Heterodox Currents in China s Cultural Revolution: A Case Study of Guangzhou

Transcription

1 Heterodox Currents in China s Cultural Revolution: A Case Study of Guangzhou by Heng Ge A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Department of East Asian Studies University of Toronto Copyright by Heng Ge 2012

2 Heterodox Currents in China s Cultural Revolution: A Case Study of Guangzhou Abstract Heng Ge Master of Arts Department of East Asian Studies University of Toronto 2012 This thesis aims to explore heterodox ideological currents that developed in the Cultural Revolution, focusing on the background and writings of the August 5 activists and the Li Yizhe group in Guangzhou. While the Cultural Revolution produced catastrophic consequences in many regards, this thesis intends to show that there are still ways in which young participants exercised their independent thinking and developed novel political ideas that significantly diverged from the official ideology. Beginning with an overview of the development of the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou, I study the analyses of the August 5 activists and the Li Yizhe group as well as examine how their heterodox views about China s social and political system were inspired by their participation in the movement. ii

3 Table of Contents Introduction...1 The Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou...4 Emergence of Heterodox Voices The August 5 Theory...11 The Foshan Conference...12 Voices from the Opposition...14 Stillness before a Fierce Combat...16 Guangzhou Must Undergo More Turmoil...20 The End: Suppression and Demobilization...23 Socialism, Democracy, and Legality The Li Yizhe Manifesto...26 The Group and Its Members...28 The Manifesto...31 The Fate of the Li Yizhe Group...43 Conclusion...47 Bibliography...50 iii

4 1 Introduction In 1981, fifteen years after the eruption of the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership officially declared this period to be a catastrophe, one that had led the nation to chaos. The Red Guard rebels, once enthusiastically devoted to the movement, were now described as the lost generation. These young rebels had been called to attack, criticize, and struggle, in the name of proletarian revolution, against the party s élites and institutions. As described by Anita Chan in her book Children of Mao, they were the political activists who sincerely believed that China could be made into a prosperous and politically pure society through widespread commitment on the part of the masses. 1 But after less than three years of tumult, many of the young rebels already had become disillusioned with the power struggles among the élites and turned politically inactive. There were, however, a number of Chinese youth who persisted with their critical attack of the party leaders and political system, and they held firm in their belief that the battle was worth fighting. The Cultural Revolution, to which these activists were devoted, vastly broadened their intellectual and political horizons, teaching them that dissent is possible. Although couched in language burdened by the cult of Mao, their writings were often thought-provoking and moved beyond the official ideology of the CCP. A common characteristic among authors of these heterodox writings is that they were often veteran rebels who had been activists in the Cultural Revolution. They were 1 Anita Chan, Children of Mao: Personality Development and Political Activism in the Red Guard Generation (London: Macmillan, 1985), 6.

5 2 among those who most enthusiastically responded to Mao s call to rebel against authority and who were suppressed severely by the Party authorities during the subsequent factional struggle and demobilization campaigns. In , for example, rebel groups such as the Shengwulian in Hunan, the Bei, Jue, Yang in Wuhan, the Anti-Restoration Society in Shanghai, and the Bohai Battle Regiment in Shandong all produced critical analyses of China s political system and suffered similar fate. These groups and their writings were regarded as heterodox by many of their contemporaries and often were labeled reactionary by the Party authorities. As elsewhere in China, some young rebels in Guangzhou attempted to exercise their independent thinking, and they developed novel interpretations of the meaning of the Cultural Revolution and in ways that significantly diverged from the official ideology. The so-called August 5 Theory (ba wu lilun) and On Socialist Democracy and the Legal System the big-character poster produced by the Li Yizhe group in 1974, were among the heterodox currents of thought which emerged in the city. This paper will examine their writings as they derived from the development of the Cultural Revolution. I intend to show that even though many consequences of the Cultural Revolution could with good reason be characterized as catastrophic, there are still ways in which young participants exercised their individual thinking and developed independent political and social analyses. In the first section, I will describe the development of the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou, and in particular, the rebels participation in and response to the movement. The second section will introduce the background of the August 5 Theory and examine the writings of August 5 activists. While focusing on two representative works of the

6 3 episode, Stillness before a Fierce Combat and Guangzhou Must Undergo More Turmoil, in this section I try to show how the August 5 Theory was developed and to explain why it was both heterodox and at the same time also significant to the main current of Guangzhou s rebel movement. Then, in the third section, and in discussions of the Li Yizhe s On Socialist Democracy and the Legal System, I will try to sketch out the distinctive features of their writings and to evaluate their perspectives. The section will center on the activities of key members of the Li Yizhe group and on the development of their manifesto. I will examine the exposition of the writers political analyses as well as their demand for democracy and legality. In doing so, I hope to provide a better understanding of the political and ideological differentiations that emerged in the Cultural Revolution.

7 4 The Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou The students involvement in the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou started in August 1966, as Mao received tens of thousands Red Guards at Tiananmen Square. Inspired by the movement in Beijing, Guangzhou s students began to form their own Red Guard organizations. When the students from Beijing on exchange of experience missions (chuanlian) arrived in Guangzhou, the local students were encouraged and began to leave the city to network with the Red Guards in other provinces. The chuanlian movement broke regional boundaries, and reinforced the communication and mutual understandings among people from different areas. A far-reaching implication was that the experience allowed young students to obtain a better understanding about the characteristics of the CCP, and provoked doubts that would later undermine their faith in the Chinese Communist regime. 2 From this moment and onward, instead of an activism performed under institutional pressures, political participation now was left to one s own choice. This shift, according to Anita Chan, was accompanied by changes in the young people s conception of themselves, of the party and, later, even of Mao. 3 By October 1966, students from different backgrounds took the opportunity to join or establish their own Red Guard organizations. The groups were of different sizes, ranging from as small as a couple of members to large groups consisting of thousand of members. Many student leaders sought to strengthen their organization by expanding and 2 Hai Feng, Guangzhou Diqu Wenge Licheng Shulüe [An Account of the Cultural Revolution in the Canton Area] (Xianggang: Youlian Yanjiusuo, 1971), Chan, Children of Mao, 125.

8 5 consolidating internally and externally, eventually forming inter-school coalitions. 4 The most active organizations included: Zhongshan University August 31, South China Engineering Institute Red Flag, Zhongshan University Red Flag, and Guangzhou Medical College Red Flag. 5 These organizations were to become the core of the Red Flag faction, a rebel coalition that would be formed later in Guangzhou. As the Guangzhou s movement proceeded, conflicts among rebel and conservative groups started to emerge. The first major incident in the development of factionalism was the closure of the Red Guard News (hongwei bao), formerly known as Yangcheng wanbao. The debates and conflicts over whether or not the newspaper should be closed down were the beginning of the growing factional division in Guangzhou s Red Guard movement. 6 The incident took place on December 13, 1966 attended by twentyfour rebel organizations from Guangzhou and other regions such as Beijing, Harbin, Hunan, and Hubei provinces. Opponents of the action clashed with the rebels. In the violent conflicts between the rebels and the supporters of the newspaper, the incipient factional alignment that would dominate Guangzhou s Cultural Revolution movement was born. Opponents of the closure organized into two large workers organizations, the Red General Headquarters (hong zong) and the District General Headquarters (di zong), joining the conservative alliance. 4 Stanley Rosen, Red Guard Factionalism and the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou (Canton) (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), Hai Feng, Guangzhou Diqu Wenge Licheng Shulüe, Ibid.,

9 6 With the power seizure in January 1967, the splits of Guangzhou s mass movement worsened, especially with the division within the rebel groups. On January 22, eight local and nine outside organizations participated in the power seizure and together they formed the Guangdong Provincial Revolutionary Alliance or Shenggelian. While the conservative organizations made no move to prevent its implementation, the power seizure, however, encountered oppositions from other rebel organizations which believed that the time was premature. With the involvement of the local military, the rebels who initiated the power seizure soon came under pressures. After a series of power seizures by the Shenggelian, the conservatives staged a counter attack supported by the People s Liberation Army (PLA). 7 On February 8, 1967, the Shenggelian organizations raided the Guangzhou Military Region (GMR) with the cooperation of the rebels inside the PLA. The incident, which opened the conflicts between the rebels and the military, was a significant turning point. It provided Huang Yongsheng, the commander of the GMR, the opportunity to abandon his public neutrality and start taking actions against the rebels. 8 At the same time, the conservative organizations obtained support from the military and shifted their allegiance from the provincial and municipal Party Committees to the PLA. In the following month, the military in Guangzhou started cracking down on the rebels. On March 1, the GMR banned the August 1 Combat Corps (bayi zhandou bingtuan), a rebel organization consisted of disgruntled veterans and workers, accusing it 7 Hai Feng, Guangzhou Diqu Wenge Licheng Shulüe, Rosen, Red Guard Factionalism, 133.

10 7 of being a reactionary organization. The military also banned several other important rebel organizations such as Pearl River Film Studio East is Red as well as many small organizations under the Shenggelian. Thousands were arrested. Although Shenggelian s student organizations including Zhongshan University Red Flag and Zhongshan University August 31 were not banned, they were forced to stop staging public activities. This period was condemned by the rebels as the March Black Wind. While Shenggelian rebels withdrew from their dissolved units, the conservative organizations accelerated their expansion with the support of the military. These organizations, which owed the strength to their ties with the PLA, raised the slogan March s east wind blows with mighty power; the military control achieves glorious victories (sanyue dongfeng haodang, junguan chengji huihuang) and named themselves East Wind faction. They became the major forces later in the armed conflicts and the suppressions of the rebels with the support of the local military. The events in April brought about a sharp turn in the fortunes of the rebels when the central leadership in Beijing provided its support. On April 6, the Central Military Affairs Commission issued a ten-point directive that severely limited the power of the PLA in its dealings with Red Guard organizations. 9 The most visible support the rebels received at this time came from Zhou Enlai s visit to Guangzhou in mid-april. During his short stay, Zhou received several times the representatives from the Red Guard organizations. He declared that Zhongshan University Red Flag, South China 9 Zhongyang junwei shitiao mingling [Central Military Affairs Commission 10 Point Directive], April 6, 1967, collected in Song Yongyi, Wenhua Dageming Wenku [The Chinese Cultural Revolution Database], (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006).

11 8 Engineering Institute Red Flag, and Guangzhou Medical Institute Red Flag were all leftist organizations and praised them as the Three Red Flags (sanmian hongqi). Since then, the rebels named themselves Red Flag faction or Flag faction. 10 During the same meetings, Zhou pointed out the Red General Headquarters and the District General Headquarters, two leading East Wind faction organizations, leaned towards conservatism. Encouraged by Zhou s speeches, on April 22, the Red Rebel Headquarters (hongsi zaofan silingbu), also called Red Headquarters (hongsi), were set up under the leadership of Zhongshan University Red Flag. Even though the local military retreated, it nevertheless still exerted influence. A series of notices were issued by the Guangzhou s PLA against the Flag faction. The most important of these was issued on May 30, and hinted broadly that the responsibility for the current confusion in the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou was due to actions of some organizations affiliated with the Flag faction. 11 As a result, the Flag faction became more and more openly opposed to the GMR and to its leader, Huang Yongsheng. The tensions between the rebels and the PLA-supported conservatives finally led to violent confrontations. On April 22, Guangzhou s Doctrine Guards (zhuyi bing), a conservative organization led largely by children of high-level cadre and military background, stirred up the first violent conflict, opening the prelude for the armed struggle between two 10 Liu Guokai, Guangzhou Hongqipai de Xingwang [The Rise and Fall of the Guangzhou Red Flag Faction] (Xianggang: Boda Chubanshe, 2006), Rosen, Red Guard Factionalism, 202.

12 9 factions for the following months. 12 In August, the month that the violence reached its highest peak, the city of Guangzhou was almost at a scene of civil war. 13 The violent clashes in Guangzhou caught the attention of the Party leaders in Beijing. In mid-august 1967, Zhou Enlai received Flag faction representatives in Beijing and reviewed various Guangzhou s issues with them. These meetings, under Zhou s direction, opened a series of meetings known as the Beijing Peace Talks. The talks began in late August and lasted until mid-november and involved representatives from both the Red Flag and the East Wind factions. At first, Zhou not only supported the positions espoused by the Flag faction organizations but also made it clear that they were the key to the success of the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou. 14 The task of maintaining public order and safety was to be placed in large part in the hands of the rebels. At the same time, the local military was under pressure to issue a written selfcriticism which admitted its mistakes in denouncing the Shenggelian. Starting in October, however, the development of Cultural Revolution took a different turn and support to the rebels waned. Nationwide, the emphasis was on unity. Although it was Mao who inspired the Chinese people to rebel against authority, by this time he was anxious to put an end to the nationwide civil war through forging great 12 Hai Feng, Guangzhou Diqu Wenge Licheng Shulüe, Ibid., Rosen, Red Guard Factionalism, 207.

13 10 alliances by all mass organizations and establish a new order in China. 15 The revolutionary committees, essentially a traditional CCP-style bureaucracy, were established throughout provinces in response to Mao s call to forge great alliances. 16 As the national direction changed, the support from the Central Committee that Guangzhou s rebels received soon faded. The focus at the moment was to restore order and establish the alliance between Guangzhou s two factions under the leadership of revolutionary committees. 15 Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao s Last Revolution (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), Ibid.,

14 11 Emergence of Heterodox Voices The August 5 Theory It is against this background that the August 5 activists developed ideas which diverged from the guidelines that the authorities were promoting. The changing policies in Guangzhou compelled the young participants to think through issues on their own and to come up with their own standpoints. From the military s self-criticism to the alliance with the PLA-supported East Wind faction, some Flag faction members began to question the policies issued by the CCP Central Committee. Their distrust of political leaders, developed through more than a year of participation in the tumultuous mass movement, taught them how to deal with the situation with caution. Based on the new direction of the Cultural Revolution set by the central leadership, the Preparatory Provincial Revolutionary Committee of Guangdong led by General Huang Yongsheng was established on November 12, The Flag faction leaders dutifully shifted their focus to accommodate the moderate policies being pursued by the Beijing leadership. The emphasis on unity, however, caused concerns and confusion within the Flag faction. Many Flag faction members cast doubts on the military. A significant number of the rebels questioned both the central leadership and their own leaders in Guangzhou. As the politics of moderation continued throughout autumn and winter, these Flag faction members, in effect the radical rebels in the Cultural Revolution, began to take the initial steps toward formulating a heterodox 17 Guanyu Guangdong wenti de jueding [The Decision s on Guangdong s Issues], November 12, 1967, collected in Hai Feng, Guangzhou Diqu Wenge Licheng Shulüe, 1971,

15 12 analysis of Chinese society, arriving at an explanation of the successes and failures of the Cultural Revolution to date that was far removed from official accounts. 18 The Foshan Conference In order to ease the doubts and unify the Flag faction, a conference was held in the city of Foshan attended by most of its major units. The meeting, held from December 12 to December 19, was called to sum up the situation as the Flag faction leaders viewed it by that time, and to arrive at a unified policy for the future. The main points of the conference were the self-criticism of the previous attitudes towards the PLA and advocacy of the alliance with the East Wind faction. The Flag leaders expressed their support for Huang Yongsheng as well as the newly established Provincial Revolutionary Preparatory Small Group. The meeting issued a statement entitled Minutes of the Foshan Conference, claiming that the general situation has already become fixed and power has been grasped (daju yiding, daquan zaiwo) as well as reaffirming Flag faction s support for the policy of consolidation. 19 Rather than developing a unified policy for the Flag faction, however, the Foshan meeting only worsened the split within the group. The Minutes of the Foshan Conference immediately suffered resistance and accusations. The conference was severely denounced through big-character posters put forward by the groups which charged that the conference completely denied the two line struggles and blamed all the 18 Rosen, Red Guard Factionalism, Hai Feng, Guangzhou Diqu Wenge Licheng Shulüe, 324.

16 13 responsibilities to factionalism. 20 In place of the slogan the general situation has already become fixed and power has been grasped, they substituted the general situation is still undecided and power is still in dispute (daju weiding, daquan zaizheng). 21 The theme of unity was echoed in a speech by Huang Yongsheng, the head of the Preparatory Provincial Revolutionary Committee. On December 12, the committee held a meeting at Zhongshan Memorial Hall attended by the representatives from both the conservative and rebel factions. At the meeting, Huang delivered an important speech in which he stated: Some organizations and some people have a debate of principle on the question of who should be the core of the alliance.... It is incorrect to appoint any of our organizations to be the core.... [It is] necessary to eagerly and patiently help those comrades who had been influenced by ultra-left ideas. Recently, the atmosphere in Guangzhou has become tense and factionalism is serious. Some people do not act according to Chairman Mao s instructions and yet they accuse other organizations of being Right and conservative and hinder them by all possible means. 22 In his speech, Huang pointed out that the most important thing at the moment was to end armed conflicts and obtain unity. He also urged the return of all those still in Guangzhou on chuanlian missions to their own provinces. In particular, he singled out Xiang River 20 Hai Feng, Guangzhou Diqu Wenge Licheng Shulüe, p Ibid., p Huang Yongsheng tongzhi dui Guangzhou ge geming qunzhong zuzhi fuzeren de jianghua (zhaiyao) [Comrade Huang Yongsheng s Speech to Responsible Persons of Revolutionary Mass Organizations of Guangzhou (Excerpt)], December 12, 1967, collected in Hai Feng, Guangzhou Diqu Wenge Licheng Shulüe, English translation is quoted in Survey of China Mainland Press, #4098, January 12, 1968, p. 5-6.

17 14 Storm (xiang jiang feng lei) from Hunan province. Composed largely of dissatisfied students, white-collar personnel, and workers, the organization spawned the development of Shengwulian, which would become nationally famous through the writings of Yang Xiguang as the best-known ultra-left groups in China. 23 Voices from the Opposition The Foshan conference and Huang s speech were immediately criticized by some of the rebels. Slogans such as Huang Yongsheng s report aimed at breaking up the rebels and was a huge poisonous weed were posted all over Guangzhou s streets. The oppositions reflected the conflict between the Flag s militant and moderate wings. The widely adopted reformism (gailiang zhuyi) within the Flag faction generated a force of resistance from the ultra-left members who advocated the theory of a thorough revolution (chedi geming). 24 One of the most influential radical groups was the August 5 Commune (ba wu gongshe). The group published a newspaper named August 5. Along with Red Guard publications such as August 1 Combat Bulletin, Commentary on the Cultural Revolution, and October Torchlight, the writings from these ultra-left groups were often called August 5 Theory. The August 5 activists began their discussions on the current political situations soon after the Preparatory Provincial Revolutionary Committee was established. First, the August 5 activists began to question the optimistic views promulgated within the Red 23 For more details about Xiang River Storm please reference Unger, Whither China, Hai Feng, Guangzhou Diqu Wenge Licheng Shulüe, 329.

18 15 Flag faction. On the crucial issue of power, they argued that the great alliance did not guarantee that the power was in the hands of the rebels: Some of the heads said that the power is now in our hand and the founding of the Guangdong Provincial Preparatory Group for the Revolutionary Committee has announced the complete collapse of the black headquarters of Tao and Zhao and announced that the proletarian headquarters has held firmly the political power in Guangdong. First of all, let us see whether or not the power is in our hand! The Provincial Preparatory Group is trusted by the Central Committee, and of that there should be no doubt. However, it is still a preparatory group. What is there to prepare? To prepare two responsible teams, is it enough to rely on only two responsible comrades of the Central-South Bureau and five from the military region? Exceedingly few of the provincial and municipal leading cadres have been outstanding, and none of the principal leaders character can be confirmed! Furthermore, power cannot be an empty framework. It should include the power of all districts and units at the basic levels and all the departments. This power should be seized from the bottom up. It is impossible for the Provincial Preparatory Group to give power to them one by one from the top down. Is power now entirely in the hands of proletarian revolutionaries in all units? You may count the great number of factories from the People s Brigade onward. Can you point out any one of them holding power in it hand?! 25 The Red Headquarters Call-to-Arms Combat Group (hong si nahan) led by Li Zhengtian, a leading member of the later Li Yizhe group, was one of these organizations that also advocated the attacks on this optimist view. In the article Ten Differences Criticism of the Current Reformism in Guangzhou, the group asserted, the belief that we hold the power is the opium that poisons our fighting spirit; we must criticize it. The article also pointed out that some Flag faction leaders betrayed the revolutionary principles for their immediate interests Sansi zhanbao [Bulletin of The Third Headquarters], Issue 38, August 24, 1967, quoted in Rosen, Red Guard Factionalism, Liu Guokai, Guangzhou Hongqipai de Xingwang, 161.

19 16 The August 5 activists turned harsh criticism against the Minutes of the Foshan Conference and Huang Yongsheng s speech. They pointed out that with the rising power of the conservatives, the so-called level off mountain strongholds (chanping shantou) and unconditional great alliance (wu tiaojian dalianhe) was, in fact, a counterattack used by the conservatives through a seemingly peaceful method against the rebels. They warned that suppression and bribery were the new strategies adopted by the conservatives. In addition to criticism on political issues, the August 5 activists also addressed social problems. Some activists attempted to re-define class in ways based on the traditional Marxist concept of ownership. They proclaimed, We should re-divide the class at this moment! They believed that current contradictions were between those who had climbed up to the throne of power and those rusticated youth, contract workers and temporary workers who lived under the worst social conditions and suffered the most. 27 Two of the most representative works among these critics were Yu Hong s Stillness before A Fierce Battle and an anonymous article Guangzhou Must Undergo More Turmoil. Both articles warned that the rebels who advocated the great alliance were being too optimistic, and urged the rebels to continue to fight for themselves. Stillness Before A Fierce Combat In February 1968, August 5 published its most representative article entitled Stillness before a Fierce Combat A Comment on Problems Concerning Guangzhou s 27 Hai Feng, Guangzhou Diqu Wenge Licheng Shulüe, ; Liu, Guangzhou Hongqipai de Xingwang, 160.

20 17 Current Political Situation. The article urged the rebels who embraced optimistic views for the great alliance to abandon their over-confidence and to analyze the situation with caution. The author was Yu Hong, a student at Guangzhou Labour University. Also known by his birth name Deng Yanrong, Yu Hong was born to a black five categories family. 28 Despite the excellence in high school study, upon graduation he was assigned to Guangzhou Labour University, a school held in relative low reputation in the region. From June 1966 to March 1967, Yu Hong participated in the closure of Guangzhou Red Guard News, the power seizure as well as other political events, and had earned his reputation as a rebel leader due to his political vision and organizational capability. In April 1967, Yu Hong and some like-minded activists founded the first Marxism Leninism Study Group in Guangdong. 29 During the group s first meeting, Yu Hong pointed out the importance and urgency to establish a party based on the principles of a genuine Marxism-Leninism. The fruit of the meeting was a programmatic document entitled The Manifesto of the Marxism-Leninism Group. Unlike most of their contemporaries, whose accusations of the Party leaders saw a strong influence of Maoism, the authors of the Manifesto not only challenged the leadership of the CCP but reportedly also questioned the authority of Mao. 30 In the introduction, they pointed out 28 The following account is drawn from Zuo Shiyi, Hongweibing yundong zhong yige bei yiwang de ren he shi: Yu Hong yu Guangdong diyige ma lie zhuyi xiaozu [A Forgotten Man and His Stories during the Red Guard Movement: Yu Hong and The First Marxism-Leninism Group in Guangdong], Guancha Jia [The Observer] 18 (April 1979): Black five categories refers to landlords, rich farmers, counterrevolutionaries, bad elements, and rightists. 29 Zuo Shiyi, Yige bei yiwang de ren he shi, Ibid., 50.

21 18 that the CCP could not be counted as a proletarian political party either in terms of its structure or what it had done to the people. The CCP had implemented the feudal oneparty dictatorship from the very beginning, forming a massive bureaucracy to suppress the demand for democracy. The leader in the throne of this massive bureaucracy was Mao who, like an emperor, held the power of final judgment. They also suggested that in order to achieve proletarian democracy and socialism, it must undergo political revolutions to overthrow the rule of the fascistic-feudalistic party of the CCP. They divided the path to takeover the rule of the CCP into three stages: the first stage was the ongoing Cultural Revolution that weakened the rule of the bureaucratic class, forcing the privileged to make concessions to the people; the second stage should further weaken the bureaucratic class and defeat its leadership; the third stage should overthrow the bureaucratic class and establish a new society. The document was only circulated within the very small group, and this perhaps saved Yu Hong from political troubles. In later May, Yu Hong and other two group members went secretly on a chuanlian mission in Hunan to meet with the group founded by Yang Xiguang, later a key member of the Shengwulian and a renowned author due to his article Whither China? After coming back from Hunan, Yu Hong established several organizations, among them, the August 5 Commune became the most militant Red Guard organization in Guangzhou. In late January 1968, Hunan s Shengwulian group was denounced by the leaders of the CCP as a counter-revolutionary organization because it advocated the complete eradication of the privileged stratum and the state apparatus. It was labeled as ultra-left, and deemed dangerous. Its members were arrested and the theories articulated in article

22 19 such as Whither China? were denounced. In spite of foreseeing dangers, on February 14, Yu Hong republished Whither China? on the first page of the August 5 without a word of denunciation. In order to invite discussions, he also published the criticism of the Shengwulian by Kang Sheng, a top party leader, as well as republished another article Warning for Guangdong s Shengwulian From the Fall of Hunan s Shengwulian by Jin Hou, a Red Flag member. Yu Hong soon published an article Stillness before a Fierce Combat, challenging the optimistic views reflected in the Foshan conference towards the future of the Red Flag faction. Yu Hong depicted the dangers that the rebels were facing. As he claimed, In such an intense volume of the sounds from gongs and drums, it is not difficult to sense, on both sides of the Pearl River, an atmosphere of political silence prevailed before a surge of fierce fighting. 31 The author warned of the dangers to forge the alliance with the conservatives and the military and reminded that the enemy was applying a strategy of bribery and repression to deal with the rebels. Further, Yu Hong argued that charges such as damaging great alliance, disrupting the Chairman s strategic plan, adverse current, ultra-leftist, and Guangdong s Shengwulian intimidated many rebels. The number of bystanders or wanderers (xiaoyao pai), who were deterred by these charges, increased sharply, and people became politically apathetic. The rebels current situation was that the revolution was not yet successful but the fighting spirit had already fallen apart. He warned: An invisible political pressure has taken away the rebels right to fight against the reactionary line. The rebels are on the 31 Zuo Shiyi, Yige bei yiwang de ren he shi, 52.

23 20 way of losing their power, and they are on the verge of political and organizational collapse. 32 If we don t fight back because we are afraid of being labeled as ultraleftists, Yu Hong warned again, the rebels, in the end, will have to pay the price and will be thrown into jail as ultra-leftists. 33 Yu Hong s warning, however, was not accepted by most of his comrades from the Flag faction, and his article was denounced as pessimism. Guangzhou Must Undergo More Turmoil Guangzhou Must Undergo More Turmoil Where Guangzhou s Movement Is Going, an anonymous article appearing in the August 1 Combat Bulletin in January 1968, was another representative work that echoed the ideas of the August 5 activists. The author was rumored to be Wu Youheng, a writer and former municipal official who had been denounced as a rightist in the late 1950s. The article discussed many important issues. The author reminded the rebels, many of whom were hoping to attain a united leadership through the great alliance, that the time for this was still premature. The article advocated the continuation of the kind of turmoil that prevailed in Guangzhou during January Power Seizure in early 1967, and called for the expansion of mass mobilization. The author pointed out that the turmoil fomented in the past was not 32 Hai Feng, Guangzhou Diqu Wenge Licheng Shulüe, 331; Zuo Shiyi, Yige bei yiwang de ren he shi, Zuo Shiyi, Yige bei yiwang de ren he shi, 52.

24 21 enough, as the conservatives were still quite strong. 34 In many work units, the power that was once seized by the rebels was recaptured by the conservatives during the March Black Wind. He thus stated, The actual situation which prevails at present is that the rebels are not holding any power at all... [and] to alter this situation it is necessary to foment as much chaos as possible. 35 The turmoil or chaos that the article advocated referred to an earlier period, a time when the rebels were under much less restraints in their political activities: At the time the rebels were exuberant while the sworn partners of Tao and Zhao and the capitalist roaders were so panic-stricken that their entire front was on the verge of virtual collapse. At the time people debated in the street as to who was revolutionary and who was conservative, work units competed with one another in the seizure of power, the masses were never so conscious as they were then while the situation progressed at an accelerated pace. 36 To foster such chaos, the author claimed, it would be necessary to mobilize the wider public, particularly the vast numbers of workers and cadres, and to continue or expand the mass movement. 37 All revolutionary organizations should promote mass criticism and repudiation, mass debates, the great alliance and extensive democracy. And, the general populace should be consulted as much as possible. 34 Guangzhou haixu daluan Guangzhou xiang hechu qu? [Guangzhou Must Undergo More Turmoil Where Guangzhou s Movement Is Going], Bayi Zhanbao [August 1 Combat Bulletin] 4 (January 1968), Translation is quoted in Survey of China Mainland Press, # 4121, February 19, 1968: Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., 9-10.

25 22 The article targeted those individuals within the rebel organizations who were willing to capitulate to the pressure from above, as they were afraid of being accused of opposing the great alliance and harboring factionalism. The author believed it was their action that resulted in widespread disillusionment, in the paralysis of organizations, in internal rifts and in the weakening of the fighting power, letting slip opportunities to expand organizations and step up activities. 38 The great alliance in its present form, from the author s point of view, was, in the main, an alliance in name only. As a matter of fact, the present alliance between the two factions was far from playing the part of unified leadership but was merely a union for consultative and liaison purposes. The key to achieving the role of unified leadership was that the rebel organizations win superiority. As the author pointed out:... the final victory of the great cultural revolution movement shall be determined by the relative strength between the revolutionary forces and the conservative forces. In other words, it will be determined by the expansion and growth of the mass organizations comprising the revolutionary rebels and the weakening and disintegration of the conservative forces. This is an extremely important factor which by no means should be overlooked. 39 The author s call for the continuation of the turmoil and the expansion of mass mobilization deviated from the policies of consolidation and moderation that the Beijing leadership was implementing. Although the author foresaw the dangers of a premature alliance and offered suggestions, his ideas, by this time, were impossible to realize. 38 Guangzhou haixu daluan, Ibid., 11.

26 23 The End: Suppression and Demobilization The August 5 Theory caused serious concerns not only for the Preparatory Provincial Revolutionary Committee and the East Wind faction, but also for many leaders from the Flag faction. From January to March 1968, with the nationwide attack on factionalism and the denunciation of Hunan s Shengwulian, many of both the East Wind and the Red Flag factions attacked the August 5 Theory, including Zhongshan University Red Flag, once one of the most militant Flag organizations. Although the August 5 Theory encountered pervasive opposition, it proved to be influential with the further development of the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou. After the Provincial and Municipal Revolutionary Committees were established, the Flag faction lost its once superior position, and its fate was now in the hands of the PLA. The dangers warned of earlier by the August 5 activists had been proved true. The Flag leaders who had laid their hope in the alliance were taught a lesson. In the spring months of 1968, various units in the Flag faction confronted the military. 40 Some members even put forward a so-called Theory of the Second Revolution (erci geming lun), which was in all likelihood influenced by the August 5 Theory, emphasizing that the Cultural Revolution was not yet completed and must be carried out to the end. As the August 5 activists and their supporters had warned, the military, which held the real power in the revolutionary committees, began to prepare for the suppression of the Flag faction organizations. 41 Spearheaded by the military and aided by its ally the 40 Hai Feng, Guangzhou Diqu Wenge Licheng Shulüe, Ibid., 356.

27 24 East Wind Faction, the attack was launched in March 1968, in parallel with the nationwide campaigns against ultra-leftism and factionalism. The increasing pressure drew the rebels closer together. In late June, the Flag faction held a meeting attended by many of its leaders. The participants concluded that the Flag faction must break away from its past blind optimism and resolutely fight against the suppression. 42 However, the meeting could not save the Flag faction from defeat. In the following month, the military in Guangzhou hit hard at the rebels. In early July, the Provincial and Municipal Revolutionary Committees called for an end to all armed confrontations, and demanded all participants to return to their original work units and schools. Ending support for the rebel groups, they also called for absolute support for the PLA and the officially sponsored worker militia. 43 In mid-july, the Guangzhou Military Region took action against the Flag faction and seized control of several of its important bases. The worker militia and police forces, both under the control of the conservative East Wind faction, were deployed. Mass arrests were made against members of the Flag faction, essentially ending the mass-mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou. The crackdown of the Flag Faction in Guangzhou was parallel to the suppression of rebels nationwide, which already had become an unmistakable trend. In July, the CCP Central Committee, State Council, and Central Military Commission, and Central Cultural Revolution Group repeatedly issued directives 42 Liu Guokai, Guangzhou Hongqipai de Xingwang, Rosen, Red Guard Factionalism, 242.

28 25 prohibiting armed conflicts and permitting the use of lethal force against the rebels. 44 This was brought home most forcefully to Guangzhou s Flag faction by the mass exodus from the neighboring province of Guangxi, where the local rebels were brutally suppressed by the PLA and militia forces and tens of thousands were killed. 45 The suppression continued throughout the summer of Even though members of the Flag faction continued holding meetings and discussing strategies, little success was achieved. By the end of July, the demobilization of the Red Guard movement accelerated nationwide. In Guangzhou, many rebel leaders were arrested, and denounced as bad heads (huai toutou) at massive rallies. By late August, the Flag faction had been largely dismantled. 46 While some of the unyielding elements continued to battle, by the early fall, it was all but over. 44 Zhonggong zhongyang, guowuyuan, zhongyang junwei, zhongyang wenge bugao [Public Announcement of the CCP CC, the SC, the CMC, and the CCRG], July 3 and July 24, 1968, in Song Yongyi, Wenhua Dageming Wenku. 45 Hai Feng, Guangzhou Diqu Wenge Licheng Shulüe, 384; Rosen, Red Guard Factionalism, Rosen, Red Guard Factionalism, 243.

29 26 Socialism, Democracy, and Legality The Li Yizhe Manifesto Throughout 1968, much of the Cultural Revolution revolved around the Beijing leadership s attempts to overcome indiscipline and factional divisions within the mass movement. The rebuilding of party and state organizations from the wreckage of the political upheaval required taming the fragmented and often-violent mass movement. The demobilization and suppression of the mass movement, however, frustrated and antagonized many of the rebel activists who once enthusiastically had responded to Mao s call for rebellion. While a small number attempted to keep going, many dropped out of a political movement of which they had grown increasingly weary. In the process of restoring stability, new power structures were formed, both in Guangzhou and nationwide. The Cultural Revolution came to an anticlimactic close when the CCP s Ninth National Congress officially concluded the upheaval in the spring of 1969, and a restructured party was restored to its dominant position. With the effective termination of the Cultural Revolution s mass movement, the political space in which independent Red Guard organizations once flourished no longer existed. However, while the Cultural Revolution brought no profound changes in China s political system, it did inspire important changes in popular political consciousness and expression. The Cultural Revolution bred intellectual and political activism among China s young generation, youth whose lives were decisively shaped by their experiences during the upheaval. Throughout much of the 1970s, some of the critical currents that first emerged in the Cultural Revolution survived the demobilization and suppression, and serious political discussions continued in various underground spaces, drawing many

30 27 disenchanted former Red Guards and other disenfranchised youth. 47 While many withdrew from political activism, others were disillusioned not with politics per se. Despite the highly repressive political environment, heterodox ideas continued to be pursued. The Cultural Revolution idea of mass democracy was a critical influence on many young people. Such ideas, wrote the former rebel activist Liu Guokai in a manuscript he secretly penned in 1971, were like a heavy bombshell in the field of ideology... [that] struck a responsive chord in the hearts of many people. Although such ideas made only a brief appearance, Liu observed, the ideas were spread far and wide. Many people hid copies of writings reflecting such ideas and passed them around among those they trusted, holding lively discussions. The big suppression of 1968 infuriated many people and caused them to change their outlook.... They lost interest in factional struggles and turned their attention to the bigger issues of the existing system. 48 Popular political skepticism and discontent culminated after the Lin Biao Incident in the fall of On September 13, 1971, Lin Biao, once Mao s officially designated heir and closest comrade-in-arms, died in an airplane crash while trying to escape to the Soviet Union. The affair shocked tens of millions in China. As Wang Xizhe described in his autobiography, this event s impact on the Chinese people, whether we describe it 47 For a rich study of underground intellectual and literary activities during the Cultural Revolution, see Yang Jian, Zhongguo Zhiqing Wenxueshi [A Literary History of the Rusticated Youth] (Beijing: Zhongguo Gongren Chubanshe, 2002), Chapters Liu Guokai, A Brief Analysis of the Cultural Revolution, trans. Anita Chan (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1987), For Liu s recollection of his experience during the Cultural Revolution, see Liu Guokai, Jiceng Wenge Nining Lu [The Muddy Path of the Cultural Revolution from Below] (New York: Boda Chubanshe, 2006).

31 28 as sky falling or land subsidence, can only express one thousandth of it. 49 Many who once fervently and earnestly threw themselves into the Cultural Revolution to follow Mao and Lin suddenly felt disenchanted or awakened. The Lin Biao incident brought an increasing number of Chinese youth to develop a strong mistrust of official politics and to analyze for themselves the social and political problems surrounding them. It was under such a circumstance that the article On Socialist Democracy and the Legal System, produced by a small group of young activists under the pseudonym of Li Yizhe, appeared in late For the first time in six years, wall posters appeared once again in Guangzhou s streets. Developed in the article was a proposal for widening democracy among the Chinese people and institutionalizing the rule of law. Appropriating the official rhetoric from the Party s campaign against Lin Biao, members of the Li Yizhe group continued to explore the critical themes that first emerged during the Cultural Revolution upheaval, developing a scathing critique of China s state-socialist system in the name of criticizing the Lin Biao system. The Group and Its Members Li Yizhe was a name formed from abbreviations of the major figures of the group, Li Zhengtian, Chen Yiyang, and Wang Xizhe. The membership of the Li Yizhe group reached about a dozen at its height, and most of the participants were members of the Red Flag faction during the Cultural Revolution. The four key figures of the group included Li Zhengtian, Chen Yiyang, Wang Xizhe and Guo Hongzhi. The group began to operate 49 Wang Xizhe, Wang Xizhe Zizhuan, 70.

32 29 in the summer of 1973, and their activities were forced to stop after arrests of the members starting in July Born in 1944, Li Zhengtian was the son of a Guomingdang military officer who crossed over to the Communists during the civil war and had risen high in their ranks. Li Zhengtian was in his senior year at the Guangzhou Fine Arts Institute when the Cultural Revolution erupted in Li disapproved of the heavy-handed methods employed by the work teams in the early stage of the Cultural Revolution such as declaring school administrators and faculty members to be black gangs, capitalist roaders, reactionary academic authority, and naming them reactionaries and rightists without evidence. 50 At the university, Li was a leading figure in a small rebel group called the Red Headquarters Call-to-Arms Combat Group, an organization affiliated with the Red Flag faction. He also made his name among Guangzhou s young people for writing provocative posters and speaking with a compelling oratorical style. 51 In August 1968, Li wrote a wall poster protesting against the harsh suppression of the rebels by the military in Guangzhou. 52 He was arrested soon after for participating in the rebel movement and was not released till Yin Hongbiao, Shizongzhe de Zuji: Wenhua Dageming Qijian de Qingnian Sichao [The Footprints of the Missing People: The Thought of Youth during the Cultural Revolution] (Xianggang: Zhongwen Daxue Chubanshe, 2009), Anita Chan, Stanley Rosen, and Jonathan Unger, ed., On Socialist Democracy and the Chinese Legal System (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1985), David L. Shambaugh, The Making of A Premier: Zhao Ziyang s Provincial Career (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 68.