G X U t G U dg dt = = / / / / = + X U G U X U G U 3.5 ) (1 / / / / t X U G U t X U G U = = Introduction 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a
6 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a X Y 1 Figure 3.1: Optimal quantities for a voter at different tax prices 0 2 G 1 t 1 G 0 t.5 G 2 t.33 G Freytag
7 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a t t.5 t.33 Figure 3.2: Mapping of voter preferences into tax-public good space G 1 G 0 G 2 G Freytag
8 Percentage of tax paid by 1. Introduction 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a t 0 t 100 Figure 3.3: Contract curve in public good-tax space C` 5 t E E t F t L L F C 5 t 100 t 0 G F G Freytag
9 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a II. Optimal majority Unanimity is not realistic, not so much because of individual strategic behaviour but because of its enormous cost. uchanan and Tullock (1962) show that the optimal majority depends on cost related to the decision. a) Choosing the optimal majority Two types of cost occur: (external) cost C of the losers of the decision and cost D of achieving the required majority. Whereas C is decreasing with the number of people who agree on the decision, D is increasing with the number of citizens who have to agree. Freytag
10 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a Expected costs Figure 3.4: Choosing the optimal majority C+D D C 0 Freytag K Number of indivduals whose agreement is required for collective action N
11 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a Obviously, the optimal majority is not the same for all decisions to be made. External cost C may vary depending on the nature of the decision and on the size N of the community. The cost curve D associated with the number of individuals necessary to form a consensus may shift rightwards with increasing N. b) Simple majority as the optimal majority So, generally speaking, what is the optimal majority? It can t be below N/2. See Figure 3.5, which shows a special case in that there is a kink at N/2. pproximately, N/2, i.e. simple majority can be assumed to be the optimal majority in big communities. Freytag
12 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a Expected costs Figure 3.5: Conditions favouring a simple majority as the optimal majority C+D D C+D D C 0 N/2 Number of indivduals whose agreement is required for collective action Freytag N
13 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a III. Majority rule a) Exploitation of the Minority Consider a society which is better off with a collective good (such as redistribution) than without; consider also two groups, the rich and the poor. tax introduced would finance the collective good, depending on the kind of tax, either both groups would gain or one of the groups would lose. Unanimity rule would lead to one of many Pareto optima, because either the society would remain at the status quo ante, or both groups win. Majority voting would not lead to a Pareto optimum, as the majority is likely to exploit the minority. See Figure 3.6. Freytag
14 3. Public in a Direct U R Majority rule outcomes, rich in majority Figure 3.6: Outcomes under the unanimity and the simple majority rule 4. Public in a X Y Unanimity rule outcomes C S E Z Majority rule outcomes, poor in majority W U P Freytag
15 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a One lesson from the discussion of a collective good is to restrict the decisions to those individuals directly involved both in the decision and its consequences. In other words, it is highly sensible to reduce the number of public goods and to increase the number of club goods. For the European Union, this lesson is also of importance. s long as the unanimity rule holds for many issues but also if not the process should come up with modest harmonisation efforts to minimise the number and cost of losers. Subsidiarity principle, implying that measures should be taken on the lowest possible level. Freytag
16 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a b) Cyclical preferences Consider three persons who shall divide 100 among themselves. Possible outcome: (1): 55/45/0, (2): 50/0/50, (3): 0/60/40, V1: (1) > (2) > (3) < (1), V2: (1) > (2) < (3) > (1), V3: (1) < (2) > (3) > (1). Community under majority rule: (1) > (2) > (3) > (1). The community cannot find a first best solution but produces a cycle. See Figure 3.7. Freytag
17 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a U Figure 3.7: Voter preferences that induce a cycle V 2 V 3 V 1 X Y Z Q Freytag
18 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a c) Median voter theorem If society has to decide about a single issue and if all voters have single peaked preferences, then the median position cannot lose under majority. Plott s theorem (Figure 3.13). d) The median and multidimensional issues How does it work when multidimensional issues are discussed? Then, the outcome depends on the number of committee members who decide: committee of 1: no problem (Figure 3.8). committee of 2: contract curve (Figure 3.9), committee of 3: no solution (Figure 3.10) or like a committee of 2 (Figures 3.11 and 3.12). Freytag
19 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a x 2 Figure 3.8: Outcome for a committee of one U x 1 Freytag
20 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a x 2 Figure 3.9: Outcomes for a committee of two D U E U x 1 Freytag
21 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a x 2 Figure 3.10: Cycling outcomes for a committee of three Z U D U C x 1 Freytag
22 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a x 2 Figure 3.11: Equilibrium outcome for a committee of three E x 1 Freytag
23 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a x 2 Figure 3.12: Outcome for a committee of five E F G x 1 Freytag
24 Figure 3.13: Plott s theorem x 2 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a G E F x 1 Freytag
25 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a IV. Log-rolling The trading of votes is illegal in democracies. Nevertheless, it happens regularly. Reasons are: differences in preference intensities across issues; inclination to trade. Voters Issue 1 Issue 2-2 (-4) -2 (-4) 5-2 C -2 5 Sum +1 (-1) +1 (-1) The figures show net utility if the respective laws pass the committee of three, otherwise utility is zero. Freytag
26 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a Each law would fail if individually decided upon. If and C trade votes, both laws will pass log-rolling. This is not Pareto-optimal. However, (under cardinal utility), can be compensated, and the community is better off (net utility is +2). Imagine s net utility for both issues is -4. Then, the community faces a net utility of -2. Policy implications are different, depending on the net results: too many and to generously provided public goods (negative); reforms are possible (general compensation); bluffing and cheating may take place. Freytag
27 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a final judgement of log-rolling depends on the very case. Log rolling is not possible with transitive social preference orderings. In reality, log-rolling can be observed in US Congress as well as in the European Union. Testing for log-rolling cannot be done directly (as it is illegal), but indirectly by analysing the voting behaviour in single cases. Freytag
28 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a V. genda manipulation If individual preference ordering might produce cyclical voting under the majority rule, a committee member in control of the agenda of pairwise voting can manipulate the committee. The outcome will be the one the agenda setter prefers most (Figure 3.14). Policy implications: power of agenda setter may be substantial; decisions reached by committees are not necessarily reflecting the preferences of the median; agenda setters may influence distributional issues to their advantage. Freytag
29 U 3. Public in a Direct x 2 U 4. Public in a Z U S Z Z C U U C Figure 3.14: genda manipulation possibilities Freytag x 1
30 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a VI. lternatives to the majority rule One can think of a number of alternatives to the majority rule: majority rule, runoff election; plurality rule; Condorcet criterion; Hare system; Coombs system; pproval voting; orda count; These systems are relatively simple and easy to apply. Indeed, many of them are regularly applied in daily life (often without knowing). Freytag
31 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a There are more complicated and tricky alternatives to the majority rule: demand revealing process; point voting; voting by veto. Freytag
32 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a VII. Exit, voice and disloyalty So far, we have concentrated on the provision of pure public goods voice is the only option for the individual. However, pure public goods are rare (see chapter 2). Therefore, we turn to club goods. Clubs have an optimal size, as the marginal benefits of additional members decreases, whereas their marginal cost increase (James uchanan). In addition, clubs are competing for members exit as a second option becomes available (Charles Tiebout). We may overcome problems of the majority rule by concentrating on clubs. Freytag
33 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a Under the following conditions, it is possible to ensure global optimality of excludable public goods provision and apply both the theory of clubs and the theory of exit: full mobility of all citizens; full knowledge of the characteristics of all clubs all desired public goods available in clubs no scale economics in production of the public good no spillovers across clubs no geographical constraints on individual with respect to their earnings It can be shown that voting-with-the-feet can produce global optimality. Freytag
34 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a Empirical relevance 3 hypotheses: 1. Individuals move in response to local government expenditure-tax offerings. 2. People with similar preferences for bundles of public goods live together in groups. 3. Individual satisfaction increases when votingwith-the-feet is possible. Empirical evidence is available for the United States. It mainly supports the Tiebout hypotheses. This seems different in Continental Europe. Less club goods and more pure public goods. Freytag
35 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a FOCJ normative application* FOCJ stands for Functional, overlapping, competing jurisdictions and implies that individuals select among different clubs to meet their demand for club goods. No one is forced to purchase all public goods at one jurisdiction, but can select. Entry into clubs is not free, but exit has definitely to be free. The authors with a special reference to the European constitution suggest that the EU should be organised according to this proposal very topical! * Frey, runo S. and Reiner Eichenberger (1995), Competition among Jurisdictions: The Idea of FOCJ, Lüder Gerken (ed.), Competition among Institutions, Houndsmill, Macmillan, pp Freytag
36 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a Disloyalty - revolution When neither the ballot nor the feet constitute adequate modes of expression, there is still Chairman Mao s barrel of the gun. (Mueller 2003,, p. 204). It may be rational to start a revolution, if exit and voice are no suitable alternatives. The decision to start a revolution and/or to participate is dependent on the expected payoffs and the relative weight of cost (transaction cost, imprisonment, death etc.). For an experimental analysis of the predictions made by an economic approach see bbink and Pezzini.* * bbink, Klaus and Silvia Pezzini (2005), Determinants of Revolt: Evidence from Survey and Laboratory Data, Freytag
37 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a VIII. Summary: normative properties of the majority rule fter discussing a number of different voting rules and their properties, we now turn to some normative conclusions. gain Rousseau: ig issues demand unanimity constitutional decision. Urgent issues demand majority rule. Condorcet s Jury theorem: ssume a pairwise comparison of two a priori equally good alternatives by each voter independently. rising (odd) number of voters can increase the probability that the group makes the correct decision. Freytag
38 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a ssumptions are the following: a common probability of being good across all individuals, independent voting, honest voting. From this theorem, we can derive a normative justification of the majority rule. The theorem can also justify referenda. Nevertheless, the majority rule is not favourable in every situation. Table 3.1 compares majority and unanimity rule with respect to different circumstances. Freytag
39 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a Example: Condorcet s Jury Theorem Decision: guilty or not guilty p i P n probability of the judge i to make the correct decision (assumption in this example: p i for all judges = 0.6) probability of the jury to make the correct decision under majority rule a) One judge: P n = P 1 = 0.6 b) Three judges, and C (intuitive example): Correct decision if 2 or 3 judges are correct (majority) Pn = P3 = 0.6 * 0.6 * * 0.6 * * 0.6 * * 0.4 * 0.6,, C correct, correct, C correct, C correct P 3 = * = > 0.6 Freytag
40 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a c) 5 Judges Example: Condorcet s Jury Theorem 5 5! h pn = p5 = h= 3 h!(5 h)! 5 h P 5 = = > h = 3 h = 4 h = 5 (h = (n+1)/2 = majority) d) 11 Judges: P n = p 11 = Judges: P n = p 51 = more than 100 judges: p n = pretty close to 1 Freytag
41 3. Public in a Direct 4. Public in a Table 3.1: ssumptions favouring respective rules ssumption Majority rule Unanimity rule 1. Nature of game Conflict, zero sum Cooperative, positive sum 2. Nature of issues Redistributions, property rights (some benefit, some lose) Mutually exclusive issues of a single dimension llocative efficiency improvements (public goods, externality elimination) Issues with potentially several dimensions and from which all can benefit 3. Intensity Equal on all issues No assumption made 4. Method of forming committee Involuntary; members are exogenously or randomly brought together Voluntary; individuals of common interests and like preferences join 5. Conditions of exit locked, expensive Free 6. of issues 7. mendment of issues Exogenously or impartially proposed Excluded, or constrained to avoid cycles Proposed by committee members Endogenous to committee process Freytag Source : Mueller, p. 141.
Economics 470 Some Notes on Simple Alternatives to Majority Rule
Economics 470 Some Notes on Simple Alternatives to Majority Rule Some of the voting procedures considered here are not considered as a means of revealing preferences on a public good issue, but as a means
More informationVoting rules: (Dixit and Skeath, ch 14) Recall parkland provision decision:
rules: (Dixit and Skeath, ch 14) Recall parkland provision decision: Assume - n=10; - total cost of proposed parkland=38; - if provided, each pays equal share = 3.8 - there are two groups of individuals
More informationElection Theory. How voters and parties behave strategically in democratic systems. Mark Crowley
How voters and parties behave strategically in democratic systems Department of Computer Science University of British Columbia January 30, 2006 Sources Voting Theory Jeff Gill and Jason Gainous. "Why
More informationHANDBOOK OF SOCIAL CHOICE AND VOTING Jac C. Heckelman and Nicholas R. Miller, editors.
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL CHOICE AND VOTING Jac C. Heckelman and Nicholas R. Miller, editors. 1. Introduction: Issues in Social Choice and Voting (Jac C. Heckelman and Nicholas R. Miller) 2. Perspectives on Social
More informationPublic Choice. Slide 1
Public Choice We investigate how people can come up with a group decision mechanism. Several aspects of our economy can not be handled by the competitive market. Whenever there is market failure, there
More informationChapter 9: Social Choice: The Impossible Dream Lesson Plan
Lesson Plan For ll Practical Purposes Voting and Social hoice Majority Rule and ondorcet s Method Mathematical Literacy in Today s World, 7th ed. Other Voting Systems for Three or More andidates Plurality
More informationPolitical Economics II Spring Lectures 4-5 Part II Partisan Politics and Political Agency. Torsten Persson, IIES
Lectures 4-5_190213.pdf Political Economics II Spring 2019 Lectures 4-5 Part II Partisan Politics and Political Agency Torsten Persson, IIES 1 Introduction: Partisan Politics Aims continue exploring policy
More informationSocial Choice: The Impossible Dream. Check off these skills when you feel that you have mastered them.
Chapter Objectives Check off these skills when you feel that you have mastered them. Analyze and interpret preference list ballots. Explain three desired properties of Majority Rule. Explain May s theorem.
More information9.3 Other Voting Systems for Three or More Candidates
9.3 Other Voting Systems for Three or More Candidates With three or more candidates, there are several additional procedures that seem to give reasonable ways to choose a winner. If we look closely at
More informationThe Impossibilities of Voting
The Impossibilities of Voting Introduction Majority Criterion Condorcet Criterion Monotonicity Criterion Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion Arrow s Impossibility Theorem 2012 Pearson Education, Inc. Slide
More informationMedian voter theorem - continuous choice
Median voter theorem - continuous choice In most economic applications voters are asked to make a non-discrete choice - e.g. choosing taxes. In these applications the condition of single-peakedness is
More informationProblems with Group Decision Making
Problems with Group Decision Making There are two ways of evaluating political systems: 1. Consequentialist ethics evaluate actions, policies, or institutions in regard to the outcomes they produce. 2.
More informationanswers to some of the sample exercises : Public Choice
answers to some of the sample exercises : Public Choice Ques 1 The following table lists the way that 5 different voters rank five different alternatives. Is there a Condorcet winner under pairwise majority
More informationpolicy-making. footnote We adopt a simple parametric specification which allows us to go between the two polar cases studied in this literature.
Introduction Which tier of government should be responsible for particular taxing and spending decisions? From Philadelphia to Maastricht, this question has vexed constitution designers. Yet still the
More informationIntro Prefs & Voting Electoral comp. Voter Turnout Agency GIP SIP Rent seeking Partisans. Political Economics. Dr. Marc Gronwald Dr.
Political Economics Dr. Marc Gronwald Dr. Silke Uebelmesser Ludwig-Maximilians University Munich Summer term 2010 Motivation Total government spending as fraction of GDP in the late 1990s: Sweden: 60%;
More informationLecture 16: Voting systems
Lecture 16: Voting systems Economics 336 Economics 336 (Toronto) Lecture 16: Voting systems 1 / 18 Introduction Last lecture we looked at the basic theory of majority voting: instability in voting: Condorcet
More informationIntroduction to Theory of Voting. Chapter 2 of Computational Social Choice by William Zwicker
Introduction to Theory of Voting Chapter 2 of Computational Social Choice by William Zwicker If we assume Introduction 1. every two voters play equivalent roles in our voting rule 2. every two alternatives
More informationProblems with Group Decision Making
Problems with Group Decision Making There are two ways of evaluating political systems. 1. Consequentialist ethics evaluate actions, policies, or institutions in regard to the outcomes they produce. 2.
More informationChapter 9: Social Choice: The Impossible Dream Lesson Plan
Lesson Plan For All Practical Purposes An Introduction to Social Choice Majority Rule and Condorcet s Method Mathematical Literacy in Today s World, 9th ed. Other Voting Systems for Three or More Candidates
More informationExercises For DATA AND DECISIONS. Part I Voting
Exercises For DATA AND DECISIONS Part I Voting September 13, 2016 Exercise 1 Suppose that an election has candidates A, B, C, D and E. There are 7 voters, who submit the following ranked ballots: 2 1 1
More informationTAMPERE ECONOMIC WORKING PAPERS NET SERIES
TAMPERE ECONOMIC WORKING PAPERS NET SERIES OPTIMAL FORMATION OF CITIES: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS Hannu Laurila Working Paper 58 August 2007 http://tampub.uta.fi/econet/wp58-2007.pdf DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
More informationRecall: Properties of ranking rules. Recall: Properties of ranking rules. Kenneth Arrow. Recall: Properties of ranking rules. Strategically vulnerable
Outline for today Stat155 Game Theory Lecture 26: More Voting. Peter Bartlett December 1, 2016 1 / 31 2 / 31 Recall: Voting and Ranking Recall: Properties of ranking rules Assumptions There is a set Γ
More informationThe Manipulability of Voting Systems. Check off these skills when you feel that you have mastered them.
Chapter 10 The Manipulability of Voting Systems Chapter Objectives Check off these skills when you feel that you have mastered them. Explain what is meant by voting manipulation. Determine if a voter,
More informationElecting the President. Chapter 12 Mathematical Modeling
Electing the President Chapter 12 Mathematical Modeling Phases of the Election 1. State Primaries seeking nomination how to position the candidate to gather momentum in a set of contests 2. Conventions
More informationMany Social Choice Rules
Many Social Choice Rules 1 Introduction So far, I have mentioned several of the most commonly used social choice rules : pairwise majority rule, plurality, plurality with a single run off, the Borda count.
More informationVoting: Issues, Problems, and Systems, Continued
Voting: Issues, Problems, and Systems, Continued 7 March 2014 Voting III 7 March 2014 1/27 Last Time We ve discussed several voting systems and conditions which may or may not be satisfied by a system.
More informationCSC304 Lecture 16. Voting 3: Axiomatic, Statistical, and Utilitarian Approaches to Voting. CSC304 - Nisarg Shah 1
CSC304 Lecture 16 Voting 3: Axiomatic, Statistical, and Utilitarian Approaches to Voting CSC304 - Nisarg Shah 1 Announcements Assignment 2 was due today at 3pm If you have grace credits left (check MarkUs),
More information(67686) Mathematical Foundations of AI June 18, Lecture 6
(67686) Mathematical Foundations of AI June 18, 2008 Lecturer: Ariel D. Procaccia Lecture 6 Scribe: Ezra Resnick & Ariel Imber 1 Introduction: Social choice theory Thus far in the course, we have dealt
More informationMath for Liberal Arts MAT 110: Chapter 12 Notes
Math for Liberal Arts MAT 110: Chapter 12 Notes Voting Methods David J. Gisch Voting: Does the Majority Always Rule? Choosing a Winner In elections with more then 2 candidates, there are several acceptable
More informationElections with Only 2 Alternatives
Math 203: Chapter 12: Voting Systems and Drawbacks: How do we decide the best voting system? Elections with Only 2 Alternatives What is an individual preference list? Majority Rules: Pick 1 of 2 candidates
More informationChapter 10. The Manipulability of Voting Systems. For All Practical Purposes: Effective Teaching. Chapter Briefing
Chapter 10 The Manipulability of Voting Systems For All Practical Purposes: Effective Teaching As a teaching assistant, you most likely will administer and proctor many exams. Although it is tempting to
More informationTopics on the Border of Economics and Computation December 18, Lecture 8
Topics on the Border of Economics and Computation December 18, 2005 Lecturer: Noam Nisan Lecture 8 Scribe: Ofer Dekel 1 Correlated Equilibrium In the previous lecture, we introduced the concept of correlated
More informationFairness Criteria. Review: Election Methods
Review: Election Methods Plurality method: the candidate with a plurality of votes wins. Plurality-with-elimination method (Instant runoff): Eliminate the candidate with the fewest first place votes. Keep
More informationPRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
'' ' IIIII mil mil urn A 383358 PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS PEOPLE'S POWER, PREFERENCES, AND PERCEPTIONS SECOND EDITION Bruce Bueno de Mesquita New York University and Hoover Institution at Stanford
More informationIntroduction to the Theory of Voting
November 11, 2015 1 Introduction What is Voting? Motivation 2 Axioms I Anonymity, Neutrality and Pareto Property Issues 3 Voting Rules I Condorcet Extensions and Scoring Rules 4 Axioms II Reinforcement
More informationVOTING ON INCOME REDISTRIBUTION: HOW A LITTLE BIT OF ALTRUISM CREATES TRANSITIVITY DONALD WITTMAN ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
1 VOTING ON INCOME REDISTRIBUTION: HOW A LITTLE BIT OF ALTRUISM CREATES TRANSITIVITY DONALD WITTMAN ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ wittman@ucsc.edu ABSTRACT We consider an election
More informationSocial Choice & Mechanism Design
Decision Making in Robots and Autonomous Agents Social Choice & Mechanism Design Subramanian Ramamoorthy School of Informatics 2 April, 2013 Introduction Social Choice Our setting: a set of outcomes agents
More informationReducing income inequality by economics growth in Georgia
Reducing income inequality by economics growth in Georgia Batumi Shota Rustaveli State University Faculty of Economics and Business PhD student in Economics Nino Kontselidze Abstract Nowadays Georgia has
More informationComputational Social Choice: Spring 2007
Computational Social Choice: Spring 2007 Ulle Endriss Institute for Logic, Language and Computation University of Amsterdam Ulle Endriss 1 Plan for Today This lecture will be an introduction to voting
More informationDesirable properties of social choice procedures. We now outline a number of properties that are desirable for these social choice procedures:
Desirable properties of social choice procedures We now outline a number of properties that are desirable for these social choice procedures: 1. Pareto [named for noted economist Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923)]
More informationElecting the President. Chapter 17 Mathematical Modeling
Electing the President Chapter 17 Mathematical Modeling What do these events have in common? 1824 John Quincy Adams defeats Andrew Jackson 1876 Rutherford B. Hayes defeats Samuel Tilden 1888 Benjamin Harrison
More informationPart IIB Paper Outlines
Part IIB Paper Outlines Paper content Part IIB Paper 5 Political Economics Paper Co-ordinator: Dr TS Aidt tsa23@cam.ac.uk Political economics examines how societies, composed of individuals with conflicting
More informationCandidate Citizen Models
Candidate Citizen Models General setup Number of candidates is endogenous Candidates are unable to make binding campaign promises whoever wins office implements her ideal policy Citizens preferences are
More informationExperimental economics and public choice
Experimental economics and public choice Lisa R. Anderson and Charles A. Holt June 2002 Prepared for the Encyclopedia of Public Choice, Charles Rowley, ed. There is a well-established tradition of using
More informationMATH4999 Capstone Projects in Mathematics and Economics Topic 3 Voting methods and social choice theory
MATH4999 Capstone Projects in Mathematics and Economics Topic 3 Voting methods and social choice theory 3.1 Social choice procedures Plurality voting Borda count Elimination procedures Sequential pairwise
More informationThe Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative. Electoral Incentives
The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives Alessandro Lizzeri and Nicola Persico March 10, 2000 American Economic Review, forthcoming ABSTRACT Politicians who care about the spoils
More informationComputational Social Choice: Spring 2017
Computational Social Choice: Spring 2017 Ulle Endriss Institute for Logic, Language and Computation University of Amsterdam Ulle Endriss 1 Plan for Today So far we saw three voting rules: plurality, plurality
More informationThe Minimum Wage. Introduction. Impacts on Employment
The Minimum Wage Copyright 2013 by Tony Lima. Permission is granted to quote entire paragraphs of text without editing. If you wish to edit a paragraph, I must approve your editing before you publish it.
More informationEconomic Epistemology and Methodological Nationalism: a Federalist Perspective
ISSN: 2036-5438 Economic Epistemology and Methodological Nationalism: a Federalist Perspective by Fabio Masini Perspectives on Federalism, Vol. 3, issue 1, 2011 Except where otherwise noted content on
More informationMath for Liberal Studies
Math for Liberal Studies As we have discussed, when there are only two candidates in an election, deciding the winner is easy May s Theorem states that majority rule is the best system However, the situation
More informationAgendas and Strategic Voting
Agendas and Strategic Voting Charles A. Holt and Lisa R. Anderson * Southern Economic Journal, January 1999 Abstract: This paper describes a simple classroom experiment in which students decide which projects
More informationA New Method of the Single Transferable Vote and its Axiomatic Justification
A New Method of the Single Transferable Vote and its Axiomatic Justification Fuad Aleskerov ab Alexander Karpov a a National Research University Higher School of Economics 20 Myasnitskaya str., 101000
More informationFirst Principle Black s Median Voter Theorem (S&B definition):
The Unidimensional Spatial Model First Principle Black s Median Voter Theorem (S&B definition): If members of a group have single-peaked preferences, then the ideal point of the median voter has an empty
More informationBuying Supermajorities
Presenter: Jordan Ou Tim Groseclose 1 James M. Snyder, Jr. 2 1 Ohio State University 2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology March 6, 2014 Introduction Introduction Motivation and Implication Critical
More informationRationality of Voting and Voting Systems: Lecture II
Rationality of Voting and Voting Systems: Lecture II Rationality of Voting Systems Hannu Nurmi Department of Political Science University of Turku Three Lectures at National Research University Higher
More informationA New Proposal on Special Majority Voting 1 Christian List
C. List A New Proposal on Special Majority Voting Christian List Abstract. Special majority voting is usually defined in terms of the proportion of the electorate required for a positive decision. This
More informationSupporting Information Political Quid Pro Quo Agreements: An Experimental Study
Supporting Information Political Quid Pro Quo Agreements: An Experimental Study Jens Großer Florida State University and IAS, Princeton Ernesto Reuben Columbia University and IZA Agnieszka Tymula New York
More informationClassical papers: Osborbe and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997)
The identity of politicians is endogenized Typical approach: any citizen may enter electoral competition at a cost. There is no pre-commitment on the platforms, and winner implements his or her ideal policy.
More informationMATH 1340 Mathematics & Politics
MATH 1340 Mathematics & Politics Lecture 6 June 29, 2015 Slides prepared by Iian Smythe for MATH 1340, Summer 2015, at Cornell University 1 Basic criteria A social choice function is anonymous if voters
More informationVoting and preference aggregation
Voting and preference aggregation CSC304 Lecture 20 November 23, 2016 Allan Borodin (adapted from Craig Boutilier slides) Announcements and todays agenda Today: Voting and preference aggregation Reading
More information12.2 Defects in Voting Methods
12.2 Defects in Voting Methods Recall the different Voting Methods: 1. Plurality - one vote to one candidate, the others get nothing The remaining three use a preference ballot, where all candidates are
More informationNotes for Session 7 Basic Voting Theory and Arrow s Theorem
Notes for Session 7 Basic Voting Theory and Arrow s Theorem We follow up the Impossibility (Session 6) of pooling expert probabilities, while preserving unanimities in both unconditional and conditional
More informationMathematics and Social Choice Theory. Topic 4 Voting methods with more than 2 alternatives. 4.1 Social choice procedures
Mathematics and Social Choice Theory Topic 4 Voting methods with more than 2 alternatives 4.1 Social choice procedures 4.2 Analysis of voting methods 4.3 Arrow s Impossibility Theorem 4.4 Cumulative voting
More informationChapter 4: Voting and Social Choice.
Chapter 4: Voting and Social Choice. Topics: Ordinal Welfarism Condorcet and Borda: 2 alternatives for majority voting Voting over Resource Allocation Single-Peaked Preferences Intermediate Preferences
More information2 Political-Economic Equilibrium Direct Democracy
Politico-Economic Equilibrium Allan Drazen 1 Introduction Policies government adopt are often quite different from a social planner s solution. A standard argument is because of politics, but how can one
More informationVoting and preference aggregation
Voting and preference aggregation CSC200 Lecture 38 March 14, 2016 Allan Borodin (adapted from Craig Boutilier slides) Announcements and todays agenda Today: Voting and preference aggregation Reading for
More informationDISCUSSION PAPERS Department of Economics University of Copenhagen
DISCUSSION PAPERS Department of Economics University of Copenhagen 06-24 Pure Redistribution and the Provision of Public Goods Rupert Sausgruber Jean-Robert Tyran Studiestræde 6, DK-1455 Copenhagen K.,
More informationDirect Democracy, Unanimity Rules
WEEK 2 POLITIL EONOMY McGraw-Hill/Irwin opyright 2008 by The McGraw-Hill ompanies, Inc. ll rights reserved. Direct Democracy, Unanimity Rules If free rider problem exists, public goods are underprovided.
More informationThe Mathematics of Elections
MTH 110 Week 1 hapter 1 Worksheet NME The Mathematics of Elections It s not the voting that s democracy; it s the counting. Tom Stoppard We have elections because we don t all think alike. Since we cannot
More informationThe Mathematics of Voting
The Mathematics of Voting Voting Methods Summary Last time, we considered elections for Math Club President from among four candidates: Alisha (A), Boris (B), Carmen (C), and Dave (D). All 37 voters submitted
More informationSchool of Economics Shandong University Jinan, China Pr JOSSELIN March 2010
1 THE MAKING OF NATION STATES IN EUROPE A PUBLIC ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE Size and power of governments: an economic assessment of the organization of the European states during the 17 th century Introduction
More informationMathematical Thinking. Chapter 9 Voting Systems
Mathematical Thinking Chapter 9 Voting Systems Voting Systems A voting system is a rule for transforming a set of individual preferences into a single group decision. What are the desirable properties
More informationApproaches to Voting Systems
Approaches to Voting Systems Properties, paradoxes, incompatibilities Hannu Nurmi Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political Science University of Turku Game Theory and Voting Systems,
More informationCloning in Elections 1
Cloning in Elections 1 Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, and Arkadii Slinko Abstract We consider the problem of manipulating elections via cloning candidates. In our model, a manipulator can replace each
More informationFrench. Chinese. Mexican. Italian
Lesson 1. rrow s onditions and pproval Voting Paradoxes, unfair results, and insincere voting are some of the problems that have caused people to look for better models for reaching group decisions. In
More informationSorting Out Mechanical and Psychological Effects in Candidate Elections: An Appraisal with Experimental Data
12-296 Research Group: Behavioral and Experimental Economics April, 2012 Sorting Out Mechanical and Psychological Effects in Candidate Elections: An Appraisal with Experimental Data Karine VAN DER STRAETEN,
More informationDresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics
Dresden University of Technology Faculty of Business Management and Economics Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics Coalition formation in multilateral negotiations with a potential for logrolling:
More informationMASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
LIBRARY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with funding from Boston Library Consortium IVIember Libraries http://www.archive.org/details/votingforpublicaoomask
More information1 Voting In praise of democracy?
1 Voting In praise of democracy? Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said
More informationProf. Bryan Caplan Econ 812
Prof. Bryan Caplan bcaplan@gmu.edu http://www.bcaplan.com Econ 812 Week 14: Economics of Politics I. The Median Voter Theorem A. Assume that voters' preferences are "single-peaked." This means that voters
More informationCoalitional Game Theory
Coalitional Game Theory Game Theory Algorithmic Game Theory 1 TOC Coalitional Games Fair Division and Shapley Value Stable Division and the Core Concept ε-core, Least core & Nucleolus Reading: Chapter
More informationCourse: Economic Policy with an Emphasis on Tax Policy
Course: Economic Policy with an Emphasis on Tax Policy Instructors: Vassilis T. Rapanos email address: vrapanos@econ.uoa.gr Georgia Kaplanoglou email address: gkaplanog@econ.uoa.gr Course website: http://eclass.uoa.gr/courses/econ208/
More informationSimple methods for single winner elections
Simple methods for single winner elections Christoph Börgers Mathematics Department Tufts University Medford, MA April 14, 2018 http://emerald.tufts.edu/~cborgers/ I have posted these slides there. 1 /
More informationVoting. Suppose that the outcome is determined by the mean of all voter s positions.
Voting Suppose that the voters are voting on a single-dimensional issue. (Say 0 is extreme left and 100 is extreme right for example.) Each voter has a favorite point on the spectrum and the closer the
More informationVoter Participation with Collusive Parties. David K. Levine and Andrea Mattozzi
Voter Participation with Collusive Parties David K. Levine and Andrea Mattozzi 1 Overview Woman who ran over husband for not voting pleads guilty USA Today April 21, 2015 classical political conflict model:
More informationDavid R. M. Thompson, Omer Lev, Kevin Leyton-Brown & Jeffrey S. Rosenschein COMSOC 2012 Kraków, Poland
Empirical Aspects of Plurality Elections David R. M. Thompson, Omer Lev, Kevin Leyton-Brown & Jeffrey S. Rosenschein COMSOC 2012 Kraków, Poland What is a (pure) Nash Equilibrium? A solution concept involving
More informationPublic choice and the development of modern laboratory experimental methods in economics and political science
Const Polit Econ (2014) 25:331 353 DOI 10.1007/s10602-014-9172-0 ORIGINAL PAPER Public choice and the development of modern laboratory experimental methods in economics and political science Charles R.
More informationDecision making and problem solving Lecture 10. Group techniques Voting MAVT for group decisions
Decision making and problem solving Lecture 10 Group techniques Voting MAVT for group decisions Motivation Thus far we have assumed that Objectives, attributes/criteria, and decision alternatives are given
More informationNotes on exam in International Economics, 16 January, Answer the following five questions in a short and concise fashion: (5 points each)
Question 1. (25 points) Notes on exam in International Economics, 16 January, 2009 Answer the following five questions in a short and concise fashion: (5 points each) a) What are the main differences between
More informationChapter 4 Specific Factors and Income Distribution
Chapter 4 Specific Factors and Income Distribution Chapter Organization Introduction The Specific Factors Model International Trade in the Specific Factors Model Income Distribution and the Gains from
More informationEconomics 320F An Economic Analysis of Law Midterm Exam Suggested Answers
Economics 320F An Economic Analysis of Law Midterm Exam Suggested Answers Fall 2003 University of Toronto Joanne Roberts Please answer all parts of the exam in the exam booklet provided. Calculators are
More informationPublic Choice by Referenda or Delegation. An Experimental Comparison of Direct and Indirect Democracy
Public Choice by Referenda or Delegation. An Experimental Comparison of Direct and Indirect Democracy Werner Güth, Martin Kocher, Katinka Pantz and Matthias Sutter January 13, 2004 Abstract Direct democracy
More informationPick a Winner: Decision Making in a Democracy
1 UNIT 1 Pick a Winner: ecision Making in a emocracy 2 Video Support LESSON ONE 3 emocratic Elections in the United States LESSON TWO 10 Improving the Election Process TEHER S GUIE 1 18 HNOUTS H1.1 H1.3
More information"Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information", by Bengt Holmström and Roger B. Myerson
April 15, 2015 "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information", by Bengt Holmström and Roger B. Myerson Econometrica, Vol. 51, No. 6 (Nov., 1983), pp. 1799-1819. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1912117
More informationThe Problem with Majority Rule. Shepsle and Bonchek Chapter 4
The Problem with Majority Rule Shepsle and Bonchek Chapter 4 Majority Rule is problematic 1. Who s the majority? 2. Sometimes there is no decisive winner Condorcet s paradox: A group composed of individuals
More informationManipulating Two Stage Voting Rules
Manipulating Two Stage Voting Rules Nina Narodytska and Toby Walsh Abstract We study the computational complexity of computing a manipulation of a two stage voting rule. An example of a two stage voting
More informationCS 886: Multiagent Systems. Fall 2016 Kate Larson
CS 886: Multiagent Systems Fall 2016 Kate Larson Multiagent Systems We will study the mathematical and computational foundations of multiagent systems, with a focus on the analysis of systems where agents
More informationFrancesco Parisi * POLITICAL COASE THEOREM
Francesco Parisi * POLITICAL COASE THEOREM ABSTRACT: This Article shows that, if all voters are allowed to enter into Coasian bargaining over the policy outcome to be adopted by the majority coalition,
More informationTesting Political Economy Models of Reform in the Laboratory
Testing Political Economy Models of Reform in the Laboratory By TIMOTHY N. CASON AND VAI-LAM MUI* * Department of Economics, Krannert School of Management, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310,
More informationLearning and Belief Based Trade 1
Learning and Belief Based Trade 1 First Version: October 31, 1994 This Version: September 13, 2005 Drew Fudenberg David K Levine 2 Abstract: We use the theory of learning in games to show that no-trade
More information