WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY, 2ND EDITION

Transcription

1 WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY, 2ND EDITION ALLAN M. FELDMAN AND ROBERTO SERRANO Brown University Kluwer Academic Publishers Boston/Dordrecht/London

2 Contents Preface xi Introduction 1 1 The Concerns of Welfare Economics 1 2 The Concerns of Social Choice Theory 4 3 Practical Concerns of Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory 7 1. PREFERENCES AND UTILITY 11 1 Fundamental Assumptions 11 2 Best Alternatives and Utility Functions 13 3 The Formal Model of Preferences 14 4 Decisions under Uncertainty and Expected Utility 19 5 Introduction to Social Preferences 23 6 Exercises 28 7 Appendix 29 8 Selected References BARTER EXCHANGE 33 1 Introduction 33 2 Allocations 34 3 The Edgeworth Box Diagram 36 4 Pareto Optimal Allocations and the Core 37 5 Algebraic Examples 40 6 Final Notes on the Core: The Number of Coalitions 46 7 Exercises 46

3 vi WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY, 2ND ED. 8 Selected References WELFARE PROPERTIES OF MARKET EXCHANGE 51 1 Introduction 51 2 The Two-Person, Two-Goods Model 52 3 Competitive Equilibrium in an Exchange Economy: Formal Preliminaries 56 4 The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics 59 5 The Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics 63 6 An Algebraic Example 70 7 Exercises 73 8 Selected References WELFARE PROPERTIES OF JUNGLE EXCHANGE 79 1 Power as a Basis for Exchange 79 2 A Model of Indivisible Objects 80 3 A 4-Person 4-Houses Example 82 4 Finding a Market Equilibrium with Top Cycles 85 5 Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics and Jungle Economics 87 6 Exercises 91 7 Selected References ECONOMIES WITH PRODUCTION 93 1 Introduction 93 2 Optimal Production Plans 96 3 Competitive Equilibrium Production Plans 99 4 The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics, Production Version The Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics, Production Version Extending the Production Model, and Combining Production and Exchange An Algebraic Example in a Simple Production Model Exercises Appendix Selected References 115

4 Contents vii 6. UNCERTAINTY IN EXCHANGE Introduction States of the World Symmetric Uncertainty Examples Asymmetric Information Exercises Selected References EXTERNALITIES Introduction Externalities in an Exchange Economy: An Example Pigouvian Taxes and Subsidies: The Exchange Example Continued Pigouvian Taxes and Subsidies: A Production Example Exercises Selected References PUBLIC GOODS Introduction The Public Goods Model The Samuelson Public Good Optimality Condition Private Financing of the Public Good and the Free Rider Problem: The Wicksell-Lindahl Tax Scheme Fixed Tax Shares and Majority Voting The Demand-Revealing Tax Scheme The Groves-Ledyard Tax Scheme Exercises Selected References COMPENSATION CRITERIA Introduction Notational Preliminaries The Pareto Criterion The Kaldor Criterion The Scitovsky Criterion 201

5 viii WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY, 2ND ED. 6 The Samuelson Criterion Compensation Criteria in Exchange Economies Consumer s Surplus Money Metrics Consumers Surplus - Boadway Paradox Quasilinear Utility Cost Benefit Analysis with One Good Exercises Selected References FAIRNESS AND THE RAWLS CRITERION Introduction Fairness The Rawls Criterion Exercises Selected References LIFE AND DEATH CHOICES Introduction Economic Model The Money Value of a Life A Formal Version of the Economic Model The Broome Paradox Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Problems with Utilitarian Measures of Life/Death Choices The Pareto Principle and Extended Pareto Principles What s Repugnant About the Repugnant Conclusion? Conclusions About Life and Death Choices Exercises Selected References MAJORITY VOTING Introduction The Majority Voting Criterion Majority Voting and Single-Peakedness Majority Voting and Single-peakedness: The Multidimensional Case Multidimensional Voting Are the Cycles That Bad? 268

6 Contents ix 6 Exercises Selected References ARROW S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM Introduction A Simple Model for Arrow s Impossibility Theorem Requirements on the Arrow Social Welfare Function Applying the Requirements Arrow s Impossibility Theorem Relaxing the Universality Requirement Reactions to Arrow s Impossibility Theorem Another Version of Arrow s Theorem Exercises Selected References DOMINANT-STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION Introduction Examples of Strategic Manipulation The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem Significance of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem Exercises Appendix Selected References NASH IMPLEMENTATION Introduction An Example Maskin Monotonicity Maskin s Theorem Comments on Maskin s Theorem Limitations of Maskin Monotonicity and Approximate Implementation Exercises Appendix Selected References 341

7 x WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY, 2ND ED. 16. BAYESIAN IMPLEMENTATION Introduction Asymmetric Information in the Model of Types Incentive Compatibility From Truthful to Full Implementability Bayesian Implementability: Example 3 Continued Bayesian Implementability: Theory Exercises Selected References EPILOGUE 363 SOLUTIONS TO EXERCISES 370 Index 399