Concept note Reforms for improving the quality of democracy and citizen participation

Transcription

1 Theme 2: Quality of democracy. LATIN AMERICA EUROPE Concept note Reforms for improving the quality of democracy and citizen participation First Latin American Social Cohesion Conference. A strategic priority in the European Union-Latin American partnership Club de Madrid PROGRAMME FOR SOCIAL COHESION IN LATIN AMERICA

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3 Concept note Reforms for improving the quality of democracy and citizen participation First Latin American Social Cohesion Conference. A strategic priority in the European Union-Latin American partnership Santiago, Chile, 22 nd and 23 rd January 2015 This concept note was prepared by the working team of the Club de Madrid s Next Generation Democracy project

4 This publication was prepared with the assistance of the European Union. The content thereof is the exclusive responsibility of the author and should not be deemed to reflect the opinion of the European Union.

5 Index I. Introduction to the compendium... 5 II. A Latin American view Introduction Internal comparative perspective. Remaining challenges and future perspectives Topics for discussion III. A European view Introduction Internal comparative perspective of the EU. Remaining challenges and future perspectives Topics for discussion IV. Conclusions V. Bibliography... 23

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7 I. Introduction to the compendium This concept note is a collaboration of the Madrid Club with EUROsociAL Programme, of the European Union, as contribution to the Latin American Social Cohesion Conference organized by Chilean Senate. This note is a contribution to improving the quality of democracy and citizen participation in the European Union and Latin America. In developing it, diverse bibliographic sources were used, particularly regional reports prepared for the Next Generation Democracy (NGD) project described later on, as well as the conclusions of the European and Latin American working groups in the Democracy and Human Rights in Decline? A Call to Action Policy Dialogue organized by the Club de Madrid in November, Due to the generalized perception that democracy is in decline at the moment, the Club de Madrid and its members proposed re-examining the state of same in a new project called Next Generation Democracy. Over the next two years, this will involve multiple actors under the coordination of the Club de Madrid and facilitate a debate on the state and future of democracy by exhaustively analyzing regional dynamics and responses to potential threats to democracy and bringing together, directly and indirectly, evaluations by experts with the experienced perspectives of essential political and social actors. NGD includes different strategic partners, such as international organizations and agencies and institutions that will provide the vision and direction for developing the project. The members of the working team, the main engine for the content of the project, whose contributions have been especially important for this document, are the Bertelsmann Foundation of Germany and the think tanks FRIDE (Europe) and FLACSO (Latin America). In the context of the NGD project, regional trends in democracy from 2000 to 2015 were analyzed and compared in order to project future trends and identify and share best practices that have been successful in counteracting disturbing dynamics and to propose practical policies for each region at a global level with the goal of promoting effective democracy. This process makes up the reference framework for the preparation of this concept note with the specific focus on the situation in Europe and Latin America. 5

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9 II. A Latin American view 1. Introduction In recent decades, Latin America has made decisive progress towards democracy. Nevertheless, although military dictatorships are a thing of the past, democratic institutions continue to be weak and limitations on the participation of civil society in political decision-making processes persist. In addition, despite much progress, populism is on the rise and organized crime has not be eliminated. Inequality and lack of inclusion continue to be the main obstacles to achieving genuine democracy in Latin America as prosperity alone has not led to greater equality. The middle classes have enjoyed a good standard of living in recent decades, but we do not know whether this trend will continue. If the answer is no, there may be instability in the near future, and it is likely that the middle classes will blame the democratic governments for this. Moreover, in Central America and parts of Mexico, organized crime has displaced the judiciary and the police, exercising de-facto control in place of democratic governmental institutions. To the fact that civil society continues to be comparatively weak in Latin America, we must add rudimentary structures in political parties, which makes the task of building consensus difficult. Despite the problems that exist and disturbing trends, regional institutions, such as the Organization of American States, seem increasingly less capable of pointing out the deficiencies of the governments and pressuring both them and civil society to advance towards democracy. Also considering that the presence of the international community has diminished in Latin America, the possibility that democratic practices will continue to regress is a possibility that cannot be ruled out. 2. Internal comparative perspective. Remaining challenges and future perspectives. Diagnosis of the quality of democracy in the Latin America requires an analysis of trends in recent years relative to political participation, the rule of law, the strategic capacity and effectiveness of political action, the creation of societal and political consensus, as well as the projection of these trends into the future. 1 a) Political participation Elections Elections are mainly free and constitute one of the great assets of Latin American democracies, with the greatest exceptions being the failing state of Haiti and Cuba. Nevertheless, in the last decade there has been a notable decline in the quality of electoral processes and institutions in some Latin American countries, due in part to strong societal and political polarization and/or populist policies designed 1. The ideas expressed in this section were prepared using the Regional Report for Latin America of the Club of Madrid s NGD project: 7

10 Club de Madrid to gain control of the government, especially in Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua and Venezuela, and to a lesser extent in the Dominican Republic and Guatemala. In addition, the coups in Honduras and Paraguay demonstrate that veto power can ignore electoral results when these go against its basic interests. Association and assembly rights With some exceptions, respect for the rights of association and assembly has reached quite a high level in Latin America, representing an undeniable pillar of democratic solidity in the region. Apart from autocratic Cuba, problems are only noted in the highly polarized Venezuela and in Guatemala, where racism and violence, both deeply rooted, have affected political rights overall. In turn, the citizen protests in Chile and Brazil represent a clear signal that citizens are confident enough that their voices will be heard to demand answers from the government. Freedom of expression Freedom of expression has reached a good level of development in Latin America, with the exception of Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala and Venezuela. Another negative example is Chile, where media pluralism is significantly damaged. The factor that has most affected freedom of expression has been drug trafficking from South America to the United States through Central America, Mexico and the Caribbean, countries where the governments are unwilling or unable to combat organized crime and corruption. Projections The factors that awaken the greatest uncertainty with respect to political participation in Latin America are the sharp polarization in some countries and governance problems due to persistent social inequalities, populist temptations and the high degree of violence related to organized crime and drug trafficking. If civil society continues to remain uninvolved in decision-making processes, it is possible that elite groups and socio-economic exclusion mechanisms will continue to be an obstacle to democratization. b) Rule of law Apart from Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay, the rule of law in Latin America constitutes the weakest factor in the region s political development. In fact, significant improvement has not been observed since 2000 due reticence about reforms, corruption and new challenges that are weakening respect for law in general. Separation of powers With the exception of Haiti, Latin American countries have opted for presidentialist systems. Direct electoral legitimization of the president has often served to invoke a superior legitimacy and to justify concentration of power in the executive, which has undermined the balance of powers. Only Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and with some limitations Brazil, Jamaica and Mexico, have demonstrated a solid separation of powers. Independent judiciary Historically, the judiciary in Latin America has been weak. Only Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay have successfully (re)established a strong and independent judiciary; in countries like Brazil and Colombia, some improvements have been made in this area. Given that the judiciary is often plagued by professional deficiencies and generalized corruption, the government and the elites tend to view it as an obstacle and try to manipulate it, at the same time as they are reticent to undertake judicial reforms. Nor has the advance of organized crime contributed to increasing the already scant confidence in the judiciary. 8

11 Concept note Reforms for improving the quality of democracy and citizen participation Civil rights Currently, civil rights in Latin America are enjoying greater respect, with the exception of Cuba, the failing state of Haiti on the one hand, and Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and Venezuela with serious problems of violence, on the other. Some countries have taken significant steps towards investigating and prosecuting horrible human rights violations in the past. Projections The strongest expectations for the rule of law are bleak throughout the region due to divisions generated by inequality and exclusion, elites that evade the rule of law or which have no interest in improving it, and the informal actors responsible for transnational organized crime who create lawless zones. The only countries that escape this dark reality are Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay. The fight against organized crime to improve the rule of law is a long-term objective that requires regional cooperation and the willingness to seriously address structural factors such as economic growth and reducing inequality. Given the mobility of organized crime, in addition to the economic recession, many countries in Central America and the Caribbean will face problems in introducing the economic, social and political reforms necessary to root it out. c) Strategic capacity and efficiency of political action Strategic priorities Only Brazil, Costa Rica, Chile and Uruguay have established clear strategic priorities, while Colombia and Mexico, non-populist countries, have also made a notable effort in this regard. It is important to highlight that even the government of Evo Morales in Bolivia, whose strategic objectives encompass concepts of democracy and inclusion that differ from the principles of liberal democracy and a market economy, has been capable of establishing and maintaining its strategic priorities with some success in the area of social development. The greatest failures in this areas are found in Cuba, Haiti and Venezuela. Implementation Policy implementation poses problems in Latin American countries, with the exception of Brazil, Chile, El Salvador and Uruguay, where this has been done successfully. Mexico and Peru have had less success, while Venezuela and Haiti have failed categorically in this aspect. The greatest problems for this policy implementation are structural barriers such as deficiencies in infrastructures, a difficult landscape, low levels of professionalism, lack of a merit-based bureaucracy and civil service, and a low level of institutionalization. Anti-corruption policy The majority of Latin American countries are experiencing difficulties in combating corruption and establishing appropriate mechanisms for tackling it. Only Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay have consistently combated corruption successfully. Other countries like Brazil and Peru have had less success, and the rest have failed completely in implementing these policies, with the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, Panama and Venezuela heading the list. Projections Poor governance has been identified as one of the major characteristics of political development in Latin America since the eighties. Recent events, however, hint at the possibility that the political elites, at least in some countries like Chile and Uruguay, have recognized the need for good governance, although their capacity to initiate the necessary reforms is limited by structural impediments. In the future, greater effort will be required on the part of both the elites and citizens to reach consensus and 9

12 Club de Madrid combat structural problems such as drug trafficking and organized crime, as no country can solve these separately. d) Societal and political consensus-building Conflict management Traditionally in Latin America, many conflicts have been repressed or ignored and have only come to light after democracy allowed the population to demonstrate or vote. In the cases of Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, these changes triggered a rupture of the established order. The patterns of conflict management frequently change with each government, and therefore we cannot speak of a clear trend for the region since Civil society participation Although most governments always cite the importance of civil society, its influence is very limited in practice. Only Brazil and Uruguay, and to a certain extent Bolivia and Costa Rica, regularly include civil society actors in consultation and decision-making processes. Nevertheless, as with conflict management, the involvement of civil society depends on each government, and therefore we cannot speak of a clear trend since Projections The consensus-building seems to be a little-used resource in the democratic governance of the countries of Latin America. Therefore, it is necessary to promote greater use of this resource with credible strategies based on knowledge of the past. Examples such as President Morales in Bolivia, and more recently, President Fernández in Argentina, hint at the possibility that the consensus-building may be on the rise. Recent events in Brazil and Chile may stimulate civil society to get more involved if the governments manage conflicts adequately. In fact, already in some countries like Colombia and Mexico, the governments have realized the advantages of consensus-building among political elites, which was an important success factor in post-pinochet Chile. 3. Topics for discussion The topics proposed for discussion are some positive examples of citizen participation initiatives in Latin America which are increasingly common in the region thanks in part to the democratic transitions of recent years. They involve proposals promoted both by governments and civil society that have improved governance, the sense of accountability and social justice. Among the most important ones, the following are worth mentioning: Citizen consultation These are processes that make it possible, both at the national and local level, to ask citizens their opinion about a law, a constitutional reform, an administrative decision or a development project on a large scale before it is formulated or implemented. These consultations have a variety of names: referendums, plebiscites, popular consultations and town-hall meetings, and they are considered a direct or semi-direct participation tool. In addition, the majority of the constitutions of Latin American countries include these citizen consultations, and some of them are complemented with secondary laws that regulate consultations in specific sectors or at the local level. Although this mechanism offers great opportunities, laws cannot always guarantee that the opinions collected in the consultations have a real impact on the decision-making process. 10

13 Concept note Reforms for improving the quality of democracy and citizen participation Participatory budgets The participatory budget arose in Brazil in 1989 and currently is applied by over 2,500 local governments in 15 countries in the region; it consists of having citizens decide directly which projects, services or priorities should be financed by the government with a percentage of the local budget. This mechanism strengthens transparency in the budget, citizen participation and joint governance and accountability, and it guarantees that citizens at risk for exclusion receive more public funds and services, which are no doubt challenges for governance in the zone. The operating mechanism is as follows: once a year, local or regional governments call individuals or civil society organizations to participate in a series of workshops or meetings in which all give their opinion or decide which projects, services or priorities the government should finance with a portion of the percentage of the local budget. These proposals have had a significant impact in Brazil, Peru and Uruguay, where budget allocations have benefited the poorest regions and collectives and responded more effectively to their needs. Local citizen councils These councils started to appear in the eighties, driven by the processes of democratization and decentralization in countries like Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay and Peru. They are mechanisms that allow ordinary citizens to participate in development programmes and policy decisions at the municipal level. They generally bring together actors from different sectors of civil society, such as academics, civil society organizations and the private sector, with local authorities in a single body, in which they collaborate in the creation of public policies or the design of development programmes and plans. Positive outcomes related to these local councils have been documented in Brazil, Colombia and Peru, where marginalized groups are starting to get directly involved in decisions on the public policies that concern them. Citizen collaboration with supreme audit institutions A supreme audit institution is a government body that monitors the expenditure of other governmental bodies. Normally this is an external agency with some autonomy with respect to the government which conducts annual audits of a portion of the expenditure, reports same and, in some cases, imposes penalties. As these institutions cannot audit all public expenditure, citizens have been asked to help in the supervision to improve the scope and quality of the control process. These institutions offer citizens the opportunity to supervise public expenditure actively through telephone hotlines, offices, electronic mail accounts and voice mailboxes that receive citizen complaints about public expenditure or the actions of government agencies. These mechanisms have generated some promising results, for example in Colombia, where the audit institution has noted irregularities thanks to information provided by citizens. Citizen evaluation of public services Throughout Latin America, citizens, at the initiative of both the government and civil society groups, examine the quality and effectiveness of public services, such as justice, water, garbage collection, healthcare, education and housing, through surveys, discussion groups with users or mechanisms such as text messages, telephone hotlines or internet platforms. In Mexico, the Citizen Council for Public Safety and Criminal Justice is a civil society organization that aims to create mechanisms that allow citizens to evaluate public justice and security services in the capital. To collect information, the Council created a system that allowed citizens to report problems such as potholes, broken traffic lights or crimes that occurred due to lack of police intervention through a text message, telephone calls or by filling out online forms. The council sends these reports to the relevant government agencies to attempt to solve the problems. Citizen observatories A citizen observatory is a supervisory body made up of citizens or organizations for identifying and supervising relevant social matters, in addition to evaluating certain policies or programmes. To carry out their 11

14 Club de Madrid task, these observatories use different tools, such as surveys, to collect information on the number of people living below the poverty threshold and compare it to the budget allocated for fighting poverty. The most representative examples of citizen observatories include the Justice Observatory in Mexico, made up of a group of civil society organizations whose objective is to evaluate whether judicial practices respect and guarantee the rights of indigenous peoples and women. The data collected by the observatory have been useful for encouraging these collectives to demand their rights. Another example is the Public Health Observatory of Chile, which conducts analyses and reflects on the health situation of Chilean communities and territories, and on the responses of the state agencies in terms of policies and programmes. In Colombia we should mention the Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Observatory, whose objective is to develop analyses on human rights to improve policy design, which has become a reliable source of information. 12

15 III. A European view 1. Introduction The image and public perception of the European Union (EU) have been seriously damaged by the economic crisis, to the point where the EU is considered part of the problem instead of part of the solution. The two basic features of a democratic system the possibility voters have to not re-elect a particular government and the translation of voters preferences into government actions through elections are not yet evident at the EU level, or they are very partially. In addition, a lack of the empathy, solidarity and reciprocity, essential in democratic politics, is being observed at the European level. In this context, it is not surprising that in the last thirty years the number of voters in European elections has been dropping at the same time as the European Parliament has been acquiring more powers. The question of how democratic credentials and the legitimacy of the EU can be strengthened in a way that is consistent with its unique political structure is still open. Nevertheless, the fundamental reason for existing and Europe s level of ambition must be renewed, especially in response to growing populist pressures. The division between moderate parties working within the system and anti-system political forces (often equivalent to the juxtaposition between pro- and anti-europists) currently characterizes national politics more than the traditional left-right division. Another very prominent factor is the establishment of a series of guardian institutions that barely existed before or played a much more subordinate role than they currently do, which are exerting greater pressure on the decisions taken by elected leaders or legislators. In the first place are the independent central banks that practically dictate financial and economic policy, along with a wide range of independent regulatory agencies that formerly regulated interstate commerce, transport, public health, worker safety, food, medicine, professional ethics, consumer protection, etc. To these agencies have been added electoral and anticorruption commissions in many countries that have been deliberately designed to not be affected by political interference (democracy) and are presided over by experts who are not receptive to the pressure of citizens or governments, or are controlled by those they are supposed to be regulating. The European Union itself has not only its Central Bank but also more than thirty regulatory agencies. It s not surprising that citizens complain that they do not have an effective influence in policy formulation, especially when their politicians hide behind these supranational actors and assert that they have no choice but to obey Washington or Brussels. 2. Internal comparative perspective of the EU. Remaining challenges and future perspectives Diagnosis of the quality of democracy in the EU requires an analysis of the trends in recent years relative to political participation, the rule of law, the strategic capacity and effectiveness of political action, social and political consensus-building, as well as the projection of these tendencies into the future The contributions developed in this section are extracted from the Regional Report for Europe of the Next Generation Democracy project of the Club de Madrid, 2014: 13

16 Club de Madrid a) Political participation Elections In the great majority of countries in the region, electoral processes guarantee free and transparent elections and constitute a stable trend. The Nordic countries and Germany top the list with transparent and open rules for candidacies and a strongly protected right to vote. The majority of the political parties have both public and private financing, which is characterized by transparency. During election periods, the parties and candidates have a balanced level of access to the media. Likewise the processes for presenting candidacies, registering to vote and voting are effective and impartial overall and allow citizens to avail themselves of the courts if they feel discriminated against. However, there are exceptions, such as Romania, where the processes for inclusion in the electoral census for candidates and parties are quite demanding and represent a significant obstacle for new parties and independent candidates. In Bulgaria there were allegations of fraud (not proven) in the 2011 presidential elections and in the 2013 parliamentary elections which have undermined confidence in the political system. In Croatia, the greatest problem with respect to the right to vote has been the excessive number of registered voters who do not actually reside in the country. Some of the oldest western democracies also display some defects, such as France, where the voter registration processes are open to all citizens, but many immigrants and lower class voters do not participate. Another weak point is campaign financing in countries like Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain, which lack adequate control mechanisms with respect to electoral spending and political donations. Association and assembly rights In the majority of European countries, political liberties, particularly the rights of association and assembly, are amply protected and guaranteed as they are an essential part of the political culture. This is true even in ex-communist countries, as demonstrated by the fact that Poland, the Baltic countries and Slovenia and the Czech Republic have developed strong constitutional mechanisms to protect political liberties. Variations are also observed in other countries such as Croatia, where the Public Assembly Act is more restrictive than even in France or the United States. In Romania there are certain legal prohibitions against defamation of the country, which may represent restrictions on assembly rights. In Hungary, the police has tolerated attacks by the extreme right on leftist demonstrators, and in 2011 a law was passed giving public support to religious communities which has given the Catholic Church a privileged position and caused concern over freedom of religion. Freedom of expression Although the freedom of the media and freedom of press are solid in most countries, the trend has been clearly negative in recent years. Hungary, along with other central, eastern and southern European countries, is the clearest example of interference and weakening of media freedom due to a series of controversial laws from 2010 and 2011, passed by Prime Minister Orbán, which strengthen government control over media content and new broadcasting licenses. Moreover, public radio and television have seen their continued existence threatened by the loss of advertising revenue due to the crisis. In addition, many journalists depend financially on media owners, and journalistic standards are often subordinated to their commercial interests and political objectives. In the ex-communist countries, the political actors, economic groups, media owners and journalists form informal networks in which opaque and personal relationships take precedence over professional ethics. These facts clearly threaten then democratic foundation established after the fall of the socialist regimes. Even in western European countries, negative trends can be observed in terms of media independence and pluralism. For example, in Spain the government of the Partido Popular in 2012 modified a previous legal reform that had converted Radiotelevisión Española (RTVE), traditionally manipulated by the government in power, to an autonomous corporation that guaranteed neutrality. In the United Kingdom, there have been a series of scandals in recent years that have exposed the strong links 14

17 Concept note Reforms for improving the quality of democracy and citizen participation between the political establishment and journalists of the Westminster lobby, which may have negatively affected the quality of news coverage. Projections With regard to electoral processes and association/assembly rights, the current trend is expected to remain stable. However, the functional deficits of certain southeastern European countries in voter registration and financing of political parties are not expected to improve in the next few years. Likewise, the high level of press freedom and media pluralism is expected to remain stable in most countries in northern and western Europe, although the relatively high concentration of ownership by private media could cause problems in western democracies. The growth of internet media can be interpreted as a positive trend for press freedom and pluralism. The perspective of the central, eastern and southeastern European region is more difficult to predict, but the negative trend is expected to continue in the short term, as structural changes in the relations between the political elite, media owners and journalists have been too drastic. Even if the economic situation improves, it is unlikely that journalists and editors, who currently depend so heavily on their financial backers, can resume exercising truly independent journalism. b) Rule of law Separation of powers In the states of the European Union, it is possible to speak of a clear separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial powers which is not typically compromised if there is a government with an absolute majority that wishes to favour its political interests. The situation in some countries of southeastern European is quite different: in recent years, there have been cases in which the parties in power have used their parliamentary majorities to weaken the balance of powers, as the cases of Hungary and Romania demonstrate. Thus in 2011, the conservative government in Hungary, led by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, used its majority to promote a new constitution, without reaching consensus with the opposition or prior debate in society. In Romania, the social democratic/national-liberal coalition led by Prime Minister Victor Ponta reduced the authority of the parliament and constitutional court in his fight against President Traian Basescu, who campaigned for reforming the judicial system and implementing effective anti-corruption laws. Independent judiciary In most European countries, the courts are independent, effectively supervise the executive power, and ensure that the government and administration act according to the law. Ex-communist countries like Estonia, Lithuania and Poland have made great progress in recent years, to the point of becoming countries with a strong judiciary. On the other hand, in Bulgaria informal political pressure and corruption often represent obstacles to effective and independent action by the judiciary. Romania is also confronting corruption in the judiciary and deficient training of judges. Civil rights The protection of personal liberty, the right to life and personal security, access to justice and the principle of equality before the law constitute the cornerstone of the constitutional frameworks in most European countries. Although in some countries, the parameters of civil rights and political liberties seem to have changed after the attacks of 11th September, with a tendency to give security priority over traditional liberties, this tension has not affected the high level of civil rights protection. Many countries, including the Nordic ones, Germany and Ireland, are models to be followed for their effective protection of civil rights. Nevertheless, we also find exceptions that indicate structural, legal 15

18 Club de Madrid and constitutional defects in Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania, where violations of civil rights still occur and judicial protection of same is inefficient. Projections It is expected that both the northern and western European countries will remain stable and maintain their high levels of democracy and constitutional structures. A stable trend is also forecast for most countries of southern Europe and many ex-communist countries, specifically the Baltic countries and Poland. However, the trend in the eastern and southeastern European countries is more difficult to predict due to problems that have arisen in the separation of powers in recent years in Hungary and Romania, where greater erosion of constitutional principles may occur. c) Strategic capacity and efficiency of political action Strategic priorities Traditionally, strategic priorities and long-term planning have been well integrated in the processes of policy design in European countries, especially in the Nordic countries and the United Kingdom. Latvia, Lithuania and Poland have also developed solid institutional structures and long-term decisionmaking procedures. Likewise, the commissions of non-governmental experts that advise the people responsible are an important part of the design of plans and legislation in Denmark and Sweden. Nevertheless, the strategic capacity of many European governments is underdeveloped (at least from an intraregional perspective) due to strong institutional dependencies and/or the internal political logics of coalition governments. In Germany, for example, the strong autonomy of the ministries, the lack of unified thinking and party politics are the main elements that undermine executive capacity. Just as there are no clear regional patterns or country groups showing specific strengths or weaknesses, except for the successful Nordic countries, there are none for the countries with the greatest deficiencies in terms of strategic priorities and long-term planning. Implementation In the area of policy implementation, there is no clearly positive or negative regional trend. Governments with a strong strategic planning capacity, such as the Nordic ones and the United Kingdom, execute their policies efficiently. However, this execution can be affected by changing political preferences, the short-term thinking typical of electoral cycles, legislative gridlock and coalition politics. The most obvious problems can be observed in Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Malta, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia: poor functioning of ministries, inefficient ministerial bureaucracies, insufficient financing of local governments, and central governments that lack administrative capacity to ensure that the decentralization of public services (healthcare, public transportation and waste management) meets the standards established at the national level. Efficient use of assets Many countries of the European Union, especially in the north and in western Europe, make efficient use of human, financial and organizational resources, as the both ministerial bureaucracies and administrations are well equipped and have solid organizational structures that ensure interministerial coordination and effective and efficient policy implementation. Countries that receive high marks in this sense are the Baltics and Poland, while Cyprus, Greece and Malta and southeastern Europe receive lower marks. This is especially true of Hungary, where the government, through repeated and drastic institutional reorganization, has undermined institutional memory and experience, as well as best practices in administration. Anti-corruption policy The overall trend is quite positive, although the results of anti-corruption policies vary greatly in the different European countries. Traditionally Denmark, Finland and Sweden, and to a lesser degree 16

19 Concept note Reforms for improving the quality of democracy and citizen participation Austria and Luxembourg, are at the head of the list for prevention and effective containment of corruption, as both the state and society avoid letting public servants and politicians accept bribes by applying a wide variety of mechanisms such as audits of public expenditure, regulation of party financing, access to information by the media and citizens, declarations of assets, conflict of interest rules and codes of conduct. Although the level of corruption in Belgium and Germany is low, there have been cases, as until 2013 the rules for declaration of assets by members of parliament were quite lax. In France, corruption continues to be a serious problem despite various legal reforms and new anti-corruption measures adopted in recent years. In many southern, eastern and southeastern European countries, the panorama is very different, as numerous corruption scandals involving politicians show that the use of public office for private gain is widespread and even tolerated by the political elite. Corrupt politicians are rarely denounced by journalists or investigated by the police. The most noteworthy cases are Croatia, where Prime Minister Ivo Sanader was convicted after a two-year trial, and Slovenia, where Prime Minister Janez Jansa was sentenced to two years in prison, in addition to other similar ones in Slovakia, Czech Republic and Romania. These scandals have caused protests and given rise to new political parties that consider the fight against corruption as their main political objective. On the other hand, Greece has made great efforts to combat corruption since 2011, which has increased the pressure exerted by the judicial authorities to actively investigate politicians allegedly implicated in money laundering. A law has also been passed to reduce tax evasion by autonomous workers and professionals. Projections Although in terms of the quality of political management, it is difficult to predict a clear trend for the entire region due to its heterogeneity, substantial changes are not expected in most countries in the middle term. However, the particular situation of many eastern and southeastern European countries clearly indicates that the situation is not going to improve in the near future. In particular, the high level of corruption present in the highest political spheres, in addition to deficient administrative capacity for long-term planning and implementation, will most likely continue to affect the political systems of these subregions for years to come. The new protest movements and parties formed in many eastern and southeastern European countries in the context of corruption scandals may pressure government elites to exercise greater political integrity, but this possibility cannot be conclusively asserted. d) Social and political consensus-building Conflict management Social tensions and conflicts are at a moderate or low level in the majority of the consolidated democracies of the European Union. Some countries in the region, particularly the countries of northern Europe, tend to promote a broad social consensus in the policy planning phase. For their part, many continental European countries, although with much more heterogeneous populations than their counterparts in the north, are finding considerable success when it comes to reaching social consensus through consultation mechanisms and the participation of societal actors in the political process. However, the increase of separatist movements in countries like Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom pose ever more serious problems in the area of consensus. Civil society participation The societies most capable of building consensus are found in northern Europe (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), but also in many continental countries with neo-corporatist structures (Austria, Belgium, Germany), where there is a long tradition of inclusion of civil society in all the phases of the policy cycle. Thus, governments actively and intensively consult with societal actors such as trade unions, business associations, leading companies, religious communities, social and environmental groups, which enhances the quality of government policies and guarantees their effectiveness. 17

20 Club de Madrid In other countries, societal actors also participate to a greater or lesser degree in consultations and decision-making, although the degree of participation varies considerably from one country to another. Thus in Greece (due to the economic crisis) and Hungary (under the Orbán government), participation by civil society through consultation has deteriorated greatly. In Ireland, Spain and Portugal, the respective governments consult much less with societal and economic actors than before the crisis. Similarly, the social participation processes could clearly be better in many other countries, such as the United Kingdom, where there is little tradition of systematically incorporating organized civil society in decision-making processes. In Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, societal actors are consulted frequently, but the procedures are perceived as overly formal and inefficient. Lastly, in some southern, eastern and southeastern European countries, civil society participation is characterized by being selective (Slovenia under the Jansa government or the Czech Republic under the Necas government), not methodical (Cyprus), or largely ineffective (Bulgaria). Projections Given the heterogeneity of Europe, the perspectives for societal and political consensus-building are varied. In northern Europe as well as western and eastern Europe, the level of participation of societal groups in decision-making processes and the levels of consensus will remain relatively stable. In some countries (Germany) it has been observed that civic movements and grassroots organizations are increasingly strong, and they could lead to even greater openness of political systems through new forms of participation and involvement of societal groups. On the other hand, it is much more difficult to predict the prospects for the crisis-afflicted countries in southern Europe, where societal consultation and involvement in political processes has been weakened. It is possible that if Greece, Portugal and Spain manage to emerge from the crisis, participation in political processes will also increase; but if the negative economic situation persists, there will be more social conflict and political polarization will increase, specifically that caused by the separatist movements in Spain. 3. Topics for discussion As topics for discussion, we propose some reforms and initiatives that have been implemented in countries of the European Union aimed at improving the quality of democracy. Among the most prominent, we can cite the following: The referendums and initiatives, organized at both the national and regional level, for consulting the population on different topics perhaps constitute the most widespread innovation. While some of these referendums are merely for consultation purposes, it is also true that they have provided citizens with a more direct channel for participation in decision-making processes. The use of primary elections as a mechanism for selecting a candidate in a political party has always been a peculiarity of United State politics, but in recent decades this practice has spread to Europe as well. This mechanism has also led to what are known as open primaries in which the two leading candidates, regardless of their party affiliation, become the nominees for the election. Another reform that could affect the partiocracy is the NOTA voting mode, which stands for None of the Above and allows the voter to indicate disapproval of the candidates by marking a box on the ballot. In some versions of NOTA, if a sufficient number of citizens mark this box, a new election must be held. Public financing of political parties represents another relatively recent innovation with the objective of counteracting the pressure exerted by rich citizens and private corporations that contribute disproportionately by making contribution by the state obligatory. The fact that control of private contributions tends to be lax gives rise to persistent allegations of corruption. Quotas for women, both as electoral candidates and eventually as elected representatives, has been a standard practice in recent decades. In some cases, this is a legal obligation included in the constitution. In other cases, the political parties themselves, especially those on the left but increasingly also those on 18

21 Concept note Reforms for improving the quality of democracy and citizen participation the right, have imposed quotas. Another feature is zipping, which consists of alternating male and female candidates. Some countries have passed laws so that half or a smaller proportion of seats are reserved for women. It is less common for other social minorities (ethnic, linguistic or religious) that have suffered discrimination in the past to benefit from this policy. Likewise these efforts have been transferred to the formation of governments: the informal rule that half of ministries should be led by women has started to take root in many European countries. Many democracies have transferred decision-making power to city halls, provinces or regions formerly governed by central governments. While large-scale federalism seems to be in decline, this more flexible form of local government should allow citizens to be better informed about who governs in their region and to demand accountability. A frequent complaint about the most longstanding democracies is that they are short-sighted, i.e. that they are subject to the electoral cycle and swings of public opinion, and therefore incapable of anticipating future problems and preventing their negative impact. In past decades, there was a veritable explosion of future commissions, some within governments and others in think tanks and NGOs, whose purpose was evaluation by a group of experts of the final cost and consequences of proposed legislation. In some places the figure of the ombudsman for future generations has even been created to perform this task habitually. The most longstanding democracies assume that citizens are sufficiently informed about the behaviour of their political leaders and that representatives have a reasonable idea of what voters want. A recent and interesting measure is the proliferation of transparency laws, which provide citizens and their associations with access to the materials used by governments. We know that this access takes time and requires abilities that not all of the population possesses, and that the degree of vigilance of governments has increased exponentially. However, this measure only contributes modestly to guaranteeing the transparency on which government accountability is based. The advances in communication technology are starting to have a significant impact on the practices of the most deeply rooted democracies due to its low cost, widespread distribution and the personal anonymity which have given citizens access to sources of information that are difficult to control or censor by the established authorities and which frequently expose compromising behaviour by governments. Both parties and political leaders have been forced to use these new technologies and, in some cases, they have used them effectively to raise funds and mobilize their followers. In the meantime, wide segments of civil society have used these technologies to create virtual units of collective action that are often critical of authorities. The next step in this technological transformation has already emerged on certain websites, and it consists of the use of electronic communication to influence in the nomination of candidates and the formation of party platforms, to unify personal preferences with the positions of parties and candidates (known as smart-voting) and lastly to cast a ballot. Some countries have extended this form of electronic democracy in a sort of electronic government by providing offices or kiosks to citizens where they can contact agencies, download forms and submit complaints. Some countries have introduced novel financing systems for civil society organizations. Thus, citizens have the possibility of assigning a fixed percentage of their taxes to an approved list of associations, institutions or agencies of their choice, which requires these organizations to compete publicly and actively for these funds by divulging what they have done and plan to do in the future. The distribution of these funds is not only a source of funding for these organizations but also an approximate indicator of their legitimacy and also reveals citizen preferences that would otherwise be hidden. The nature and role of the electoral body is also starting to change, as demonstrated by the trend towards lowering the voting age to sixteen. In addition, citizens who live in other countries can vote through their respective embassies or consulates. Foreigners who are legal residents are given some voting and consultation rights, especially at the local level, and sometimes it is easier for them to acquire citizenship in their 19