Christian List. 177 Mission Impossible, DPhil-thesis, University of Oxford BIBLIOGRAPHY

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1 177 BIBLIOGRAPHY Anscombe, G. E. M. (1976) "On Frustration of the Majority by Fulfillment of the Majority's Will," Analysis 36(4), Arrow, K. (1951/1963) Social Choice and Individual Values, New York: Wiley. d'aspremont, C. (1985) "Axioms for social welfare orderings," in Hurwicz, L., Schmeidler, D., and Sonnenschein, H. (eds.) Social Goals and Social Organization, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, d'aspremont, C., and Gevers, L. (1977) "Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice," Review of Economic Studies 44, Batra, R., and Pattanaik, P. K. (1972) "Transitive Multi-Stage Majority Decisions with Quasi- Transitive Individual Preferences," Econometrica 40(6), Black, D. (1948) "On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making," Journal of Political Economy 56, Black, D. (1958) The Theory of Committees and Elections, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Blackorby, C., and Donaldson, D. (1982) "Ratio-Scale and Translation-Scale Full Interpersonal Comparability without Domain Restrictions: Admissible Social-Evaluation Functions," International Economic Review 23(2), Blackorby, C., and Donaldson, D. (1987) "Welfare Ratios and Distributionally Sensitive Cost- Benefit Analysis," Journal of Public Economics 34, Blair, D. H. (1988) "The Primary-Goods Indexation Problem in Rawls's 'Theory of Justice'," Theory and Decision 24, Bossert, W., and Weymark, J. (1996), "Utility in social choice," forthcoming in Barberà, S., Hammond, P. J., and Seidel, C. (eds.) Handbook of Utility Theory, Volume 2, Boston: Kluwer. Brennan, G. (2000), "Collective Coherence and Belief," International Review of Law and Economics, forthcoming. Budge, I., Robertson, D. and Hearl, D. (eds.) (1987) Ideology, Strategy and Party Change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapman, B. (1998) "More Easily Done than Said: Rules, Reason and Rational Social Choice," Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 18, Davidson, D. (1974) "Belief and the Basis of Meaning," Synthese 27, Davidson, D. (1986) "Judging interpersonal interests", in Elster, J., and Hylland, A. (eds.) Foundations of Social Choice Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

2 178 Dryzek, J., and List, C. (2000) "Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation", Proceedings of the American Political Science Association, September Elster, J. (1986) "The Market and the Forum," in Elster, J., and Hylland, A. (eds.) Foundations of Social Choice Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fishburn, P. C. (1971) "The Theory of Representative Majority Decision," Econometrica 39(2), Fishkin, J. S. (1997) The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy, New Haven/London: Yale University Press. Fishkin, J. S., and Luskin, R. C. (1999) "Bringing Deliberation to the Democratic Dialogue," in McCombs, M., and Reynolds, A. (eds.) The Poll With a Human Face: The National Issues Convention Experiment in Political Communication, Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence E. Erlbaum Associates. Gehrlein, W. (1983) "Condorcet s Paradox," Theory and Decision 15, Gehrlein, W. (2000) "Social Homogeneity and Condorcet Winners: A Weak Connection," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Public Choice Society, Charleston, South Carolina, March Gevers, L. (1979) "On Interpersonal Comparability and Social Welfare Orderings," Econometrica 47, Gibbard, A. (1973) "Manipulability of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica 41, Gibbard, A. (1979) "Disparate Goods and Rawls' Difference Principle: A Social Choice Theoretic Treatment," Theory and Decision 11, Gibbard, A., Hylland, A., and Weymark, J. (1987) "Arrow's theorem with a fixed feasible alternative," Social Choice and Welfare 4, Gibson, R. (1986) "Translation, Physics, and Facts of the Matter," in Hahn, L. E., and Schilpp, P. A. (eds.) The Philosophy of W. V. Quine, La Salle, Ill.: Open Court. Guha, A. S. (1972) "Neutrality, Monotonicity, and the Right of Veto," Econometrica 40, Hammond, P. J. (1976) "Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle," Econometrica 44, Harsanyi, J. (1955) "Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics and interpersonal comparisons of utility," Journal of Political Economy 63, Hausman, D. (1995) "The Impossibility of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Mind 104,

3 179 Inada, K. (1964) "A Note on the Simple Majority Decision Rule," Econometrica 32, Jevons, S. (1911) The Theory of Political Economy (4th ed.), London: Macmillan. Kelly, J. S. (1989) "The Ostrogorski Paradox," Social Choice and Welfare 6, Kelsey, D. (1987) "The role of information in social welfare judgements," Oxford Economic Papers 39, Khmelnitskaya, A. B. (1999) "Social Welfare Orderings for Different Subgroup Utility Scales," Discussion Paper #198, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Khmelnitskaya, A. B., and Weymark J. A. (2000) "Social choice with independent subgroup utility scales," Social Choice and Welfare 17, Kornhauser, L. A., and Sager, L. G. (1986) "Unpacking the Court," Yale Law Journal 82. Kornhauser, L. A., and Sager, L. G. (1993) "The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts," California Law Review 81, Laakso, M., and Taagepera, R. (1979) "'Effective' Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe," Comparative Political Studies 12(1), List, C. (1998) Measurability, Comparability and Social Choice, MPhil-thesis, University of Oxford. List, C. (1999) "Craig's Theorem and the Empirical Underdetermination Thesis Reassessed," Disputatio 7, List, C., and Goodin, R. E. (2001) "Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Journal of Political Philosophy, forthcoming. List, C., McLean, I., Fishkin, J., and Luskin, R. (2000) "Can Deliberation Induce Greater Preference Structuration? Evidence from Deliberative Opinion Polls", Proceedings of the American Political Science Association, September List, C., and Pettit, P. (2000) "The Aggregation of Reason: An Impossibility Result and Its Implications," ANU Working Papers in Social and Political Theory, Australian National University, Canberra. Luskin, R. C., Fishkin, J. S., McAllister, I., Higley, J., and Ryan, P. (2000) "Information Effects in Referendum Voting: Evidence from the Australian Deliberative Poll," paper presented at the annual meeting of the European Consortium for Political Research, Copenhagen, April Luskin, R. C., Fishkin, J. S., Plane, D. L. (1999) "Deliberative Polling and Policy Outcomes: Electric Utility Issues in Texas," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April Mackie, Gerry (2000) The Coherence of Democracy, unpublished manuscript, St. John's College,

4 180 Oxford. Maskin, E. (1978) "A Theorem on Utilitarianism," Review of Economic Studies 45, McLean, I. (2001) "Rikerian Heresthetic: An Application to Two Constitutional Moments in British Political History," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Public Choice Society, San Antonio, TX, March Miller, D. (1992) "Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice," Political Studies 40 (special issue), Miller, N. (2000) "The Geometry of Voting Cycles: Theoretical Developments," paper presented at the Workshop on Mathematical Models of Individual and Public Choice, Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences, University of California, Irvine, July Mueller, D. (1989) Public Choice II, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Naumova, N. (1998) "Nash social welfare orderings with lexicographic comparisons," unpublished manuscript, St. Petersburg State University. von Neumann, J., and Morgenstern, O. (1944) Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Niemi, R. G. (1969) "Majority Decision-Making with Partial Unidimensionality," American Political Science Review 63, Niemi, R. G., and Wright, J. R. (1987) "Voting Cycles and the Structure of Individual Preferences," Social Choice and Welfare 4 (3), Nussbaum, M. (1992) "Human Functionings and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism," Political Theory 20, Pettit, P. (2001) "Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma," Philosophical Issues 11. Plott, C. R. (1978) "Rawls's theory of justice: An Impossibility result," in Gottinger, H. W., and Leinfellner, W. (eds.): Decision Theory and Social Ethics, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, Plott, C. R., Little, J. T., and Parks, R. P. (1975) "Individual choice when objects have 'ordinal' values," Review of Economic Studies 42, Quine, W. V. (1960) Word and Object, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Quine, W. V. (1970) "On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation," Journal of Philosophy 67, Rae, D. W., and Taylor, M. (1970) The Analysis of Political Cleavages, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rawls, J. (1982) "Social Unity and Primary Goods," in Sen, A. K., and Williams, B. (eds.) Utilitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

5 181 Rawls, J. (1993) Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press. Riker, W. H. (1982) Liberalism Against Populism, San Franscisco: W. H. Freeman. Robbins, L. (1932) An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, London: Macmillan. Roberts, K. W. S. (1980a) "Interpersonal Comparability and Social Choice Theory," Review of Economic Studies 47(2), Roberts, K. W. S. (1980b) "Possibility Theorems with Interpersonally Comparable Welfare Levels," Review of Economic Studies, 47, Roberts, K. W. S. (1995) "Valued Opinions or Opinionated Values: The Double Aggregation Problem, in Basu, K., Pattanaik, P. K.,and Suzumura, K. (eds.) Choice, Welfare and Development: A Festschrift in Honour of Amartya Sen, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Roemer, J. E. (1996) Theories of Distributive Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Saari, D. G. (1998) "Connecting and resolving Sen's and Arrow's theorems," Social Choice and Welfare 15, Satterthwaite, M. (1975) "Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions," Journal of Economic Theory 10, Sen, A. K. (1966) "A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions," Econometrica 34, 1966, , reprinted in Sen, A. K. (1982) Choice, Welfare and Measurement, Oxford: Blackwell. Sen, A. K. (1970/1979) Collective Choice and Social Welfare, San Franscisco: Holden-Day (1970), Amsterdam: North Holland (1979). Sen, A. K. (1980/81) "Plural utility," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81, Sen, A. K. (1982) Choice, Welfare and Measurement, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Sen, A. K. (1985), Commodities and Capabilities, Amsterdam: North-Holland. Sen, A. K. (1987) The Standard of Living, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sen, A. K. (1991) "On Indexing Primary Goods and Capabilities," mimeographed, Harvard University. Sen, A. K. (1992) Inequality Reexamined, Oxford / New York: Oxford University Press. Sen, A. K. (1997) On Economic Inequality (expanded ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

6 182 Sunstein, C. R. (2000) "The Law of Group Polarization," paper presented at the conference Deliberating about Deliberative Democracy, University of Texas at Austin, February Taagepera, R., and Grofman, B. (1981) "Effective Size and Number of Components," Sociological Methods & Research 10 (1), Tangian, A. S. (2000) "Unlikelihood of Condorcet's paradox in a large society," Social Choice and Welfare 17, Tsui, K.-Y., and Weymark, J. A. (1997) "Social welfare orderings for ratio-scale measurable utilities," Economic Theory 10, Tullock, G., and Campbell, C. D. (1970) "Computer Simulation of a Small Voting System," Economics Journal 80, Tungodden, B. (1998) "Social Choices with Independent Norm Levels," Discussion Paper No. 2/98, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Waldner, I. (1972) "The Empirical Meaningfulness of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Journal of Philosophy 69, Walzer, M. (1983) Spheres of Justice, New York: Basic Books. Ward, B. (1965) "Majority Voting and Alternative Forms of Public Enterprises," in Margolis, J. (ed.) The Public Economy of Urban Communities, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. Yanovskaya, E. B. (1998) "Nash social choice orderings," unpublished manuscript, St. Petersburg Institute of Economics and Mathematics.

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