REFUGEE RELIEF PROGRAMMES

Transcription

1 THE CHURCH OF CHRST N THALAND N ASSOCATON WTH THE WORLD COUNC L OF CHURCHES 1988 REFUGEE RELEF PROGRAMMES SOCAL DEVELOPMENT AND SERVCE DEPARTMENT CHURCH OF CHRST N THALAND 14 PRAMUAN Rd.. BANGKOK THALAND

2 The Thailand Burma Border Consortium was established in 1984 as the Consortium of Christian Agencies (CCA). Jack Dunford was Refugee Relief Coordinator with the Church of Christ in Thailand (CCT) and served as chair of CCA. No reports were written by CCA in the early years but the work of the Consortium was summarised in Annual CCT Refugee Programme reports which also included work with ndochinese refugees. This report for 1988 are the sections relating to TBBC/ CCA's work in the CCT Annual reports that year.

3 iii) Karen Refugee Situation 2.36 The number of Karen refugees in Tak and Mae Hong Son provinces along the Burmese Border remained almost constant during The end of year camp fig~res reported by the Karen Refugee committee were similar to those reported last year: Caml ' Wang Kha '-' Maela Kamaw Lay Kho " Kler Kho ' '1636 Sho.Khlo Mae: :Tha Waw NO~l ' Pa Doh Salween Ka Htee Hta Mae Po Hta Camp locations are shown on Map This apparent stabili'ty, however, hides the events of a momentous year during which hopes for a better future were raised, only to be dashed by the year-end, leaving the outlook now as bleak as ever At the beginning of 1988 rumours persisted of an imminent Burmese Ai-my offensive against; the Karens. Troops and supplies were being moved into the area although for the time-being the Karens appeared to be successfully holding them off with pre-emptiye attacks on Burmese supply routes. n the event. the offensive never materialised, initially because t"e ~urmese Army was simultaneously conducting similar massive campaigns against the Kachins and the Burmese Communist Party, but later because events inside Burma diverted the full attention of the Army There had bei:!n grol~ing unrest in Burma since Septemb.er 1987 when the He win Government had domonetorised the Bu.rtnese currency t~ ithou ~ c::planation or compensation. The economy was in desperate straights and the people were thoroughly dispirited after 25 years of oppressive rule under Ne Win. Feelings hightened in March 1988 when student protests were violently pu~ down' by the Government, al)d a cur:few was imposel:f in June when riots once again broke out. Ne Win resigned on 23rd July promj.sj.ng economi-c reforms and a transition to democracy.

4 2.40 To the disbelief of the people He Win's appointed predecessor was Sein Lwin, one of his most hated close associates accused of being responsible for most of the earlier Gover.nment brutalities. Massive protests followed which Sein Lwin attempted to put down by force. Thousands of innocent protesters died. The situation was chaotic and Sein Lwin resigned on 12th August Maung Maung was the newly appointed leader, a civilian, considered to be the most moderate of He Win's associates, but massive protests continued as the people sensed the possiblity of finally overthrowing the entire regime. Demands for democracy increased and as Maung Maung began to make concessions promissing a referendum these where never enough to appease the people. A General Strike began on September 8th, the Army withdrew from the streets and with civil servants joining the protestors, the Government virtually gave up running the country and the economy ground to a halt. t seemed the whole country was on the streets in protest and that the masses were on the brink of success Cruel reality wa s swiftly restored as Defense Minister Saw Maung ousted Maung Maung in a military coup d'etat on 18th September. The following day the Army was back on the streets shooting demonstrators and within days public gatherings were effectively stopped. The new regime began to systematically weed out trouble makers and resume heavy handed control During this time the ethnic minorities had remained fairly quiet. Their stance was to wait and see what the democracy protests would bring. t was the rainy season which precluded any major military campaigns but with the Burmese Army having to withdraw troops to take care of affairs in the cities the Karens were able to move supplies around. At about the time that Saw Maung took over the Karens began to mount offensives against Burmese positions which they had lost is Morale was boosted in late September when the Karens re - took Mae Thawaw a strategic military and trading base overlooking the Moei River.

5 2.44 At the peak of the upr1s1ng it seemed that at last the end of the 40 year ethnic minority struggle might be in sight. Whilst it might yet be a, difficult path to democracy in Burma and to recqnciliation between the peoples, at least it seemed that there was every chance that the Karen re'fugees would 'be.able to make an early return to their own territory. f the He Win clique had been over-thrown then, even if difference between a new Government and the ethnic minorities prevailed, it seemed unlikely that a new democratic 'regime would wage war as enthusiastically as the previous one. 'Conversely, even if the old regime hung on to power', it was fel t that they would be so weakened as to, have to scale down their campaign. Under any.scenario it seemed that at last the pressure might be off the Ka r ens. There was a feeling that the volunta'ry agency relief programme had been well justified, having <ept open options for a natural solution Sadly, it has become increasingly clear that these.were over-optimistic assessments. Observers have been surprised at the way in which the military regime has been able to ruthlessly regain control of the country in spite of 'a continuing trade and aid embargo by most other countries. Saw Maung is now so much in control that the Army has been able to renew its 'campaign 'against the Karens with a vengeance. t is ' reported that the Army has re-stated its 1987 pledge to wipe out the Karens 'within two years'., 2.46 The current situation is ominous. The Saw Maung regime was reportedly furious that Maethawaw had been lost and the Army was instructed to re-take it at all costs. A massive attack was mounted employing more than 2000 troops and a large number of conscripted porters. A fierce battle w.aged for three months with heavy casualties on both sides. The Burmese were ruthless and it is estimated from porters escaping to the Karen side or returning to Rangoon that the porter fatality rate was at l~as t 50 percent as they were forced to work without food or water and often used as human mine-detectors. The Karens were forced to surrender Maethawaw just before Christmas. The Burmese were using 120 mm guns which are larger than anything the Karens possess, and the Karens claim that during the last days of the battle the Burmese were using helicopters to ferry in supplies and ensure a continuous bombardment. n the end the Karens were simply out-gunned.

6 2.47 After taking Maethawaw the Burmese have moved on to attack Kler Day a little to the south. Again the shelling was intense and Kler Day fell on the 19th January. A section of Shoklo camp next to the Moei river has been evacuated and so to has Kler Kho camp further south again. We can assume that the Burmese offensive will continue. There is a real possibility of increasing refugee numbers The Royal Thai Government policy for the Karen refugees has so far remained unchanged, but the arrival of Burmese students on rebel territory has complicated the issue. Students began to arrive at the border immediately prior to, and after, the Saw Maung take over. They feared reprisals and many of them wanted to train to fight back against the Army. Estimates of numbers have varied, but possibly upto 10,000 were along the border at one time n general, the ethnic ' minorities have fed the students (most are on Karen territory, but others are on Mon and Karenni territory) and have given basic military training to those who wanted it. But the minorities do not have the resorces to really look after them,or to arm 'them. Various relief groups, mainly headed by exiled Burmese, have provided assistance in a somewhat haphazard manner across the border The Royal Thai Government initially announced that asylum would be given to the students and that none would be forced back. Few, however, were allowed to enter Thailand and on December 14th the Thai Army seemed to take the political initiative when Supreme Commander Chavalit Yongchaiyudh became the first senior foreign dignatory to visit Rangon after the coup. Chavalit secured undertakings from Saw Maung for the safe repatr iation 'of the students and since then the official policy has been uncomprom1s1ng. A repatriation centre was set up at Tal< on 21st December and over 300 students have returned directly to Burma. The Government has said that the,centre will remain open until 31st March after which any students in Thailand will be jai18d as illegal immigrants. The implication is that aid to the students across the border will be stopped The repatriation programme is controversial and rumours abound that students have been returned against their will. There is a fear that students returning will not be safe and there are rumours of disappearances. These rumours are strongly denied by the Thai authorities and to date supportive evidence has indeed been very weak. The number of students on the border is now believed to be down to around 4500 with many others having made their own way back into Burma.

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8 2.52 The arrival of the students has had both positive and negative affects on the Karen situation. On the positive side the situation. has brought extensive contact between _ the Karen rebels and Burmese groups for. the first time. Students who previously had only heard of the ethnic minorities as terrorlsts have found them to be generous hosts sharing common difficulties. The formation of a Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB) is a positive 'step, formalising relationships between the ten National Democratic Front(NDF) et-hnlc minori ty groups and another thi rteen minority and Burmese groups. The political strength of such a group might not be strong, but the cooperation and understanding be'tween minority and Burmese groups will, ~urely be important in the future Anoth~r ' tenuous advantage of the Burmese student presepce in the border area has been the world~wide attention they have drawn to the area helplng to publicise the nature of the,minority conflicts.for the most part, the 40 year ethnic minority struggle has attrac~ed little international interest or sympathy and the minorities have had few spokesmen able to voice their case. n comparison, there is a large articulate exiled Burmese community which has ~ollowed recent events with great interest and voiced their conceni-' With access inside Burma remaining problemktical, the students at the border have attracted a good deal of publicity and support from this community,drawing attention to an area previously ignoreq by most commentators On the negative side however, the student groups have been factious since their arrivals and difficult to contr'ol. Although the students formed the All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF) to coordinate their affairs, there have been continuing question marks about the representativeness of their chosen leaders, and little effective coordination between the different groups. There have been conflicts of ideology and policy and varying degrees of cooperation with the ethnic minorities. There is a strong suggestion that some of these student groups have been infiltrated by Burmese Government agents and their presence on minority territory represents a very real security risk There is also concern that the arrangement reached between the Burmese and Thai armies concerning the repatriation of students from the border may lead to a hardening of policy in relaticn to the Karens. To date the Royal Thai Government policy towards the Karens has been tolerant and sympathetic but recent announcements of approval for the Burmese Government to undertake aerial surveys of the Thai/Burma border

9 area, and territory Karens. logging must be concessions agreed in rebel-held a major cause of concern for the 2.56 At the time of writing heavy fighting continues and refugees in other camps are packing their belongings. in readiness to f.lee. t is a very worrying situation

10 ' ii) Karen Refugees The Karen relief programme continued in 1988 much as described in last year's report. There were no major changes in camp locations or populations, and no major emergencies Medecins Sans Frontiers (MSF) is now the only medical agency serving the Karen refugee population in Tak Province. Medecins Du Monde (MOM) were required to cease their programme in Mae Hong Son Province at the end of March. The refugee population in Mae Hong Son Province is quite small and is located amongst displaced Karen populations which moved into Thailand in the 1970's. The Thai authorities have consistantly argued that they do not consider this a refugee situation and that the presence of relief agencies is not necessary. Whilst it is true that the older Karen population can support the new people to some extent, and that there is some access to Thai medical facilities, the departure of MOM has le ft this population with very po o.r heal th protecti.'on. Malaria. has always has been the main medical concern along the border but there were no major crises or epidemics again this year. Operation Handicap nternational (OH) continues to make periodic visits to the prosthetics work-shop which is now very efficiently run by the Karens themsej.ves The 'Consortium~ of Christi'an Agencies' continues to be far the largest provider of food and relief items,supplying over 75.percent of needs in During 1988 the Thailand Baptist Mis~ionary Fellowship (TBMF) and the Church of Christ in Thailand (CCT) contributed over 90 percent of the Consortium funds but ZOA Refugee Care Nethe,' land, Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), Christ Church, and Food for the ' Hungry nternational (FH), which continues to partly s,upport the consortium coordinator Brian Hintz in Mae Sot, all continued to be active participants. Compassion nternational nc., also began to contribute funds to the Consortium during 198,8, and nternatio'nal Christian Aid (CA) began to transfer funds to the Consortium to make purchases and distribute supplies on their behalf. The Catholic Office for Emergency Relief and Refugees (COERR) and the Full Gospel Church (Penticostal) were the other two regula,r suppliers of food and relief items in 1988, 4.31 The Committee for the Coordinator of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand (CCSDPT) Karen Sub Committee continued to meet monthly with Jack Dunford as Chairman (CCT). These meetings were attended by the agencies providing assistance, but during 1988 was not attended by the Ministry of nterior (MOl) since there were no policy changes or major issues from their prespective.

11 4.32 Rice prices remained high throughout 1988 and appear unlikely to decrease for the forseeable future. The average price paid in 1988 was B 555 per 100 kg sack compared with B 370 in The current price is around B 580 to B 600. The Consoritum. programme was assisted greatly in 1988 with the donation of funds through the Baptist Union of Sweden for a project vehicle. A 4 wheel drive Toyota pick-up was purchased in February and modified locally with a double-cab and fibre rear compartment. This vehicle is similar to that owned by the Karen Refugee Committee and has been shelled twice by the Burmese Army in the last six weeks on Thai soil, fortunately without mis-hap CCT continues to raise funds for participation in the Consortium programme from a variety of sources. Receipts and expenditures during 1988 are listed in Table C1 of the Appendix. A balance of B 809, was held at the end of the year. Table C2 shows CCT's total programme since the beginning in Table C3 sets out the Consoritum accounts as a whole for A balance of 3,343, was held at the end of year plus approximately two months supply of rice (4331 sacks purchased for B 2,511,980.00). This balance mainly represents funds received by TBMF from the Swedish Baptist Union designated for the first half of Table C4 shows the Consortium sources of income during 1988 plus donations of supplies made by individual agencies in the name of the Consortium. CCT contributed 35% of Consortium income in 1988 excluding the abovementioned TBMF funds received for of the blankets donated directly by CCT were purchased from i blanket project. of Church World Service Table C5 summarises expenditures in 1988 totalling B 17,597, representing an increase of about 30% over 1987, taking into account year-end rice stocks. Most of this increase was due to the higher rice prices prevailing in % of expenditure was on rice and 9% on other food items. Excluding the vehicle purchase cpst, total administrative expenses were about 1.3% of total expenditures Note (1) to Table C5 summarises expenditures made by MSF for the supplementary feeding programme. MSF provides supplementary feeding for TB patients,pregnant women and malnurished children, using consortium funds Table C6 summarises all supplies received in the camps as reported by the. Karen Refugee Committee. t can be seen that. the Consortium now provides 80% of the staple diet requirement (rice, fish paste, salt).

12 4.39 Table C7 lists financial contributions to the Consortium totalling B since CCT's contributions now represents 22 per.cent of total funds donated. consortium Agencies have also given material assistance totalling approximately B 3 million. 4.4Q Table C8 s hows the growth of the Consortium p r ogramme over the last 5 years from' B 3.3 million in 1984.(.9 months) to over B 18 mil'lion 'ih The estimated total cost of the consortium programme to date is over B 45 million' Table C9 provides an estimate of the total value of assistance given to the Karen refugees since 1984 including both food/relief items and medical services. Total assistance is estimated to have cost about B 32 million in 1988 and B 105 million over the five year period. The total cost of relief' 'works out at about B 120 per refugee per month (just over us $1 per ' week!) ",,,.

13 APPENDX C KAREN REFUGEE PROGRAMME ACCOUNTS ygu!cjl.; ~j7 W CC'll' ~ ll. J1~ m ~ll. mmcte!lq1m ll.'iw!l Balance clf 1 Jan 1988 Bread for the World Dutch nterchurch aid Church World Service Church World Service (blanket fund) Christian Aid Australian Churches of Christ ' Australian Council pf Churches United Society for Propagation of Gospel Contributions to Consortium Purchase of 2000 blankets Travel and Administration Balance at 31 Dec , ,768, ,507, , , , , , 200, , ,300, , , , Dutch 'nterchurch Aid Bread for the World Christian Aid Church World Service Australian Churches of Christ World Council of Churches United Society for Propagation of Gospel Australian Counc~l of, Churches Miscellaneous Donations to Consortium Purchase of 2000 Blankets Anglican Ministry Travel and Administration Balance at 31 Dec 1988 ~ , ,471, ,355, , , , , , ,206, , Jan 1 Balance BKK Jan 1 Balance Mae Sot Receipts BK< nterest BKK Receipts Mae Sot , ,299, ,

14 nterest Mae Sot Expenditures Less returns (Rice sacks etc.. ) December 31 Balance" SK(, December 31" Balance Mae' Sot December' 31 Balance Songkhlaburi 18, ,597, (183,775.00) 3,134, ,271.02, Thailand Baptist Missionary Fellowship Thailand Baptist' t';issionary Fellpwship Church of christ in Thailand Thailand Baptist Missipnary Fell~~ship loa '. ' Anglican Church of Canada Compassion nternational nternational Church of Bangkok ADRA " 8,404, (for 1989) 4,235, " 5,300, (for vehicle) ' 625,400.00, 300, , , ,000.()Q Other Donations made by indvidual members in the name of ~he Consortium include: loa School supplies -,: loa 5660 blankets 300,000 CCT 2000 blankets 107,000 Consortium also received 8 562,900 from nternational Christian Aid for purchases and distribution on their behalf. Rice ; Fish Past Salt ' Milk Powder, Supplementary Feeding Mosquito Nets,, Administratior Mae Sot Administration RKK Purchase of Vehicle Fuel, maintenance of Vehicle 14,965, ,169,090.00, 75,815.00, 75, , , , , , , ,952 8,143 1, sacks tins bags bags MSE (@ 100 (@ 20 (@ 30 (@ 25 kgs) kgs) kgs) kgs) thro' (1) 2000 nets (various sizes) Salaries, of'fice etc Bank charges etc.. 17, (1) Supplementary feeding to 31 December (TB patients, ' pregnant women, malnurished children) Balance paid in Jan for Oct, Nov, Dec eggs 80 tins vegetable oil 6263 kg beclns 836, kg dried fish 48, , , , ,070.00

15 6133 kg fish paste 2041 kg sugar 50,87B,OO 25,692,00 299, (2) Consortium also purchased BBO sacks rice (B 510,400) and 405 tins fish paste (B 52,000) for nternational Christian Aid, (3) Stock on hand ; 4331 sacks rice (B ne-ts (B 13,072), 280 blankets (B 2,511,980), 134 mosquito 14,841) tem COERR CA OTHERS CONSORTUM TOTAL / ' Rice (sacks) 2,706 2,540 (2) ,111 31,682 Fish Paste (tins) 470 (3) Salt (sacks) 500 1,300 1,800 Milk (bags) Sardines (boxes) Sardines ( tins) ,000 Dried Fish (bags) Blankets ,050 9,550 Mosquito Nets (~ags) Mosquito Nets (nets) ,606 7,606 Mats Jaggery (boxes) Sugar (bags) Cookies (boxes) Noodles (pkts) T shirts (pkts) Pakoma Kit boxes Note books, (sets) Note books, (doz) Orchid balm (boxes) Tooth Paste (boxes) 2 2 Tooth brush (bj~ _es) School supply sets 4,670 4,670 Pencils Pencils (boxes) Pens Christmas gifts (sets) ,400 (1) As reported by Karen Refugee committee (2) ncludes 880 sacks purchased and distributed by Consortium for CA (3) ncludes 270 tins purchased and distributed by Consortium for CA

16 Thailand Baptist.Missionary Society Church of Christ in Thailand* World Vision Foundation Thailand* ZOA Refugee Care Netherlands* Christ church* ADRA* CAMA Compassion nternational World Relief Thailand Baptist Mission Refugees nternational Japan nternational Church of Bangkok CCSDPT Miscellaneous Baht 23,847, ,206, ,632, ,214, , , , , , , , , , Baht Agencies have also given material assistance through the Co'nsortium totalling about 3,000,000 Baht in value. *Th~se tem/year 1984! 1985 O\l.~!rl!;ltomn 1Jllw~:..,. " Rice (sacks) : '4;890. : \ 8,855 Fish Paste (tins }-. ~OOO : '. 2,132 SaLt (sacks~.,chillies (kgs) : : 120:_ 30 : ; Blankets : :, 20,500 Mosquito Nets : : 1,500,r Baht cost including. administra'tion and Supplementary feeding 1B!~!ljlJml!@1l" $ ;l&~ Medicines Mosquito nets Blankets School supplies Utensils > - _ :, 2.,75." m _ 3.90 m : ~1,502 4,620 quty.,. 400 ' 2,900 quty quty Baht cost. Say 0.45 m ' 0.35 m: g {Jj~ WJ : ld g j 1l p lw Dg ,660 5, ,050 1, m 400 3,450 quty 0.33 m, ,951 11,064 1, : m.= 8283 : 6800 : quty : 1.00 m! : ,952 8,143 1,300 2,000 17,60' m 7,660 quty 0.65 m (f.d ld glliv QD Ulipla jill *purchased directly by consortiur Member Agencies but donated in, the name of ' Consortium~, '

17 tem Food/Relief tems Medical Programme m. 5 m m. 9 m m. 6 m m. 10 m m. 40 m. ll@ PD. ~ll These figure include staff and administration costs. PD. W 0:0.