Economics 320F An Economic Analysis of Law Midterm Exam Suggested Answers

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1 Economics 320F An Economic Analysis of Law Midterm Exam Suggested Answers Fall 2003 University of Toronto Joanne Roberts Please answer all parts of the exam in the exam booklet provided. Calculators are permitted. This test will be marked out of 50. The marks for each question are noted throughout the exam. Part 1: [20 marks each] Comment on two of the following: 1. A non-voluntary transaction never increases utility. True or False. A FALSE. See discussion on page 453 of text: In general goods that are acquired through voluntary exchange, because such exchange guarantees that goods move to those who value them the most and, in doing so, makes both parties better off. Goods that exchange hands without the consent of both parties as by theft do not carry this same guarantee. However, this does not imply that it is not possible for a non-voluntary transaction to increase utility. For example, the MB to the person(s) taking a good may be very high and the MC to the person from whom it was taken may be very small. Such a transaction would clearly increase total utility (i.e., would be efficient) even though the transaction was non-voluntary. Examples of such non-voluntary transactions which may (but not necessarily) increase utility include (but are certainly not limited to) instances of necessity or situations in which a government takes property for a public purpose. 2. The Coase theorem implies that from an economics standpoint society will be indifferent between a rule that prohibits the theft of assets and a rule that permits theft because under either rule the asset in question will wind up in the hands of the party who values it the most. True or False. A FALSE: Theft involves non-voluntary transactions. The Coase theorem applies to situations in which, whatever the legal rule, voluntary exchanges will ensure that the efficient allocation is arrived at. With theft (involuntary

2 exchanges) the market mechanism does not operate and therefore, we cannot be sure that the asset winds up in the hands of the party who values it the most. 3. What economic argument can you offer for the fact that police services are provided by the government, not by private enterprise, and are paid for by compulsory contributions (taxes) rather than by voluntary payments to private police forces? A Public provision of police services have a social benefit because they reduce criminals expected (average) profitability of committing a crime and hence serves to deter crime. This benefit is a public good because it is non-excludable (everyone benefits) and non-rivalrous (one person s consumption of the good does not exclude others from also consuming it). As with all public goods, if these services were provided by private enterprise and funded by voluntary payments there would be under-provision of the good because people would tend to free-ride (i.e., not pay their share). Public provision with compulsory payments, therefore, allows for a level of police services much closer to the social optimum than is possible with private provision. Also, public provision (potentially) avoids the problem of redistribution of crime that is likely to occur with private crime prevention. Part 2: [30 marks each] Answer both of the following questions. 1. Sean, a professional robber of 7-11 s is trying to decide how many 7-11 s to rob this week. In order to limit the number of 7-11 s that Sean will rob, the government is establishing the punishment levels for this crime. They consider two alternatives, fines and imprisonment; they also consider whether to put resources into the police force (which increases the certainty that Sean will be caught) or into punishment administration (i.e. the administration of fines or imprisonment, which increases the severity of the punishment). a) First assume that 7-11 s are flush with cash, so that robbing them is a very lucrative profession. If the government uses only severity measures, i.e. fines or imprisonment, will the government use more fines or more imprisonment to deter Sean from committing a certain number of crimes? Explain the government s choice, using a diagram. A Presumably fines are the cheaper method of punishment (collect money instead of spending it on prisons), so the optimal deterrence mechanism is to use fines to the greatest extent possible and only then use imprisonment (the more expensive deterrence mechanism) if needed to achieve the desired level of deterrence. In this case, since robbing 7-11 s is particularly lucrative, it would seem that a fairly high level of fines (and correspondingly low level of imprisonment) can be used to deter Sean from robbing 7-11 s. In the diagram, Sean s solvency constraint is above the optimal fine of y* because the 7-11 s

3 are flush with cash (i.e., if he commits the crime and he is caught, the lucrative nature of the crime will enable the payment of the fine). (5marks) Fine y* Offender s Solvency Constraint Higher cost D 0 Low cost Imprisonment b) Now assume that 7-11 s have little cash on the premises, so that robbing them provides Sean only with a very, very low income. How will this alter the government s choice of how much to use fines, and how much to use imprisonment, assuming that they want to maintain the same level of deterrence? What then, will be the effect on government expenditures on anti-crime programs? Explain your answers to these questions using a diagram. A Now Sean s solvency constraint will be much lower and therefore, the fine mechanism may be insufficient alone to deter Sean from committing the crime. In this case, some imprisonment (say x*) may be required in addition to a fine. Given that the government must now use less fines and more imprisonment, it will have fewer revenues to spend on anti-crime programs. (5 marks)

4 Fine y* Offender s Solvency Constraint Higher cost D 0 Low cost x* Imprisonment c) Finally, now consider the government s choice between certainty measures and severity measures. Given your answers to a) and b), will the government utilize more measures that increase certainty, or more measures that increase severity, given that i) Sean is very rich, as in a) A In this case, since a fine is the cheaper method of punishment (as opposed to imprisonment) increasing the severity of punishment (fine) is cheaper than increasing the certainty of punishment (cost of police, etc.), therefore, the most efficient combination is a high fine and relatively low certainty of punishment. ii) Sean is very, very poor, as in b) A In this case, since imprisonment is the primary mechanism for increasing the severity of punishment and imprisonment is relatively expensive, we can expect that the most efficient combination would involve higher certainty and lower severity of punishment than that in case i to achieve the same level of deterrence. (5 marks) 2. Suppose there are two people who live next door to each other. One of them (person A) has loud parties. Person B dislikes the noise from parties. Person A claims that he has the right to have parties on his property. Person B claims that he has the right to live noise free. They ask the court to clarify the allocation of their property rights. They know that the following table contains all of the information about their relationship. Person A can have at most 10 parties a month. Number of Parties Marginal Benefit to A of more parties Marginal Cost to B of more parties

5 a. Sketch the marginal benefit and cost curves. Clearly label. (3 marks) MB, MC MB to A of more parties MC to B of more parties 5 10 # of Parties b. How many parties is it efficient for person A to have? A 10 parties since MB>MC and 10 is the maximum number of parties possible. (3 marks) c. How should the court rule? Clearly show the consequences of ruling for either person A or B. (Assume that any bargaining that takes place is Nash Bargaining.) What affects do these rules have for the number of parties and the distribution of income? A The Coase Theorem suggests that the final allocation will be the same regardless of how the court rules provided transaction costs are low. In this case if the court rules for A, A will have 10 parties (the efficient outcome) and B will be unwilling to pay A enough to reduce the number of parties since the MB to A at 10 parties is greater than the MC to B. If the court rules for B, then A will bargain with B for the right to have parties. In particular, A will be willing to pay up to $2800 for the right to have 10 parties and B will accept anything over $700. Nash bargaining solution $700 + ½*($2800-$700) = $1750. The result in either case is the same (10 parties), but in the latter case the distribution of income is clearly in favour of B. (5 marks) d. Suppose there are transactions costs associated with bargaining. At what level of transactions cost would you change your answer in the above question (c)? A If transaction costs are greater than the surplus of $2100 ($2800-$700) no bargaining will take place if B is given the right to have no parties. (2 marks) e. Suppose now costs are above this level found in (d). How should the court rule?

6 A Since there will be no bargaining if the court rules for B, the efficient number of parties will only occur if the court rules for A. (2 marks)

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