IPSA Conference 2014, Montreal

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1 IPSA Conference 2014, Montreal Panel: Political Representation in Crisis Europe (I): Campaigns, Issues, Ideology and EU Integration Paper: Levels and Styles of Political Participation in Europe: before and after the 2008 crisis José Manuel Leite Viegas, Conceição Pequito e Inês Amador Abstract Before the financial and economic crisis started in 2008, the theoretical and empirical literature indicated some trends of change in the patterns of political participation in the majority of European countries, which were in the direction of smaller institutional political participation, particularly in political parties, and increased in designated "consumer engagement" and participation via the internet. With the trigger of the crisis of 2008, greater participation of protest, particularly in southern European countries most affected by the crisis and by the financial austerity measures that followed. In some cases, notably in Portugal, there was also a change in social segments involved in the protest participation, inter alia, the increased participation of protest of higher age segments. In this paper we analyze the political participation in different European countries, before and after the trigger of the crisis of In this evolutionary analysis we give particular attention to the participation of protest and what happened in the countries of southern Europe, most affected by the crisis, and the financial austerity measures that followed. It is intended also to know whether or not there was a change in social segments involved in the protest participation. This will essentially be quantitative analysis and on the basis of the European Social Survey data from 2002 to

2 Less participative citizens, or citizens with a different style of political participation? José Manuel Leite Viegas, Conceição Pequito and Inês Amador Index Introduction 1. Political participation and Democracy 2. Political participation concept, hypotheses and empirical operationalization 3. Political participation in Portugal and European countries longitudinal comparative analysis 3.1 Conventional political participation Portugal in the context of European Countries (2002 to 2010) 3.2 Non-conventional political participation Portugal in the context of European countries (2002 to 2012) 3.3 Political participation in Portugal before and after the financial bailout (2008 and 2012) 4. Explanations on institutional political participation and on protest in Portugal, before and after the crisis (2008 and 2012) Conclusions 2

3 Introduction The analysis, in the present day, of political participation in European democracies, namely in Portugal, should be able to distinguish the tendencies in structural changes from the conjectural aspects connected to the economical and financial crisis triggered in late What we designate as structural tendencies is particularly associated with the economical, social and cultural changes that became evident in the last decades of the XX century and went on into the XXI century. We are talking about tendencies such as the increased education, the growing levels of social well-being, environmental concern, widespread internet connection access, followed by the increasing individual action, the decreasing weight of ideology and growing political pragmatism, the volatility of the vote, among other tendencies that will be discussed in the following section (Inglehart, 1977; Norris, 1999; Schweisguth, 2004;. Dalton, 1996). Nowadays, all attention given to political participation is more addressed towards the conjuncture, and to the effects that the crisis had upon such behavior. Some studies already conducted, have focused on electoral behavior, enhancing an increase in economical votes and its consequences on changes that occurred on Parliamentary composition and government political orientation levels (Marsh and Mikhaylov, 2012; Martín and Urquizu- Sancho, 2012; Bosco and Verney, 2012; Lewis-Beck and Nadeau, 2012; Freire and Santana, 2012). The effects that the crisis had regarding non-electoral participation have been less approached, but analysts and media have pointed out certain aspects in protest action: a greater involvement from older age segments, demonstrating along with the younger; a larger number of middle class elements involved, public demonstrations organizing entities originating in spontaneous groups from civil society, along with other demonstrations led by traditional vindicating organizations. (Baumgarten, 2013). It is under this synthetically presented framework, that we will develop this work on political participation in Portugal in the XXI century, in a European comparative perspective. These are the research s main goals: 1) Comparing levels of political participation in Portugal to those verified in Southern, Central, Northern and East European countries, on the decade spanning from 2002 to ) Checking if, in this decade, any changes have been noted in political participation patterns in countries across Europe, comparing them with Portugal. 3

4 3) Analyzing any shifts in political participation in Portugal before and after the financial bailout (2008 and 2012). 4) Analyzing the determinants for the institutional political participation and protest participation, before and after the financial bailout in Portugal. This is how the following text will develop. On section 1, we will revise some literature regarding political participation, pointing towards our theoretical analysis board. On section 2, we will present to you the adopted concept of political participation, as well as its dimensions, followed by the hypotheses and the operational and methodological options. On section 3, we will do the first empirical analysis on the evolution of political participation in Portugal and in European countries, using data from the European Social Survey from 2002 to This section includes a further thorough study of political participation in Portugal before and after the financial bailout. On section 4 we will present to you a study of the determinants of political participation, before and after the bailout. And finaly the conclusions will be presented. 4

5 1. Political participation and Democracy The Almond and Verba (1963) work on civic culture and democracy is an essential theoretical and empirical reference when it comes to political participation in the post World War II period. According to these authors, this would be the political posture to best fit democracy. Bearing in mind that the authors concept of civic culture included certain limits to political participation, in order to insure governability, we must acknowledge that it surpasses the vision of the elitist conception of democracy, which resumed all political participation to electoral moments and processes (Schumpeter 1996 (1942)). This concept of political participation that considers other forms of citizen participation, other than the electoral participation, aiming at influencing governmental decision, came to be adopted by several authors who followed this same perspective, in their empirical research (Verba and Nie, 1972:2; Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978: 46). This concept of political participation, despite being widely spread, soon faced other propositions, in which the citizens will, expressed through different forms of political participation, was highly valued. For Barber (1984: 151), the participation of the representative democracy matched a weak model of democracy, to which he opposed a strong model, with intense and broadened political participation, which would eventually climax in the Citizens self-government model, unlike the representative government model (Barber, 1984: 151). Even though they did not accomplish this model of democracy, which goes to the point of denying political representation in the name of direct democracy, there were other authors, such as Pateman (1970: 43), who suggested participation as a primal and nuclear vector of democracy. In either case, more democracy implies, hence, more participation (Lijphart, 1997). In a more analytical and empirical field we must stress, for its repercussion, Inglehart s proposition (1997) of distinguishing materialist and post-materialist values, which includes the presupposition of expanding these latest political values to more educated generations, who lived their youth in a safer environment and greater economical well being the postwar generation. The participation, political and social, is clearly a post-materialist value, whereby a growing adherence to this political value was expected in developed democracies. In more recent years, other authors have pointed towards different transformations in citizens attitudes and behaviors, with influence in political participation, moving to the individualization and atomization of action (Dalton e Wattemberg, 1993), and to the appearance of the critical citizen, ideologically less aligned (Norris, 1999; Schweisguth, 2004) or to the decline of party relation as a support for political participation (Dalton, 1996; 5

6 Wren and MacElwain, 2007). The consequences that these attitude and behavior shifts have had in political participation are, however, contradictory. Although recognizing the civic potentiality of participation and its central part in democratic operation, some authors stress the low investment in political and social participation, and even, the decline of some forms of more institutional participation (Brady, 1999; Putman, 2000; Viegas and Faria, 2009; Viegas, Belchior and Seiceira, 2010; Teorel, Torcal and Montero, 2007). For some, this decline in participation reveals a wider phenomenon of citizens detachment from their democratic political institutions (Montero, Gunther and Torcal, 1997; Newton and Morris, 2000; Magalhães, 2004). Meanwhile, other works consider that the decrease of a more institutional and continuous participation would be compensated by new, less conventional (Montero and Torgal, 1994; Liphjart, 1997), or more instrumental and time located (Viegas, Faria e Santos, 2010) ways of participation. Some authors even mention the emergence of consumer participation, given their individual and instrumental features (Teorel, Torcal and Montero, 2007). The considerations that were thoroughly made regarding the evolution of the theories of political participation along the last decades, related to the different normative concepts of democracy, and also the references to empirical reception of political participation, refer to a development or tendency for structural change, occurred in the last decades. The emergence of the financial and economical crisis after 2008 substantially alters many assumptions of development in the democracies in stake. Some of the effects that economical and social crisis conjuncture had in political participation, especially in electoral participation, were already mentioned in the introduction. One of the most prominent is related to the greater importance conferred by citizens to financial factors, through tax raise and unemployment rates, along with the reduction of wages and salaries. All of this leads, in terms of vote orientation, to an increased importance of the so called economic vote. (Marsh and Mikhaylov, 2012; Bosco and Verney, 2012; Lewis-Beck and Nadeau, 2012; Freire and Santana, 2012). It may also be logical to think that these economical motivations may be felt in non-electoral participation, especially in protest participation. A simple observation at media information, whether in Portugal or any other Southern Europe country state to that fact, and the small number of studies confirm it (Baumgarten, 2013). One presupposition of many of the previously referred theories about participation, is that developed democracies grew solid based on social models of stability and development, increasingly more educated citizens, with better social security and blooming standards of 6

7 living. This would be a continuous process which would support democracy and its deepening. So, the growing economical and financial crisis deeply shook these assumptions. Yet, we don t even know if we stand before a cyclical economical crisis of capitalism, with a few years, or a relatively long period of economical depression. This doesn t mean that the results will necessarily point to a return to the status quo ante, but there are already symptoms, although not all of them validated by empirical research, of changes in citizens behaviors and attitudes, namely when it comes to political participation. 2. Political participation - concept, hypotheses and empirical operationalization 2.1 The concept of political participation: dimensions and empirical operationalization The concept of political participation, and its operationalization, has evolved in the last decades accordingly with the previously mentioned theories. If we think of Verba and Nie s work (1972: 2) as the primal reference, political participation is understood to be the activities developed by citizens more or less focused on influencing the ruler s decision making (Verba and Nie, 1972: 2). These actions take place in the legal and institutional field, thus making its participation indicators accrue, logically, from this understanding. The social transformations occurred in the 60s and the extension of protest to other sectors, especially the students, would necessarily cause changes in the theoretical and methodological instruments of analysis and reception of political participation. Barnes et al. Empirical study (1979) is a paradigm of this change. These authors later included some forms of demonstration in political participation, which used to be excluded from such studies, the so called non-conventional forms of participation, such as legal and illegal protest participation forms (occupation of houses, obstructing roads, etc.). The other forms of participation, previously mentioned, were included in the so called conventional participation. Change isn t verified only in the new mentioned forms of participation, but also in their targets. Although Verba and Nie (1972) state that political participation intends to influence values location in society, the target is in fact, in the empirical studies conducted by these authors, the governmental decision makers or members of the State machine. The form of participation known as product boycott clearly reflects what we mean by new targets of political participation (Barnes, et al, 1979). While previously the only targets of political participation were the political decision makers, now the big corporations and 7

8 organizations, mercantile or non-profit, but all detaining power to allocate resources in society are added as targets. In this study, we ll consider the broad concept of political participation, which means, encompassing the activities that aim at influencing the choice of rulers and their decisions, but also the activities that intend to influence decisions made by big corporations or associations, profit or non-profit, with economical and social power (Viegas, Belchior and Seiceira, 2010: 21). There are multiple propositions of types and forms of participation that derive from all these theoretical and empirical developments (Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978; Milbrath and Goel, 1982; Montero and Torgal, 1994; Teorel, Torcal and Montero, 2007; Viegas and Faria, 2007). In this study we will consider forms of participation grouped in the following dimensions of political participation: 1) politically motivated institutional participation; 2) socially motivated institutional participation; 3) protest participation; and 4) new ways of participation. Still, all indicators used will depend on the selected databases. The comparative and longitudinal analysis of political participation in Portugal in a European context will be made based on the European Social Survey data (years of 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012). In this case, we ll consider two types of participation: conventional, encompassing the first two dimensions of participation mentioned above, and the non-conventional participation, encompassing the latest two dimensions of participation (see Table 1). The indicators used will be, in this longitudinal analysis, those available in this database and indicated in Table 1. All analysis made with aggregate data will match both types of participation: conventional participation and non-conventional participation. The first type concerns institutional participation (political and social) and the second type concerns protest participation, encompassing traditional forms of protest as well as the new forms of participation. 8

9 Table 1. Types, dimensions and forms of political participation (for the comparative study based on the ESS, from 2002 to 2012) Types of participation Dimensions Participation in political Conventional institutions Participation Forms - Contacting with a politician or ruler - Working in a political party or movement Non-conventional participation Participation in social institutions Participation in protests - Using electoral campaign material -Working in a social organization or association - Signing petitions - Participating in a public demonstration New ways of participation -Boycotting certain products The analysis of public participation, in Portugal, before and after the 2011 financial bailout will be made, firstly, with data from the 2008 ESS, and the 2012 ESS. Secondly, this analysis will be made based on data from inquiries conducted within the following researches: 1) Portuguese Parliament Members in a Comparative Perspective: Elections, Leadership and Processes of Representation (coordinated by André Freire, with JM Leite Viegas, for the 2008 data; 2) Elections, Leadership and Accountability: Political Representation in Portugal in a longitudinal and comparative perspective (coordinated by André Freire, with Marco Lisi and José Manuel Leite Viegas), for the 2012 data). The same conception of political participation was used on both national investigations mentioned above, but revealing bigger disintegration in the forms of participation than on those present in the data from the European Social Survey (see Table 2). 9

10 Table 2. Dimensions and forms of participation (National inquiries of 2008 and 2012) Dimensions of political participation Politically motivated institutional participation Socially motivated institutional participation Participation in protests New ways of political participation Forms of political participation Contacting with a politician or ruler Collaborating with a political party Participating in a political meeting or rally Pasting posters, handing flyers Collaborating with a civic or social association Contacting or appearing on the media Writing a letter to a newspaper Signing a petition Participating in a legal demonstration Participating in legal strikes Participating in illegal strikes Participating in the occupation of buildings or factories Blocking roads or railways Causing damage to public spaces Deliberately buying a product... Boycotting products or services Participating in a discussion forum on the internet Collaborating with a civic movement to stand up for a cause The explanatory analysis of participation will be made with data from the inquiries conducted in the Portuguese population mentioned on the previous researches (2008 and 2012 data), considering the aggregation of forms of participation that define the politically motivated institutional participation and the protests participation as depending variables. 2.2 Hypotheses The hypotheses presented next refer to three different purposes. The first one is about the evolution of political participation in Portugal in the decade between 2002 and 2012, comparatively to other European countries. When it comes to this purpose, we shall consider some previously conducted studies (Viegas and Faria, 2007; Teorel, Torcal and Montero, 2007; Viegas, Belchior and Seiceira, 2010) and our hypotheses are: 10

11 H1 The conventional political participation in Portugal is inferior to political participation in countries from Northern and Central Europe, being equivalent to political participation in countries from the Southern Europe, and superior, in some of its forms, to political participation in East European countries; showing a pattern constant along the decade. H2 The forms of socially motivated political participation in institutions will be the ones in which the difference between the values found for Portugal, relatively to other Central European countries, is shorter. When it comes to purpose 2), meaning, the evolutionary tendencies of institutional and protest participation in Europe and in Portugal, our hypotheses consider what was previously mentioned regarding the detachment between European citizens and their political parties or general politics. It also bears in mind what has been happening in South European countries on the end of the decade. Hence, the hypotheses are: H3 Most European countries, apart from the Nordic ones, while including Portugal, reveal, in this decade, a tendency of decrease in institutional participation. H4 Protest participation shall follow the same tendencies indicated on the previous hypothesis, except for the values of 2010 and 2012, when an increase in protest participation is expected, especially in South European countries. When it comes to the hypotheses related to explanatory factors, before and after the bailout, our hypotheses consider structural and conjectural factors. The first follow the theoretical literature and the repeatedly obtained results on this matter, which states them as the most educated individuals, the ones who trust political institutions the most, more interested in politics and with a stronger ideological identity, the ones who will tend to reveal a larger institutional participation. In terms of conjectural change, our hypotheses consider the signs coming from South European societies, Portugal included, which reveal increasing protest participation, extended to the older age, more educated, higher income segments, and with worse evaluations of the economical situation. Hence, our hypotheses are: H5 The explanatory factors for the institutional participation in Portugal follow the same pattern before and after the bailout, meaning, the best predictors will be education, social integration, and political integration, measured by variables of relation to a certain political party and interest in politics. H6 The younger and elder segments, just like the middle classes (segments with more education and higher working income) will prove more important in explaining protest participation in 2012 than in

12 3. Political participation in Portugal and European countries longitudinal comparative analysis 3.1Conventional political participation - Portugal in the context of European countries ( ) Data from the last decade, show that political participation in its different forms is, in Portugal, globally low (Teorell, Torcal and Montero, 2007; Viegas and Faria, 2009). Yet, these same studies reveal that, in certain forms or comparatively to other countries, the differences could be smaller or it could even happen, that the participation values registered in Portugal could be superior to the ones registered in other countries, in those ways of participation. We mean countries like the new Eastern Europe democracies, but also, in some cases, South European countries. The same things happen in forms of participation such as the contact or voluntary work with organizations, or making donations. In other cases, a political participation in Portugal is low, but the same thing happens in European countries, such as: working in a political party, going into strikes or fundraising (Teorel, Torcal and Montero, 2007). Now, let s see what the ESS data indicate for the 2002 to 2012 period. Table 3 refers to conventional participation and table 4 refers to non-conventional participation, with the aggregation of the forms indicated in the tables legends. In order to facilitate we will consider four groups of countries: 1) Nordic, this group includes Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland; 2) Western and Central European countries, this group includes the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, France and Switzerland; 3) South European countries, Portugal, Spain; 4) Eastern Europe countries, this group includes Poland, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Estonia. 12

13 Table 3. Longitudinal analysis of conventional political participation in Europe, sorted by countries, (average values, from 2002 to 2012) (%) Net Change Average ( ) Year Sig. Belgium Bulgaria Switzerland Czech Republic Germany Denmark Estonia Spain Finland France United Kingdom Hungary the Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Sweden Slovenia SOURCE: European Social Survey 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010 and NOTE 1. The index for the conventional political participation is the result of the joint following variables: Personally contacting a politician or ruler + Working in a political party or group of action + Working on another association or organization + Using electoral campaign materials (badge / sticker). NOTE 2. Cronbach's Alpha =0,558 When it comes to conventional political participation, Portugal is far below the average of the West European countries, and that difference is even more obvious when compared to Nordic countries. This group of countries presents average participations levels spanning from 15% in Denmark to 23% in Norway. In the group of the West and North European countries, those average levels range from 10% in the United Kingdom to 14% in France. In South European countries, in which Portugal is included, the average conventional political participations spans from 5% in Portugal to 11 % in Spain. The East European new democracies group is the only one with an inferior average level of conventional participation than Portugal, with Bulgaria (4%), and another country sharing the same level, Hungary (5%). All others, Slovenia (6%), the Czech Republic (12%), Estonia (7%) and Poland (6%), present average conventional participation levels superior to the Portugal, even though, in some cases, that is a slender margin. Still, it is important to stress that, even in the countries with higher conventional political participation, the levels of participation are evolving to a decrease, especially in the later part of the period, such as Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, also registering, less significant decreases in countries such as Switzerland, Germany and the 13

14 United Kingdom. Despite having a low conventional participation level, Portugal also indicates a decrease in such type of participation, given the fact that, starting with an 8% level in 2002, reaches as low as 3% in Yet, if we consider only the years of 2008 and 2012, we find that there is a stabilization of political participation in Portugal, or even, slight increases. Portugal stands stable with low levels in this change. The results are also in line with the presented hypotheses, when it comes to the theoretical literature on this matter. This is the type of political participation marked by a more continuous and traditional character associated to a larger institutional integration that folds away from the critical citizen model emergent in these democracies and previously mentioned: more pragmatic, instrumental, less ideological, more politically and socially mutable (Norris, 1999; Dalton, 1996)). In this aspect, Portugal isn t far from other countries in terms of trend, though the absolute participation levels are lower than those found in other Western European democracies, while comparing it better with Eastern European democracies. 3.2 Non-conventional political participation Portugal in context with European countries (2002 to 2012) Now let s look at the average levels of non-conventional political participation in Portugal for the period of 2002 to 2012 (Table 4). Portugal presents the lowest average level, 4%, of non-conventional political participation in this period, along with Bulgaria (4%) and Hungary (4%). In this type of participation, the biggest difference between Portugal and other countries is also registered relatively to the Nordic countries, with levels that range from 20% in Finland to 28% in Sweden. Yet, the West and Central European countries also register higher levels, from 15% in Belgium to 25% in France. Now, if we consider the South European countries, the group in which we take part, we ll find that Spain (19%) evidences superior levels than Portugal (4%). 14

15 Table 4. Longitudinal analysis of non-conventional political participation in Europe, sorted by countries,(average levels, from 2002 to 2012) Net change Average ( ) Year Sig. Belgium Bulgaria Switzerland Czech Republic Germany Denmark Estonia Spain Finland France United Kingdom Hungary the Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Sweden Slovenia SOURCE: European Social Survey 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010 and NOTE 1. The index for the nonconventional political participation is a result of the joint following variables: Signing a petition + participating in a legal public demonstration + boycotting certain products. NOTE 2. Cronbach's Alpha = The results partially met our expectations. We predicted a stable framework for nonconventional participation until the beginning of the crisis and an increase towards the end of the period. In fact, we find a level stabilization in most countries, whether it happens with high or medium levels, such as Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, or it happens with low levels, such as Estonia (5%) and Slovenia (6%). Hungary defines a unique situation, of decreasing non-conventional participation, especially towards the end of the analyzed period. The remaining countries, in which Portugal is included, evidence some increase in non-conventional participation, especially significant in the Spanish case, ranging from 14% in 2008 to 26% in 2012, but increases are also registered in the Czech Republic, going from 6% in 2006 to 13% in 2012, in Germany, from 19% in 2006 to 26% in 2012, in Bulgaria, from 3% in 2006 to 6% in 2012, in Estonia, from 3% in 2004 to 7% in 2012, in Poland, from 4% in 2006 to 6% in Portugal evidences an increase in non-conventional participation in this period, from 3% in 2004, to 6% in This increase, although a small one, is registered towards the end of the period. What reading can be made from these results? First of all, we must warn you about one thing. Despite analyzing the effects of the crisis, we mustn t be limited to this conjectural aspect. The crisis has differentiated effects, according to 15

16 each country s experience of the crisis and, most importantly, according to the structural reality of each country s national situation, in socio-cultural and political fields. Democracies with continuous higher levels of participation stand upon a pattern that shares some common features among each other, namely a precocious modernization, strong democratic tradition, long periods of social, political and economical stability, and in many cases, a strong protesting tradition. It s these features, less present in East European new democracies and, also in Portugal that will explain the passive character of these democracies, when it comes to political participation. The backgrounds for the installment of democracy in Portugal, in 1974, aren t particularly favorable for a political participation culture. The installment of the republic in 1910 took place in a country with high levels of illiteracy, census vote and delays in economical modernization. This republic period was a very troubled time, with several coups d état, clearly unfavorable for citizens to absorb values like tolerance, mutual respect and democracy. If we consider the National Dictatorship ( ) and Salazar and Marcelo Caetano s New State ( ), we are facing the longest authoritarian regime in Western Europe, in the XX century, counting 48 years of lifespan. Well, this longevity was based in authoritarian values, and antiparliamentary and antiparty attitudes contrary to the most elementary civic and political liberties. Autonomous citizen participation was perceived with suspicion and it was strongly repressed, in case it didn t derive from the actual political regime s ideas. But not everything is made of differences, while comparing Portugal to Western European countries. In fact, if we don t heed to the absolute values of participation, but to the evolutionary tendencies, we will find that there are similarities. Conventional participation also tended to decrease in this period in several more developed democracies, except in the 2012 levels. This tendency, previously analyzed, matches structural changes in modern democracies, to which Portugal wasn t immune. The increase in non-conventional participation towards the end of the period is a result that Portugal shares with several European countries, but this aspect shall be approached in a more adequate moment. Following this line, we could say that, if on one hand Portugal evidences features of a delayed modernization, on the other hand it seems to keep up with the vicissitudes of more advanced democracies, via their more developed sectors, closer to Central Europe. 16

17 3.3 Political participation in Portugal before and after the financial bailout (2008 and 2012) Previous analysis referred to the relatively long, 10 year, period: 2002 to Yet, some variation in political participation has been already observed, especially in non-conventional participation, towards the end of the period, when the economical and financial crisis was already affecting Europe. For now we will pay special attention to this final period, from 2008 to 2012, and to Portugal. Despite the fact that the crisis spread all over Europe, its consequences were particularly severe to citizens from countries that underwent financial bailouts, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and also Spain, although in this case, the bailout was limited to banks only. Still, impact was severe in this country too. This experience is still relatively recent in order for us to have detailed results on the effects of the crisis. Existing studies are focused on election results: government changes, the growth of populist and far-right parties (Martin and Urquizu-Sancho, 2012). In voting motivations, electoral analysis stress the importance acquired by economical factors with conjectural nature (Freire and Santana-Pereira, 2012; Bosco and Verney, 2012; Marsh and Mikhaylov, 2012; Lewis-Beck and Nadeau, 2012). In non-electoral participation, the focus has been on protest, especially in the new organization forms and in the included social segments (Baumgarten, 2013). In a first moment, we ll use the already analyzed data from the 2008 and 2012 ESS, but using more detached data, comparing the four dimensions of political participation: 1) politically motivated institutional participation; 2) participation in social institutions; 3) protest participation; 4) new ways of participation. 17

18 TABLE 5. The evolution of the forms of participation in Portugal, in 2008 and 2012 PARTICIPATION (already done in the last 12 months) 2008 (n= 1350) 2012 (n= 1209) n % N % 1. Politically motivated institutional participation Personally contacting a politician or ruler Collaborating with a political party 96 8 Participating in a political meeting or rally 40 3 Pasting posters or handing flyers Socially motivated institutional participation Collaborating or associating with a social organization or association Contacting or appearing in media Writing a letter to a newspaper New ways of political participation Collaborating with a social or civic movement (standing up for a cause) Deliberately buying a product for political, ethical reasons Participating in a forum or a political discussion group on the Internet Protest Signing a petition or an undersigned Participating in legal demonstrations Participating in legal strikes Participating in non-legal strikes Participating in the occupation of buildings or factories Blocking roads or railways Causing damage to public spaces 3 0 SOURCE: 2008 and 2012 National Inquiries. 18

19 Graphic 1. Evolution of the forms of participation in 2008 and SOURCE: 2008 and 2012 National Inquiries. 19

20 At first sight this table (and graphic) highlights that all forms of participation in Portugal increased between 2008 and 2012, except for participation in social institutions. Even the institutional political participation increased, a fact that wasn t verified previously, when analyzing conventional participation, because this increase was neutralized by participation in social institutions, which decreased, as we now observe. Protest participation has largely increased, as well as the new ways of participation, which represent protest for most of its parts. These results point towards our hypotheses and the several readings made on the media regarding the increase of protest in Southern Europe countries, especially in Portugal. The conjectural situation may be mostly responsible for such results, even if we admit that the structural tendency for participation points toward an increase in instrumental participation directed to specific purposes (Viegas, Faria and Santos). Previously research conducted in Portugal in 2008 and 2012 provide us with a clearer clarification of change, because we have the results separated by forms of participation (cf. Table 5). 20

21 The two forms of institutional political participation, in which there are values for both years, reveal an increase in participation, more significant in contacts with politicians (from 5% to 9%) than in pasting posters and handing flyers (from 5% to 7%). Unfortunately we don t have values, for 2008, for the collaborating with a political party form, but the 20128% result must mean something, when compared to previous results in Portugal, namely the ones gathered under the Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy European Research (2001 inquiry in Portugal), in which we observed values between 1% and 2% for the many types of involvement with political parties (Teorel, Torcal and Montero, 2007). Institutional political participation has clearly increased, according to data previously found in the 2008 and 2012 ESS. In this case, the crisis inverted structural tendencies of a declining institutional political participation, not only nationally. Even though the data regarding political parties is fragile, evidence points toward a distancing, in all aspects, of citizens from their political parties. When it comes to participating in organizations or institutions with a social nature, there isn t much to be said, given the fact that there is no continuity of data in two forms of participation, leaving us only with the writing a letter to a newspaper form, which by itself, doesn t fit as a quality indicator for this dimension of participation. Yet, the 19% level, in 2012, for collaborating with a social or civic organization, is relevant. Previous studies reveal similar results. In the Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy project, 19% of the respondents claimed to have contacted with associations and 11,5% stated to have collaborated with a non-political association (Viegas and Faria, 2009). The highest participation from the Portuguese in these forms does not appear to be a result of the crisis, rather a more permanent feature. Still, this result does not match the data collected in the European Social Survey, which pointed towards a decrease in the participation in social or civic organizations from 2008 to In the protest participation field, there are clear signs of change heading towards a significant increase in these forms of participation, from 2008 to 2012; rather evident in petitions, public demonstrations or strikes. These results corroborate those found with the 2008 and 2012 data, although these are even more expressive. For example, let s look at the increase in those forms of protest: petitions went from 21% to 31%, rallies went from 12% to 24%, legal strikes from 11% to 25%. The shifts in protest participation appear to be, essentially, an effect of the economical crisis. Let us compare it to what happens with the new ways of participation. They grow, accordingly to what could be the modernization of Portuguese society higher education, 21

22 larger access to internet and information but not as much as protest. Let s check some indicators; participating in a group of political discussion in the internet climbs from 2% to 5%; deliberately buying a product goes from 2% to 5%, and collaborating with a group of social or civic action from 3% to 5%. Synthesizing, we could state that the crisis altered political participation in Portugal, especially because of the significant increase in protest, but also in the increase in some forms of institutional political participation and in new ways of participation. 4. Explanations on institutional political participation and on protest in Portugal, before and after the crisis (2008 and 2012) In this section, we seek to find the individual determinants involved in, whether politically motivated institutional participation with, or in protest participation, before and after the bailout (2008 and 2012). In order to do so, we used a linear regression model, in which the dependent variables result from the aggregation of the different forms of politically motivated institutional participation with in a scale, as well as gathering protest related forms of participation in a different scale. The dependent or explained variables used in the regression model are, therefore, quantitative or ordinal. When it comes to selecting the independent variables, with codification on Appendix A, they are the following: 22

23 TABLE 6. Individual determinants for institutional political and protest participation in Portugal (2008 and 2012) Politically motivated institutional Politically motivated institutional Protest Protest participation 2008 participation β B t P β B T p β B t p t p t p (Constant) -,222-4,801,000 -,319-4,540,000 -,216-6,262,000 -,356-6,170,000 - Gender (1= Men; 0= Women),052,001 1,535,125,021,037 3,302,201,033,013 1,664,196,020,007,769,442 - Age,096,036 3,550,000,117,002 3,517,000 -,090 -,001-2,780,006,185,002 5,885,000 - Education,126,013 3,616,000,179,017 4,644,000,272,022 8,083,000,396,034 11,375,000 - Marital status (1= married or equivalent; 0= others),018,007,688,492,009,004,315,753,036 -,017 2,185,129,035,013 1,338,181 - Labor situation (1= employed; 0 = others) -,056 -,009-2,072,038 -,015 -,006 -,522,602 -,071 -,003-1,367,003,021,007,740,459 - Habitat (urban),044,016 1,406,160,108,006 1,404,011,077,003 1,435,002,130,019 5,081,000 - Interest in politics (very interested),229,051 7,844,000,162,038 5,609,000,193,033 6,851,000,150,031 5,485,000 - Party relation (extremely identified),082,040 3,081,002,237,117 8,919,000 -,102 -,039-4,000,000 -,073 -,032-2,918,004 - Cognitive Mobilization (consumo de informação,009,001 -,346,730,065,013 2,100,036,004,000,170,865,067,012 2,278,023 política) - Ideological positioning in a left-wing / right-wing,063 -,006 2,384,017,105,010 3,714,000 -,143 -,011-5,629,000 -,477 -,015-6,611,000 scale - Post-materialism,010,000,361,718 -,101 -,014-3,047,000,028,001 1,086,278,049,018 1,928,054 - Assessment of government performance (very bad) -, ,133,033 -,126 -,008 -,888,075,045,010 1,700,089,230,008 1,081,008 - Assessment of a country s economical situation (very bad) -,052 -,011-1,885,060 -,130 -,006 -,695,087,076,012 2,843,005,312,003 1,467,004 R2 global,102,190,166,275 N Level of significance of the beta coefficients OLS = * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < Source: 2008 and 2012 National Inquiries. 23

24 On a first moment, the usual variables for socio-demographic control and social integration were taken into account, such as gender, age, education, labor situation, marital status and habitat. On a second moment, we included variables connected to attitudes, identities and values in the respondents political fields, which assume a mostly structural dimension given the fact that they result from primary and secondary political socialization processes, hence enjoying a greater stability and time continuum, namely the interest in politics, the connection or relation to a certain party, cognitive mobilization or exposure to political information through media, the ideological position in a leftwing/right-wing scale, and the respondents adhesion to post-materialist values. Lastly, we considered the predominantly economical short term explanatory variables, related to the individuals assessment of their government s general performance on one hand, and of their country s economical condition on the other hand. Now that the variables are presented, matching those usually considered to explain political participation from citizens, besides vote, we will approach the conclusions that can be drawn from the regression models used in this part of the research and, to what extent these meet the initially formulated hypotheses. Thus, and concerning politically motivated institutional participation, in 2008 and 2012, it s the older, more educated, best integrated in the labor market individuals, that reveal a greater interest in politics, who relate more to a certain party, positioned on the rightwing and opposed to post-materialist values, who tend to join one or more forms of institutional political participation. If we consider the variables related to the assessment of government performance or the country s economical situation, the pessimistic individuals are the ones who tend to less participate in forms of institutional political participation. Even though the explanatory variables for politically motivated institutional participation are practically identical before and after the bailout, however is it noteworthy that in 2012, politically motivated institutional participation is also justified by the respondents type of habitat, as well as by their degree of media exposure. In other words, the respondents living in an urban habitat and consuming more political information through different types of media are the ones that mostly tend to more institutional participation. In abstract, we can state that the results meet hypothesis number 5, whereby the explanatory factors for politically motivated institutional participation are not only similar in 2008 and 2012, but they also keep substantially unaltered between these two dates. 24

25 And what to say of protest participation? If we take a look at table 6, and the 2008 data, we easily come to the fact that the younger, more educated and currently unemployed, living in a rather urban habitat, are the ones who tend to participate the most in protest actions. On one hand, this adhesion to protest can easily be justified by their greater interest in politics, greater cognitive mobilization, non-relation towards any political party, a rather left-wing political positioning by part of the respondents, along with, both a negative assessment of their government s general performance, and a negative assessment of their country s economical situation. On the other hand, if we take a closer look at table 6, we ll be able to find two differences regarding the explanatory variables between 2008, before the crisis, and 2012, after the crisis. The first one concerns age: if, in 2008, the younger segments are the ones who mostly tend to opt protest participation, in 2012, there is a shift and, it s mostly the older segments of population who tend to protest. A last aspect, in more conjectural terms: the effects of the sovereign debt crisis and their consequent strongly austere policies are translated in the short term variables, in 2008, and also in 2012, but it s mostly after the crisis that their determination coefficients become particularly high, and this partly validates hypothesis 6. Conclusions Initially we established three marked lines of questioning: in the first line, we intended to understand how non-electoral political participation in Portugal evolved in context with European countries, (2002 to 2012); in the second line of questioning we intended to further analyze the eventual changes in political participation in Portugal, before and after the financial bailout; and finally, in the third line of questioning we intended to find an explanation for political participation in Portugal, before and after the bailout, meaning, before and after the economical crisis surfaced. When approaching the first question, the most protruding result is that in that period, Portugal was characterized by a low level of participation, conventional and nonconventional, comparable only to some East European countries. This result was, moreover, accordingly to those obtained is prior studies. But a new finding was registered after we analyzed the results from the end of the period, we mean, from 2008 to And this is how we enter the second question. 25