The Naxalite Movement in India from Independence-Present: Theoretical and Pragmatic

Transcription

1 The Naxalite Movement in India from Independence-Present: Theoretical and Pragmatic Challenges of Counterinsurgency within the Framework of a Constitutional Democracy Cody William Punter 1

2 Acknowledgements First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Rudra Chaudhuri. As my supervisor, Dr. Chaudhuri imparted me with invaluable knowledge and helped guide me in the right direction. Our conversations, whether during formal meetings or in our more informal exchanges were always engaging. His enthusiasm both as a professor and supervisor were a source of inspiration throughout my research and writing of this paper. Without him this piece of scholarship would not have been possible. I would also like to thank my professors, especially Antaol Lieven and Rudra Chaudhuri who both taught my course on the Conduct of Contemporary Warfare. It was thanks to their course that I was introduced to the issue of the Naxalite insurgency in India, and I would not have been able to write about such an engaging topic without their support. I would also like to thank my family for their moral and financial support. They have continually provided me with the opportunity to expand my personal and academic horizons. It is to them, above all that I would like to dedicate my dissertation. 2

3 Introduction It is an object of paramount importance that the cause which gave rise to [those disturbances] should be fully understood and such measures adopted as are deemed expedient to prevent a recurrence of similar disorders Judicial Authorities in Calcutta When India became an independent country in 1947, it became the world s largest democratic state. Since then it has gradually sought to establish a predominant presence in South East Asia while seeking a greater role amongst developed countries in the West. In recent years, it has become widely acknowledged as a world power in large part to the exponential growth of its economy as a result of the government s policies of economic liberalisation in the 1990s. While this has indeed raised its clout and reputation on the international stage, the exponential growth of the economy has been paralleled by that of an indigenous Maoist insurgency, which has challenged the political foundations upon which this growth rests, for the past 60. The greatest challenge the insurgency has put forward has been its rejection of the legitimacy of the Indian government based on the abdication of its legal and constitutional duties to the most disenfranchised and politically vulnerable social groups as set out in the constitution. In refuting the authority and legitimacy of the Indian government the Maoist groups has presented itself as rival political faction which has been able to achieve a great deal of popular support of the populations which it claims to represent. By 2006, the extent of the political control exerted by Maoist insurgency especially in the central region of India resulted in the Indian Prime Minister declaring that the insurgency was the country s number one security threat. 2 1 Guha, Ranjit (1980) p 3. 2 PM s speech at the Chief Minister s meet on Naxalism. April 13,

4 According to one estimate, up to 74,000 sq km or Indian territory is under the direct control of the Maoists (also known as the Naxalites). 3 Moreover, as of 2007, the Cabinet Secretary stated that the Maoists officially had a presence in 182 districts in 16 states. However, while the extent of the Maoist presence is alarming and disturbing for the government, it is the exponential rise in Naxal-related violence over the past ten years that has led to growing discontent about the movement. Over the past five years over 10, 000 civilians and security personnel have lost their lives as a result of Naxal Violence with 2,732 deaths being reported in 2009 as against 1,769 in Despite the increasing levels of violence, the Indian government has so far failed to come to terms with the political issues which are raised by the growth and of the insurgency and has simply resorted to trying to stop violence with violence. While there has been a great deal written on the insurgency, the majority of what has been written in English has been journalistic/editorial in style and content. As a result, available literature on the topic of the insurgency has been either overly biased, or narrative in nature, with little attempt to place the insurgency within a social scientific frame of analysis. Moreover there has been little attempt to critically assess and compare the theoretical underpinnings of Maoism and Indian democracy within a historical context. Finally there has been little academic literature which has sought to critically apply a comprehensive theory of contemporary counter-insurgency to the current situation in India. Therefore this paper seeks to set the development of Maoist ideology against that of Indian democracy within a historical narrative whilst evaluating the state s response to the Maoist insurgency within the framework of contemporary counterinsurgency theory. The goal of this approach is premised on the belief that the political element involved in both the development of the insurgency and the subsequent state response to it 3 Singh, Harindar (2010) p 4. 4 Hindustan Times, July 06,

5 has been largely neglected. As the central tenet of counter-insurgency theory is that the government must have a clear political aim to challenge that of the insurgent 5, the need to understand the development of the political ideologies of both Maoism and democracy is fundamental to understanding how to formulate an effective counterinsurgency campaign. Indeed if the Indian government is to be successful in carrying out a counterinsurgency campaign it will have to acknowledge the primacy of political aims in determining its overall strategy. It should also be noted that the scope of this paper will be limited to the central regions of India. This is because of the 85 million Indians who are officially classified as scheduled tribes 70 million of them live in the heartland of India comprising the regions of Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, West Bengal, Marahartra and Rajasthan. 6 Thus while the government claims that 16 states are affected by Naxalism, this paper will be focusing specifically on those areas with tribal populations. Furthermore, of those states special attention will be given to Orissa, Andhra Pradesh West Bengal, Bihar, Jharkand, and especially Chhattisgarh, as these states form a region, otherwise known as the Red Corridor, which is the focal point of both insurgent and state violence. Finally, although the Naxalite movement currently has many front organisations, this paper will be focusing mainly on the current incarnation of the Communist Party of India (Maoist). In addressing the insurgency in this manner, the paper will be divided into three chapters. The first chapter hopes to examine two separate but closely connected issues. First it shows how Left-Wing ideologies in India, adopted from Maoism and Marxism- Leninism, were used to politically mobilise peasant insurgencies, thus representing a fundamental shift in the nature of peasant insurgency in India. Having established that, it 5 Nagl, John (2005) p Guha, Ramchanrda (2007) p

6 then demonstrates how the political ideology of the movement was crystallised and subsequently transformed through external repression and internal splits resulting in the development of a more sophisticated political ideology. The second chapter is divided into two parts. The first part examines how after having changed its political direction, the Maoist movement was able to exploit the state s failure to address problems related to the poverty, underdevelopment and fundamental legal rights of tribals. In doing so the Maoist movement was able to establish itself as a rival political ideology to that of the state leading to a broad support base amongst impoverished rural areas which the movement came to control. The second part of the chapter examines how at the turn of the Millennium the developmental and political aspects of Maoism were accompanied by an increase in violence. The state responded to this by resorting to violence without addressing the political and developmental grievances of local populations, thus leaving the insurgency un-defeated. The final chapter demonstrates how the state s current response to the Naxalite insurgency has failed to draw on its own experiences and contemporary lessons of counter-insurgency. Moreover, the chapter suggests that in contrast to traditional counterinsurgencies, as a constitutional democracy, India faces specific challenges related to its institutional deficiencies and the high standards set by its legal framework. It then concludes that failure to overcome these challenges has resulted in a crisis in the political aim of the state s counterinsurgency strategy, which ultimately fails to overwhelm the political ideology of Naxalism. In analysing and comparing the simultaneous development of the Maoist and democratic political traditions in India, this paper hopes to show that the democratic government of India has the resources to undermine the Naxalite insurgency. However this is dependant on it having a clear political aim, through which it can confront the 6

7 political challenges raised by the insurgency, and which is essential in order to bring a peaceful settlement to the insurgency. 7

8 Chapter 1 A revolutionary war is 20 percent military action and 80 percent political 7 General Chang Ting-chen of Mao Zedong s central committee. During the colonial period, peasant insurgencies were a common form or resistance to the injustices of un-even land distribution, India s caste system, and colonial repression. Between , in the Telangana region of Andhra Pradesh, India faced its first insurrection of the post-colonial era and its single largest insurrection on its soil since the 1857 war of independence. 8 While it was the later and much smaller rebellion in Naxalabri that would give the Maoist movement in India its title, it is this movement that provided the foundations for modern Left-oriented revolution in the name of social justice and agrarian reform in India. What made it different from all the previous insurrections and insurgencies that the Indian government and the East India Company had dealt with, was that it was openly encouraged and organised by the Communist Party as a struggle against forced labour, illegal exactions, unauthorised evictions and more generally the feudal rule of the Nizam. 9 It thus marked the beginning of a trend where peasant resistance to the social injustices they were subject to were not simply sporadic acts of defiance and violence organised by peasants in the name of peasants; they were now being mobilised by educated members of the Indian intelligentsia with a view to securing a political end. The first introduction of Communism as a form of revolutionary struggle in Telangana was a demonstration of the potency of the movement s organisation and ideology. Firstly it showed that when combined with the organisational capacity of the Communist Party, high levels of peasant grievance could be effectively mobilised with 7 Galula, David (1964) p Singh, Prakesh (2006) p 4. 9 Singh, Prakesh (2006) p 5. 8

9 concrete results. This is evident in that during the five years in which the insurgents were fighting, they were able to establish control over approximately 3,000 villages. 10 It also showed that such control cost dearly in terms of human life as around 4,000 people were killed in the struggle. 11 Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, drawing on theories of Marxist-Leninism and Maoism, the Communist Party purported to offer an alternative to the state-led development paradigm, which was inadequate for addressing India s wellentrenched feudalism. 12 Thus, although the Telangana insurrection was quelled in 1951 without having achieved their intended radical agrarian reforms, it left an indelible mark on the history of peasant struggles and insurgency in India. However, while the revolutionary leftist ideology was a potent tool, it was by no means a single coherent line of thought something that became only too evident in the lead up and subsequent aftermath of the events in Naxalabri. The rebellion itself, which only lasted 72 days, was the result of a skirmish that erupted between a tribal youth who was attacked by a landlord s goons when he went to plough his land. This resulted in the retaliation of the tribals in the area, who went about trying to forcefully capture back their lands. While the rebellion had been unplanned and resulted from indigenous grievances, a group of ultra-left ideologues regrouped to form the All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR) in May 1968 and proclaimed Allegiance to the armed struggle and non-participation in the elections 13 In effect the AICCR was to form the armed revolutionary counterpart to the Communist Party of India (Maoist) the party in power in West Bengal under the United Front. However, while it all of those who formed the AICCCR agreed on the topic of non-participation in government, in the immediate aftermath its formation, the AICCCR 10 Ibid (2006) p Ibid (2006) p Chakrabarty, Biyut and Kujur, Rajat Kumar. (2010) p Iibd. (2010) p 42. 9

10 began to show internal rifts based on disagreements as how to best wage armed struggle. The main point of contention to arise was over the question of class annihilation, with AICCCR members basically split between two schools of thought. One was led by Charu Mazumdar who maintained the need for immediate annihilation of class enemies, the other by Kannhai Chatterjee who believed that the anihhalation of class enemies should only take place after building up massive organised forces. 14 This was to result in a split of non-parliamentary leftist revolutionaries into two groups the Maoist Community Centre (MCC) led by Chatterjee and the Communist Part of India (Marxist-Leninist) led by Mazumdar. Of those issues which were creating the greatest rifts were the topics of annihalation, the use of firearms and the dependence on the petty bourgeois intellectual. 15 Mazumdar was himself aware of the negative effects that this could have on the movement and answered by attacking dissidents as centrists while vigorously defending the party line of with an emphasis on the annihilation of class enemies. 16 This constant defence of class annihilation as a tactic was part of Mazumdar s obsession with revolutionary violence. Indeed, Mazumdar claimed that violence especially against class enemies jotedors, bourgeois compradors was the key to achieving revolutionary success. He decscribed his model for revolutionary success as follows: rely on the the poor and landless peasants; educate them in Mao Tsetung Thought; adhere firmly to the path or armed struggle; build guerrilla forces and march forward along the path of liquidating the class enemies [author s emphasis]; only thus can the high tide of struggle advance irresistibly Kujur, Rajat (2008) p Singh, Prakesh (2006) p Ibid. p Ghosh, Suniti Kumar (2009) p

11 One of the results of this obsession was that it saw Mazumdar constantly looking to exploit opportunities for open conflict. In particular he sought to harness the adventurism and aggressiveness of disaffected male youths in urban areas. Indeed, although the ultimate goal of Mazumdar s revolution was to liberate India from feudalism by inciting peasants to overthrow those who oppressed them, there was an almost tacit understanding that the peasants could only become a revolutionary force after it was acted upon by the revolutionary youth and students and by the working class. 18 Mazumdar s belief in the need to inspire those who were oppressed through guerrilla violence would in effect become the modus operandi of the CPI (M-L) in the years between the Naxalabri uprising in 1967 and Mazumdar s death in Throughout this period, various CPI (M-L) cadres operated across India. As per Mazumdar s doctrine, they largely carried out violence in urban areas. In West Bengal, where there had been links between the AICCR and student movements before the formation of the Party, youths and students were incited to start an iconoclastic campaign against Gandhi and Nehru. 19 Throughout Calcutta and its surrounding villages these campaigns manifested themselves in the form of book burnings, attacks on educational institutions, and the targeting and killing of landlords and security personnel. Similar attacks were organised an carried out in other parts of the country under the initiative of the CPI (M-L) with schools, businessmen and policemen being attacked in Districts across Bihar, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh. 20 As a result of the party s emphasis on bourgeois-led guerrilla conflict with specific attention being paid to urban areas, the peasantry and their grievances came to occupy an auxiliary role. As Kanu Sanyal, who was a key figure within the party pointed out, we 18 Dasgupta, Rajeshwari (2006) p Ghosh, Suniti Kumar (2009) p Singh, Prakesh (2006) p

12 had not faith in the heroic peasant masses we, the petty bourgeois leadership, imposed ourselves 21 Thus although the CPI (M-L) under Mazumdar claimed to be fighting against the antiquated feudalism that restricted the rights and freedoms of tribals, they were themselves guilty of using the tribals for their own ideological ends. While this may have been justified at the time as a necessary measure for the achievement of a revolution, the reality is that it had an alienating affect within tribal areas. This alienation was further compounded by the state-response which the CPI (M- L)-led violence invited especially in West Bengal. In response to the Maoist violence, the government of India in conjunction with state governments undertook Operation Steeplechase in the bordering districts of West Bengal, Orissa, and Bihar. 22 During this period, a joint force of army and police personnel was organised and given increased mandates for the carrying out of arrests and application of violence with the implementation of acts such as the West Bengal Prevention of Violent Activities Acts (1970) and the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (1971). 23 After being carried out for forty days, the operation was deemed a victory for state forces. Although it did not achieve any clear political goals, Operation Steeplechase was deemed a success based on the large amount of casualties inflicted upon CPI (M-L) cadres and their supporters and the number of people arrested across all three states. As a result, violence dropped as did the stealing or arms, but most importantly the administration was able to restore the people s confidence in the state. 24 Thus although severe measures were required against the CPI (M-L) the immediate threat which it posed to state-order was put down with relative ease. Amongst 21 Sanyal in Dasgupta, Rajeshwari (2006) p Singh, Prakesh (2006) p Ghosh, Suniti Kumar (2009) p Singh, Prakesh (2006) p 100. Singh points out that in Birbhum for example of the 400 known activists known in the area only 150 were caught. 12

13 those peasants who were fighting for the improvement of their social and economic standing, many felt the Party betrayed them by placing its own political ideologies ahead of their own political goals. That the need to seize power was put ahead of their own agendas for agrarian reform was already an issue of contention; but that the move to seize political power could be put down so easily and lead to further setbacks for tribals increased the strain between the Party leadership and its tribal supporters. Thus in the end, Mazumdar s strategy and its subsequent failure had a demoralising effect on the peasants and ended with considerably weakened support from various peasant association. 25 The failure of Mazumdar s tactical line also led to increased tensions amongst the ideological proponents of Marxist-Leninism and Maoism in India leading to debates over its political strategy and how best to implement it. At the core of the majority of disagreements of various factions during the 1970s was whether the teachings of Mao Tse Tsung were to be strictly adhered to, or whether there was room for variation and adaptation. Mazumdar, who had been heavily influenced by Mao, believed that Mao s teachings were universally applicable and had to be strictly adhered to. However, in seeking to achieve the level of success which Mao had in China, Mazumdar was keen to achieve political ends faster than could be possible and his aim of achieving total revolution in India by 1975 was inconceivably far-fetched given the circumstances of the time. Moreover, he failed to predict that violence, especially in favour of urban targets and educational institutions would have an alienating affect rather than an inspiring one. Furthermore in seeking to adhere strictly to the Chinese model, Mazumdar was neglecting some of the differences which existed, and which Mao himself had pointed out, between the revolutionary situation in China as compared to other countries. 26 In this regard, Mazumdar s line of thought failed to take into account two major differences 25 Ahuja, Pratul and Ganguly, Rajat (2007) p Ibid

14 between India and China. Firstly, India is home to a wide range of nationalities, religions and languages whereas at the time of Mao s revolution in China 94% of the population were Hans. 27 Secondly, one of the successes of Mao s revolution is that it provided a means of unifying China, which at the time of his revolution, had no central government. India on the other hand, not only had the tradition of a centralised bureaucratic state dating back to British rule, but ever since independence it had been subject to its own unifying process under the democratic ideology of Nehru. As such, Mazumdar s revoltuonary goals for India based on strict adherence to Mao Tsetung Thought faced the dual challenges of extreme regional divisions while having to contend with a rival nationalist democratic ideology which was becoming increasingly entrenched in Indian political culture. The recognition of the shortcomings of Mazumdar s strict adherence to Maoism and the nature of India s regional differences would ultimately lead to endless splits and divisions throughout the 1970s, 80s and 90s. While many different lines of thought emerged with the death of Charu Mazumdar and the failure of his revolutionary model, one of the general conclusions reached amongst most parties was that pure military struggle should be limited, and greater emphasis given to peasant struggles. Further weight was added to this point when the Chinese communist issued a message in 1970 in which they disapproved of annihilation carried out by secret squads and disagreed with the view that guerrilla warfare was the only way to mobilise people against the enemy. 28 Indeed, if anything was to be learned from the failures of Mazumdar s movement, it was that Mao s revolution did not provide the template for a successful revolution to be replicated under the circumstances of 1970s India. However, while the failure of the Naxalabri uprising had exposed the shortcomings of Mazumdar s tactic of annihilation 27 Ibid. p Krishnaji, N. (1980) p

15 and the CPI (M-L) s overestimation of the capacity for a pan-indian revolution, it did not undermine the socialist-egalitarian ideology or the communist capacity for large-scale organisation of disaffected populations. Rather, the decades following Naxalabri would prove that Marxism-Leninism-Maoism was a versatile ideology that could be adapted to a variety of settings and be employed to achieve the level of support which Mazumdar had sought for the success of his revolution. Thus the idea of class annihilation was dropped with an emphasis being placed on trying to come up with an Indianised version of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. 29 ii Having seen the Naxal movement swiftly crushed by 1972, through the arrest, death, and fleeing of large numbers of its cadres, the Naxalite movement became scattered and regionalised. However it would be wrong, as is often done in the literature on the history Naxalism, to suggest that the period of rivalry and splits represents a lull in the movement as a whole. As K.P Singh has pointed out, the various splits and dissensions during the 1970s 80s and 90s should be viewed as a process whereby each regional split led to a faction seeking to increase its individual base of support thus leading to a growth in organisational progress as opposed to regression. 30 During this time there remained some small factions operating in West Bengal, Bihar and Andhra Pradesh, which upheld allegiance to Mazumdar s line of class annihilation. However, for the most part, their tactics remained relatively unsophisticated and unpopular. As a result they were put down with relative ease by authorities conducting extensive police operations Chakrabarty, Biyut and Kumar Kujur, Rajat. (2010) p Singh, P.K. (2008) p Singh, Prakesh (2006) pp

16 Those who supported the goals of Marxist-Leninist-Maoism in India recognised that Mazumdar s interpretation of Maoist ideology was crude and unsuited to the India s socio-economic condition. Thus one group that had belonged to the CPI (ML) formed a new party called CPI (M-L) Liberation based in Bihar, and proceeded to undertake a project of course-correction. As part of correcting the mistakes of the past, the group suggested that greater emphasis should be put on mass peasant struggles while pure military armed struggle should be limited in an attempt to provide an Indianised version of Masixm-Leninism-Maoism. 32 Moreover, implicit in the turn away from Mazumdar s ideology was an understanding that a swift revolution was not possible given the circumstances of Indian social and political culture. Thus Mazumdar s pipe dream of overthrowing the Indian government by 1975 through a united struggle was abandoned in favour of small scale regional organisation with an emphasis on winning over local populations. In keeping with this program of establishing themselves at a grassroots level the Maoists sought to establish control over areas that were isolated and ignored by state s development and security initiatives. There were several reasons for this. Firstly in choosing to establish themselves where the majority of the population was living below the poverty line the revolutionaries faced a greater chance of mobilising populations in favour of a new people s revolution. 33 Secondly, the areas chosen tended to be characterised by their hilly and forested terrain, thus making them inaccessible to security personnel. The combination of these two factors meant that the Naxalites would be able to exert a combination of sympathy amongst and control over the tribal populations without government interference. 32 Kujur, Rajat (2008) p Garg, Ruchir (2008) p 27 16

17 Of those groups who were able to garner popular support in remote tribal areas over the next few decades, the Maoist Communist Centre and the People s War Group were to become the most influential. The two groups had developed in different regions along different lines. The PWG emerged in the period after the Emergency as a reactionary response to the authoritarian repression which communist and Naxalite leaders had faced and to the gradual acceptance of the parliamentary methods conceded by the CPI (M-L) Liberation. 34 Meanwhile the MCC had existed since 1969 under the name of Dakshin Desh and had evolved parallel to Mazumdar s CPI (M-L) in opposition to its brazen policies. 35 Indeed, despite the emphasis placed on the splits within the Naxalite movement during the 1970s and 1980s, with the PWG having renounced the policies of predecessor, both it and the MCC came to a more sophisticated understanding of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. In effect the central goal of their ideology remained that of their archaic predecessor: the liberation of the people from all exploitation and the dictatorship of the ruling classes through the violent overthrow of the Indian government. 36 However the strategy through which they hoped to achieve this was far more sophisticated than the CPI (M-L) s had been. According to the PWG the success of an Indian Revolution was dependant on liberating the countryside first through area wide seizure of power, establishing guerrilla zones and base areas and then encircling the cities and finally capturing power throughout the country. 37 Similarly the MCC, which was based out of Bihar, proclaimed the need for a protracted people s war along the lines set out by the PWG and differed only in its emphasis on guerrilla warfare. The strategy of both the 34 Singh, Prakash (2006 pp Chakrabarty, Biyut and Kujur, Rajat Kumar. (2010) p Kujur, Rajat (2008) p Chakrabarty, Biyut and Kujur, Rajat Kumar. (2010) p

18 groups thus showed a better understanding of the contemporary political, social and military situation in which they were trying to establish themselves. Indeed the evolution of strategic thinking amongst the PWG and the MCC was apparent at the tactical level. While the leaders of the PWG did not completely give up the notion of attacking security forces, the main points of their programs consisted in concentrating on issues which directly affected tribals. Of those issues which PWG claimed to give primacy were: the redistribution of land; enforcing payment of minimum wages to the farm labour; imposing taxes and penalties; holding people s courts; enforcing a social code. 38 Thus rather than simply attacking the government s inability to ensure some of these social services, the members of the PWG attempted to win over local population by providing an ideological and more importantly a material alternative to the state as a benefactor and protector. In seeking to gather support for their cause from local populations the various Naxalite groups made a concerted effort to establish a strong presence in those areas which were most isolated from the governments security forces and most ignored by its development and social policies. As such, PWG was able to rapidly establish a strong base in the Telangana region where it had chosen to base itself in 1980 given the favourable terrain and the well-established history of popular rebellion in that area. Meanwhile the MCC chose to set itself up in Bihar where it competed with the more moderate Liberation as well as Party Unity. A few short years after having established itself in Telangana, PWG was able to spread its influence across the borders of Andhra Pradesh and into the Southern regions of Orissa and the Chhattisgarh region of Madhya Pradesh as early as Meanwhile MCC s overtly military line became increasingly influential amongst tribals in the central regions of Bihar. 38 Singh, Prakesh (2006) p

19 Regardless of the feasibility of these strategic aims, whether it was Liberation, MCC or Party Unity in Bihar or PWG in Andhra Pradesh, at the grassroots level, considerable bases of support were developed over the following decades. The range of support varied from tribals in areas where the Naxalites established themselves, to those who took up arms to form part of its military program. Thus, rather than having found itself defeated by government repression in the wake of the Naxalabri uprising, the revolutionary left in India was able to evolve and expand its sphere of influence, thereby presenting an increasing threat to the authority and legitimacy of the Indian state by the end of the century. 19

20 Chapter 2 On the 26 th January 1950 [the founding of Indian Republic with its new Constitution], we are going to enter into a life of contradictions. In politics we will have equality and in social and economic life we will have inequality. 39 B.R. Ambedka Chair of the committee that drafted the Constitution. When they were drafting the Indian constitution, the founders of Indian democracy sought to redress the injustices suffered by tribals during the colonial period. At the time of Indian independence, Nehru proclaimed the dawn of an independent Indian democratic state would be tasked with the ending of poverty and ignorance and disease and inequality of opportunity 40. Acknowledging some of the deep-seeded historical divisions which were inherent in India s caste society, Nehru presented his Objectives Resolution to the Constituent Assembly of India on December 13, In it he proclaimed that adequate safeguards shall be provided for minorities, backward and tribal areas and depressed and other backward classes 41 Subsequent legislation represented an attempt by the state government to address these issues. The two most important steps taken by the government in this respect were the abolition of the caste of untouchables as a legal classification as well as the abolition of the Zamindari system. The classification of individuals as untouchables was traditionally accepted as part of India s caste system and had meant that those individuals classified as such were given lower legal status than those of higher castes. The implications of this categorisation meant that untouchables were frequently treated as less than human and were subject to a variety of injustices from not being allowed to draw water from 39 Sen, Amartya (2005) p Dreze, Jean and Sen, Amrtya (1997) p Guha, Ramachandra (2007) p

21 communal wells, to be subjected to lynching or burning over trivial matters, without recourse to due legal process. 42 The Zamindari system was equally a feature of India s caste system, which saw upper-caste members owning large amounts of land and often using this land to exploit landless peasants by charging extortionate rents and interest rates. Moreover their legal status as owners of the land permitted them to evict rentiers without proper cause, often in the interest of generating a greater profit. The intention of the abolition of the Zamindari system was to revoke the right of private intermediaries to control the land revenue system with the goal of clearer definitions of private property rights with respect to land ownership. 43 However ground-breaking and well-intentioned these constitutional measures may have been, in the years following their implementation, those populations who were most marginalised by India s uneven caste system, continued to face persecution and hard-ship. On the one hand this was due to the lack of legal and pragmatic re-enforcement that these initiatives received. Thus as Deze and Sen have pointed out, even with the abolition of the Zamindari system land ownership structure in India has remained relatively unchanged over the last forty years. 44 On the other the Indian government failed to implement wider reaching reforms which might provide more robust welfare to under-privileged tribals in terms of political, gender, educational, healthcare, and legal rights. Part of the problem has been the way in which the India economy has grown. According to Jayati Ghosh, the models for economic growth in India since Nehru have been plagued by a pattern of growth which has been fundamentally unbalanced and in crucial respects unsustainable, [ ] as it failed to provide minimum basic needs to the 42 Ahuja, Pratul and Ganguly, Rajat (2010) p Dreze, Jean and Gazdar, Haris (1997) p Ibid. p

22 bulk of the population and allowed for the persistence of absolute poverty among a fairly large section of the population 45 Over the last forty years, whether under Nehru or during the period of rapid economic liberalisation in the 1990s under the guidance of the IMF, India has been unable to implement institutional changes at the local level, thus leaving landed proprietors and rich farmers to profit most in rural areas through maximising short-term gains without regard for the needs of tribal populations. Indeed, in 2004 a Report of the Expert Group on Prevention of Alienation of Tribal Land and Its Restoration concluded that the development paradigm pursued since independence has aggravated the prevailing discontent among marginalised sections of society. 46 The inefficiency of Indian development in providing for the most marginalised sections includes lack of basic necessities in terms of access to food, clean water, healthcare and education. The list goes on to include the adminstration s failure to implement protective regulations in scheduled areas, resulting in land alienation, forced eviction from land, dependence on money-lenders and often compounded by blatant violence by state functionaries. 47 In and of themselves, these shortcomings point to the failure of Indian democracy to deliver the promises of the constitution from which the government derives its legitimacy. However when held up against the spectre Naxalism these shortcomings provided for the encroachment of an opposing ideology which was able on prey the failures of the state. Indeed, as John Mackinlay has pointed out, one the main characteristics contributing to the support of an insurgency is that there must be an overwhelming sense of grievance for the insurgents to manipulate. 48 With its ideological 45 Ghosh, Jayati (1998) p Banerjee, Sumanta (2008) p Ibid. p Mackinlay, John (2010) p

23 turnaround in the late 1970s, the Maoists began to prove time and again that it was well aware of this fact. Throughout the 1970s, 80s and 1990s, the Maoists displayed a cautious and wellorganised approach to winning over local support in tribal areas. Already by the late 1970s the PWG, which was based in Telangana in the North of Andrha Pradesh set about creating committees to isolate certain areas in order to assess and exploit the grievances of the local tribal populations. Henceforth groups of Forrest Committees were created for the jungle areas and Regional Committees for the plains areas. 49 Furthermore, small squads or dalams comprising between six to ten members would be organised and sent to talk to the people and they would consult the tribals about their grievances. In particular they would find out who was responsible for their problems. Once these individuals had been identified usually landlords or government officials, the Maosits would go about killing the most notorious amongst them. 50 By either using direct acts of violence or simply intimidation, the armed cadres would in effect use violence as an empowering tool, but not an end in itself. Indeed, in contrast to the class annihilation which was seen as a strategic end in itself, the selected application of violence as a tactic at a local level was intended to be more symbolic. In this sense, the cautious application of force by Maoists can be explained as a form of Propaganda of the Deed at the local level. 51 Kumar Himanshu gives the example of how a forest guard in Dantewada would punish a woman for carrying a bundle of firewood by raping her. He would then ask for a three-ruppee fine, which if unpaid would lead to the guard trying to extort Rs 300. The Naxalites were aware of the discontent this caused amongst the population and would seize upon it by capturing a forest guard, trying him 49 Singh, Prakesh (2006) p Mukherji, Nirmalangshu (2010) p Mackinlay, John (2010) p

24 up, and having the tribals come to beat him. 52 The list of methods used to gain popularity amongst the population further include: thrashing moneylenders and destroying promissory notes; attacks on or sometimes elimination of people found to be harassing women; eve teasers and those misbehaving with women being punished in praja (people s) courts; warning the landlords to distribute land; organising demonstrations against the government on popular issues; and issuing statements to the media 53 Indeed the Maoists quickly learned that confronting those people and issues which the local population viewed unfavourably was not only useful in gathering their support, but also in driving state representatives and landowners off the land, allowing the Maoists to take control. 54 While some especially young males came to accept the Maoists because it provided them with an outlet for violent action, there was much more to the Maoist s program which attracted tribals. For example in Dandakaranya in 1982, the Maoists saw local agitation by Tendu collectors against exploitation and for better wages as an opportunity for spreading their influence. During this period the PWG sent dalams into the region and helped the tribal farmers occupy hundreds of acres of land. 55 As such they were able to empower the farmers and provide immediate results in terms of landownership where the state had previously failed to do so. While the government has the legal power to distribute land to the poor, it has repeatedly failed to do so. As such Naxalite groups were able to gain influence by performing the functions of the state in the forest areas of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, 52 Kumar, Himanshu (2009) p Reddy, K. Srivinas (2008) p Muhkerji, Nirmalangshu (2010) p Garg, Ruchir (2008) p

25 Maharashtra, Orissa, Bihar and Jharkhand. 56 Although the seizure of land was not legal in the eyes of the state, to the tribals who had suffered for generations, the Naxalites became dispensers of justice. In those areas where Naxalites were able to gain increasing influence throughout the 1980s and 90s, that is exactly the model that they have used for their success by essentially providing a parallel government apparatus. Over time these parallel governments have been able to achieve a high level of sophistication and organisation. As armed groups gradually secured an area, they went about co-ordinating economic, political and social reforms based on the needs of the local population. Insofar as economic reforms are concerned, the Naxalites have made an effort to improve land rights, increase minimum wages and secure common property resources. 57 In Andhra Pradesh, the Naxalites seized on the governments indifference to the wages of tendu leaf gatherers and secured both a minimum wage as well as a pay increase for the tribals. 58 Meanwhile in Central Bihar, where the MCC has traditionally exerted a great deal of influence, Bela Bhatia who has done extensive field research in that region since the mid 90s has pointed to the fact that in Naxal-dominated areas there has been a significant rise in the average wage of tribal labourers as well as an equal wage for women. 59 Over time, through their capacity to defend the territories that they occupy and their ability to mobilise local populations, the Naxalites have been able to establish their own system of governance and justice. Part of this has been achieved through the creation of gram rajya committees or Revolutionary People s Committees (RPC), which have been put in place in areas under Maoist control to provide the basic functions and services 56 Banerjee, Sumanta (2008) p Bhatia, Bela (2005) p Banerjee, Sumanta (2008) p Iibid. p

26 of the state. 60 By incorporating the local population in the political process these committees have been able to achieve a level of co-operation and an ad-hoc form of people s rule. In Dandakaranya alone the Naxalites established RPCs in 500 villages, and it is estimated that through these committees the Naxalites were able to wield influence over 2000 villages. 61 Moreover, the Naxalites have made a concerted effort to address the lack of law and order in areas in which they came to establish a strong presence. On top of their ability to run parallel administrations they have been able to institute jan adalats (people s courts) and systems of tax collection. 62 The jan adalats have traditionally been very harsh in their verdicts with the death penalty being common. However, while their respect for traditional legal concepts such as due process and weighted sentencing have resulted in concern, they have continued to be held with increasing frequency. The trials are widely publicised before taking place and the fact that up to 5,000 villagers might attend the trial attest to their popularity. 63 Indeed one of the reasons that they are so popular is that while the ineffectiveness of the local judicial system may keep a litigant involved in a petty land dispute tied up in court for several years, at a jan adalat the case can be settled in a matter of no time. 64 Their system of taxation too has been criticised as it is based mostly on profits generated from extortion, levies, and theft by the armed cadres. However, that they have been able to profit from the corruption of contractors, government officials, businesses, mines, factories and forest contractors point just as 60 Garg, Ruchir (2008) p Ibid. p Jha, Sanjay K. (2008) p Singh, K.P. (2008) p Harivansh (2008) p

27 much to the state s inability to address fundamental inefficiencies its economic and political system as it does to the Naxalites opportunism. 65 It must be acknowledged therefore, that in failing to deal with the underlying causes of tribal disaffection, the state has effectively allowed for a rival political and socio-economic form of governance to establish its authority in certain regions of the country. Indeed, where the Indian government has failed to provide substantive justice and development, the Naxalite movement has been able to distinguish itself by becoming directly involved in a struggle to capture the minds and beliefs of the population. 66 ii The ability of the Naxalites to take advantage of the situation in India through the spread of their ideology and their physical occupation of rural territory has been able to continue, more or less unchallenged up until present day. Of those achievements that are particularly impressive has been their ability to establish liberated zones over vast amounts of land, over which the Naxalites wield uncontested control through a combination of political mobilisation and coercion. As of June 2010, the Naxalites were able to claim the areas of Dantewada, Bastar, Bijapur and Narayanpur in Chhattisgarh; Malkinigiri and Rayagada in Orissa; West and East Singhbhum in Bihar; Gadchiroli in Maharashtra; West Midnapore in West Bengal for a total of 72,000 square kilometers as being unquestionably under their political and military control. 67 Moreover, in the majority of these areas, the Naxalite presence has been established for decades, such that in certain areas many people have grown knowing the Naxalite leadership as the sole source of authority in those areas. The 65 Ibid. p Mackinlay, John (2010) p Singh, Harinder (2010) p 4. 27

28 situation is such that in some areas it is possible to come across second or even thirdgeneration cadres. 68 Having established strong bases through their close contact with disaffected tribal populations, various Naxalite groups believed that there was a need to go beyond establishing the support of tribals, with the aim of achieving the intended aims of their revolutionary ideology. The significant turning point in this respect was the convening of the Coordination Committee of Maoist parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA), where Maoist groups across South Asia including the Nepalese Maoists, reaffirmed their dedication to armed struggle. This led to the conclusion that the erstwhile splits in the Indian Maoist movement needed to be reconciled with the intention of forming a unified Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) a Red Corridor spreading from Nepal, through Bihar and the Dandakranya region to Andhra Pradesh. 69 The conclusion of CCOMPOSA saw a series of mergers between Indian Maoist groups. First came the unification of Party Unity and the PWG, which then became the Communist Party of India (ML) (PW). 70 This was followed by the 9th party congress of the People s War in March 2001, where the leaders of the organisation concluded that in order to achieve success it needed to increasingly militarise its operations. 71 This was in turn followed by the announcement in 2003 that the two largest and most influential of the Naxalite groups for the previous three decades MCC and PWG were merging to form a unified command structure under the title of the Communist Party of India (Maoist). 72 This final merger confirmed the essence of what was said at the 9 th congress in 2001 when the new group proclaimed in a joint press release that: 68 Bhatia, Bela (2005) p Jha, Sanjay (2008) p Singh, K.P. (2008) p Singh, Prakesh (2009) p Singh, K.P. (2008) p

29 the immediate aim and program of the Maoist party is to carry on and complete the already ongoing and advancing New Democratic Revolution. This revolution will be carried out and completed through protracted people s war with the armed seizure of power remaining as its central and principal task. 73 Indeed, what makes the Naxalite movement different from the other insurgencies such as those in Nagaland, Jammu and Kashmir is that it rather than seeking to contest the authority of the Indian government to exercise its sovereignty over a given area based on racial, religious, or territorial claims, the Naxalite movement seeks to challenge the sovereignty of the democratic state by undermining the fundmental principles justice, governance, monopoly of violence which underpin its authority. It is thus that as of 2006 the Indian Prime Minister proclaimed that the Naxalite movement in India was India s single largest security concern. 74 Insofar as the state is concerned, the Naxalite s increased sophistication and organisation have resulted in an increase in their guerrilla and military capacity. As early as the mid-1980s and reaching a peak in 1991, Naxalites began employing violence to secure their political and territorial gains. 75 While levels of violence remained at a relatively stable level for the next decade, the 9 th Congress of the PWG and the subsequent creation of the CPI (M), was accompanied with a rapid increase in violence. According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, between 2004 and 2008, 877 security service personnel and 926 Naxalite cadres lost their lives as a result of violence between state and Maoist forces. 76 However, what is perhaps most troubling is that in this fight for 73 Ramana, P.V. (2009) p PM s speech at the Chief Minister s meet on Naxalism. April 13, Singh, K.P. (2008) p MHA Report on Naxalism Ministry of Home Affairs; mha.nic.in 29