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1 , :,,,, : ;; ;, (: ) D80 A (2009) ,,,1946, ( ),,1961-,, 1986,,, ,, , ,,,, :, :, 2000, [] :,[],:, :, 1995,2537 [], ::, :, 1997, George P. Shultz, W illiam J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn,A World Free of Nuclear W eapons, W all S treet Journal, January 4, 2007, p. A15; George P. Shultz, W illiam J. Perry, HenryA. Kissinger and Sam Nunn,Toward a Nuclear - Free World, W all S treet Journal, January 15, 2008, p. A13. The W hite House, Office of the Press Secretary,Remarks by President Barack Obama, H radcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic, Ap ril 5, 2009, http: / /www. whitehouse. gov/ the_p ress_office /Remarks - By - President - Barack - Obama - In - Prague - A s - Delivered /. 51

2 1995,, (Joseph Rotblat), ( Ivo Daalder) (Jan Lodal) () 1 000,,, ( IISS),,, ( ), :? /???,,,,,,,,, 52 :,,,,,,, : (N ina Tannenwald),,, 2 000;,,, ;, ;, The Henry L. Stim son Center, An Evolving US N uclear Pos2 ture, Report 19, December 1995, http: / /www. stim son. org/pdf/re2 port19. pdf Canberra Comm ission on the Elim ination of Nuclear W eapons, Report of the Canberra Comm ission on the Elim ination of N uclear W eap2 ons, 1996, http: / /www. dfat. gov. au / cc /CCREPORT. PDF. [],:, :, 1995 Ivo Daalder and Jan Lodal,The Logic of Zero: Toward aworld without NuclearW eapons, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 6, George Perkovich and James M. Acton, Abolishing N uclear W eapons, http: / /www. iiss. org/publications/ adelphi - papers/ adelphi - papers /abolishing - nuclear - weapons/. 2007,, Comm ission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, Am erica s S trategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Comm ission on the S trategic Posture of the United S tates, May 5, 2009, p. xii, http: / /www. usip. org/ strategic_posture / final. ht2 m l [], :,,, 2003,233 N ina Tannenwald,The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and Normative Basis of Nuclear Nonuse, International O rganization, Vol. 53, No. 3, 1999, pp ; N ina Tannenwald,Stigmatizing the Bomb: O rigins of the Nuclear Taboo, International Security, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2005, pp

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4 ,?,? (R ichard Price) : ( ),,? :,,, ( ),, () (),,,,,, (WMD),, 1 (Martha Finnemore) ( Kathryn Sikkink) :,,,,, :, ;,?, (1),,, : ( 1) ; (2); (3), :,,,,,,, 1 : :,, ,7184 Resolution of the Comm ission for Conventional A rmaments, August 12, 1948, http: / / avalon. law. yale. edu /20 th _ century/ dec2 ad253. asp#1. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink,International Norm Dynam ics and Political Change, International O rganization, Vol. 52, No. 4, 1998, pp : :,, ,6882 John F. Dulles, Challenge and Response in United States Policy, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 1, 1957, pp

5 ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,() 1996,,,,,,, ( nuclear blackmail) ( nuclear deterrence) (massive retaliation) ( lim ited deter2 rence) (m inimum deterrence), ( existential deterrence),,,,,, ,, ;,,, :, ( ),, :,? [],: :, :, 2008,6263 SherriW asserman, The N eutron B om b Controversy: A S tudy in A lliance Politics, New York: Praeger, B ryan L. Fearey, et al.,an Analysis of Reduced Collateral Damage NuclearWeapons, Com parative S trategy, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2003, pp Robert W. Nelson,NuclearBunker BustersWould More Likely D isperse than Destroy Buried Stockpiles of B iological and Chemical Agents, Science & Global Security, Vol. 12, No. 1-2, 2004, pp Sidney, Drell et al.,a Strategic Choice: New Bunker Busters versus Nonproliferation, A rm s Control Today, Vol. 33, No. 2, 2003, p. 8. :,198200,,,,, U. S. Conference of Catholic B ishop s, The Challenge of Peace: God s Prom ise and O ur Response, W ashington, D. C., May 3, 1983, http: / /www. usccb. org/ sdwp / international/ TheChallengeofPeace. pdf. M ichael N. Schm itt,the International Court of Justice and the U se of Nuclear W eapons, N aval W ar College Review, Vol. 52, No. 2, 1998, pp ;:,

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8 ,,,, 1982,, ( ),,,,,, 19941, ; 9, , ,, ( FAS) (NRDC) FAS NRDC, 20094,,,, ( counterforce),,, ( Sergey Ryabkov),,,,, :,,,,, [ : ] [ : ] [ :],, ,1 Larry M. Wortzel, China s N uclear Forces: Operations, Train2 ing, Doctrine, Comm and, Control and Cam paign Planning, Strategic Studies Institute of the U. S. A rmyw ar College, May 2007, pp < >,, , http: / / swedenem2 bassy. fmp rc. gov. cn /chn /gxh /zlb /zcwj/ t htm Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, Ivan Oelrich, From Counterforce to M inim al D eterrence: A N ew N uclear Policy on the Path to2 ward Elim inating N uclearw eapons, Federation of American Scientists & The Natural Resources Defense Council, Occasional Paper, Ap ril 2009, http: / /www. fas. org/p rogram s/ ssp / nukes/ doctrine / targeting. pdf. Hans Kristensen,Russian Reactions to M inimal Deterrence Study, http: / /www. fas. org/blog/ ssp /2009 /04 / reactions. php. Hans Kristensen,Russian Foreign M inistry Responds to FAS/ NRDC Study, http: / /www. fas. org/blog/ ssp /2009 /04 / russianre2 sponse. php. 58

9 W orld Econom ics and Politics No. 10, 2009 vey data collected by the Chicago Council on GlobalAffairs to exp lore the nature of Americansviews about the rise of China. It turns out that most Americans are well aware of the rise of China. Some are app rehensive about that rise, chiefly for national security ( rather than econom ic) reasons and many favor a degree of off - shorebalan2 cingof the sort that realists recommend. But few Americans want to actively work to lim it the rise of China. Very few favor the use of American troop s to defend Taiwan. Large majorities of Americans take stands more akin to those of neo - liberals than realist theorists, favoring cooperation and peaceful engagement w ith China. Hegem ony, Ba lance of Power and Grand Stra tegy:o ff - Shore Ba lanc ing and Selective Engagem en t W u Zhengyu( 33) In the studies of modern international relations, balance - of - power theory and theory of hegemony have been de2 veloped along two parallel but never overlapped lines, and this can be exclusively attributed to the different nature and basis of hegemony defined by the two theories. In modern history, liberal hegemons generally emp loyed two kinds of m eans to m aintain its leading positions: one is international institutions, and the other is the p reponderance of power. B eing the leading maritime powers, the liberal hegemons have always regarded maintaining the balance of power among major powers in European ( Eurasia) continent as one of the most important ways to uphold its posi2 tions. A s a result, they often faced a hard choice between two modes of grand strategy, namely, off - shore balan2 cing and selective engagement. B ecause the theoretical basis and historical conditions which off - shore balancing depends on is no longer app licable to the post war era, the U. S. has adop ted selective engagement as its grand strategy towards Eurasia, which not only led to the leading position of the U. S. but also accounted for the continui2 ty of the U. S. grand strategy in the post - war period. How to Understand the W orld Nowadays A Com plex System Perspective W ang Fan( 41) The realism of international relations theory identified the ontological reductionism as the mainstream. To some ex2 tent, it led to the simp le, static and linear thoughts on world politics, and the m isunderstanding and vacancy in in2 terp reting the changes in international relations. to enrich the exp lanatory power of the IR theory. The systematic evolution perspective should be used for reference C larifying the relationship between the order and the disorder of the systematic evolution, and holding the evolution s characteristics would p rovide a better understanding of the rel2 ativity, relevance and mutuality, and integrate the whole and the parts, and the certainty and the uncertainty w ithin one analytical framework. It is suggested that systematic and dialectical thinking should be taken when review ing the world and analyzing the new developments in international relations. JustW ar, Nuclear Taboo and Nuclear - W eapon - Free W orld W u R iq iang( 51) Nuclear weapons are considered to be unjust because of their massive destructive capabilities which violate just war p rincip les. This identity results in nuclear taboo. Nuclear taboo can be divided into three levels: use, threat to use, and possess. The p rocess that nuclear taboo gets deepened is the p rocess that leads to a nuclear - weapon - 4

10 No. 10, 2009 W orld Econom ics and Politics free world. A p rocess model of nuclear - weapon - free world is constructed based on just war theory and nuclear taboo. A t p resent, nuclear states should adop t existential deterrence strategy to reduce the role of nuclear weapons for the ultimate realization of a nuclear - weapon - free world. Specific suggestions include: de - alerting nuclear weapons; declaring that the only role of nuclear weapons is to retaliate nuclear attacks; declaring an unconditional no - first - use policy; not targeting nuclear weapons at any country. Puzzles and L esson s from the 2008 F inanc ia l Tsunam i & Effects on S ino - U. S. Jam es C. Hsiung( 59) Rela tion s The Financial Tsunam i unfolding since late 2008 holds some intriguing mysteries and vital lessons for students of in2 ternational relations ( IR) theory, especially in regard to the governance of international finance. The most crucial mystery is why desp ite the p resence of IMF, an institutionallender of last resortdesigned to p revent a dup lica2 tion of the Great Dep ression of the 1930 s, the world was inflicted w ith a disaster that is much more serious. An2 other m ystery was the w idesp read woes of cap ital inadequacy besetting so many banks and financial institutions, as was highlighted by the collap se ofw all Street in October. A ll this called into question the function and role p layed by the B asle regime in banking supervision. The most eye - opening lesson is that the global financial crisis demon2 strated a relationship between China and the United States that can best be ep itom ized by what R ichard Rosecrance calls avulnerability interdependence. China cannot afford to see the U. S. go under, just as the latter needs Chinese help if a meaningful bailout of the world economy is to be meaningful. W hile thismutual interest will p rove to be a durable bond for future Sino - U. S. relations, the author also suggests step s for China to consider taking, such as in offering its own successful state - cap italism experience as a model for other countries to em ulate, and establishing the legitimacy of the Chinese model as an alternative to the W estern laissez faire econom ic system. failure of the laissez faire system to self - correct after straying onto the w rong tracks for so long reveals a need for greater supervision and governm ent intervention in the economy ( and in financial governance), such as is p racticed and illustrated in the Chinese model, if the W est is to recover from its m ishap s. The The Evolutionary L og ic of IO School in In terna tiona l Politica l Econom y L iw e i( 68) The IO School is one of the most influential intellectual communities in International Political Economy. During 1970 s and 1980 s, the birth of the IO School and the initial paradigm atic debates inside the school built a bridge be2 tween international politics and international economy, and enriched the research p rogram of IR studies. Since the m id 1980 s, the paradigm atic debates began ebb, and then shifted into issue - oriented studies, which m arked a new phrase of IPE. Issue - oriented IPE studies gradually broke down the discip linary lines between International and Comparative politics, and evolved into so - called Global Political Econom y through integrating Comparative Political Economy, which bridged the gap between international political econom y and domestic political economy. From International Political Econom y to Global Political Economy, the evolutionary logic of IO School embodies the fact that globalization as a kind of material force drove forward academ ic developments as well as the logic of disci2 p linary integration and specialization. 5