When Two Worlds Collide: Rational Choice Insights into Deliberative Democratic Theory A Q investigation into framing and team-reasoning

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1 When Two Worlds Collide: Rational Choice Insights into Deliberative Democratic Theory A Q investigation into framing and team-reasoning 1. Overview The phrase 'deliberative democracy', coined originally by Bessette (1980) to describe the discussions between members of the US Congress, has since evolved into its own influential area within political theory, and as Parkinson (2006; p.1) puts it, can roughly be described as 'a way of thinking about politics which emphasises the give and take of public reasoning between citizens, rather than counting the votes or authority of representatives'. More specifically, whilst aggregative conceptions of democracy have traditionally been understood as focussing merely on the decision making process a method of aggregation which takes predetermined individual preferences and yields a collective decision after some social choice function is applied; deliberative theory stresses the importance of the process, whereby 'individuals are amenable to changing their judgements, preferences and views during the course of their interactions' (Dryzek 2000; p.1). In other words, the focus of democratic theory has shifted starkly from the 'what' question of decision making, to the 'why'; and it is this adjustment that is so often referred to as the 'deliberative turn' (Dryzek 2000). Many of the classic early statements regarding deliberative theory then, for example those offered by Cohen (1997), Habermas (1996) or Gutmann and Thompson (1996), pictured the goal of deliberation as the creation of consensus, whereby individuals should be encouraged to use some form of public reason to arrive at an almost Rousseauian general will. In one of Cohen's most famous passages for instance, he states that 'outcomes are democratically legitimate if and only if they could be the object of free and reasoned agreement among equals' (1989; p. 22), or more polemically put by Young (1996; p. 122) that 'the goal of deliberation is to arrive at consensus'. But just as democratic theory more widely experienced the deliberative turn, deliberative theory itself seems to have gone through its own revolution, which I refer to as the aggregative turn of deliberative democratic theory. In the work of, for example, Fishkin (1991, 1995), Dryzek (2000, 2003) and Goodin (2003), a conviction has emerged which states that deliberative theory's rejection of the assumptions behind aggregative democracy need not prohibit it from the use of an aggregative methodology post-deliberation. When consensus is not forthcoming, due to reasons such as value pluralism, then some form of majoritarianism is relied upon. 1 Voting, it is argued, can be fused with the deliberative process (Fishkin 2005) to yield politically more legitimate outcomes than a simple process of aggregation. Setting the specific dynamics of the shift towards a model of democracy that stresses both deliberative and aggregative phases to one side (this represents the initial opening chapter of the thesis); empirical political science has become increasingly interested in investigating the assumptions made by the normative theoretical account. In particular, questions regarding the structure and content of preferences, which are tested both before and after deliberative mechanisms are applied, have become quite salient within the democratic literature (Fishkin 2005, Niemeyer 2004, 2007). Preference transformation, measured against the criterion that deliberation yields 'better' or 'more socially minded' judgements (some would argue ideally representative of a 'common good'), as an argument for enhanced legitimacy, is reflected extremely pertinently in, for example, the practices of deliberative polling (Fishkin 1991), citizens' juries (Coote and Lenaghan 1997), and consensus conferences (Joss and Durand 1995) respectively. As Luskin and Fishkin (2005; p. 1) state: A second sense of "better" concerns citizens' definitions of their interests. Deliberation may make citizens public spirited. They may come, in the process of discussing the issues with others and, partly as a result, learning and thinking more about others and their interests, to take greater account of the interests of others of either the population as a whole or at least wider sections of it. (Luskin and Fishkin 2005; p. 1) 1 Indeed Dryzek (2000; p. 170) makes the notion of non-consensus a virtue due to its oppressive nature.

2 Yet when dealing with the concept of preferences, an obvious candidate for an analytical framework, the rational choice approach, is often overlooked. It is claimed, for example, that deliberative democracy shapes human decision making in a manner inconsistent with the assumptions of this methodology. But this argument, I contend, is fallacious and driven by a mistaken conflation of the concepts of 'rationality' and 'self-interest', as well as the assumption that preferences are fixed and exogenous. Dealing with the latter point first and very quickly, the argument stems from the fact that most formal modelling of economic analysis takes place with a fixed utility function; a purely self-interested individual i chooses a bundle of goods x i to maximise their utility, yielding an ordering that can be represented by a function U i = U i (x i ). But as Goodin (1986) argues, there is nothing to prevent preferences (and therefore utility functions) from changing due to how an individual judges the situation. This idea, premised on Harsanyi (1955, 1977), allows for a number of different preference orderings to exist within each individual, with a large portion of the predictive power now premised on distinguishing which 'function is in play'. In short, rational choice theory, properly understood, can accommodate the notion of preference transformation. Secondly then, when deliberative advocates argue the irrelevance of the rational choice approach, in the most part they are in fact arguing against the paradigm of self-interest. Rational choice theory, although it often uses this baseline for convenience and predictive power, is however not irrevocably associated with this single maxim 2. As Hargreaves-Heap et al (1992; p. 5) put it 'desires can be good, bad, selfish, altruistic anything you like', asserting that rational choices can made on criteria other than mere self-interest. In fact this point is also illustrated in Harsanyi (1977; pp.48-55), who makes an argument particularly relevant to deliberative democrats of both Rawlsian and Habermassian traditions by sketching a technical exposition of an 'ethical utility function', reminiscent of the original position. More recently, partly in response to such phenomenon as the voluntary provision of public goods, this approach has been comprehensively investigated in the guise of rational altruism (Margolis 1982, Sugden 1982, 1984, 1985), inequality aversion (Hoffman et al 1996, Roth 1995) and reciprocity (Rabin 1993) respectively. 3 Again, to put it bluntly, rational choice theory can accommodate the notion of 'other regarding preferences'. People are self-seeking, but they also have other 'social' characteristics like altruism, sense of fairness, the cooperative spirit, which temper their selfishness. Just as selfinterest creates drive and ambition, so can these other social concerns... we know at an intuitive level that people can be taught or inspired to be more altruistic, more trustworthy and more trusting. (Basu 2006; pp ) What therefore seems paradoxical, at least within the confines of this thesis, is deliberative theory's reticence in embracing some of the insights provided by this approach. Deliberative democracy is conceptualised as a highly rational form of decision making, yet, due in large part to the mistaken beliefs discussed above, it pays little or no attention to some important insights that rational choice, and experimental economics, has to offer. The underlying strategy of this thesis, then, is to use a combination of different rational choice derived approaches to investigate the reality of normative claims made by deliberative democrats. Following this line of argument, one interpretation of preference transformation is the idea outlined above that deliberation shifts an individual onto a utility function that includes a degree of altruism, inequality aversion or reciprocity within it. Deliberative preferences then provide a rational explanation for actions such as the contribution to public goods provision, and moreover are compatible with the assertion that deliberation yields 'socially regarding' outcomes (which I discuss in chapter 2). This is a quite standard interpretation of what the phrase 'other 2 As Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759/1976) suggests. 3 The issue of trust might also be considered in this context: see Fershtman and Gneezy (2001), Ensminger (2000) and Heinrich et al (2004)

3 regarding preferences' means that individuals, faced with a specific decision pre and postdeliberation, ask themselves the following questions: (Q1) What should of action should I take, given my self-interested preference ordering? Deliberation (Q2) What course of action should I take, given my other-regarding preference ordering? But it is also, I suggest, an over-simplification of a two fold phenomenon. The concept of 'other regarding preferences' explicated in the classical rational choice account, and upon which the majority of empirical deliberative theory is based (albeit implicitly) is, I believe, a two-fold phenomenon - one that needs to be unpacked. The assumption that post-deliberation an individual will ask themself question (Q1) does represent a valid and fruitful approach, but it also seems to omit from consideration a phenomenon that becomes important when a second normative claim, that deliberation possesses a 'community generating power' (Cooke 2000) is considered. The classical rational choice approach to preferences, although is not tied to self-interest or limited to a fixed point, is however committed to behavioural individualism (Schumpeter 1909), or what Bacharach (2006) calls an individualistic mode of reasoning. Preferences might be 'other-regarding', but they still belong to a specific individual: deliberative democracy might therefore claim that individuals employ individual other-regarding reasoning (which I refer to as IOR). An alternative perspective then, discussed in the broad literature surrounding collective intentions (Tuomela and Miller 1988, Searle 1990 and Bratman 1993), and in particular team agency (Gilbert 1989, Sugden 1993, 2000, 2003, and Bacharach 1999, 2006); is the idea that preferences may appear as other-regarding because they can be represented by a utility function not of an individual agent, but rather by that of a 'team' or 'group'. In this sense, the conceptual framework rejects methodological individualism associated with classical rational choice theory in favour of an approach which embraces the idea that 'a team of individuals can be an agent in its own right' (Gold and Sugden 2004; p. 1). An individual is then modelled to employ a distinctive alternative mode of reasoning, from a collective rather than individual perspective, this time asking themself the following question: (Q3) What course of action should we take, given our preference ordering? A number of different expositions of exactly how team agency works have been offered, although two in particular suggest important points for deliberative theory. Firstly, Gilbert (1989) argues that team agency is constituted by public acts of promising and commitment, where individuals explicitly use language to come to agreement and understanding of each other as a member of a plural subject deliberative settings are therefore perceived as an opportunity for such actions to take place. Secondly, and more akin to the classical account of rationality discussed above, is Bacharach's (1993, 1999, 2001, 2006) notion of team reasoning as a result of framing (Tversky and Kahneman 1986). The argument runs a similar way to that of Harsanyi and Goodin above: that the utility function of a group can exist within an individual in exactly the same manner as those that are representative of individually dictated preference orderings. The frame, in effect the environment the individual inhabits, then determines if group preferences, which could reflect membership in a host of possible collective entities (i.e. a political party, the citizenry), form the basis of their rational decision making. 4 Taken separately, these two approaches represent two distinct ways in which the concept of decision theoretic rationality might be applied: one from the perspective of the individual, and 4 What should be obvious immediately is the link between both Gilbert and Bacharach's approach for it is clear that the former will clearly affect the prevalence of a 'group frame' in the latter.

4 the other from the perspective of a collective. But they also have something in common, for they both provide a rational justification for the assertion that post-deliberative preferences are more reflective of the interests of other individuals. On one level then, from a purely positivist perspective, there seems little to choose between the two models. But when a second important deliberative concern is introduced, Cooke's (2000) argument that it possesses a community generating power (Barber 1984), a very definite distinction becomes apparent. 5 Communities, it is claimed, are by definition more than an aggregation of individuals (even individuals with an aversion to inequality, with altruistic or reciprocate tendencies), they are in part constituted by a common sense of who 'we' are (Turner et al 1987). In terms of deliberative theory, the community generation argument is most often associated with communitarian incarnations such as Barber (1984) and Taylor (1989). But it is also present in more liberal perspectives, for example Cohen (1996; p.102) who espouses the benefits of public reason in encouraging equal membership in a sovereign body. What remains central to both perspectives, crucially, is the belief that discussion is a key component in the identification and construction of commonality. Returning to the rational choice approach, then, even with an element of 'other regardingness' in a given utility function, agents modelled under the classical approach remain individuals; but in the second they share something more than a simple interest in each other's utility they share a mutual citizens' identity 6, which I contend is (at least partially) reflected by the use of a joint mode of reasoning. Hollis (1998), for example, makes a similar point, and argues that the 'we' perspective can be compared to what Rousseau famously termed the most 'remarkable change in man'; individuals self-identify as citizens and treat the collective decisions of that unit (the community) as their own. To briefly surmise, then, deliberative theory's claim to yield 'other regarding preferences' can therefore be represented by the following two-track, rational choice derived schema of reasoning. The first, which leads to individual other-regarding reasoning, is the approach followed almost all empirical deliberative political scientists, whilst the second, which has serious implications for the idea of community generation, has been somewhat ignored. (Q1) What should of action should I take, given my self-interested preference ordering? Deliberation (Q2) What course of action should I take, given my other regarding preference ordering? (Q3) What course of action should we take, given our preference ordering? Individual Other-Regarding Reasoning Collective/Team Reasoning 5 The general question of why common identity is important, then, is normally taken as a foundational issue for most democratic theorists. Those of a purely aggregative disposition pay little regard to it other than the extent to which it shapes preferences and voting patterns, whilst those of a deliberative persuasion claim that 'deliberation across divided identities is hard' (Dryzek 2005; p. 219). 6 Although even in economics the idea of identity is gaining prominence, see Akerlof and Kranton (2000), Davis (1995, 2003), Kirman and Teschl (2004), and Sen (2006) for some alternative perspectives.

5 This deficiency in the current research agenda, identified using the rational choice approach, thus provides the impetus for the central questions that my thesis poses: (Q) To what extent does deliberation induce a collective/team mode of reasoning; and what are the implications for normative deliberative democratic theory? 2. Methodology - A one day citizen's jury with individuals - Q sort approach (Block 1961), administered both pre and post deliberation - Statements offered from a number of perspectives; i.e. I (self interested), I (altruistic), I (reciprocity), We (political party), We (citizen), and We (the deliberative group) - The process itself will also be analysed from a social-psychological perspective; i.e. the language used, the arguments offered etc 3. Chapter Outline Chapter 1 ( words) The first chapter represents a literature review of the most common arguments for an account of collective decision making premised on both deliberation and aggregation. Specifically, it offers an analysis of democratic theory with respect to the concept of political legitimacy, discussing the relevant problems with the ideal deliberative and purely aggregative accounts, and shows explicitly how and why drawing upon both enriches the legitimacy of democratic political outcomes. It concludes with the claim that deliberative models yield normatively superior outcomes due to their ability to shape preferences to reflect the interests of other individuals. Chapter 2 ( words) The second chapter is split into two sections. The first deconstructs the theoretical claim that deliberation yields socially minded outcomes, and introduces the rational choice approach to preferences to define precisely what is meant by the claim. It surveys a number of differing classical accounts; rational altruism, inequality aversion and reciprocity, and argues via an examination of empirical deliberative work that most, if not all, proceeds on grounds similar to these economic models. The next section then suggests that being tied to an individualistic conception of human action, even with some altruistic element, is problematic because it constrains the argument that deliberation also possesses a community generating power. It argues that an alternative extension to the rational choice approach, team reasoning, might offer a better way of understanding/modelling the 'other regarding' claim. Drawing on Barber (1984) it then makes a case for a collective mode of reasoning as a key component of what community means, following Hollis' (1988; pp ) statement that it offers a decision theoretic formulation of what is meant by the bond of society'. Chapter 3 ( words) Chapter three then takes a much closer look at the concepts of (group) identity and community. Premised on the literature from social psychology (Brown 1988, Orbell et all 1988), it then discusses specifically what factors may induce individuals to self-identify as a member of a team, (and therefore team-reason) and compares this to the process of deliberation. It also introduces the argument that a rational course of action is often importantly determined by which 'we' the individual identifies with, and discusses the importance of this reality in reference to the make up of a deliberative forum. Chapter 4 ( words) The fourth chapter focuses on how the claim regarding collective/team reasoning might be investigated empirically; setting out the case for both an appropriate deliberative forum, as well as the analytical approach that is warranted. After a brief literature review is undertaken of the

6 most common micro-deliberative forums, a modified form of a Citizens' Jury, consisting of a small number of people partaking in intensive deliberation to best approximate the ideal conditions of deliberation, will be argued for. Using a Q sort approach most closely associated with Block (1961), preferences and the mode of reasoning employed by individuals will be investigated both pre and post deliberation. Chapter 5 ( words) The fifth chapter then processes and discusses the results of the deliberative forum, both in terms of the Q sorts and observations collected during the deliberative experiment itself, as well as observations from the deliberative experiment itself. It will compare the factor loadings from pre to post deliberation, and ascertain the extant to which a micro-deliberative setting can induce collective/team reasoning. It will then compare the results to the theoretical claims made in earlier chapters. Chapter 6 ( words) The final chapter(s) will then take the experimentally informed theoretical results obtained from chapters 1-5, and discuss the implications for institutionalising deliberative democratic principles. More specifically, it will offer some observations of how deliberative democracy might be implemented on a macro scale in light of the micro-derived evidence collected. References Akerlof, G. and Kranton, R. (2000) "Economics and Identity" The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 115, No. 3, pp Bacharach, M. (1993) "Variable Universe Games" in Frontiers of Game Theory (ed) Binmore, K, et al (MIT Press) Bacharach, M. and Bernasconi, M. (1997) "The Variable Frame Theory of Focal Points: An Experimental Study" Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp Bacharach, M. (1999) "Interactive Team Reasoning: A Contribution to the Theory of Co operation" Research in Economics, Vol. 53, pp Bacharach, M. (2001) "Superagency: Beyond an Individualistic Theory of Games" in Proceedings of the 8 th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (ed) Johan van Bentham (Morgan Kaufmann) Bacharach, M. (2006) (ed) Beyond Individual Choice (Princeton University Press) Barber, B. (1984) Strong Democracy (University of California Press) Basu, K. (2006) "Identity, Trust and Altruism: Sociological Clues to Economic Development" CAE Working Paper #06-05 Bessette, J. (1980) "Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican Government", in How Democratic is the Constitution? R. Goldwin and W. Schambra (eds) (Washington DC) Block, J. (1961) The Q Sort Assessment in Personality Assessment and Psychiatric Research (Charles C Thomas) Bratman, M. (1993) "Shared Intention" Ethics, Vol. 104, pp Brennan, G. and Lomasky, L. (1993) Democracy and Decision: The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference (Cambridge University Press) Brown, R. (1988) Group Processes: Dynamics Within and Between Groups (Blackwell, New York) Brown, S. (1993/4) "The Structure and Form of Subjectivity in Political Theory and Behaviour" Operant Subjectivity, Vol. 17, No. 1-2, pp Cohen, J. (1996) "Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy" in S. Benhabib (eds) Democracy and Difference (Princeton University Press) Cohen, J. (1997) "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy" in J. Bohman and W. Rehg (eds) Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics (MIT Press) Cooke, M. (2000) "Five Arguments for Deliberative Democracy" Political Studies, Vol. 48, No. 5, pp Coote, A. and Lenaghan, J. (1997) Citizens' Juries: Theory into Practice (IPPR London)

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