Distribution, Interest Preference, and Democratic Institution in the International. Unipolar Moment. Hsin-chih CHEN

Transcription

1 Is Democratic Institution Changing the International System Nature?: Power Distribution, Interest Preference, and Democratic Institution in the International Unipolar Moment Hsin-chih CHEN Assistant professor, Department of Political Science, National Cheng-Kung University, Taiwan 20th World Congress of the International Political Science Association Fukuoka, Japan. Draft, please do not quote without permission

2 Abstract There are different descriptions on the current state of the international system polarity. However, most of scholars could hardly deny that contemporary international system is in a unipolar moment. This article will discuss how democratic institution influences national interest preference in terms of states power distribution position in a unipolar system. It is concluded that the nature of the international system is changing. To the state that enjoys the supremacy in the international system, United States in ours times and China before the 19th century in East Asia, promoting her political institution to the rest of the world will largely enhance her soft power and solidify her legitimacy in the world. The United States, a democratic and hegemonic state in our world, has benefits to press other countries to adopt American democratic values. To the status quo and secondary Powers, the democratic peace would avoid military confrontation with the preponderant Power. For countries that call for American protection, they try to avoid the alliance abandonment by taking democratic institution as a way to solidify their ties with the United States. The revisionist state is under the dilemma posed by democratic institution. In one way, revisionist state is driven by the sameness demand of the international anarchy system. The revisionist state could not neglect the fact that democratic institution has some superior advantages in the international competition. However, revisionist state is also under the possibility of being transformed to a status quo states as she adopts democratic institution. Key Words: Unipolarity, Democratic Institution, Power Distribution, Revisionist States 1

3 A new kind of international system has surfaced since the end of the Cold War. The global distribution of power moves to the predominance of the United States. The international trade institution fellows the ideas of free trade and none of other economic theories escaped from the fate of being exclusion form the WTO principles. The democracy becomes an important source of legitimacy without which states would be regarded as a target under international pressures. The world dominated by one single state, governed by one kind of international trade institution and prevailed by one unchallenged political ideology is hardly shaken since 1990s. The United State s invasion to Iraq in 2003 raised furious protests against American unilateralism; however, United States faces no military and political counterbalance which checks effectively American supremacy. World Trade Organization replaced the GATT and many states rushed to join the profitable international trade institution even thought most of the members still has groomed for their economic disadvantages under WTO regulations. The spread of democratic regime encounters some difficulties, but democracy is still an important label for countries to obtain domestic as well as international legitimacy. There are complaints about American arrogance, about the adjustments needed for WTO to be taken, and about the challenges faces democratic institution. But most of such kinds of grumbles never lead to actions to overthrow the international status quo and replaced it with revolutionary arrangement. It seems that contemporary international system requires 2

4 some political, economical and ideological fixes but nobody wants an international revolution which will turn up side down the world. In the past, it was hard to believe that one could prevail many in the international system. Just one and half decade ago, one country could always choose her side in a world divided politically, economically and ideologically by two or more camps. Cold War era was a world of bipolarity and the 19tn century was a multipolar system. There were at least two ways of economic development, the capitalism and Communism, before the end of the 20 th century. Democracy was not even a popular political idea superior to Communism, Fascism, and Authoritarian thoughts until the fall of Berlin Wall in Nevertheless, the old days of multiformity are gone and we are in a world without genuine options in terms of political, economic, and ideological doctrines. This paper argues that we are in an international unipolar system in which the hegemon, United States, constructs the world order by means of her predominant power source: military mighty, world economic institution and legitimacy labeled by democratic promotion. Since the unipolarity is formed, the norms guided under hegemony interests reshaped the interest preference of the system units. Nevertheless, countries could hardly escape from the behavior constraints imposed by the system 3

5 nor could they change the material power distribution of power. Soft power resources, typically the democratic institution for example, become another strong power base to maintain the unipolar status quo. The contemporary international system is transforming to a democratic community in which the hegemon supported by her subordinated colleagues promotes the expansion of the international democratic institution as a way to enhance her domination position. I. Unipolar system of democratic nature It is agreed that contemporary international system is in an unipolar moment, but how long will it last is still debatable. Some neorealist insisted that the bipolar international system could shift into multipolarity not long after the end of the Cold War but they accepted the description that contemporary distribution of power is in an unipolar moment. 1 Some believes that no matter what the near future is, United State predominance is hard to deny and we are in a unipolar world which is durable, stable and peaceful. 2 The neorealist paradigm argued that the unipolar system could not long-lasting 1 See John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (London: W. W. Norton & Company Inc., 2001) and Kenneth Waltz, Structural Realism after the Cold War, International Security, Vol. 25, No.1 (Summer 2000), pp. 5-41; Michael Mastanduno, Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy After the Cold War, International Security, Vol. 21, No.4 (1997), pp ; Christophe Layne, The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Power Will Rise, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1993), pp. 5-51; 2 William. C. Wohlforth, The Stability of a Unipolar World, International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1, (1999), pp. 5-41; G. John Ikenberry, Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (1999), pp

6 because the international anarchy poses a structure constraint upon the units within the international system, so the inherent interest of survival drives the units seeking security by self-help tendency: external alliance and internal accumulation of power resources. Neorealist generates that relative disadvantage in the international distribution of power will be disaster for state s security since strong state will destroy the weaker states. 3 Under such circumstances, the fear to be conquered by Super Power will force the weak states to take balancing measures to protect their survival. Hence, it is quite nature and reasonable, from the neorealist perspective, that unipolar hegemon will encounter sooner or later an international alliance against her domination. In neorealist point of view, the international anarchy structure will ameliorate the imbalance of power, which one country holds much of the relative power, back to a balanced world of distribution of power. Waltz even considered that the imbalance of power is a danger to weak as well as strong states because the latter being fed by the ambition to extend their control might pursuit dangerously adventurous activities. 4 From the perspective of Waltz, the strongest state can not benefit from the imbalance of power rather she will confront with a counterbalance triggered by her ambition to domination the weak states. The absence of alliance against the American predominance is compensated by 3 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p

7 the Soft-balancing which is based on a limited arms buildup, ad hoc cooperative exercises, or collaboration in regional or international institutions; theses policies may be converted to open, hard-balancing strategies if and when security competition becomes intense and the powerful state becomes threatening. 5 Yet, the balance of power neorealist literature sufficiently recognizes that unipolar hegemon holds large scale relative power in the world. Many second-tier countries take measures to constraint American foreign policy but the international power transition does not take place. United States is a hegemon in a unipolar system in which no country is capable to reverse American primacy. Relative power supremacy possessed by hegemon creates an unipolar system. American share relative advantages in the field of military, economy and technology, the so called hard power resources. United States build a formidable military force whose size and digress of weaponry modernization are far beyond other colleagues in the world. U. S. Department of Defense demands billion dollars budget in 2007, this figure means about half of global military expansion. 6 United States forces control global strategic points and give her alleys and subordinated countries security protection. On the contrary, countries regarded to threaten the interests of United 5 T. V. Paul, The enduring Axioms of Balance of Power Theory, in Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, eds. Balance of Power Revisited: Theory and Practice in the Twenty-first Century (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004), p U.S. Department of Defense, National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2007 Budget (Green Book). Website: 6

8 States domination confront with American military interventions or economic punishments unilaterally or multilaterally initiating by the United Stats. The Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals could possible no long deter American nuclear first strike since United States is in a nuclear primacy since the end of the Cold War. 7 Military predominance is a strong pillar of American hegemony. Force is not the only way for Americans to dominate the world. Economic activities offer Unites States sufficient capitals to solidify her empire. In 2004, United States GDP is ahead of every country in the world, trillion dollars and about 28.53% of international GDP. Such figure is 2.5 times of Japanese 4.6 trillion dollar GDP, the global second larger economic entity. Chinese GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP) is second to Unites States, 7.12 trillion against trillion dollars. 8 World economic prosperity also needs American internal market. Japanese government concluded that since the latter half of the 1990s, global economic growth has been driven by the domestic demand-led U. S. economic growth. 9 The international role of the dollar gives United States a supreme position in world economic and financial market. Though the Unites States twin deficits have reached record levels, United States economic collapse are hard to occur since the U.S. dollar 7 Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G..Press, The Rise of U. S. Nuclear Primacy, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 2(2006), pp World Bank, World Development Indicator Database, July Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, White Paper on International Economy and Trade 2005 (Tokyo: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 2005), chapter 1. 7

9 will remain dominant in global trade, payments, and capital flows, based as it is in a country with safe, well-regulated financial markets. 10 American technology advance guarantees her economic prosperity. Analyzing the concentration of scientific citation, it is find out that most of the 1222 most cited scientists are in the United States. The Top 20 Institutions in terms of the number and percentage of scientists cited are all located in the USA with exception of University College London and the University of Cambridge. 11 In 2002, the U.S. Research and Development total exceeded that of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom combined and in 2004, total U.S. R & D expenditures are $290 billion, more than twice the total for Japan, the next biggest spender. 12 The liberal political institution taken by United States can,on the margin, improve a state s ability to compete in the international system since the limits associated with liberal democracy provide a competitive advantage in sustained conflict against states that lack such limits. 13 A decentralized state structure, for example the United States in comparison with the Japan, Great Britain and Germany, is a necessary condition for 10 David H. Levey and Stuart S. Brown, The Overstretch Myth, Foreign Affairs, Mar/Apr2005, Vol. 84, Issue 2, pp Michael Batty, Commentaries: The Geography of Scientific Citation, Environment and Planning A, Vol. 35, No. 5 (2003), pp Adam Segal, Is America Loosing its Edge?,: Foreign Affairs, vol. 83, No. 6 (2004), p Kenneth A. Schultz and Barry R. Weingast, The Democratic Advantages: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition, International Organization, Vol. 57 (2004), pp

10 states to sustain themselves at the technological frontier. 14 United States soft power resources are even greater than her hard power. Soft power is the ability of a country to structure a situation so that others countries develop preferences or define their interests in way consistent with it own. 15 Cultural and ideological attractions, rules and international institutions are soft power resources. The democratic principals give United States unusual influence on world political development. The democratic principles have been regarded as an ideal form of state governance. United States exercise of democracy has even been an adorable example for countries under political transformation. The United States represents a national identity model in which different peoples with cultural differences could construct a unity of national identity. United States represent a promised land where people could fulfill their dreams. Thousands of people immigrate legally and illegally to United States because of the hope that America instead their mother land can give. United States represents a county of prosperity, freedom and hope, an idol which most countries of the world can never compete with. United States has forged a complex of International institutions whose adhesion standards are principally guarded by American decisions. International institution 14 Daniel Drezner, State Structure, Technological Leadership and the Maintenance of Hegemony, Review of International Studies, Vol. 27( 2001), pp Joseph S. Nye. Jr. Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization (London: Routledge,2004), p

11 could emerge because of the international needs and hegemonic leadership. However, most international institutions in our days have been dependant on United States supports and leadership. Since the end of the Second World War, United States is always the pillar of international institution of trade, financial and nuclear non-proliferation. The end of Cold War destroys the communist blocs and strengthens American leadership superiority in the international trade system. China jointed the World Trade Organization in 2001 after she passed a harsh consultation with the United States. Russia and Vietnam, impatient to be a WTO member as quickly as possible, could not joint the international trade institution before they complete their negotiations with the United States. Multilateral structure of the international institution gives hegemonic United States a veto power of gate-keeper. Hegemonic power constructs certain kinds of international institution for her interests to control the world and United States is not an exception. International institutional provides information, reduces transaction costs, makes commitments more credible, establishes focal points for coordination, and in general facilitates the operation of reciprocity. 16 Countries take advantages form the exercise of international institution but hegemonic leader benefits more because it could change other member states interest preference. The asymmetry of hard power resources 16 Keohane Robert and Lisa L. Martin, The Promise of Institutionalist Theory, International Security Vol. 20, No.1, p

12 between the United States and the rest members of the international institution put the later in an inferior position in the international institution for power may be used to determine who can play the game, be used to dictate rules of the game, and be used to change the payoff matrix, 17 International institution is a form of international cooperation, but such kind of cooperation does not mean that each member states share equal agenda-setting capability nor could they get advantages alike. Superior in manipulating the institutional principals, rules, and bargaining procedures, hegemonic leader could pose more policy constraints upon other states, especially the countries that are not familiar with the function of the international institutions. A soft power supremacy that United States shares in the field of culture, democracy, and international institution solidifies her legitimacy to rule the world according to American interests. The goal of the United States is to promote the democratic institutions to other countries. The promotion of democracy becomes a strategic tool for the United States to secure the international environment. The United States National Security Strategic Report of 2006 declared that United States government will promote a transformational diplomacy which means: 17 Stephen D. Krasner, Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier, World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3, p

13 working with our many international partners to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. Long-term development must include encouraging governments to make wise choices and assisting them in implementing those choices. We will encourage and reward good behavior rather than reinforce negative behavior. Ultimately it is the countries themselves that must decide to take the necessary steps toward development, yet we will help advance this process by creating external incentives for governments to reform themselves. 18 As the most powerful country of the world, United States argued that one of the best way to protect her national security would be an international environment where all countries adopts democratic institution defined by American standards. United States promotes her idea of democratic institution in order to transform other courtiers for the purpose to create an international community with shared values of democracy. The history that United States has experienced in the past century demonstrates that her challengers were normally courtiers against democratic values. The ideas of democratic peace also intensified United States conviction that a world of democratic counties will more peaceful and more secure for her to settled dispute with others. 18 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of American (Washingto D. C. : White House, 2006), pp. see website 12

14 United States tends to take policies of (1) protecting present and potential sources of raw materials; (2) safeguarding foreign markets and foreign investments; (3) conserving commercial sea and air routes; (4), preserving spheres of influence where United States business gets a competitive edge of investment and trade; (5), creating new foreign customers and investment opportunities via foreign military and economic aid; and more generally, (6), maintaining the structure of world capitalist markets not only directly for the United States but also for its junior partners among the industrialized nations. 19 All of these policies consolidate an international order in which democratic members submitted to the hegemonic leadership for their interests. II. The All Constructing the World Order The world order is constructed through the process in which interact the exercise of Unites States power supremacy and the passiveness of the rest of the world. The power asymmetry provides United States dynamics to constructing a hierarchical world order of democracy. In contrast with American unipolar supremacy, general submission, willingly or unwillingly, of the hegemonic order mark another powerful foundation of the world order today. 19 Harry Magdoff, Imperialism Without Colonies (New York : Monthly Review Press, 2003), chapter 3. 13

15 American superiority in the global distribution of power permits U.S. to constructs a hierarchical world order according to her expectations and interests. In a hierarchical structure, there is in relatively stable intersubjective understandings embodies in treaties, norms and shared ideology, which define behavioral expectations for each party. 20 The United States has regarded itself and has been regarded by others to be a superpower since The role of the United States, the defender of the economic prosperity and the protector of the democratic world, has been constructed since the beginning of the Cold War. Such constructed role is amplified as U. S. exercises her power around the world. American sent troops all over the world to fight against the communist invasion. The formation of NATO, the fierce fighting in Korea and Vietnam demonstrated that the United States had had determinations to guard her alleys looking for her protection. The American role of protector has also been intensified as the United States provided large amount of economic and military aids to her alleys to start their reconstruction since United States opened generously her internal market to the world so that her alleys could be able to improve their wealthy. In return, countries under American protection stood tremendous pressures to fit democratic standards defined by American way. The United States might take an isolationist policy since the 1945, but the United States 20 Alexander Wendt and Daniel Friedheim, Hierarchy under Anarchy: informal Empire and the East German State, International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 4, p

16 decided to use her position as the leading postwar state to lock the other industrial powers into a particular type of international order in which her role was the international order protector. When American alleys accepted their role of dependant under United States military and economic institutional protection, has begun the intersubjective identity and role formation practice whose result points to the hierarchical world order. The processes of such kind of role formation will not end till the protection-protégé relationship terminates. In the hierarchical order of international unipolar system, the American power preponderance is the base to build and to sustain the international order; however, the interactions between the United States and her protégés stimulate an intersubjective process of democratic community through which their identity and role within the unipolar system are constructed. Hierarchy has three advantages for the United States to construct a democratic community in which she was the leader. First, the hegemonic state has more freedoms of action to engage fewer competitors than others encounters in military, economic as well as ideological filed. Under an imbalance of power distribution, inequality of power has often led to peace and stability because there was little room for hegemonic 15

17 war being happened. 21 The dependant states of the hierarchical unipolar system would hardly challenge the leader state nor her ideological plan because their role as well as their capabilities limits them to take a revisionist policy. At moment that the potential challenger is rising, the unipolar power could take engagement policy to socialize the possible challenger. 22 As the hegemonic power considers that she will enjoy no longer relative power supremacy, she could launch a preventive war before the challenger break the imbalance of power, 23 Second, hegemon is needed by members of the international system because she supplies international order, security protection and international public goods necessary for the functioning of efficient world market. 24 Since the international institution are constructed by hegemonic leader for organizing and defending the world market economy, promoting free trade, providing investment capital, and supplying the international currency, United Stares naturally becomes the core of the world order. The fading or decay of the web of international institutions becomes imaginable for states used to live in a hierarchical system. Countries enjoying American security protection and international public goods trapped in an 21 Joseph S. Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p David Shambaugh, Containment or Engagement of China? Caculating Beijing s Responses. International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp Jack S. Levy, Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War, World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 1, p. 87; Steve Chan, Exploring Puzzles in Power-Transition Theory: Implication for Sino-American Relations, Security Studies, Vol. 13, No.3, p Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1981), p

18 institutional path dependence which has been constructed since the end of the Second World War. Path Dependence has to mean that once a country or region has started down a track, the cost of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice.. 25 During the Cold War era, the U. S. confrontation with the Soviet Union could be seen as the path by which the world were getting used to American protection under the complex of international military, economic, financial, and democratic institutions. The moment of the collapse of Soviet Union turned the world form bipolar rival into an unipolar system in which the United States is the unique superpower. The international system has changed suddenly in 1989 but the course of institutional protection-protégé relationship has even become deeper and wider. In the unipolar system nowadays, the cost of system transition is already beyond what system units could bear because any change of the distribution of power and the international institutions within the unipolar system will contribute to the destruction of the interdependent world from which most states get benefits. None of any country in the 25 Margaret Levi, A Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis, in Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, ed. Mark I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p

19 world will tolerate the cost coming from the power transition. The globalization of institutional hegemony not only enhances the importance of hegemonic leader but also consolidates the relative power position of the unipolar Power. From the perspective of states acquired advantages from the hegemonic institutions, they could no longer quit the unipolar path because the benefits of international power transition probably could not make up the costs of departure from the hegemonic protection-protégé relationship. States bear the unipolar domination not mainly because they emotionally depend on the hegemony but because they need the unipolar hegemony for their interests. In democratic community, states posses a compatibility of core values derived form common institutions, and mutual responsiveness- a matter of mutual identity and loyalty, a sense of we-ness, and are integrated to the point that they entertain dependable expectations of peaceful change. 26 A unipolar order offers international public goods for the subordinated states who support the hegemony status quo without challenging the hegemonic leader. Finally, unipolar hegemony also enjoys positional advantages of international course-setting. Relative hard and soft power resources already permit unipolar hegemony to impose her will by coercion, but she can maintain her primacy in a less costly way of agenda-control. There are two types of agenda control. The first type of 26 Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the light of Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p.5. 18

20 agenda control is that one actor denies the status quo to others in order to steer them into accepting alternatives more to his interests. The second type of agenda control is that one actor exercises power by preventing others form adopting changes the latter would prefer. 27 States voluntarily fellow the international development course principally setting by the unipolar hegemony because their decisions are made according to their best interest whose preference standards had already been leaded to the direction that the unipolar power makes of. With the course-setting capability, the unipolar hegemony can manipulate the international system environment and the international development direction. Internet governance is a good example that United States denies the possibility to give up her dominance in the international institutions. Internet is an invention that has already changed the way we communicate, the fashion of our entertainment, the style we trade and even the way our life would be. With her advanced technology, United States created in 1970s the internet for military use and latter the commercial internet has been developed. United States controls till today the internet addressing system through a private organization, Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). European Union and China try to challenge U. S. domination in the internet governance, but they hardly shake American commanding position in the 27 Terry M. Moe, Power and Political Institutions, Perspectives on Politics, vol. 3, No.2 (2005), p

21 internet. In November, 2005, United Nations World Summit of the Information Society held a conference in Tunis. The agreement announced by the Summit reaffirmed United States in effective control over the Internet governance but also created an Internet Governance Forum where governments, businesses and civil society representatives will raise what they consider to be important Internet issues. 28 However, United States dominate still the essential IP system of the internet. American supreme power in the internet governance demonstrates that unipolar hegemony could maintain their position not by wining conflicts against opponents, but by using agenda control to keep conflictural alternatives off the table entirely. 29 In the other way, United Stated opponents accepted a less good option in the internet governance as they together could not overturn American supremacy in the international internet governance institution. International commercial and financial institution is another example for United States to consolidate her primacy through agenda control. At the moment when United States was the biggest economic giants in the world, United States created the International Monetary Funds, World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) at the beginning of the Cold War. The international financial and trade 28 See Second Phase of the WSIS (16-18 November 2005, Tunis), Tunis Commitment WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/7. website: (2006/04/19) 29 Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz. Two Faces of Power, The American Political Review, Vol. 56, No. 4, (1962), p

22 institutions enlarged after the collapse of Soviet Union. For former members of the communist group, they faced a strong attractive by the international economic institutions because they considered that their entrance to the WTO would improve their economic fragility. Form the perspectives of agenda control, these transitional states were forced to make a choice between two harsh options: economic isolation and domestic turbulence of economic reform, both could threaten their national stability. When the United States moves her alleys together to form a democratic community, states that oppose such development encounters a fait accompli created by the unipolar hegemony. As United States has already set the international agenda and the international development course, the original status quo has been taken away form opposition states, and the new reality is that such kind of democratic community already exists. Less powerful states will stand in a policy dilemma that they can either join the new institution or they can stay out. But since the unipolar hegemony has founded the new institution, the status quo has no long exist and the whole environment has changed to a new one, setting by the unipolar power. Keeping distance form the new institution could not go back to the way things were. If opponent states now decide that joining makes them better off than not joining, they will voluntarily become members of the new institution. When the unipolar leading 21

23 states decides to go it along in creating a multinational institution, other states may eventually choose to join even if they never wanted such an institution in the first place and expect to be worse off. 30 In general, United States constructs a hierarchical international order from the base of her relative power resources superiority. The practice of the hierarchical system, form 1945 till nowadays, constructs roles of system units, a relationship of protector-protégé sustained by the international institutions in which the United Stated is the needed leader. The unipolar hegemony also commands the development course of the hierarchical system through the tactics of agenda control. III. States Framed under the Current International System States are presumed to act in their won interests. In a unipolar systme the foreign policy of all states, the hegemonic power as well as the second rank courtiers, are constrained by the international structure of the anarchic society of hierarchical distribution of power. States may choose to balance, to bandwagon, and to appease their opponents in an international system; however, position-maintaining shall be the main course for each member of states in the unipolar system. In realist perspective, states are homogenous in nature and their only difference is 30 Lloyd Gruber, Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions. (Princeton, New York: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp

24 the power they posses. So, in order to achieve their objectives and maintain their security, states in a condition of anarchy must rely on the principle of self-help. 31 The realist discussion on the polarity implied that international decisive poles are generally in the same rank, the Great Powers, and their power were largely symmetric which created a balance of power situation in the international anarchic system. In the multipolar international system, the power of the decisive countries, three or five poles, is basically symmetrically divided; the bipolar powers balance each other as long as their capabilities are equal. 32 Rare oeuvres discussed the structure with hierarchical ranks which the decisive poles and their subordinate states live together. Since the realist works excludes the possibility of hierarchical distribution of power within the anarchy system, there is no need for the realist to discuss the rank in the international system. The international unipolar system reshapes the decision-making grounds of states strategic choice. The state s policy orientation is largely generated according to state s interests, but there are three points of differences of state s behavior orientation in the unipolar system from that of the multipolar and bipolar system. First, states 31 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979),, p See Karl W. Deutsch and David Singer, Multipolar Power System and International Stability, World Politics, Vol. 16, No.3 (1964), pp ; Morton A. Kaplan, Balance of Power, Bipolarity and Other Models of International Systems, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 51, No. 3( 1957), pp ; R. N. Rosecrance, Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 10, No.3 (1966), pp ; Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979). 23

25 power difference is largely asymmetric in the unipolar system. Second, the power distribution of the international unipolar structure is hierarchical and finally, the position of the states is basically hierarchical. Generally speaking, there are ranks in the international unipolar system not only in terms of the possession of power but also in terms of the position of power distribution. The realist think the rank of states depends largely on how they score on power, so we need only rank states roughly by capability. 33 Starting from this definition, all poles in the international system are in same rank. Therefore, in a multipolar system, great powers are in the same rank and we can conclude their behavior by measuring their power difference. In a bipolar structure, as the neorealist assumed, the two rival Powers are also in the same rank with matched power. However, under unipolarly system, there is a problem before we analyze states strategic choice because the unipolar strategic environment is quite different form that of the multipolar and bipolar system. In unipolar system, the relationship between the unique dominant state and the weak states is an intersubjective practice across different rank of capabilities and different rank of power distribution position. States may adopt different strategies to survive in an anarchic environment. Stats may seek to balance against other states by forming alliances with some against others. 33 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p

26 States may take bandwagon strategies by joint with the stronger rather than opposing the stronger state. States may seek peaceful accommodation and make concession to satisfy their opponents. But in an unipolar system, different rank of states has different limitations and orientations of strategic choice. To conquer the fear of being cheated and being threatened in the international anarchy, the country of the first rank in the unipolar system trends to maintain her primary position. The unipolar will use her power with lowest cost to protect her position by widening the relative power gap between the unipolar hegemony and others states. The unipolar hegemony enjoys power superiority which permits her holding wide range of freedom of action. Her strategic choice could be conquer, balance, bandwagon, appease and even take a policy of buck-passing when she interact with other units in the system but below her power rank. Large amount of power means that the unipolar hegemony could make more mistakes and could endure more costs than other states. Powerful states are more capable of absorbing losses than are weaker ones. Hence the hegemonic power can afford more costs in a long term, and she can take risks that more fragile nations dare not to stand. Different strategic choice has different policy shortages, but the unipolar could stand more cost of inappropriate policy than states inferior in the power 25

27 resources. Unipolar hegemony could also last longer than country with smaller power when both of them suffer from damages of policy change. British Empire paid large price for her German policy before the outbreak of the Second World War. Great Britain had shifted her German policy from appeasement in 1938 to balancing policy before the German invasion to Poland in British Empire had paid much to resist against Nazi German, but she managed to survive when other weak countries had been vanished under German military expansion. If British Empire had not possessed enough power than her alleys, she might not spare of the tragedy of defeat. United States experience in the Cold War is another example which demonstrates that power asymmetry the hegemonic power have enjoyed is a valuable resource to endure a long competition against her opponent. Only the most powerful state can be the champion in the marathon of arms race. In contrast with the widely freedom of action possessed by the unipolar hegemon, the second rank countries bandwagon the hegemony state for reasons to keep their survive because of first that the cost to balance is far beyond they can stand as well as the second that the advantages to joint the hegemony camp exceed much to create a new kind of international system. The second-rank states within the unipolar system incline to comply with the 26

28 hegemonic domination for the sake of their interests: state survival and developmental prosperity. The Realist argued that the weak states would form a military alliance to counter the country with relative power advantages for the sake of their skins. However, the balance of power theory could not stand before one condition has been fulfill, the collective power of the small states should be equal or larger than the power of the balanced country. In a multipolar system, certain countries of the same rank are easy to create an alliance whose collective power are larger or at least symmetry to their competition. Balance of power can not break down in the bipolar system because the two superpowers of the same rank can not beat the other. However, in the unipolar system, the precondition of the balance of power theory does not exist because the combination power of second rank countries could not surmount the hegemonic one of the first rank. None of second rank states in the unipolar system has the capabilities to solely challenge the unipolar hegemon, nor could a group of them. If the second rank countries could not go over individually as well as collectively the hegemon in the unipolar system, it has little incentives for the second rank countries to create a useless and fatal balancing coalition against the hegemon. In a unipolar system. balance of power policy is doomed to fail because no chance for the collective power of the possible alliance to challenge the hegemon. 34 On the contrary, any 34 William. C. Wohlforth, The Stability of a Unipolar World, International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1, (1999), pp

29 provocation come from states inferior to the hegemonic power will lead to their destruction. Under the circumstance of power asymmetry, bandwagoning is the last choice for the subordinated countries. Bandwagoning involves first unequal exchange; the vulnerable state makes asymmetrical concessions to the dominant power and accepts a subordinate role. Besides, Bandwagoning is an accommodation to pressure (either latent or manifest). Most important of all, bandwagoning suggests a willingness to support or tolerate illegitimate actions by the dominant ally. 35 International anarchy forces the states to highlight their vital interest of survival, but the degree of power asymmetry decides states policy orientation. Relative weak states might choose to balance the stronger country only under the condition that their collective power will surpass the latter, which means that they could keep their survival by relative advantage. However, second rank states change their strategy to guard their vital interests by obedience to the unipolar hegemon when their collective force could never overturn the power asymmetry enjoyed by the hegemon. For countries who shared same values and material interests with the hegemonic power, the unipolar system has been able to satisfy their material interests as well as 35 Stephen M. Walt, Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia: Balancing and Bandwagoning in Cold War Competition, In Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder ed, Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in The Eurasian Rimland. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p

30 their survival. They got rewards from their bandwagoning policy. 36 The democratic community has guaranteed that internal disputes within the democratic community must be settled through peaceful means. As their survival is ensured, the second-rank countries might expand their interests form the unipolar order by their inclusion to the multilateral international institution forged by the hegemonic power. The status quo countries of the second rank donate their obedience to the hegemonic power in exchange of their security survival and economic prosperity. The system transformation will raise more uncertainty, environmental disorder, and security competition, all of which are less intensified in a unipolar system. The cost to overturn the unipolar system will be too high for the status quo countries of second rank. Besides, their identity and role formation in the unipolar system could not permit them to destroy the protector-protégé relationship. Bandwagoning of the second rank countries reflect only their subordinated role constructed by the unipolar system. Martin Wight considered that weak, corruptive and undemocratic countries inclined to become a Jackal states jointing the hegemon. 37 But in practice, second rank states of democracy incline more easily to bandwagon the hegemonic power defending democratic values. Unites States 36 Randall L. Schweller, Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In, International. Security, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp Martin Wight, Power Politics (London: Leicester University Press, 1978), p

31 invasion against Iraq in 2003 showed that there were always states supporting the hegemonic behavior no matter how illegal or unilateral it might be. Several governments, England, Japan, Spain as well as other democratic countries sent troops with the American forces to Iraq in spite of their domestic critics on American unilateralism. The Revisionist State of the second rank inclines to submit to the unipolar hegemony too. The revisionist states do not satisfy with the distribution of power of the unipolar system but they failed to challenge the status quo before they can overcome the power asymmetry beneficial to the hegemonic state. The states that are excluded from the democratic community could not benefit from the unipolar hegemony but they lack sufficient power to change the unipolar system. The international unipolar system of democratic community limits the possibility for the revisionist states to forge an ally against the hegemonic leader because revisionist states could offer too little advantages for democratic subordinated states to abandon the unipolar hegemony in which the democratic states shared important values and material interests with the leader state. VI. Conclusion The unipolar system could hardly be shaken not only because of the asymmetry 30

32 distribution of power between the hegemonic power and rest of the states within the system but also because of the identity construction and complex of international institutions, which construct a sense of democratic community with shared values and collective interests among the concerning countries, The nature of the international system nowadays has been changing under the unipolar hegemony. The unipolar hegemony promotes democratic institution with her brutal force as well as with her generous incentives of material interests to improve her security environment. The hegemonic behavior of democratic promotion triggers the amplification and the deepening of the international democratic institutions around the world. The democratic institutions reshape the norms, rules, and the decision procedures of the international system. Within the unipolar domination, there is intense political, economic, and ideological similarity which constructs the base of the democratic community. The leading unipolar hegemon offers security coverage, economic public goods and ideological guidance whereas the subordinated states contribute their obedience in return. Both of the hegemon and the second rank states have been constructing their identity and role in the process of their interactions which have been socializing every member of the unipolar system continuously. The unipolar hegemon tends to maintain her supreme position in order to keep 31

33 material interests, however, in the mean time; the identity of world leader and the role of world unique superpower also push the hegemon to safeguard the world order supported also by the inferior states of democratic values. The subordinate states have not incentive to overturn the unipolar system because the power asymmetry forbidden them to balance the hegemon. The shared values of international democratic community play also an active role to maintain the unipolar system since the democratic states rarely settle their political difference with war, which limits the possibility of hegemonic war within the democratic communities. Since the majority of the states have been include in the web of the international institutions, the huge interdependent of material interest and the ideological democratic perception give little room for the revisionist states to crush the unipolar system by forming an ally with power advantages superior to the democratic community of hegemon and democratic subordinated states. The unipolar system mixed with shared values, interdependent web of material interests, and the asymmetry of power distribution could last longer than other kinds of international polarity. Nevertheless, the uniplar system is more stable and peaceful then the bipolar and multipolar world. The domestic factors of hegemon deserve to paid much more attentions had they been the possible source leading to the decay of 32