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1 Bibliography [1] Albers W, Güth W, Hammerstein P, Moldovanu B and van Damme E (eds) 1997: Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten; Berlin & Heidelberg: Springer. [2] Amar A R 1984: Choosing representatives by lottery voting, Yale Law Journal 93: [3] AumannRJ1997: Onthestate of the art in game theory: An interview with Robert Aumann, in [1, pp. 8 34]. [4] AumannRJandHartS(eds) 1994: Handbook of Game Theory, Volume 2 ; Amsterdam: Elsevier Science. [5] Banzhaf J F 1965: Weighted voting doesn t work: a mathematical analysis, Rutgers Law Review 19: [6] 1966: Multi-member electoral districts do they violate the one man, one vote principle, Yale Law Journal 75: [7] 1968: One man, votes: a mathematical analysis of the Electoral College, Villanova Law Review 13: [8] Barrett C and Newcombe H 1968: Weighted voting in international organizations, Peace Research Reviews 2(2): [9] Barry B 1980: Is it better to be powerful or lucky?, Political Studies 28: , [10] Brace P, Harrington C B and King G (eds) 1989: The Presidency in American Politics; New York: New York University Press. [11] Brams S J 1975: Game Theory and Politics; New York: Free Press. [12] 1978: The Presidential Election Game; New Haven CT: Yale University Press. [13] 1985: Rational Politics: Decisions, Games, and Strategy; Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Press. 307

2 308 Bibliography [14] Brams S J and Affuso P J 1976: Power and size: a new paradox, Theory and Decision 7: [15] 1985: New paradoxes of voting power in the EC Council of Ministers, Electoral Studies 4: [16] Brams S J, Affuso P J and Kilgour D M 1989: Presidential power: a game-theoretic analysis in [10, pp ]. [17] Brams S J, Lucas W F and Straffin P D (eds) 1982: Political and Related Models (Vol. 2 in series Models in Applied Mathematics edited by W F Lucas); New York: Springer. [18] Brams S J, Schotter A and Schwödiauer G (eds) 1979: Applied Game Theory; Würzburg Wien: Physica. [19] Calvo E, Lasaga J and van den Nouweland A 1999: Values of games with probabilistic graphs, Mathematical Social Sciences 37: [20] Coleman J S 1971: Control of collectivities and the power of a collectivity to act in [65, pp ]; reprinted in [21, pp ]. [21] 1986: Individual Interests and Collective Action; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [22] Deegan J and Packel E W 1978: A new index of power for simple n-person games, International Journal of Game Theory 7: [23] 1982: To the (minimal winning) victors go the (equally divided) spoils: a new index of power for simple n-person games in [17, pp ]. [24] Dixon R G 1968: Democratic Representation: Reapportionment in Law and Politics; New York: Oxford University Press. [25] Dreyer J and Schotter A 1980: Power relationship in the international monetary fund: the consequences of quota changes, Review of Economics and Statistics 62: [26] Dubey P 1975: On the uniqueness of the Shapley value, International Journal of Game Theory 4: [27] Dubey P and Shapley L S 1979: Mathematical properties of the Banzhaf power index, Mathematics of Operations Research 4:

3 Bibliography 309 [28] Feller W 1957: An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications (2nd ed.); New York: Wiley. [29] Felsenthal D S and Machover M 1995: Postulates and paradoxes of relative voting power: a critical re-appraisal, Theory and Decision 38: [30] 1996: Alternative forms of the Shapley value and the Shapley Shubik index, Public Choice 87: [31] 1997: The weighted voting rule in the EU s Council of Ministers, : intentions and outcomes, Electoral Studies 16: [32] 1997: Ternary voting games, International Journal of Game Theory 26: [33] 1998: The product paradox of voting power, Public Choice 96: [34] 1999: Minimizing the mean majority deficit: the second square-root rule, Mathematical Social Sciences 37: [35] Models and reality: the curious case of the absent abstention (forthcoming in [48]). [36] Felsenthal D S, Machover M and Zwicker W [S] 1998: The bicameral postulates and indices of a priori voting power, Theory and Decision 44: [37] Fielding G and Liebeck H 1975: Voting structures and the square root law, British Journal of Political Science 5: [38] Fischer D and Schotter A 1978: The inevitability of the paradox of redistribution in the allocation of voting weights, Public Choice 33(2): [39] Fishburn P C 1973: The Theory of Social Choice; Princeton: Princeton University Press. [40] Friedmann W 1965: An Introduction To World Politics 5th edn; New York: St Martin s Press. [41] Grofman B and Scarrow H 1979: Iannucci and its aftermath: the application of the Banzhaf index to weighted voting in the State of New York, in [18, pp ]. [42] Halsbury s Laws of England 51 4th edn 1986; London: Butterworths.

4 310 Bibliography [43] Halsbury s Statutes of England and Wales 17 4th edn 1993 Reissue; London: Butterworths. [44] Hartley T C 1988: The Foundations of European Community Law: An Introduction to the Constitutional and Administrative Law of the European Community 2nd edn; Oxford: Clarendon Press. [45] Herne K and Nurmi H 1993: The distribution of a priori voting power in the EC Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, Scandinavian Political Studies 16: [46] Holler M J (ed) 1981: Power, Voting, and Voting Power; Würzburg: Physica. [47] 1982: Forming coalitions and measuring voting power, Political Studies 30: [48] Holler M J and Owen G (eds): Power Indices and Coalition Formation (forthcoming). [49] Hosli M 1993: Admission of European Free Trade Association states to the European Community and Council of Ministers, International Organization 47: [50] 1995: The balance between small and large: effects of a double-majority system on voting power in the European Union, International Studies Quarterly 39: [51] International Financial Statistics, vol. L, No. 8, August 1997 ; Washington DC: International Monetary Fund. [52] International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1980 ; Washington DC: International Monetary Fund. [53] Johnson R E 1969: An analysis of weighted voting as used in reapportionment of county governments in New York State, Albany Law Review 34:1 45. [54] Johnston R J 1977: National sovereignty and national power in European institutions, Environment and Planning A 9: [55] 1978: On the measurement of power: some reactions to Laver, Environment and Planning A 10: [56] Keynes J M 1921: A Treatise on Probability; London: Macmillan. [57] Kilgour D M 1974: A Shapley value for cooperative games with quarreling in [84, pp ].

5 Bibliography 311 [58] Kuhn H W and Tucker A W (eds) 1953: Contributions to the Theory of Games II (Annals of Mathematics Studies 28); Princeton: Princeton University Press. [59] Lambert J P 1988: Voting games, power indices, and presidential elections, UMAP Journal 9: [60] Lane J-E and Mæland R 1995: Voting power under the EU constitution, Journal of Theoretical Politics 7: [61] Laruelle A and Widgrén M 1998: Is the allocation of voting power among EU states fair?, Public Choice 94: [62] Laver M 1978: The problem of measuring power in Europe, Environment and Planning A 10: [63] Laver M and Schofield N 1990: Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe; Oxford: Oxford University Press. [64] Leech D 1990: Power indices and probabilistic voting assumptions, Public Choice 66: [65] Lieberman B (ed) 1971: Social Choice; New York: Gordon and Breach. [66] Lucas W F 1982: Measuring power in weighted voting systems in [17, pp ]. [67] 1992: Fair Voting: Weighted Votes For Unequal Constituencies, HISTOMAP Module 19 ; Lexington, MA: COMAP. [68] Luce R D and Raiffa H 1957: Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey; New York: John Wiley. [69] Mann I and Shapley L S 1964: The a priori voting strength of the electoral college in [98, pp ]. [70] Morriss P 1987: Power A Philosophical Analysis; Manchester: Manchester University Press. [71] Myerson R B 1991: Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. [72] Ordeshook P (ed) 1978: Game Theory and Political Science; New York: New York University Press. [73] Owen G 1971: Political games, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 18:

6 312 Bibliography [74] 1975: Multilinear extensions and the Banzhaf value, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 22: [75] 1978: A note on the Banzhaf Coleman axioms in [72, pp ]. [76] Palmer N D and Perkins H C 1957: International Relations: The World Community in Transition 2nd edn; Cambridge, MA: Riverside Press. [77] Pennock J R and Chapman J W (eds) 1968: Representation: Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy, Nomos X ; New York: Atherton Press. [78] Penrose L S 1946: The elementary statistics of majority voting, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 109: [79] Peters T 1996: Voting power after the enlargement and options for decision making in the European Union, Aussenwirtschaft 51: [80] Pollio M C 1992: Weighted voting in Nassau county: an overview. Unpublished paper; Dept. of Politics, New York University. [81] Rae D W 1969: Decision rules and individual values in constitutional choice, American Political Science Review 63: [82] Raiffa H 1982: The Art and Science of Negotiation: How to Resolve Conflicts and Get the Best Out of Bargaining; Cambridge: Harvard University Press. [83] Rapoport A 1970: N-Person Game Theory: Concepts and Applications; Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. [84] (ed) 1974: Game Theory as a Theory of Conflict Resolution; Boston: Reidel. [85] Riker W H 1982: Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice; San Francisco: W H Freeman. [86] 1986: The first power index, Social Choice and Welfare 3: [87] Riker W H and Shapley L S 1968: Weighted voting: a mathematical analysis for instrumental judgments in [77, pp ]. [88] Roth A E 1977: Utility functions for simple games, Journal of Economic Theory 16:

7 Bibliography 313 [89] (ed) 1988: The Shapley Value; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [90] 1988: Introduction to the Shapley value in [89, pp. 1 27]. [91] Sainsbury R M 1987: Paradoxes; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [92] Schotter A 1981: The paradox of redistribution: some theoretical and empirical results in [46, pp ]. [93] Selby H A (ed) 1973: Notes of Lectures on Mathematics in the Behavioral Sciences (mimeographed); Williamstown, MA: Mathematical Association of America. [94] Shapley L S 1953: A value for n-person games in [58, pp ]; reprinted in [89, pp ]. [95] 1962: Simple games: an outline of the descriptive theory, Behavioral Science 7: [96] 1973: Political science: voting and bargaining games in [93, pp ]. [97] Shapley L S and Shubik M 1954: A method for evaluating the distribution of power in a committee system, American Political Science Review 48: ; reprinted in [89, pp ]. [98] Shubik M (ed) 1964: Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social Behavior; New York: John Wiley. [99] Simma B (ed) 1982: The Charter of the United Nations A Commentary; New York: Oxford University Press. [100] Straffin P D 1982: Power indices in politics in [17, pp ]. [101] 1988: The Shapley Shubik and Banzhaf power indices as probabilities in [89, pp ]. [102] 1994: Power and stability in politics in [4, pp ]. [103] Taylor A D 1995: Mathematics and Politics: Strategy, Voting, Power and Proof ; New York: Springer. [104] Taylor A [D] and Zwicker W [S] 1992: A characterization of weighted voting, Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society 115: [105] Simple Games: Desirability Relations, Trading, and Pseudoweightings; Princeton: Princeton University Press (forthcoming).

8 314 Bibliography [106] Teasdale A L 1996: The politics of majority voting in Europe, Political Quarterly 64: [107] Treaties Establishing the European Communities Abridged Edition 1987; Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. [108] von Neumann J and Morgenstern O 1944: Game Theory and Economic Behavior; Princeton: Princeton University Press. [109] Weinstein J B 1965: The effect of the federal reapportionment decisions on counties and other forms of local government, Columbia Law Review 65: [110] Widgrén M 1994: Voting power in the EC decision making and the consequences of two different enlargements, European Economic Review 38: [111] 1995: Probabilistic voting power in the EU Council: the cases of trade policy and social regulation, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 97: [112] 1995: European economic decision-making policy: progress or paralysis?, Economic Policy 21: [113] World Tables 1995 ; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. [114] Young H P 1985: Monotonic solutions of cooperative games, International Journal of Game Theory 14: [115] 1994: Equity In Theory and Practice; Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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