China and Hong Kong Game Theory in a One Country, Two Systems Framework. Morgan s Money Grabbers. Miran Ahmad, Somit Guha, Kurt Sheline, Hiu Yu

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1 China and Hong Kong Game Theory in a One Country, Two Systems Framework Miran Ahmad, Somit Guha, Kurt Sheline, Hiu Yu We fight for our goal without analyzing the possibility of success. If... you have to consider the possibility to reach the goal, you should not involve [yourself] in the social movement or student movement. - Joshua Wong (Hong Kong Student Activist and Founder of Scholarism) Late September early this year saw an unusual sight on Chinese soil - thousands of demonstrators, armed only with umbrellas and makeshift gas masks, surrounding government buildings protesting for democracy. In a socialist country, strictly controlled by a government with such strong authority, where could this be? The only part of the country that can challenge their government openly Hong Kong. Hong Kong s recent umbrella revolution protests mark the latest installment in the region s ongoing demonstrations against the Chinese government for universal suffrage since it was handed back to Chinese control in These protests highlight the obvious tension between communist party leaders in Beijing and the existing democratic rights of Hong Kong citizens and pose an interesting question of what the longterm future between these two regions holds. The China Hong Kong Relationship 1 The Treaty of Nanking signed on 29 August 1842 marked the end of the First Opium War between the UK and the Qing dynasty of China. As part of the Treaty, China relinquished possession of Hong Kong to the UK, agreeing to make the island a crown colony. In 1860, the colony was extended with the Kowloon peninsula and in 1898, the Second Convention of Peking further expanded the colony with the 99-year lease of the New Territories. With the expiration of the 99-year lease (1997) over the New Territories approaching, in 1982, the UK Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, visited Beijing to discuss the future of the colony. The UK s initial proposal was that while China regain sovereignty over the territory, the UK would retain administrative control over Hong Kong. This initial proposal was rejected by China s Communist leadership and led to the Chinese Supreme Leader, Deng Xiaoping proposing a one country, two systems formula for Hong Kong. Under the proposal, Deng suggested that China and Hong Kong would be united as one country, however both regions would be seen as distinct, with Hong Kong retaining its own capitalist economic and political system and China maintaining its own socialist system. In 1984, the UK and China announced in a joint declaration, that China would resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong on July 1, As part of the declaration, it was noted that China would respect Hong Kong citizen s freedoms of speech, religion, and association and that there would be an independent judiciary system for the region. Under the joint declaration, Hong Kong would observe a high degree of autonomy in all matters except defense and foreign affairs. The declaration stipulated that the region would maintain its capitalist economic system and guaranteed the rights and freedoms of its people 1 Source: BBC, Wikipedia 1

2 for at least 50 years after the 1997 handover. These guarantees over the region s autonomy are enshrined in Hong Kong s Basic Law, which outlines the system of governance but is subject to the interpretation of the Standing Committee of National People s Congress. From the years since the joint declaration through to 1997 when China regained sovereignty over Hong Kong, Beijing maintained a commitment to the agreement, noting that Hong Kong citizens would have all the rights that were outlined. Notably in 1993, China s senior official for Hong Kong stated that the universal suffrage method for electing Hong Kong s Chief Executive, who would replace the post of Governor, would be completely within the sphere of the autonomy of Hong Kong and that the Chinese central government would not interfere. In reality, this has not been the case. When Hong Kong was handed back to Chinese control in 1997, and whilst the legislation governing the regions is in line with the one country, two system proposal, it did not offer the rights of universal suffrage. The region s first Chief Executive was Tung Chee-hwa, a Shanghai-born former shipping tycoon with no political experience, who was hand-picked by Beijing to rule the territory following the takeover. Since 1997, the Beijing government has constantly tried to limit Hong Kong citizens right to universal suffrage, which has led to tensions in the region. In 2003, Beijing s proposed anti-subversion law known as Article 23 led to large scale demonstrations in the territory and as a result, the bill was indefinitely shelved. As a means of trying to exert further influence within the region, in 2004 China ruled that its approval must be sought for any changes to Hong Kong s election laws, giving Beijing the right to veto any moves towards more democracy. In 2007, whilst a decision made by the Standing Committee of the National People s Congress ruled out universal suffrage for the selection of the 2012 Chief Executive, Beijing did open up the possibility of having fully democratic elections in This possibility was ruled out earlier this year with the release of a Chinese white paper in which Beijing demanded that any future Hong Kong Chief Executive must love China. This translated in to the future elections for Chief Executive, with Beijing noting that whilst the position will be elected by universal suffrage, only candidates approved by Beijing may run and furthermore any appointment would be subject to final approval by Beijing. This latest announcement from China around the election process triggered the umbrella protests that are being witnessed in Hong Kong today exacerbating a precarious situation. Since handover, it appears that whilst in theory China agreed to a fully democratic Hong Kong operating under the one country, two systems premise, practically China is not willing to implement this. In all instances, when Beijing has raised the possibility of universal suffrage, at the time of reckoning, there has been a movement away from implementing the democratic process and reason to revisit the subject in the future. This constant postponement has caused tension with the Hong Kong citizens, leading to the current situation and standoff between Beijing and protesters. The goal of this paper is to analyze the situation being faced by the Chinese government and the Hong Kong Protesters through a game theoretic lens, and offer some potential conclusions and plans of action to change the game. 2

3 Hong Kong s Place in China With the rapid economic growth of China over the last 20 years, Hong Kong s economic importance in terms of absolute contribution is slowly declining, however it is still important to Beijing in terms of providing an eye to the western world. Although Hong Kong only accounts for 0.5% of all of China s population, it accounts for over 3% of China s total GDP (notably, this figure declined from approximately 17% of GDP at the time of handover in 1997). Furthermore, Hong Kong s continued importance as the leading financial hub within Asia-Pacific and its judiciary system under Hong Kong Basic Law, provides an attractive center within the region for companies to establish their Asian headquarters. Hong Kong is also a means for Chinese corporations to access foreign capital for domestic and international investment, and acts as a valuable financial bridge to world markets. Hong Kong s unique position at the crossroads of China s access to the Western world has translated to a generally higher quality of life for Hong Kong citizens over their counterparts in mainland China (with a GDP per capita of $41,000, almost six times as high as the GDP per capita of $7,000 seen in China). Table 1. Hong Kong and China Comparison Metric China Hong Kong Population 1,400 million 7.2 million GDP (nominal) $9,500 billion $7,000 (per capita) $303 billion $41,000 (per capita) Economic Activity Services: 46.1% Industry: 43.9% Agriculture: 10.0 Services: 59.7% Trade: 26.4% Industry/Other: 13.9% Stock Exchange Global Rank Hang Seng: 6th Shanghai: 7th Shenzhen: 11th Source: Wikipedia Moving forward, the interactions between Hong Kong and Beijing could have far-reaching implications (both temporally and geographically). Commentators have noted that Hong Kong may hinder hopes of the RMB becoming a world reserve currency as China s economic development continues. Furthermore, others have stated that Hong Kong s position and continued dominance in the Asian finance industry could hamper China s goal of positioning Shanghai as a worldwide financial hub. If these assumptions are correct, it leaves an important dynamic between Hong Kong and China that could inform future interactions. The environment is rich with stakeholders, competing interests, and a gamut of strategic and competitive capabilities. 3

4 Civil Disobedience History To provide further context around the most recent protests, a review of prior civil disobedience in China is important. The most striking and historically significant incident occurred in China in 1989, and is formally known as the 1989 Democracy Movement. The protests, which lasted over one month, were spread across 400 Chinese cities, with the majority of protesters converging on Tiananmen Square in Beijing (at the peak, over one million protesters occupied the Square; and in Hong Kong, 1.5 million protesters converged to show support for those in the Square). Ultimately, the protests were forcibly repressed through the use of military force (300,000 troops used), and became known as the Tiananmen Square Massacre (casualty estimates range from a few hundred to a few thousand). After the protests, the Chinese government enforced martial law for seven months in the capital and conducted widespread arrests of protesters, expelled foreign journalists, and strictly controlled coverage of the events in the press. International reactions to the protests were severe, as many Western governments imposed economic sanctions and arms embargoes on the Chinese. In Hong Kong, the protests made citizens fear that the PRC would not follow the commitments made under the One Country, Two Systems formula beginning in 1997, and resulted in many losing trust in the Chinese government. The only other notable pro-democracy movement in China occurred in 2011, when protesters assembled in a dozen Chinese cities. The Chinese government s reaction, while less severe than in 1989, was still swift and strong. Protesters and journalists were arrested, and censorship was utilized. These events serve as context for Hong Kong s political struggles and the region s relationship with Beijing in the years leading up to the handover. Table 2 provides an outline of pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong. As shown, Hong Kong has had a consistent record of protests since 1997 (a record that is much more numerous than pro-democracy protests in China). Each year on July 1st, rallies are held to commemorate the handover of Hong Kong to the Chinese and to demand democracy, universal suffrage, the protection of freedom of speech, and a variety of other concerns. Table 2. Hong Kong Civil Disobedience History Date # of Protesters Notes ,000 per year Organised annually by The Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China ,000-1,000,000 Opposing the anti-subversion Hong Kong Basic Law Article 23, which would erode freedom of speech ~500,000 The National People's Congress Standing Committee attempted to modify the Basic Law on April 6, 2004 to deny direct elections for the Chief Executive in 2007 and the Legislative Council in July 2005 NA Oppose government collusion, striving for universal suffrage was the theme of the protest. Built on the momentum of the 2004 protests, and emphasized that a high degree of autonomy must accompany democracy. December ~100,000 A timetable for universal suffrage was demanded, and

5 2005 was considered ,000 Creating hopes for universal suffrage and democracy with an equal and just Hong Kong was the theme of the protest ~60,000 Achieving universal suffrage, improving livelihood was the theme of the protest ,000 NA May ,000 20th Anniversary of Tiananmen Square July ,000 NA ,000 NA ,000 Just two days before the protest, the government led by Stephen Lam tried to pass a bill to no longer allow byelections ,000 The fact that universal suffrage was still denied, as well as the suppression of freedom of speech in Mainland China were featured in the protests ~63,000 NA ,000 The National People s Congress set limits for the 2016 Legislative Council election and the 2017 Chief Executive election, resulting in protests through Hong Kong that are ongoing. Source: BBC, Wikipedia, Financial Times As shown, protests have ranged in size each year, with the most significant protests occurring in in opposition to the Basic Law Article 23 anti-subversion legislation (the Hong Kong public was worried that civil rights and liberties would be taken away as a result of the proposed legislation). The current protests, the largest since 2004, were sparked by the National People s Congress decision to limit the 2016 Legislative Council election and the 2017 Chief Executive election. Stated simply, Hong Kong has a history of protesting for universal suffrage, and the Chinese Government has a history of consistently resisting their demands. Competitor Analysis (Isolated and Inward Thinking) This context serves as the basis for our isolated competitor analysis (looking specifically at a Hong Kongcentric view). The details of this analysis are provided in Tables 3 and 4. From the Chinese Government s perspective, the Hong Kong protester s short-term goals include negotiations, and their capabilities and strategy are highlighted by non-violent protests with the increased use of social media to rally others and enhance solidarity. The very fact that protests are so numerous are likely to result in the Chinese government downplaying the importance of the protests, and its concern. As a result, in the longer-term, the Chinese Government is likely to suffer from representativeness bias. Protesters are likely to follow prior protest 5

6 timelines, and are highly likely to give up, give in, and lose resolve for the cause. This belief, in the isolated game, is likely to form the foundation of the Chinese government s strategy. Table 3. HK Protesters Competitor Analysis Assumptions Strategy Goals Capabilities Short-Term Negotiations possible Non-violent demonstrations, scale, solidarity Social media Negotiations Protests Long-Term Give up Non-violent/violent demonstrations Social media Universal Suffrage Scale Tech savvy From the Hong Kong protester s perspective, the Chinese government is likely to engage in a strategy of containment and downplaying the importance and size of the protests (as they have done in the past). In the long-term, the government is likely to utilize a variety of other strategies to stop the protests and ensure that pro-democratic ideas are not disseminated to the mainland (most notably, the use of third-party non-state actors, and increased censorship of the situation across mainland China). Table 4. Chinese Government Competitor Analysis Assumptions Strategy Goals Capabilities Short-Term PRC want increased influence in HK Containment via police Stop protests Police, political Long-Term Communism in HK Fear democratic uprising in PRC Negotiations Containment via police/other means (e.g.triads) Political and economic stability Military, thirdparty groups, censorship, technology, political The Isolated Ordinal Game Having analysed the assumptions and goals of the rivals, Figure 1 shows the initial game between the HK protesters and the Chinese Government. An ordinal system (1-4 scale from best to worst) has been chosen as the exact payoffs are difficult to estimate, as they include intangible assets (such as nationalism and patriotism). The HK protesters have two options: [Fight] - Protest against the proposed legislation, or [Not 6

7 Fight] - Do nothing. The Chinese Government has two options; [Fight] - To crackdown on the HK populace or [Not Fight] - Do nothing. Figure 1: Isolated Game Matrix To assign rankings to the ordinal payoffs (1 is highest), we have utilized our context and competitor analysis information discussed above. First, from the HK protesters perspective, we have assigned a status quo scenario [HK: Not Fight, PRC: Not Fight) as least desirable (ranking of 4). The [HK: Not Fight, PRC: Fight] is 3rd best as the Chinese Government will pass the election legislation (not allowing full universal suffrage) and a crackdown on the HK populace and taking away their rights would create additional support for democracy. Of the [HK: Fight] options, the HK protesters would prefer that the Chinese Government not to fight them and listen to their objections. Therefore [HK: Fight, PRC: Not Fight] would be the HK protesters most desired option, given a 1, and [HK: Fight, PRC: Fight] is ranked second. From the Chinese Government s perspective, the best situation is for the legislation to pass (no true universal suffrage), and for the HK protesters to not put up a fight. [HK: Not Fight, PRC: Not Fight] is ranked first. The worst choice for the Chinese Government is to [Fight] the HK populace when they are not doing anything. The negative impact of this would be severe, and would harm the credibility and reputation of the government and country on an international stage. The economy of HK would be negatively affected, and the Chinese government s rationality would be seriously questioned. Foreign corporations based in Hong Kong would likely flee to Singapore, and China s use of Hong Kong as a gateway to the western world would no longer be available. [HK: Not Fight, PRC: Fight] is given a 4. When the HK Protesters [Fight], the Chinese Government has the option to [Fight] or [Not Fight]. Although HK has protests yearly about gaining universal suffrage and other concerns, previous protests in HK have largely been short and unimportant. Considering the importance of HK as a global business city in Asia, and the effect [PRC: Fight] could have on the HK economy suggests that the Chinese Government would prefer to [Not Fight] over [Fight], making [HK: Fight, PRC: Not Fight] number 2 and [HK: Fight, PRC: Fight] number 3. As the ordinal payoffs for the rivals have been determined, we can easily determine the Nash equilibrium for the isolated game as [HK: Fight, PRC: Not Fight]. This is what was seen at the very beginning of the Umbrella Protests: the Chinese Government allowed the protests to happen, with no crackdown apparent. 7

8 Refining the Payoffs The previous analysis was centered on a very simplistic game, when in reality, the situation is much more complex. Further refinement of the competitor and behavioral analyses is provided below to match the true complexity of the game. On a competitive basis, we believe that little changes when compared to the isolated game. Regardless of scope, the landscape of assumptions, strategy, goals, and capabilities is the same: the HK protesters will protest, and want universal suffrage. Starting with a more in-depth and refined analysis of the competitors, the Chinese government is likely to believe that the motivations and goals of the HK Protesters remain the same (Table 5). Table 5. HK Protesters Competitor Analysis Assumptions Strategy Goals Capabilities Short-Term Negotiations possible Non-violent demonstrations, scale, solidarity Social media Negotiations Protests Long-Term Give up Non-violent/violent demonstrations Social media Universal Suffrage Scale Tech savvy On the behavioral side, the game s terminal period provides an added complication that could change the protesters actions. The historical declaration signed between the United Kingdom and China stipulated the HK region would maintain its capitalist economic system and guaranteed the rights and freedoms of its people for at least 50 years after the 1997 handover. Elementary analysis using look forward reason back would dictate that since legal reunification in 2047 is inevitable, protesting in 2046 is a moot cause. Reasoning this logic backward until today, this would suggest that there is no point in protesting today as the result - legal reunification will still happen. This is not how the HK protesters see the situation; the main reason for this is loss aversion. The Hong Kong protesters are accustomed to certain rights; they have had these rights since British rule began over a century ago, and as a result are likely to behave more irrationally (potentially risk-seeking) in situations in which these rights could be taken away. In the near-term, this riskseeking behavior is likely to be muted due to the lack of immediacy of the ultimate results of the situation and the perception that the fight will continue. As the fight continues and the potential loss of freedoms becomes more immediate and pronounced, the HK protesters are likely to begin acting more irrationally; the incentive to fight is increased. In this situation, historical perspective may misinform the Chinese Government s strategy, and protesters may not give up as the Chinese Government expects. As shown below in Figure 2, Hong Kong s confidence in the One Country, Two Systems policy has deteriorated to an all-time low in July 2014, indicating that resolve for protester s goals is likely at an all- 8

9 time high. Commitment decreases susceptibility to threats from the Chinese government, and increases the chance of strategically raising the stakes. This behavioral analysis of the protester s changing situation as time progresses should inform the Chinese government s strategy. But has it? Figure 2. Confidence in the Hong Kong Governance System Source: Financial Times, University of Hong Kong, Public Opinion Program From the Chinese government s perspective, the increased scope of the game to a national and global scale changes the competitive analysis as shown in Table 6. Hong Kong, while possibly strategically valuable, remains a very small portion of China in terms of geographic size, GDP and, population, yet appears a very large potential threat to the stability of the majority. That being said, the Chinese government likely balances the protests in Hong Kong in the context of other national and global concerns. The additional national and international goals China potentially has for the long-term include, promoting Shanghai to an international financial center, thereby replacing Hong Kong, and elevating the RMB to world reserve currency status, thereby challenging the U.S. dollar. With these added goals, it is possible that China is more willing to fight, but again, this must be balanced with the fact that on an international stage, how the government deals with the Hong Kong situation is likely to severely impact the ultimate achievement of these goals. Table 6. Chinese Government Competitor Analysis Assumptions Strategy Goals Capabilities Short-Term Increased PRC influence in HK Containment via police Stop protests Police, political 9

10 Long-Term Communism in HK Fear democratic uprising in PRC Negotiations Containment via police/other means (e.g.triads) More to lose, more willing to fight Political and economic stability Shanghai as financial hub RMB as world s reserve currency International reputation Internal security Military, thirdparty groups, censorship, technology, political On a behavioral basis, the Chinese government is likely to suffer from various biases, both related to the history of dealing with protests in Hong Kong. First, with years of successfully ruling both mainland China and Hong Kong, the Chinese Government likely suffers from hindsight bias in its analysis that this protest would be similar in length and voracity to previous protests. Second, the Chinese Government is also likely overconfident, overstating their understanding of the situation and understating Hong Kong protester s resolve, while assuming that they are fully prepared to deal with any changing dynamics of the situation on a reactive basis. With this behavioral analysis, the Hong Kong protesters have several strategic moves that are capable of capitalizing on the Chinese Government s prevailing biases, given that their short-term interactions with the government lead them to believe that they still suffer from a flawed mental model. The Chinese Government is likely to respond to the HK protests in a way that balances its national and global concerns. Currently, the Chinese Government has banned any mention of the HK protests from being reported in the Chinese social and traditional media for fear the HK protests may incite other dissident groups (shown in Figure 3). The Chinese Government must act carefully as the protests currently underway in Hong Kong are illegal in Mainland China. Given that current protests have remained non-violent, the current policy of media censorship by the PRC matches the strategic decision to simply contain the protesters. However, if the protests were to become violent, the Chinese Government may respond in-kind and shift from censorship to openly broadcasting the crackdown on protesters to serve as a warning to other dissident groups in Mainland China. 10

11 Figure 3. Social media censorship in Mainland China Source: i100, Independent After taking this refined analysis into account, the payoffs and game outcome are likely to change. From the HK protesters perspective, there is no change in the ordinal rankings. If anything, their behavioral aversion to losses and added incentive to seek risk while operating in loss space has increased their commitment to the dominant [Fight] strategy. As time progresses towards 2047 (when the One Country, Two Systems policy ends), their commitment to the cause will only increase. From the Chinese government s perspective, the rankings of the payoffs do change. The desired outcome for the Chinese Government is still the status quo with [HK: Not Fight, PRC: Not Fight] and its worst is cracking down on a non-protesting populace [HK: Not Fight, PRC: Fight]. The two options where the HK populace are protesting are more difficult to rank. If the Chinese Government chooses to not fight, their global reputation may be improved, as it makes the Chinese Government seem fair. However, this reaction could raise the risk of copycat protests in Mainland China, of paramount concern due to the threat to national security and the government s very existence. Aware of its potential susceptibility to hindsight and overconfidence bias, and its paramount goal of maintaining control over the country, fighting is now more likely (ranking of 2). Refining the Game The Nash equilibrium is now [HK: Fight, PRC: Fight]. This is beginning to be seen in Hong Kong, with the HK Police taking down barricades and being accused of violence against the HK protesters. There are also accusations that the Chinese government is paying pro-beijing protesters to participate and incite conflict, and using third-party non-state actors to quell the protests. 11

12 Figure 4. Refined Game Matrix Overview of the Game After analyzing the two games above, it is clear that the situation is rich and dynamic. What is interesting to note, is that the HK protesters maintain a dominant strategy to fight proposed legislations, regardless of the PRC s moves. It is also important to note that the PRC changes from [Not Fight] to [Fight] as its ordinal payoffs change due to global considerations. The Nash equilibrium of the second game [Fight, Fight] is not sustainable in the long-term for either party. So what are the options available to both competitors to best change the game to their advantage and move out of the [HK: Fight, PRC: Fight] world? This is a dynamic environment, nothing is static and the players should seek to change the game. So how do HK protesters, as the entrant, compete against the breadth of resources and internal capabilities of the PRC? In much the same way as disruptive entrant businesses succeed in a hostile environment, by turning incumbent strengths into weaknesses. HK protesters should aim to make the future process of reunification as painful as possible for the PRC by properly understanding what matters most to the PRC and exploiting it, they should up the stakes. If the PRC relies on its communist strength for internal security, then HK protesters must find a way to export democracy to the mainland. If PRC fears economic isolation, HK protesters must find a way to make Hong Kong a financial hub, impossible to replace. Acting independently, the HK protesters may raise the stakes either financially or socially to change the PRC s payoffs for also fighting. Protesters may demonstrate the value of commitment by preemptively partnering with leading HK corporations who would openly consider leaving Hong Kong if the political environment moved towards communism. Hong Kong protesters could also seek internal support from Macau, a former Portuguese colony facing similar reservations about fully reunifying with China. Lastly, Hong Kong could seek to raise the stakes by creating an international agreement of support with Taiwan, another region with a complicated relationship with China. The added advantage of this relationship stems from the Taiwan Relations Act, which could ultimately get the United States involved in the situation (raising the stakes for the PRC exponentially). Purposefully vague, the Act states the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capabilities 2. The Act s strategic ambiguity both inhibits Taiwan from unilaterally declaring independence and China from unifying Taiwan with the PRC. 2 Source: Wikipedia 12

13 A common motif throughout these potential actions is that they broaden the protesters previously held HKfocused viewpoint, essentially making HK a larger, more global issue to the PRC, thereby potentially changing the responses from the PRC. Of course, the main determination in such a situation is whether any nation, corporation, or entity would actually partner with the protesters. There is very little incentive to be the first partner, as such a situation would alienate that party from one of the biggest countries and economies in the world (China). The ensuing strategic disadvantage of that country, corporation, or entity after being shunned by China could be catastrophic. If Hong Kong were able to offer concessions that would ensure the protection, or decrease the consequences of Chinese punishment, to the potential partner, it is possible that a partnership could be formed. In addition, it is also possible to rally support from the international community by baiting the Chinese government into acting inappropriately or irrationally to the point that condemnation would necessitate action by others in support of Hong Kong. Critical to the success of this plan is the accurate and timely dissemination of information about the protests to critical parties and potential partners. From the PRC s perspective, it may also act independently by appearing or acting irrationally and using third-party organizations such as Triads to change HK protester payoffs, and avoid detectability or accountability. Separating itself from the protests while achieving its objectives is a win, win situation for the PRC. That being said, the behavioral analysis of the HK protesters indicates that over time, the resolve and commitment to the cause (and a feeling of being more and more entrenched in loss space) could serve to exacerbate the situation and any potential solution as time progresses (and especially as we reach the end of the game in 2047). Knowing this, the Chinese government should seriously consider making concessions on the universal suffrage issue before the situation escalates (as we predict will occur over time). Hong Kong has become less and less of a contributor to the overall Chinese economy, and is expected to decrease in proportionate size even further. The PRC must balance this decreasing influence with the increasing resolve and commitment of the Hong Kong people to preserving their rights. Lastly, both competitors may find it in their respective best interests to cooperate, coordinate or compromise. Lebanon, as an example, escaped from a [Fight: Fight] scenario by customarily allocating public office along religious lines: the President is a Maronite Christian, the Speaker of the Parliament is a Shi a Muslim and the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim. Thinking creatively could allow both parties to claim success, change the payoffs for both players, and shift the game to a [Not Fight: Not Fight] Nash equilibrium. Conclusion The Hong Kong populace is in a life changing situation, and the Chinese Government is seeking to deny their right to universal suffrage by adding legislation to be able to choose who runs for the Chief Executive office. The situation has the potential to snowball into an international incident depending on how the Chinese government reacts, and how the protesters change strategy (if at all). With so many moving pieces in a politically charged environment, we can only hope that the situation unfolds peacefully. 13