JAPAN-CHINA PEACE TREATY (1978):

Transcription

1 Chapter 7 THE CONCLUSION OF THE JAPAN-CHINA PEACE TREATY (1978): SOVIET COERCWE POLICY AND ITS LIMITS 1. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONCLUSION OF THE TREATY FOR THE SOVIET UNION On August 12, 1978, after six years of frequently interrupted negotiations, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship was finally concluded between Japan and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Moscow had opposed the treaty, particularly because it contained the so-called "antihegemony" clause, which in Beijing's parlance was directed against none other than Soviet hegemonism and expansionism.' The treaty in itself, which is really no more than a statement of five broad principles, did not constitute a serious threat to Soviet security. Yet, both the symbolic and, hence, the political significance of the treaty signing at that time cannot be easily underestimated.2 Among other things, its negative impact upon the Soviet Union was significant. Let us start this chapter by briefly discussing this. First, from the international perspective, or at least the perspective of the Asian regional power constellation, the rapprochement of the two powers, the PRC and Japan, accompanied by the blessing of another power, the 159

2 160 THE DETERIORATION IN JAPANESE-SOVIET RELATIONS United States, meant almost automatically a tremendous blow to the remaining fourth power, the USSR. The impact upon the USSR was more than doubled by another diplomatic blow immediately thereafter, the Sino-U.S. normalization in January, Even such a Western observer on Asian affairs as Professor John J. Stephan at the University of Hawaii, who suggested that neither the Sino Japanese nor the Sino-American normalizations came necessarily as a surprise to the Soviets, conceded that what Soviet analysts did not envision was "a simultaneous Sino Japanese and Sino-American rapprochement without any corresponding attenuation of Japanese-American ties."3 One theory argues that the conclusion of the Beijing-Tokyo peace treaty in 1978 was a part of the U.S. global strategy, particularly promoted by the Carter-Brzezinski team. If we accept such a theory, as do some Western observers and Soviet spokesmen,4 we must also admit that the Soviet Union proved to be a victim of such a ploy. Second, the treaty clearly signaled a Chinese victory over the Soviets in their bitter rivalry to court the Japanese.5 Japan and China had begun their efforts to improve relations far later than Japan and the USSR, but they had been able to move quickly. Relations between Japan and China were normalized in Only six years later, the two nations concluded the Peace and Friendship Treaty of In contrast, Japan and the USSR, despite their early normalization of relations in 1956, have not yet concluded a peace treaty, largely because of Moscow's highly inflexible and insensitive attitude toward Japanese feelings about the recovery of the "Northern T erritories." Japan's signing of a peace treaty with China also signaled a manifestation of Tokyo's decision of "let us do first what we can do now, leaving other matters until later," but by the same token meant that the Tokyo government de facto discarded one of its diplomatic principles, i.e., an "equidistance policy" toward the two Communist rivals. In an attempt to justify the shift in Japan's major foreign policy line, Sonoda Sunao, at that time Foreign Minister of the Fukuda government, replied in the Diet (Japanese Parliament): "We will seek an understanding from the Soviet Union of Japan's intention to pursue its policy toward China, separating it from that towards the USSR."6 This position of the Fukuda government was reported by the Asahi Shimbun to be one in which the PRC

3 THE CONCLUSION OF THE JAPAN-CHINA PEACE TREATY (1978) 161 occupies the priority in Japan's policy in Asia, second only to the United States. As the paper put it under the headline "The New Starting Point of Japanese Diplomacy": Although it is based on the principle that Japan-U.S. relations constitute the basis of Japanese foreign policy orientation, the Fukuda diplomacy has revealed that it gives first priority to its relations with the PRC in Asia. That is, the "all-dimensional diplomacy" advocated by Prime Minister Fukuda does not mean an "equidistance policy" to all countries but rather presupposes that there naturally exists a difference in the degree of closeness with regard to relations with different nations."7 Furthermore, the conclusion of the peace treaty contributed to closer and friendlier relations between Japan and China. Previously, being a neighboring communist giant, the PRC had been regarded as one of the sources of threat to the security of Japan, but, with the signing of the peace treaty, it almost ceased to be a potential adversary to Japan. This meant that Japan no longer had an excuse for not cooperating with China in many areas. While Japan is still trying very hard not to let the close bilateral relations turn into a military alliance, despite strong pressure from China, it has nevertheless found it difficult, even in the defense area, to decline a minimum level of exchange and contact, such as exchange of personal visits and some information. In economic fields, where Japan and China were in no less of a complementary relation than were Japan and the Soviet Union, trade and other exchange of economic activity between Japan and the PRC gained further momentum from the signing of a peace treaty, which provided a legal, public, and symbolic endorsement and encouragement of stable and developing economic relations. In their efforts to woo Japanese capital, technology, and management knowhow for the development of their less-developed economies, China and the Soviet Union were in the position of competing against each other in a manner which was not necessarily completely, but at least partially, mutually exclusive manner, particularly given the

4 162 THE DETERIORATION IN JAPANESE-SOVIET RELATIONS fact that Japan's capital and other economic capabilities were not unlimited. In this regard, China's success meant a loss for the Soviet Union. Lastly, the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship helped to enhance Japan's diplomatic and economic position. In the postwar period from 1945 to 1978, Japan's diplomacy faithfully followed Washington's lead,8 and Japan sometimes found itself in the awkward situation of being compelled to abruptly alter its policy line after encountering a "shock."(the best example is the "Nixon shock" in the early 1970s-the announcement of U.S. President Nixon's visit to Beijing, without informing Tokyo in advance despite persistent assurances to Tokyo by successive U.S. administrations that the U.S. would support the Taiwan regime and not the Beijing regime.) By concluding a treaty with China before Washington could, however, Tokyo must have derived a silent satisfaction that this time it was not kept behind but, on the contrary, was even able to demonstrate diplomatic initiative and independence to a certain degree, although this Japanese decision and action was, according to some interpretations, endorsed, encouraged, and even prodded by the Carter-Brzezinski administration. In September, 1978, after the signing, Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo told the Diet that "Japan has entered a new era in which it can no longer be content with reacting passively to what takes place in the world."10 Moreover, he continued, "The time has come for Japan to play an active role in world peace and prosperity," 11 assuming that "the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese peace treaty will contribute to peace and stability in Asia and the world."12 The Baltimore Sun at that time noted that, "having finally played ball with the big boys and won an inning after a long diplomatic low profile since its defeat in World War II," Japan has obtained its self-confidence.i3 The largest benefit that the signing of the treaty brought to Japan is that the military threat from the PRC to the security of Japan was largely reduced. Another benefit to Japan was the Chinese pledge to abrogate the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, which was directed specifically against "Japan and any states allied with it." Deng Xiaoping told Sonoda Sunao that China was ready to take the necessary steps to annul the treaty with the USSR and in fact within a year, in April 1979, carried out this promise. This was a mile-

5 THE CONCLUSION OF THE JAPAN-CHINA PEACE TREATY (1978) 163 stone for postwar Japanese diplomacy, which had been aiming at rectifying the unfavorable conditions and situations made by the Allies and other countries at the end of World War II. In sum, with a successful "Vergangenheitbewaltigung(overcoming of the past)" with China, the decks were cleared in Tokyo to concentrate on the only major diplomatic task left over from World War II-namely, improvement in its relations with the Soviet Union, resolution of the territorial dispute, and thus the complete termination of the "state of war." It is debatable whether the signing of the peace treaty with Beijing contributed to the enhancement of Tokyo's diplomatic leverage with regard to Moscow. Some observers of international affairs argued that compromise, or what the Soviets call "capitulation,"14 on the part of the Japanese side to the Chinese demand to include the "antihegemony" clause in the main body of the treaty helped make the Japanese position vulnerable vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, who wanted in turn to take full advantage of such a compromise or "capitulation" in the Soviet favor. Others, including the Japanese government, argued that it was China that made a concession in agreeing to insert in the treaty the so-called "third countries" clause, which states expressly that the treaty shall not affect "the position of either contracting party regarding its relations with third countries" (Article 4). Since Japan made such a painstaking effort to include this provision in the main body of the treaty simply in order to mollify Soviet apprehension, the Tokyo government does not have to feel a strong sense of guilt toward one of the third countries, the Soviet Union. What was also pointed out by some, including Soviet spokesmen,15 is that Japan's signing of a peace treaty while shelving the issue of the Senkaku (Diaoyu in Chinese) Islands, which are claimed by Tokyo, Beijing, and Taipei, provided the Soviet Union with a pretext to follow the same formula in Japan-Soviet peace treaty negotiations. Others, however, pointed out that the circumstances of the two territorial disputes are so different that the same formula cannot be used: (1) first, the Soviet Union denied even the existence of the territorial issue-a fact that made the Soviet claim to shelve the question logically contradictory; (2) the Senkaku islands were de facto controlled by Japan, and hence the Chinese suggestion of keeping

6 164 THE DETERIORATION IN JAPANESE-SOVIET RELATIONS the status quo, by shelving the issue until "a future generation has the wisdom to settle it peacefully" (Deng Xiaoping),16 coincides with the Japanese interest, while the Northern Territories are, in contrast, de facto occupied and controlled by the Soviet Union and hence maintaining the status quo would benefit the Soviet Union only. Regardless of which of these arguments may be correct, one quite clear byproduct of the conclusion of the Sino Japanese treaty is the fact that, after the conclusion of the treaty, the Japanese appeared to have more self-confidence than before in their dealings with the USSR. Having done fairly well in dealing with one of the two communist powers, the Japanese in general appear to feel that one more Vergangenheitbewaltigungwould not be very difficult if they concentrated their entire diplomatic effort on the only remaining job-a new phenomenon in which some observers detect the birth of Japanese nationalism. 2. SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO PREVENT THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY The conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and the PRC became a pending issue for Tokyo and Beijing as a result of the Sino Japanese Joint Communique' of September 29, 1973, which stipulated that the two nations should conclude such a treaty to improve relations with each other.17 Nevertheless, the signing of a Sino Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship was delayed for six years for a variety of reasons, the major ones of which are as follows. First, given that diplomatic relations had already been normalized between the two countries, bilateral administrative agreements on such concrete matters as trade, civil aviation, shipping, and fishing were regarded as more urgent." Second, both Japan and China were occupied respectively with their own, domestic political problems and crises (on the Japanese side, the "Lockheed bribery scandal," and the weak and unstable transitional government under Miki Takeo; on the Chinese side, the Cultural Revolution, the deaths of Chuo Enlai and Mao Zedong, and the arrest of the "Gang of Four," to mention just the most pressing), which made it difficult for them to be engaged in