Mapping attitudes towards European integration in the French political space : how many worlds of euroscepticism is there?

Transcription

1 Mapping attitudes towards European integration in the French political space : how many worlds of euroscepticism is there? Bruno Cautrès CEVIPOF- Centre de recherches politiques de Sciences Po (Paris) Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques. Paper to be presented at the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Nicosia, april Workshop Mapping elite attitudes to globalization, European integration and regionalization (B. Cautrès, A. Gamble). Paper not to be quoted without permission, work in progress and not definitive. 1

2 On the 29 May of 2005, French electorate voted No to the EU Constitution by a large majority of votes (55%) with a large turnout rate (more than 70%). The contrats was big in regard to the last European elections (June 2004) where a low turnout (43%) gave a majority of pro-eu deputies for the French representation to the EU Parliament. One may argue that the 2005 referendum has a phantom winner EU as itself since Europe and the issues of its political integration went on the front of the political battle. It also appears a strong interest of French mass public towards the issues of the Constitution, a very lively campaign and a king of politicization process through it, good news in fact for the EU political debate. The story that happened on that day, starts before and one may see the 29 of May 2005 has having some links with the 21 april 2002, the date of the first round of the last presidential election when Jean-Marie Le Pen was able to reach the second round, finally won by the incumbent president Jacques Chirac.This paper aims at addressing the nature and the impact of euroscepticisme within the main political parties and within the electorate in France and their voters between the May 2002 Presidential election and the 2005 referendum on the EU Constitution.. By choosing the term "euroscepticism" on purpose, we will thus make a clear distinction between the word "souverainisme" (sovereignism) in France which corresponds to a French phenomenon and the general definition of Euroscepticism as provided by many academics and previous research. Our paper, still work in progress and part of a larger publication project, aims at addressing the issue of the forms of euroscepticism in both the parties and the electorate. It is divided into two main parts, one on the parties, the other on the electorate. 2

3 Introduction In recent years, there has been a conceptual debate on this notion of party-based euroscepticism 1. Here are just a few examples of these definitions : - Aleks Sczerbiak and Paul Taggart introduced the distinction between hard euroscepticism which is opposition to EU membership itself and soft euroscepticism which is based on a case-to-case evaluation of EU developments. 2 - Applying their study to four candidate countries in 2001, Kopecky and Mudde outline a set of four categories to cover pro - as well as anti-eu parties. On the ideological plane, europhiles are those who are committed to the ideas of integration underlying the EU, whereas europhobese are not. On the strategic plane, EU-optimists broadly accept the way in which the EU is developing in practice, whereas Euro-pessimists do not consider that it is functioning well. From this, it follows that parties can be divided under four headings: Euroenthusiasts, Eurorealists, Eurocynics and Eurosceptics who are those who do not believe in the ideal of European integration and thus appear to be a combination of Europhobes and Europessimists 3. - As for Chris Flood, who identifies no less than six categories of attitudes to the EU 4, he rejects the notion of Euroscepticism as too general and stresses the fact that Euroscepticism is not a full blown ideology : "Unlike nationalism, of which it is sometimes but not always a vehicle, Euroscepticism is a purely negative concept, like anticapitalism, antimilitarism or anti-semitism" 5. From a comparative point of view, all these definitions are extremely valuable as they provide an analytical framework for a comparison of this phenomenon on the European level. Therefore, they tend to leave aside the specifically national character of Euroscepticism which is essentially linked to nature and the identity of the nation-state on which it is based. In this respect, the word "souverainisme" is interesting, it was originally meant to provide an essentially French definition of the phenomenon. However it partly failed in this purpose for two essential reasons : - first, because, as we are going to see, it turns out to provide a rather restricted and narrow view of the phenomenon in France since it gradually became synonymous to a form of "soft" 1 See Chris FLOOD. "Euroscepticism : a problematic concept", Panel : France's Relations with the European Union UCAS 32 nd annual Conference and 7 th Research Conference, Queen's University Belfast, 2-4 September Aleks SZCZERBIAK & Paul TAGGART, "The Party Politics of Euroscepticism", - Aleks SZCZERBIAK & Paul TAGGART, "The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate States", Sussex European Institute Working Paper n 51, OERN Working Paper n 6, April 2002, 45 p. ( p Petr KOPECKY and Cas MUDDE, "Empty Words or Irreductible Core? Euroscepticism in East Central Europe", conference paper, 97 th Convention of the American Political Science Associatio, San Francisco, Chris FLOOD, op. cit. 5 Chris FLOOD, op. cit. 3

4 Euroscepticism in major or moderate parties and failed to take into account the far left and the far right as well as other minor parties which cannot be classified as such, although some of them still claim to fit in this category. - second because the word souverainisme itself does not come from France. It initially designated the struggle for the independence of Quebec and was imported by French MEP and co-founder of Pasqua's RPF, Paul-Marie Couteaux. In this sense, however, the comparison is interesting : * first because it focuses on the struggle for the integrity and the sovereignty the territory on which it is based and is therefore closely connected with nationalism (whether it be a province of Quebec or a nation-state like France) * secondly by comparing the EU with Canada, the notion of "souverainisme" expresses the fear of being dissolved in a federal nation-state and is therefore closely associated with anti-federalism. Forms and extent of euroscepticism in the French party system The extent of Euroscepticism in French political parties has to be examined and should not be overestimated in comparison with other EU members such as Britain for instance. The comparison between the two countries is very valuable on European issues and make possible to say that Britain. France offers an image of rather muffled euroscepticism for two main reasons : - first, the positions of both countries in the EU has to be taken into account. Given the position of France as a founding country, this phenomenon has remained a taboo for a long time in the national debate, both in political parties and in the media which appear far less committed politically than their British counterparts. In this context, as opposed to Britain, there has always been a sort of tacit consensus between the leaderships of major parties on the left (PS) and the right (UMP) to support the current developments of European integration. - second, beyond differences in the political systems of France and Britain, differences in the party systems are also relevant in assessing the moderate impact of French party-based Euroscepticism. As Pierre Bréchon notes, parties have a bad reputation in France, due to the excessive fragmentation of the party system. With no common list on European issues, there has never been any successful attempt at a political realignment which could question the left-right cleavage 6. This situation tends to dilute Euroscepticism especially in first-order elections. In the 2002 French elections, "Europe was widely seen as absent from the electoral campaigns, and insignificant in its impact on voter behaviour", notes Helen Drake 7. But the French multiparty system has also favoured the bipolarisation of the system around the four major parties (RPR now UMP, UDF, PS, PCF). In this 6 Pierre BRECHON (ed), Les parties politiques français, Paris : La Documentation Française, 2005, p Helen DRAKE, "Europe in the 2002 French elections", in John GAFFNEY (ed), The French Preidential and Legislative Elections of 2002, Aldershot : Ashgate, 2004, p

5 context, the formation of coalitions has obliged minor parties to reform or to moderate their euroscepticism in order to collaborate with major parties. Although more latent than in Britain, Euroscepticism has always been present in France, particularly in European elections which provided an opportunity for Eurosceptical attitudes to develop not only in minor parties but also in major parties. Those major parties sometimes split on the European issue, as was the case in 1994 with the UDF, the RPR and the PS when Philippe De Villiers, Charles Pasqua and Jean-Pierre Chevènement formed their own lists. It also was the case during the two big moments that French political life has had on Eu matters : the 1992 and 2005 referendums. What is paradoxical however, is that in 2002 the presidential elections offered a better opportunity than the 2004 June European election for Eurosceptical parties to collect votes, although Europe was a far less salient issue in the campaign (see table 1 on electoral results : eurosceptical or anti- European parties represented almost half of the votes in 2002). Nowadays, Euroscepticism has become a natural component of the national democratic debate in France, so that major parties, like the UMP and the PS, now fail to provide a united platform on these issues. Among the nine parties which can be classified in this category, three of them have been specifically founded in the wake of the 1994 European election to promote an "alternative vision" of Europe : MPF, RPF & PR/MRC : these often refuse to be called Eurosceptics and prefer the label of Eurorealists or National- Republicans (Chevènement) and National-Liberals (de Villiers) to underline their ideological differences. In examining the theme of Europe in political speeches, five European issues now turn out to be the most often debated within parties and sometimes appear as bones of contention : 1) the European constitutional treaty and in particular, the reform of European institutions. 2) EU enlargement and in particular the question of Turkish entry to the EU. 3) The social and economic consequences of French membership, in particular the social benefits ("acquis sociaux"), the idea of social vs. liberal Europe. 4) the functioning of European institutions as related to the question of the "democratic deficit", especially the idea of bureaucracy, waste and corruption. 5) the nature of the EU political system, especially the notion of European federalism and the idea of national sovereignty/-ies. Eurosceptical parties offer rather similar attitudes to these European issues in spite of ideological differences various degrees of scepticism : looking at table 2, there seems to a broad consensus between eurosceptical parties on : 5

6 - promoting a more democratic and intergovernmental Europe. - rejecting globalisation and free-trade. - opposing an Atlanticist and ultra-liberal EU. - denouncing excessive centralisation of the EU institutions, corruption and waste in the Commission. - protecting and defending the sovereignty of France. 6

7 Table 1 : Eurosceptical parties in France : their results at the last elections Electoral Results : Presidential, election 21 April (1) & 5 May 2002 (2) Electoral Results : Legislative election, 9 & 16 June 2002 % (number of seats at the National Assembly) Electoral Results : European Parliament Election, June 2004 % (number of seats parliamentary group) FN (Front National) 16,9% (1) & 17,8% (2) 11,3% (-) 9,8% (7 n.i.) J.-M. Le Pen MNR (Mouvement 2,3% (1) 1,1% (-) 0,31% (0) National Républicain), B. Mégret MPF (Mouvement pour - 0,8% (1) 6,7% (3 IND/DEM) la France), Ph. De Villiers RPF (Rassemblement - 0,4% (2) 1,7% (0) pour la France), C. Pasqua CPNT (Chasse, Pêche, 4,2% (1) 1,7% (-) 1,73% (0) Nature,Traditions), J. Saint-Josse Ex-MDC (Mouvement 5,3% (1) 1,2% (-) - des Citoyens), now PR (Pôle Républicain)/MRC (Mouvement Républicain et Citoyen), J.-P. Chevènement PCF (Parti Communiste Français), M.-G. Buffet/R. Hue. 3,4% (1) 4,8% (21) 5,24% (2 EUL) LO (Lutte Ouvrière), A. Laguiller. LCR (Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire), A. Krivine/O. Besancenot 5,7% (1) 1,2% (-) 3,33% (0) 4,2% (1) 1,3% (-) TOTAL 42% (1) 23,8% (24) 28,1% (12 seats out of 78) 7

8 Table 2 : Eurosceptical parties in France : their attitudes toward EU issues FN MNR MPF RPF CPNT Ex-MDC, now PR/ MRC PCF LCR Constitution (Yes/No)/ European Institutions No/ withdrawal from the EU No / intergovernmental EU No / intergovernmental and democratic EU No / intergovernmental and democratic EU No / intergovernmental and democratic EU No / intergovernmental and democratic EU No / intergovernmental and democratic EU No / more popular democracy (including TUs and NGOs) EU Enlargement/ Turkey Against Turkey mbship for cultural and religious reasons> fear of the Muslim threat Against Turkey mbship for cultural and religious reasons> fear of the Muslim threat Against Turkey mbship but for a partnership with this country. In favour of "free and differentiated cooperations". Against Turkey mbship Against Turkey mbship and against EU enlargement Against Turkey mbship for demographic and geostrategic reasons. For EU enlargement. For Turkey mbship on specific conditions. For partnerships with the former eastern bloc countries instead of full mbship. For partnerships and associations with Eastern and Southern European countries Socio-economic consequences of EU membership Reject EU "ultraliberalism" under the influence of the US Against "Euroglobalisation" Reject EU socialism and free trade as "two sides of the same coin". Reject globalisation and free trade. Promote national solidarity Against the "ecologist drift" of EU. For a "rural Europe" Against EU as "a continental version of neo-liberal globalisation". For a "social and popular Europe" Against EU as a component of "global capitalism". For a "social and citizen Europe ( ) in favour of solidarity globalisation" Against "neo-liberal" and "capitalist" EU EU Administration/ Bureaucracy Against corruption and waste Against corruption and waste Against EU centralisation and technocracy Against EU technocracy Against EU technocracy Against the "paralysing accumulation of administrative procedures" in the EU For decentralised institutions and administration. For a "Europe of workers" against technocrats and capitalists. Sovereignty / Federalism Anti-EU (renegotiate treaties) Anti-EU (renegotiate treaties). For a "powerful, independent and Christian Europe". Sovereignist Sovereignist Sovereignist Sovereignist Confederal Europe Confederal Europe 8

9 Looking at the 2005 debates about the EU Constitution, the last big occasion during which strong arguments have been exchanged about EU, the main issue on which all these parties agreed was their opposition to the European constitutional treaty on similar grounds : across the political spectrum, the constitution was accused of promoting a neo (MRC, LCR)-or ultra (FN)-liberal, undemocratic and over-centralising EU. How surprising to observe that in Britain, on the other hand, the Eurosceptics, who can essentially be found in the Conservative Party, stressed the "socialist drift" of the EU because of the European constitution! This is probably due to the constant reference, in France, to the European social model (inherited from Jacques Delors) that some commentators tend to define as a "typically French obsession" 8, as opposed to the Anglosaxon liberal model. Unlike Britain, both the left and the right in France emphasise the damage caused by neo-liberal trade policy driven by the US-dominated agenda for globalisation. The main differences could be found on the question of the enlargement of the EU, especially Turkish membership. With the exception of the PCF and LCR which advocate a conditional "yes" and leave their voters free to choose, eurosceptical parties are against Turkey membership but the reasons put forward are either cultural/ religious (FN+MNR), political (MPF+RPF), financial (CPNT), demographic and geostrategic (PR/MRC) : Le Pen's FN and Mégret's MNR stress the "Muslim threat", the MPF and RPF are against the "semi-democratic" nature of the country, the CPNT underline the "unrealistic agenda" and the financial cost of enlargement in general and the MRCT are against the opposition to Turkish membership for "identity" reasons and stress demographical problems and geostrategic choices instead, to justify their own opposition. Beyond consensus and disagreements, it is possible to define left-wing and right-wing forms of Euroscepticism. On the left, parties condemn the EU for its commitment to liberal capitalism, excessive deregulation and globalisation. They want to promote a European social model which would be redistributive and supportive of the public sector and public services. They also blame the Schengen agreements for being too restrictive and strict towards immigrants and asylum-seekers. All defend the need for fully democratic and accountable European institutions giving influence to all instances, either sub-national or supra-national. On the other hand, the right and the extreme right focus on the defence of national sovereignty in a Europe of nation states which would respect national differences and specificities. Unlike the left, they condemn the Schengen agreements as being too lax and paving the way for massive immigration, insécurité and unemployment. They remain attached to deregulation and privatisation while emphasising the necessity of social 8 Susan MILNER, "Euroscepticism and the French left since Maastricht", European Studies, n 20, 2004, p.63. 9

10 solidarity and participation. They finally defend a strongly anti-atlanticist position, being either protectionist in the field of trade and ambivalent towards NATO in the field of defence. The main similarities are to be found between MPF, RPF & PR which appear to form the "backbone" or the core of French souverainisme. The three parties emphasise the overwhelming predominance of the nation-state and defend a European vision of variable geometry. Hence their attempt at forming a common list at the 1999 European election, their common emphasis on de Gaulle's influence and the symbolical influence of the Republic, a word which is omnipresent in their discourse (known as National Republicanism), in their label (Pôle Républicain) and in the names of the dozen of associations which are close to their ideas (SOS République, Dynamique Républicaine, Génération République, Initiative Républicaine, République Moderne and Debout la République! founded by Nicolas Dupont-Aignan who leads the souverainiste tendency within the UMP) 9. Given the multiparty system in France, Euroscepticism until recently was apparently contained on the periphery of the political spectrum. As de Villiers, Pasqua and Chevènement left the UDF, RPR and PS to create their own parties, Euroscepticism could then be described as a marginal phenomenon and the European issue could be easily eluded by politicians in the main national elections campaigns, as was the case in May But the European constitution and the question of Turkish membership put an end to this situation and a new form of factional Euroscepticism within the major parties appeared again after the Presidential election and in the run-up to the European election. The prospect of a referendum on the Constitution forced the main parties to position themselves. Within the UMP, a motion of its national council in favour of it was approved by 72% of the members. But under pressure from the souverainiste tendency within the UMP (led by Nicolas Dupont-Aignan), the souverainistes of the party gathered 20% of the votes for a motion calling for "another Europe" on the 9 May On the left, divisions between the socialist leader, François Hollande (supported by DSK and J. Lang) who was in favour and Laurent Fabius who was against appeared damaging for a party which already suffer from their difficulties in recovering from past electoral defeats and from an obvious lack of cohesion. Besides, European tensions were to be closely coupled with the underlying question of the choice of the future candidate for the next Presidential election in The internal referendum on 1 December 2004 on the Constitution with a narrow majority of its members (58,6%) in favour did not heal these tensions. 9 See Chris FLOOD. "Disappearing Euroscepticisms? The limits of Party-Based Opposition to European integration in France" Workshop on Comparative Euroscepticism, Maxwell EU Center, Maxwell School of Syracuse University, NY, May

11 Turkey is another bone of contention, especially within the UMP. French intellectual Edgar Morin noted the extent in France of "Turcoscepticism" as being deeply rooted in the fear of Islam and consequently, of terrorism and insecurity, a theme which is particularly popular within the neo- Gaullist party. While President Chirac openly supports Turkish membership, most UMP politicians, including former and current leaders Alain Juppé and Nicolas Sarkozy, are against. Unlike Britain, French political culture is profoundly marked by the left-right divide, so much that there are striking left-wing and right-wing variants of Euroscepticism. Susan Milner notes that "Chevènement's sovereignist ideology, which led him to break away from the left and seek "Republican" alliances across the political spectrum failed miserably in the 2002 elections" 10. This leads to a dispersal or a de-multiplication of the Eurosceptic phenomenon which is much more difficult to grasp than in Britain. It gives a rather complex image of the phenomenon, especially in the prospect of the next referendum, since there are probably as many forms of Euroscepticism as there are arguments and reasons to vote against the European constitution. However, although there are clear differences between the attitudes of the extreme left and of the extreme right, there are striking similarities between devilliers's MPF, Pasqua's RPF and Chevènement's PR/MRC. In spite of rather minor differences, those three parties form the core of souverainisme as such. Therefore, souverainisme can be defined as a French restricted and moderate (or "soft" to use Taggart's definition) version of Euroscepticism since it can be found on the left and right centre of the political spectrum and defined as a contemporary conception of the French Republic inspired by a neo-gaullist vision of the place of the nation and the role of the state. Forms and extent of euroscepticism in the electorate. Even though euroscepticism should not be overestimated in the French mass public and electorate, one has to recognize first that (table 1), more than 40% of the electorate voted for parties having opposition to EU on different eurosceptic basis during the last presidential election (first round on the 21 april 2006). French mass public is not in fact a pro-eu one on firm grounds. Every wave of recent Eurobarometer survey shows that France is in the middle of the distribution of the classical indicators of diffuse support to EU. To first show that we have used the last available Eurobarometer survey, conduced in fall 2004 (EB62.0). Rather than using the 4 traditional indicators separately, we have combined five indicators (the four traditional, ie : benefit, support, regret and unification; plus an indicator of positive/negative image of EU) by a multiple 10 Susan MILNER, op. Cit., p

12 correspondence analysis (MCA). We then have used the factorial score of respondents on the first dimension in order to get an optimal score for each on a latent trait that can be denominated pro/anti-eu dimension. To facilitate the data analysis and presentation we have discretize the coordinates values and grouped it in quartiles categories. Table 3 Diffuse support to the EU in the 25 EU members (% of respondents belonging to the two last quartiles, ie: supporting EU integration) Countries % support Ireland 71,9 Lituany 66,5 Luxembourg 66,4 Spain 64,0 Belgium 62,6 Greece 62,5 Portugal 58,0 Italy 54,0 Netherlands 53,8 Slovakia 51,5 West Germany 51,0 Hungary 49,5 Cyprus 49,2 France 48,8 Denmark 48,7 East Germany 48,6 Malta 47,0 Slovenia 46,5 Estonia 45,5 Poland 45,4 Latvia 38,8 Tchec republic 37,8 Austria 35,6 Sweden 34,7 Finland 31,9 UK 30,7 average 50 Source : Eurobaromètre 62.0, Fall In a serie of previous work, we have shown that the distribution of anti-eu attitudes in the French electorate can be linked to sociological factors as well to political ones : less educated respondents, working class persons, those living in areas far from urban centers, women are less in favour of EU developments that men, better educated persons, urban inner cities inhabitants, managers or white collar in general. The sociological segmentation of attitudes to EU is not a French particularity and 12

13 can be found in most EU countries. As a common result the level of education has one of the biggest impact on attitudes towards EU (table 4). We can illustrate this by table 4. Table 4 - Diffuse support to the EU in the 25 EU members according the age of end of education. Countries < 16 years Age of end of education years years and Gap : (20 years- <16 years) more Ireland 59,5 73,6 81,0 21,5 Lituany 56,3 66,1 69,8 13,5 Luxembourg 59,8 62,6 71,6 11,8 Spain 60,0 68,3 73,3 13,3 Belgium 54,0 51,4 72,1 18,1 Greece 54,9 61,5 70,3 15,4 Portugal 54,3 67,4 87,0 32,7 Italy 40,2 54,6 60,9 20,7 Netherlands 40,5 47,6 61,6 21,1 Slovakia 34,5 50,5 68,3 33,8 West Germany 29,5 52,0 65,6 36,1 Hungary 36,9 53,2 66,0 29,1 Cyprus 38,5 48,1 70,6 32,1 France 33,9 39,2 60,1 26,1 Denmark 31,8 43,1 52,7 20,9 East Germany 38,5 44,6 61,0 22,5 Malta 41,5 48,7 68,6 27,1 Slovenia 40,4 58,9 69,3 28,9 Estonia 28,7 43,4 51,0 22,3 Poland 29,5 44,0 55,5 26,0 Latvia 32,4 35,7 42,8 10,4 Tchec republic 19,4 35,7 59,1 39,5 Austria 20,7 34,2 48,9 28,2 Sweden 21,9 28,1 39,4 17,5 Finland 14,9 26,1 39,7 24,8 UK 20,8 26,9 50,7 29,9 average 40,4 47,6 58,9 18,5 Source : Eurobarometer 62., Fall The political segmentation of French electorate on EU is linked to the degree of interest and attention to politics : those having higher level of interest into politics, having more likely cognitive mobilization to speak like Inglehart, are more likely to have positive views about EU. We will come back in that in our conclusions and in particular on coming back on the 29 may 2005 outcomes. The left-right dimension has few links with diffuse support towards EU, a situation due to the traditional U curve : parties at the extreme have strong opposition to EU and their voters too, parties at the centre (right and left centers) share a common government culture even if their 13

14 electorate is nowadays more diverse and segmentated on EU issues like the 2005 referendum has shown. The most interesting part on the forms of eurosceptic attitudes in the French mass public can be revealed by using two different approaches than the previous ones. Eurosceptics attitudes and values systems It is unfortunate that most of the Eurobarometer studies do not ask questions about the political values of respondents. Using the post-electoral study conduced in 2002 in France it is then possible to show how eurosceptic attitudes are in fact shaped by more general values systems. With Céline Belot, we have show that in the 2002 presidential election context, French voters where particularly shaped in their votes by their attitudes towards EU (even if candidates hardly spoke about EU issues) 11. Graphs 1 to 4 show the very significant relationship between negative views about EU and attitudinal variables, composed through the data analysis of the last post-election study conduced in France, the Panel electoral français in The methodology for composing the variable of attitude towards EU is the same as the one used before for Eurobarometer data. Graph 1 : Negative attitudes towards EU according to the opinion about democracy in France 11 see : Céline Belot, Bruno Cautrès. L europe invisible mais omniprésente. In : Bruno Cautrès, Nonna Mayer (ed ;). Le nouveau désordre électoral. Les leçons du 21 avril paris, Presses de Sciences Po,

15 Negative attitude towards EU (first and second quartiles) accoring to the opinion about democracy in France Très bien Assez bien Pas très bien Pas bien du tout Note 2 Note 1 Source : French panel electoral study, 2002, second wave. 15

16 Graph 2 : Negative attitude towards EU in France according to confidence in others Note 1 Note 2 On peut faire confiance On n'est jamais assez prudent Source : French panel electoral study, 2002, second wave. Graph 3 : Negative attitude towards EU in France according to authoritarian values Negative attitudes towards EU according to authoritarian values Fort Faible Note 2 Note 1 Source : French panel electoral study, 2002, second wave. 16

17 Graph 4 : Negative attitude towards EU according to xenophobic values Attitude négative vis à vis de l'europe (notes 1 et 2) en fonction du degré de xénophobie Fort Moyen Faible Note 2 Note 1 Source : French panel electoral study, 2002, second wave. A multi-dimensional representation of EU in the French mass public We have already shown in the followings of our analysis with Céline Belot that fears toward the development of EU can reveal the bi-dimensinonality of attitudes towards EU integration in France. : one dimension of general fears and an orthogonal dimension specific to the fears regarding social benefits and social protection. If the first of these two dimensions is quasi-independent from the left-right scale, the second one was, in the context of the 2002 presidential election, perfectly linked to. In other words, to understand the links (or absence of likns) betwenne the parties and the electorate on EU issues, one has to abandon a one-dimensional viw about attitudes toward EU and migrate to a multi-dimensional perspective. Very few research area doing so and we belived that we have been, with Céline Belot, one of the few. The very fascinating point is that this twodimensional view helps in understanding the two types of eurosceptic attitudes in France : one more rightist is preoccupied by national identity, the other one more leftist is preoccupied by the socio-economic consequences of EU. In other words, there are two worlds of euroscepticism in the French public. We also have repeated such analysis using the 2004 French sample of the European election study and it still works 12. But since our first analysis of this, new debates have occurred in the French public space about EU and the 2005 referendum have shown that the French Left splited in two opposite groups. Can it be that France is at moment knowing a kind of fragmentation (multiple views about the benefits and the negative costs of EU integration) rather than polarization (pro/cons EU) of perceptions towards the consequence of EU developments? 12 See : Bruno Cautrès, Vincent Tiberj. Une sanction du gouvernement mais pas de l Europe. Les élections européennes de Juin 2004 en France. Paris, Cahiers du CEVIPOF,

18 We have wished to test for this hypothesis, using the more recent available Eurobarometer data, the EB62.0 (fall 2004). It is unfortunate that we do not have more recent Eurobarometer data. As a first approach we can see with table 5 that the French public is highly preoccupied by the impact of EU on socio-economic matters, and more than on identity matters. The French public got the highest level of fears among EU15 members about job transfers to other EU members, a point very important to understand why the No campaign during the EU Constitution referendum voting was so strong on that particular point. Fears towards the developments of EU integration in France compared to EU members % currently afraid of (French sample) % currently afraid of EU15 % currently afraid of EU10 new members Transfer jobs to other EU members Difficulties for farmers France is paying more Loss of social benefits Increase of drug traffic and crime Economic crisis Power loss for small states French language less used Loss of national identity Source : Eurobaromter 62.0, Fall Rather than using separately each of the above items, we use them simultaneously by doing a multiple correspondence (MCA) analysis of it (see appendix). The advantages of this methodology are to be able to search for multi-dimensionnality a key point for us. The histogram of eigenvalues shows that we can be confident in retaining the first three factors of the MCA solution. Taken together, these three factors cumulate 53.60% of the total inertia. The first dimension (which account for 30.9% of total inertia by itself) is organized as a general dimension opposing fears to the absence of fears. All the items related to the fear of EU 18

19 development, whatever the item concerned, are located on the same side of the dimension (their factorial coordinates are of positive sign); all the items related to fears are all opposed to, factorial coordinates of negative sign). Among the 8 variables active in the MCA analysis, four contributes more than the other to the inertia of the first dimension : fears that EU developments are going to generate an economic crisis, to make France paying more for other EU countries, to accelerate loss of national identity and an increase in drug traffic and crime. In other words, this first dimension opposes optimistic and pessimistic views about EU in terms of economy, identity and security. It represents the usual opposition that the analysis of opinions and attitudes towards EU has found in many countries: an attitudinal opposition between an open and a closed vision of EU. The second dimension (12.19% of the total inertia) opposes specific fears and no longer a general opposition between fears and absence of fears. Four variables contribute here again to the dimension more than the other: fears that EU developments are going to weaken national identity, to contribute to French as a language less used, to generate an economic crisis and to job transfers. The items related to identity, or more exactly to fears related to identity, are of positive sign and oppose to the items related to fears about economy (factorial coordinates of negative sign). The second dimension of the MCA solution oppose two specific forms of fears : one is of economic type, the other one is of cultural, or identity, type. The third dimension (10.49% of total inertia), furthers the specific oppositions revealed by the second factor. It reveals an opposition between two fears : the fear that EU development will loss the power of small States (item getting a negative signed coordinate) and the fear that it will make French as a language less used (item getting a positive signed coordinate). This opposition is less clear to interpret and we may recall that this third dimension only account for 10.49% of the total inertia. It can appear strange than French public is preoccupied by the loss of power of small States in the EU developments. Our suggestion here is that this fear means something else, probably revealing a negative image of EU as a too big political mechanism, a political structure which does not respect the small. This is confirmed by other analysis which shown that respondents belonging to that side of the dimension have a negative view about EU. As a conclusion of this analysis we may conclude by the fact that attitudes towards EU in France, at least when measured by a battery of items related to fears is a multi-dimensional object. We may risk the term of the three worlds of Euroscepticism in the mass public in France : one is the opposition between the two general views (the global positive and negative views about EU); the other one is a view of EU as attacking, or at least damaging, national identity (it s a cultural prism of perceptions); the last one is articulated to economic concerns. Obviously this a limited analysis, 19

20 only based on Eurobarometer data and one only one type of items battery. Within these limits, the interesting point is to have a plural and multi-dimensional scope for the analysis of attitudes towards EU. As the factorial graphic below shows, the projection of the left-right scale on the plan formed by the two first dimensions is also of great interest. We have projected on this plan the leftright 10 points scale as supplementary points. The graph reveals that the first dimension is not redundant with the left-right continuum and this result goes in the direction of the existing literature on the cross-cut between the two cleavages. The second dimension is more related to the left-right cleavages even if it is not so strongly linked to than our analysis of the 2002 data. We cannot find in the Eurobarometer data such a clear result as we ve found with Céline Belot on the 2002 postelection study data. There are traces, more than that, of the existence in the French public of three worlds od eurosceptic attitudes towards Europe and it is interesting to remark that this three worlds does exist in the political supply offered by parties and within parties. Factorial graphic : the two first dimensions of attitudes towards fears about EU developments in France. An MCA analysis. Source : Eurobarometer 62.0, Fall Conclusions The findings presented in this paper do need more controls and empirical work. We are still on the way to make the connection between the analysis of the parties positions and the attitudes of the 20

21 electorate. But we ve have made some progress on that road. One cannot explain the result of the 29 May 2005 referendum without understanding that there is NOT only one form of euroscepticism either in the parties or the electorate. The key political factor, explaining the victory of the No was the U-turn of middle class, public sector and socialist electorate. The argument against the EU Constitution which was very successful in that segment of the electorate was about the consequences of EU and of this type of EU promoted by the Constitution in terms of public policies, social protection and democratic deficit. 21