Konstantin Kosachev «WE SHOULD DEFINE RUSSIA TODAY, ITS ROLE IN THE WORLD»

Transcription

1 Konstantin Kosachev «WE SHOULD DEFINE RUSSIA TODAY, ITS ROLE IN THE WORLD» Chairman of the State Duma Committee for Foreign Affairs Konstantin Kosachev answers our questions. 1 SECURITY INDEX: You had an opportunity to see the foreign policymaking through the prism of a professional diplomat, then a member of the executive branch, and now as a legislator. How would you assess Russia s role in the current system of international relations and security? Does the country have a special place in the world? Does this specialty relate above all to our neighbors, nations that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union? KOSACHEV: Neither Russia, nor the world around it have yet defined its place on the international arena. After the demise of the U.S.S.R, its successors that neighbor Europe had to choose between NATO, the EU, the United States, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other. This choice was wrong, since it followed the agenda of the early 1990s and still dominates the minds of many politicians on the European part of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). For the Caucasus, for Central Asia, this dilemma was less evident. The processes that immediately started in Moldova or in Ukraine gain momentum in the Caucasus or in Central Asia only now, in this decade. And Russia faces this new fashion. For many years our country has been living with an illusion that centripetal integration trends on the post-soviet space will last forever and automatically, since we have common history, borders, and language with our neighbors. And it seemed that all those factors did not need any additional incentives. However, now it is the time of disillusions, since it is Russia that has the only common history, common borders, and common language. Meanwhile, our neighbors have some common history with some third countries, and the same relates to borders and even languages. So Russia only begins to understand that all this is not envisaged by the heavens forever, that this is the construction to be built. Unfortunately, such understanding comes slowly. Moscow often acts by mistake, attempts to impose good relations with some administrative or purely economic measures, forgets about the set of tools called soft power, which Russia does not always employ effectively. One has to admit that Russia the way it is now and the way it existed in the 1990s can hardly be regarded as a center attracting natural sympathy and, hence, interests. Russia s place in international affairs is a complicated issue, and the Russians have not yet resolved it. On the one hand, since the early 1990s we have been declaring the so called European choice of our country and this choice is not geographical. This was an intellectual, civilization choice, the choice of the model of development which proved to be successful. This model is based on three components free market economy, pluralistic society and high social responsibility of the state and the businesses. And we follow this path with lots of hardships and impediments, but we keep going. I N T E R V I E W S SECURITY INDEX No. 1 (86), Volume 15 11

2 When I hear people in the West criticizing Russia for stepping back, I cannot agree with such approach. Simply because the model that existed in Russia in the early 1990s was worse than now. And we have never had independent media! And the 1996 presidential elections were the result of manipulations with the public opinion. And here comes the crisis in relations between Russia and the rest of the world. We feel the pressure from outside. Information and political pressure is there. Before that, in the Soviet times, we suffered from such pressure at least twice. In the late Brezhnev era, when the Soviet system was under terrible pressure, the outcome was perestroika. During the last years of the Soviet Union such pressure led to the emergence of the Yeltsin phenomenon. Unlike now, the external pressure on our country at that time coincided accurately with the domestic demands of the society. Today such massive attack has nothing to do with the vision of the nation. There is a conflict of feelings that people see in the comments and get in real life. These external forces make a big mistake, as they only provoke anti-western and anti-american sentiments inside the country. The Russian foreign policy in the recent years has become tougher, and this is the outcome of the erroneous policy of external pressure. SECURITY INDEX: And in these circumstances Russia turns its back to the West and looks at the East? KOSACHEV: It won t be right to say so. It is true that we expect the illusions of the 1990s to dissipate and Russia to enter the appropriate niche in the international affairs, which it deserves. So far this is not the case in our relations with the European Union and the United States. At the negotiations on new strategic cooperation that take place the consumerist approach to Russia is predominant disputes about raw timber, disputes about ratification of the Energy Charter and access to Russian pipelines. These are not proper terms for concluding strategic agreements with the European Union Russia cannot accept such attitude. SECURITY INDEX: Hence, Russia loses more and more of its influence on the post-soviet space? What are the traits of shortsightedness of our policy in the region? KOSACHEV: Those global centers of power (the United States and the EU nations), which began to pop up on the post-soviet space after the demise of the Soviet Union, had a forwardlooking policy at least in one aspect. They came to the former Soviet republics with the slogan (sometimes declarative, sometimes real) «We come here to help you in solving your problems.» And this strategy has worked out. Many European states have become the source of solutions for the post-soviet nations. Russia has failed to do so. At first, it turned its back to those countries, and later, when it eventually realized that such approach ran counter to our interests, Moscow began to restore its positions under selfish slogan of «We return here because we need it, Russia needs it.» Such policy can partly be justified, but only when it comes to mutually beneficial pattern of cooperation and when Russia also serves as a source of solutions. However, our country only learns to act differently, while our rivals have already succeeded in this. SECURITY INDEX: What is your opinion of Russia s participation in various integration processes? What prevents Russia from playing a more active part in this sphere? KOSACHEV: In parallel to colliding interests, another curious process takes place on this common space. Russia is being framed with some previously formed structures that have been created without our participation. Such model is effective with respect to many other countries that were not engaged in respective integration processes before. And I don t mean only the post-soviet space here, but all the nations that were hiding were behind the iron curtain during the Cold War. Participation in such integration projects that have been developing for decades, observe the traditions and have well-established interests, is always connected with the detriment to national sovereignty in exchange for the solutions to some national problems through the cooperation mechanisms. Such rapprochement is a benefit for all those states that strive for joining the integration structure. 12 «WE SHOULD DEFINE RUSSIA TODAY, ITS ROLE IN THE WORLD»

3 The only country that does not follow this logic is Russia. For us it is much more difficult to sacrifice a part of our sovereignty without infringing the rest of it, and this process is much more painful than for other nations. For instance, look at the TNK-BP conflict. TNK tries to urge its partners to invest money in oil refineries, to build more plants on the territory of Russia. At the same time, BP is willing to extract as much oil as possible and to sell it in the West. This is the essence of the conflict, as I see it. This is a classical example of how Russia s national interests collide with the interests of its partners. And here we see the major point of contradictions between Russia and our partners in various integration structures. They ask us to be like others. And when we don t follow this path, we are accused of being different. And since we are different, we are a priori perceived as a threat. Meanwhile, Russia regards as a threat this permanent desire to infringe our sovereignty, in particular our natural resources. Therefore, Russia witnesses the growth of anti-western and anti- American sentiments, which, in my opinion, are no less dangerous than anti-russian sentiments in the West, and should be curbed by politicians on both sides. If we take this dilemma in a simpler way, the root of the differences is that Russia has not yet been turned into the source of gaining profit. SECURITY INDEX: To be more specific how would you assess the prospects of the integration processes on the post-soviet space, notably the functioning of such organizations, as the CIS, the Shanghai Organization of Cooperation (SOC), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Eurasian Economic Community? Is it possible to unite them all following the European patterns? KOSACHEV: I think no one can answer this question, because any organization becomes effective, when it is interesting for all members. Such format does not yet exist on the post- Soviet space. The CIS is the structure that has carried out important missions, but is absolutely non-viable at present. And the bodies that emerged on the ruins of the CIS are not efficient either these are the attempts to provide the single pace of integration, but they are quite artificial. I am sure that the driving force of integration should be the economy and not politics or security. As soon as something is formed on the basis of politics, it becomes targeted against others anti-nato, anti-eu, anti-u.s.a And such approach is wrong. Our common interests with the CIS neighbors should rest, above all, in economy. I would welcome a sort of energy alliance on the post-soviet space, which would put an end to various political projects in this area. Such energy alliance, bringing together not only the CIS, but also China, Japan, and both Koreas, could be quite promising. The unification of present-day structures the CSTO, the EurAsEC... Theoretically it is possible, if diplomats come to an agreement. But if it becomes again a matter of intellectual speculations, a cabinet-born creature, it will turn into another mechanism that wastes lots of time, huge resources and efforts of its participants, but remains a stillborn child. Thus, it is necessary to identify common interests and use this platform to develop joint structures and not vice versa. SECURITY INDEX: Let us discuss the Russia-West relations. Which problems would you identify in Russia-NATO relations? KOSACHEV: For NATO countries, the end of the Cold War meant the elimination of the military threat, no more fear of the third world war. NATO and EU enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe was caused by their selfish interests of moving into the center, leaving other states in the periphery. And such logic was flawed. In the early 1990s Russia was ready to join any form of cooperation in the area of economy and security. The West made a mistake instead of trying to set up a structure uniting all the willing, including Russia, it relied on the NATO expansion, which could have been justified during the Cold War, but not after it. It was stereotype thinking and this stereotype is active until now and creates tensions, which can easily be noticed. It impedes the implementation of global I N T E R V I E W S SECURITY INDEX No. 1 (86), Volume 15 13

4 security projects. NATO, and there is no doubt about that, is the most effective security structure. But NATO is not an absolutely effective structure to solve the new problems. And NATO activities in Afghanistan, I assume, do not meet our interests. This operation is not efficient. The Alliance cannot control the situation in the country. It would have been different, if NATO had involved, for example, Russia, China, and India at the very beginning. These countries do not take part in the operation, simply because it is a NATO mission. Moscow cannot send its troops under command of the NATO generals. It is impossible. This is a classical example of how stereotype thinking prevents the fulfillment of real tasks. For instance, NATO membership for Ukraine or Georgia has nothing to do with solving the nonproliferation issues or combating terrorism, i.e. resisting those specific challenges that face the United States and European countries. Therefore, the latest initiative of the Russian president Helsinki-2, a new cooperation pattern, is timely and useful. It is our initiative, our first basket, some new arrangements that would regulate the use and non-use of force, regulate all the issues that remain unresolved due to the lack of action on the part of the OSCE. SECURITY INDEX: What measures could Russia undertake to avoid possible foreign policy errors and mitigate the existing tensions? KOSACHEV: I would suggest five directions for foreign policy development. First of all, it is the positive agenda. Russia reacts to the activities of our partners, agrees and disagrees with them. But Russia rarely sets forth its own concepts and keys to contemporary problems. For instance, with respect to Kosovo, Moscow spoke a lot about disagreements, but did not put on the table any solutions. The second thing is preemptive information support. It often happens that Russia either frightens its partners, or creates opportunities to all sorts of speculations about Russia. The third element is a number of talking heads. There are not enough discussion platforms to speak about international security issues. Quite often such debate goes on without any Russian participation. And Moscow does not always act professionally during such debate. Fourthly, Russia has recently stopped fearing to be left alone. But quite frequently it does not think about being more convincing through coalition-building. The United States has never been alone in any situation. For instance, Moscow decided to suspend its participation in the CFE Treaty. It could agree on this topic with Kazakhstan or Belarus, but preferred to act on its own. And finally, we are pushed to illegal action in response to various international developments. By giving way to these provocations, we always lose. We should guard ourselves against them and stay within the legal framework all the time. SECURITY INDEX: How effective is the current system of international security treaties? Isn t Russia the only country that sticks strictly to the international law and can such predictability become a weak point of our foreign policy? KOSACHEV: This is another reason for tensions in our relations with the world. We normally face such turn of events when political reasoning substitutes for the international law. Even if it contradicts the law, we would act like this, because we are right, because we need it (look at Iraq, look at Kosovo, etc.). This is a dangerous trend and Russia witnesses a real dilemma whether to fight to death for the sake of the international law, or to copy the behavior of its partners and rivals. I support the first line of action, since the law always protects the weak. If we compare the situation in the United States and in Russia Look, the Americans are real bookworms as far as the abidance to the law is concerned. Any citizen there can sue the state and this is normal. At the same time, the Americans are quite «flexible» with respect to the international law. Why? It happens simply because the U.S. state does not have all the powers over its citizens (thanks to the political model that exists there), over the civil society. The state needs legal protection, and everyone else needs legal protection. So the Americans always appeal to the law, as it is the basis of the entire U.S. life, its society. Meanwhile, beyond its bor- 14 «WE SHOULD DEFINE RUSSIA TODAY, ITS ROLE IN THE WORLD»

5 ders, the United States is the most powerful nation; it is stronger than all other countries in the world and believes that the law is an inappropriate luxury. The law prevents Washington from ruling the world on its own. So the U.S.A neglects the law. What happens in Russia? The situation is just the opposite. The respect to the law is quite relative inside the country. Why? Because the state is omnipotent and is not afraid of its citizens, does not fear losing the trial in the court, does everything that it wants to. In fact, I feel sorry about that, but these are our circumstances, that s the way it is, that s our tradition so far. And on the contrary, in external affairs we stick to the law because we are weaker than many of our partners. The collapse of the existing system of international law would mean no preferences for us, no additional benefits. It would deprive us of the existing protection, whatever weak it is. The system has many flaws, but I would avoid calling it chaos or inefficiency the United Nations exist, the UN Charter is valid, the UN Security Council continues to work somehow. Imagine for a second the situation without the UN Security Council? What would happen to Iran? I do not rule out much more radical developments the Americans and Israel would make a strike against the nuclear facilities. Nobody would win in such situation. The fact that we manage to keep this complicated, mainly non-transparent for Russia, unpredictable situation within the legal framework is a big plus. It is much more beneficial for Russia, since otherwise we would witness the replica of the crisis over the North Korean nuclear program. The United States moved on, de facto began to threaten the regime with external intervention and overthrowing. Pyongyang was frightened to death. I was there during this time and saw physical panic in the eyes of my interlocutors. And I suddenly realized that they feared for their lives. They knew that any external invasion would mean their end not only the end of their palaces or wealth, but the end of their lives. And they were ready to do anything a cornered cat transforms into a tiger, says Confucius. The same thing happened to North Korea, which abandoned the NPT, stopped cooperation with the IAEA, isolated itself from the rest of the world and began to cultivate its fear, boosting in parallel the nuclear program. We were lucky to escape the unhappy ending the Americans toned down their rhetoric and we returned North Korea back to life and the negotiation table. If Iran does the same, e.g. gets closed and starts making the A-bomb (they do it, unlike the North Koreans, I am sure), nobody would feel better neither the United States, nor Russia, nor anyone else. So it is not worth breaching the agreements and becoming unpredictable. For some time, one may succeed, but since such behavior leads to even greater loneliness, we may lose much more than win. Look at the CFE Treaty. It has not been ratified by NATO states, Russia has suspended its membership. If we leave apart the propagandistic rhetoric, none of the states that signed the CFE violates its parameters. We have an argument about a different thing. Why does Bulgaria still belong to the East, albeit it is de facto the West? The very construction is outdated. None of the states have exceeded the quotas of the treaty, as far as tanks, artillery, or aircraft are concerned. What will happen if we theoretically fully destroy the treaty? For instance, we can waste some of our national economic resources and increase the number of tanks in Kaliningrad or in the Bryanskaya oblast by 10,000. So what? They have better capabilities and each of the NATO countries will manufacture a certain number of tanks, so we will confront the army of 26 NATO nations, each possessing a certain amount of tanks. The balance will be changed dramatically. Such tanks would become useless, as it makes little sense to fight against the tank army which is ten or hundred times stronger. We would waste enormous financial resources, but such steps will not be justified from the point of our national interests. SECURITY INDEX: There is a heated debate about Russia s «greatness» as far as foreign policy is concerned. Perhaps, it is not the most important question. More important are the implications of this grandeur for the foreign policy objectives. If Russia is a Great Power, its goals on the global arena should be great as well. Does Moscow have such large-scale plans? Or is it the right time to set forth such tasks? If yes, which objectives would you name? KOSACHEV: I agree that Russia does not yet formulate strategic objectives for its foreign policy. This is not good. I N T E R V I E W S SECURITY INDEX No. 1 (86), Volume 15 15

6 There are two models for shaping foreign policy of the country. One of them is a classical pattern, when political parties compete with each other in defining the strategic goals. This type of communication is not yet active in Russia; we only pass the stage of building a true multiparty system. We still wait for the emergence of strong political parties with clear ideology. The programs of all parties in Russia are more or less the same and do not reflect specific objectives. Why does it happen? To my mind, Russia claims for the Great Power status, but does not have so clearly articulated natural interests, like our partners. For instance, China is obviously willing to provide free access to the resources for its enterprises this is a typical example of the natural external interest. The lack of such resources is an engine that moves the policy of many states, including the United States or the European Union. Another example is the provision of favorable terms for selling domestic products and the existence of saturated internal market. Alas, Russia is not affected by this factor. And the domestic market is still a lucrative target for many enterprises they can work for years ahead to fill it up with commodities and services. So this is not an incentive either. There is a natural factor called maintenance of national security. Some states that do not possess enough resources to ensure their national security enter various military blocs or use a common security umbrella. This does not work out with respect to Russia, as we are self-sufficient from the point of defense. We have nuclear weapons. And when we deal with the Collective Security Treaty, this is more an optional thing, because the existence of such agreement is not the major security factor. A different model exists in the United States. The country has a strong analytical center (the National Security Council), which accumulates the interests of the professional community, the State Department, the businesses, the civil society, etc. All this contributes to some vision of the situation, which is then reported to the president and underpins national policy. We lack such mechanism. The Security Council, of course, could play such role, but in its current state it is impossible. The President of Russia holds meetings, but this is less efficient than a standing agency. Russia has many interesting ideas in the expert community, among political scientists and think tanks, there are many curious projects, but these ideas do not reach the top. Nobody needs them in our country. The same relates to businesses, which prefer to enter the right ministerial office and agree about support. And there is no institution, which would accumulate the interests of the business community and incorporate them into the state policy. As a result, a paradox occurs this or that strategy is being elaborated by the end-user, e.g. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The MFA responds to some situation in the world and writes a memo to the president on the suggested policy on the issue. Then this report is submitted to the Security Council, to the president and gets back to the MFA, which starts its implementation. Such model does not imply any ambitious tasks because people know the things that they write today will get back to them tomorrow for fulfillment. And such goal as restoration of the U.S.S.R, for instance, cannot even pop up, since the authors of the strategy would kill it at the very initial stage. Unless we change this mechanism, the situation will remain deplorable. What can be done? Russia s top leadership should formulate the tasks not specific actions, but tasks. For instance, they can decide to make Belarus the 87th constitutional entity of Russia (or vice versa to support the sovereignty of Belarus by all means). At first glance, such objective would seem mission impossible. But the criteria should not be «possible» or «impossible», but «meeting national interests» or «contradicting national interests». Another stride forward would be the reform of the Russian Security Council. The latter should get such far-going objectives, separate it into tactical elements and set the tasks for diplomacy, businesses, military, etc. Then everyone has his own piece of work and the MFA only coordinates such activities. That s the way it should be organized. However, so far we fail to do so. And unfortunately, without strategy our foreign policy will not be efficient. SECURITY INDEX: Do you think the NPT is viable, as far as the compliance is concerned? 16 «WE SHOULD DEFINE RUSSIA TODAY, ITS ROLE IN THE WORLD»

7 KOSACHEV: The NPT is not complied with by a number of key parameters. Many of its provisions can be criticized, but we have to admit that the treaty in its initial form is not effective. And we have many countries that already are or may become nuclear weapon states. There are no legal norms to prevent this, at least, until India and Pakistan are not parties to the NPT and freely possess nuclear weapons. Besides, the NPT contains a number of commitments for nuclear weapon states they should strive for achieving nuclear zero. Hence, this is a two-edged sword. As soon as we become pedants, we risk getting the claims to nuclear weapon states, e.g. Russia, that the elimination of nuclear arsenals does not go fast enough. I am also sure that nuclear zero is a distant perspective in Russia, taking into account the state of affairs in our Armed Forces and defense budget, total elimination of nuclear weapons would significantly undermine the national security. Nuclear component is a cornerstone of our defense policy. SECURITY INDEX: Getting back to the issue of positive agenda for the Russian foreign policy, let me ask you why does Russia today avoid the discussion of complete nuclear disarmament matters? KOSACHEV: Russia does not reject the idea of negotiations on complete nuclear disarmament. In his last address to the Federal Assembly President Putin argued that we did not pay much attention to disarmament. So any statements about Russia s reluctance to deal with disarmament are relevant only with respect to the past, not to the current situation. Now the MFA together with the MOD develops the appropriate proposals to the leaders on this matter. But, of course, there is a shortage of ideas. SECURITY INDEX: What is the role of the parliament, notably your committee, in foreign policymaking? Should this role be strengthened and what is done in this sphere? KOSACHEV: These are the particularities of our Constitution. The principle of division of power in Russia emerged on the basis of the existing Constitution, which was written and approved after the tragic events of October This is the Constitution of the presidency, since the latter gained victory at that time. So the president has strong powers in the area of foreign policy and the capabilities of the parliament are quite limited. If I compare the powers of the U.S. Congress or the parliaments of some European states, I notice that we have more constraints than our foreign colleagues. Today it is our constitutional norm, which should not be changed at the moment. It helps to pursue our national interests and it works out. If we look at the U.S. or French Constitution, we will see that the functions of the parliament, including foreign policy, are clear cut. The Russian Constitution, unlike in France or in America, states that the Russian foreign policy is determined by the president. This is a specific norm, but to change it, the entire document should be amended. I am against changing the Constitution piece by piece. As soon as we realize that the whole society has changed, we can start amending the Constitution, so this should be a comprehensive process. As far as the powers of our committee are concerned, they are sufficient, in fact. Our major function is to work with the bills affecting the Russian foreign policy and the Constitution. For instance, nowadays one the most important issues is the bill on transborder cooperation, ratification of the appropriate documents. Another example is the Russian-Latvian agreement on keeping up the military cemeteries. I assume that Russia really needs this document. However, before the meeting of the State Duma I suddenly faced the resistance of the Communists and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia. They claimed that such agreement would enable Latvia to use the Russian territory to make memorials for the supporters of fascism who had fought against the Soviet Army and place Nazi symbols on such monuments. I have studied the agreement again and found the clause saying that the monuments can be set only in accordance with the national legislation. And since the Nazi emblems are banned in Russia, they cannot appear on the memorials. The agreement was ratified by the State Duma upon insistence of our committee. I N T E R V I E W S SECURITY INDEX No. 1 (86), Volume 15 17

8 The parliament reflects those sentiments that exist in the society with respect to different external events. One of our statements concerned the Latvian law prohibiting the use of the Soviet symbols along with the Nazi ones. Before that we made a statement on the fate of the Russian- Ukrainian treaty, with which I disagree. The president proposed to break the treaty, but the majority in the parliament was against this. The parliament lost this battle, but its statements reflected the real public opinion. Besides, the parliament is responsible for financing the Russian foreign policy credits, writing off the debts, etc. Finally, we consider that appointments of new ambassadors. Each ambassador is invited to the meeting of our committee, where we discuss the foreign policy tasks in this or that region, and then we have a regular dialogue. We have introduced the practice of inviting ambassadors who come back from vacation, especially if they return from significant states, to our sessions and we talk together about the failures and successes. SECURITY INDEX: Russia starts to formulate the so called national idea. Is this process justified and what can be called our national idea? KOSACHEV: As far as the national idea is concerned, it is important for Russia to be a successful nation. So far our success at the world hockey championship, at the Eurovision contest, or selection of Sochi for the 2014 Olympics is the factor that we have been waiting for. But the success of the nation reflects itself in much more serious things. For instance, in any country one can find at least one item made in China. And this is a national success. We do not have such victories yet. Moreover, we continue to put all stakes on the so called energy sector, which is not the energy sector in fact. It would be false to say that Russia is an energy superpower. Russia is a raw material power. Such approach cannot be a sustainable strategy, this is tactics, this is our additional advantage, which helps us to restore the economy and create new jobs. By the way these two goals deserve to become the national idea as well. We are yet to achieve the status of a competitive country, to become a nation that exists not only because of huge natural resources, but a nation that can be more capable intellectually than any other state. Note 1 The interview is based on the public lecture by Konstantin Kosachev at the International Summer School on Global Security organized by the PIR Center. The lecture was delivered on July 11,