The EU, North America and Shifts in Transatlantic Security Relations

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2 The EU, North America and Shifts in Transatlantic Security Relations Finn LAURSEN Introduction This book is focusing on certain aspects of the foreign and security policies of the European Union (EU), namely its place and role in transatlantic relations. This is very much the high politics part of what the new Lisbon Treaty calls external action. What kind of actor capacity has the EU developed in these areas? How have relations with transatlantic partners developed in recent years? Are North America and Europe drifting in different directions? Or do they still share enough values, institutions and interests to be able to stick together? From the point of view of world security, the United States is still the main global actor. The European Union is endeavouring to become an important actor, with some but still limited success. The UK and France are the main powers in Europe when it comes to foreign and security policy, both having nuclear weapons and being permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Germany is the economic heavyweight power in Europe, but it has hesitated to play an active role in international power politics. The EU, despite efforts to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), now renamed Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in the Lisbon Treaty, rarely speaks with one voice internationally on sensitive high politics issues. The Member States, the bigger ones in particular, have not been willing to pool and delegate sovereignty in foreign and defence policy. As argued by Stanley Hoffmann already in the mid-1960s, there is logic of diversity in the high politics area, which makes it difficult to develop common policies. This makes high politics different from economic policy areas low politics where integration has been able to progress (Hoffmann 1965). In CFSP, the Member States tend to look in different directions and see different problems, and they guard their sovereignty. Early on, the EU s predecessor the European Community (EC) was seen as a civilian power (Duchêne 1972). The European Economic Community (EEC) quickly became influential in the General Agreement 19

3 The EU, North America and Shifts in Transatlantic Security Relations on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), participating actively in rounds of trade negotiations. The Member States and the EEC also contributed with development aid to the Third World, in average more than other industrialised countries in the world. But it did not have military capabilities. Its support for international law could be seen as an asset, but it could not project power the way the United States can (Laursen 1991). A modern variant of the concept of a civilian power is the EU as a normative power (Manners 2002). The EU is seen as actively promoting its values, such as democracy, human rights, protection of minorities, rule of law and multilateralism. Is the EU also becoming a military power? Yes, especially after the beginning of ESDP in 1999, the EU has tried to build up some military capacity to deal with conflict resolution, peacekeeping and peacemaking. Since the early 2000s, the EU has been involved in a number of missions that have involved military means. But ESPD, now CSDP, has also developed a strong civilian arm, realizing the importance of nation building as an important part of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. This uncertainty about the true nature of the EU as an international actor feeds into the transatlantic debate. Robert Kagan argued that Europe is from Venus and the United States from Mars. Europeans are Kantian while the Americans are Hobbesian. Americans favour coercion and unilateralism more than the Europeans. Europeans favour negotiation, diplomacy and persuasion. Kagan went on to suggest that Europeans made a virtue out of weakness (2003). Some European countered by saying that Europe is Kantian by deliberate choice (see Rees 2011, 33-35; Bretherton and Vogler 2006). The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Since the onset of the Cold War in the early post-world War II period, close security relations have developed between the United States (and Canada) and most countries in Western Europe. This cooperation was institutionalised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) from the early 1950s. At the start of the war in Korea in 1950, the United States put pressure on West European countries to contribute more to the defence of the West. This included pressure in favour of West German rearmament five years after the end of World War II, an idea many Europeans did not like at the time. The French came up with the proposal for a European Defence Community (EDC), which would create a European Army with German participation. The idea was modelled on the proposal for a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) proposed by the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman in May 1950, a few weeks before the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. The ECSC treaty was successfully negotiated under French leadership and 20

4 21 Finn Laursen ratified by the six original Member States, France, West Germany, Italy and the three Benelux countries. The EDC treaty, however, was rejected by the French National Assembly in Instead, West Germany and Italy were allowed to join NATO in 1955, under a certain degree of supervision by the Western European Union (WEU). The idea of an independent European defence organisation was subsequently forgotten until after the end of the Cold War (Laursen 1996). The ECSC was followed by the EEC and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or EURATOM) in 1957 (in force from 1958), and, with ups and downs, European integration moved forward in the following years under the security umbrella of NATO. Both NATO and the EC had problems during the 1960s, largely due to the unilateralist policies of French President Charles de Gaulle, who sparked a major institutional crisis in the EC in 1965, and who withdrew French armed forces from NATO s integrated military command in He also vetoed UK membership of the EC in 1963 and again in 1967 (Dinan 2010, Ch. 2). The six original members of the European Communities (EC) started an informal intergovernmental cooperation about foreign policy in 1970, known as European Political Cooperation (EPC), but defence policy was excluded from EPC and left to NATO. The UK joined the EC in 1973 together with Denmark and Ireland, the latter not a NATO member. The EPC developed very slowly in the following years outside the EC framework. It was given a treaty basis in the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 but remained outside the supranational EC framework (Smith 2004). Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) The end of the Cold War in 1989 had many Europeans wondering about the continued US commitment to European security now that the Soviet threat was gone. The EC had expanded to 12 members through the 1980s, with Greece joining in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in Moreover, the end of the Cold War had neutral countries such as Finland, Sweden and Austria starting to consider the possibility of membership, and the new leaders of the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) freed from Soviet tutelage also started to talk about returning to Europe. The EC responded by negotiating the Maastricht Treaty, which created the European Union (EU) in Part of the EU was a second pillar dealing with Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which should also be able to develop a European defence policy. It remained intergovernmental cooperation as the previously existing foreign policy cooperation, the European Political Cooperation (EPC), which had started in It would not be based on the suprana-

5 The EU, North America and Shifts in Transatlantic Security Relations tional so-called Community method. It was based on consensus or unanimity among the foreign ministers and limited involvement of the European Commission and the European Parliament. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) had no jurisdiction in CFSP. The third pillar, Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), cooperation was similarly intergovernmental (Laursen and Vanhoonacker 1992; Keukeleire and Mac- Naughtan 2008). The Maastricht Treaty assigned the role of developing a European defence policy to the WEU, which had largely been dormant since the 1950s. The WEU in turn decided at a meeting at Petersberg outside Bonn in June 1992 that it could deal with soft security issues defined as humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, [and] tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking (WEU 1992). These kinds of activities become known as the Petersberg tasks. Collective defence was not included. It remained the prerogative of NATO. Subsequently, the Petersberg tasks were written into the EU treaty by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 (in force in 1999) on the proposal from neutral Sweden and Finland, who had joined the EU together with Austria in These countries did not want the EU to become a collective defence organisation. But the EU s timid flirtation with defence policy had already showed its limits during the wars in ex- Yugoslavia. It took American intervention, military and diplomatic, to stop the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 (Duke 2002). The Amsterdam Treaty also created the post of High Representative for CFSP, which was held by Javier Solana from the entry into force of the treaty in 1999 until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December In 2003, the EU adopted a European Security Strategy (ESS). It listed the following key threats: terrorism, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. It suggested three strategic objectives: addressing the threats, building security in our neighbourhood, and an international order based on effective multilateralism. The policy implications were that the EU should be more active, more capable, and more coherent as well as working with partners. 1 The Lisbon Treaty subsequently strengthened the position of the High Representative. The new High Representative (HR) of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, as the treaty names the position, chairs the Foreign Affairs Council, is a vice president of the European Commission and runs the new European External Action Service 1 For text, see [Accessed 5 January 2012]. 22

6 23 Finn Laursen (EEAS). CFSP as such, however, remains intergovernmental. Despite the formal abolition of the Maastricht pillar structure, CFSP retains special decision-making procedures, which have not changed much. The willingness to take a giant step towards a real common foreign policy just was not there (Laursen 2011a). The creation of the EEAS is a novelty. It has been composed of officials from the Commission, the Council General Secretariat as well as seconded diplomats from Member States. It is headed by HR Lady Catherine Ashton, and it is supposed to contribute to a more coherent and efficient external action of the EU, which is not an easy task given the broad agenda and institutional limitations. European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) Efforts during the 1990s to start developing a European defence policy were hampered by disagreements among the EU Member States. France was in favour of developing an independent European defence policy. The UK defended the role of NATO. Both France and the UK wanted to keep CFSP and defence as intergovernmental cooperation, but the Benelux countries, Italy, Spain and to a certain extent Germany favoured a more communautaire approach. These cleavages manifested themselves during the Maastricht and subsequently Amsterdam negotiations (Laursen and Vanhoonacker 1992, Laursen 2002). It was the Kosovo conflict that sparked a rethink in London. At Saint Malo in France in December 1998 there was a rapprochement at a Franco-British summit, where the two EU leading countries decided that the EU needed military means: 1. The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. [ ] 2. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises. [ ] 3. In order for the European Union to take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged, the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU. In this regard, the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated within NATO s European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO

7 The EU, North America and Shifts in Transatlantic Security Relations framework) (Franco-British summit Joint declaration on European defence 1998). The EU followed quickly in 1999, starting to develop an autonomous defence policy, first by adopting a declaration at the meeting of the European Council in Cologne in June 1999, where all Member States signed up to the idea of giving the EU the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence. The idea was to develop an effective EU-led crisis management in which NATO members, as well as neutral and non-aligned members, of the EU can participate fully and on an equal footing in the EU operations (Rynning 2006). A major step was taken at the Helsinki summit in December The Presidency Conclusions from the meeting of the European Council stated: The Union will contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The Union recognises the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. I. The European Council underlines its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army. II. Building on the guidelines established at the Cologne European Council [in June 1999] and on the basis of the Presidency s reports, the European Council has agreed in particular the following: cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks; new political and military bodies and structures will be established within the Council to enable the Union to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such operations, while respecting the single institutional framework; modalities will be developed for full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO, taking into account the needs of all EU Member States; appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while respecting the Union s decision-making autonomy, non-eu European 24

8 Finn Laursen NATO members and other interested States to contribute to EU military crisis management; a non-military crisis management mechanism will be established to coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the Union and the Member States (European Council 1999). The EU still deferred to NATO, and ESDP was limited to the full range of the Petersberg tasks, i.e., soft security. No European army was foreseen. The Lisbon Treaty: Towards a Common EU Security and Defence Policy? The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which used to be called European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), has a more prominent place in the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in December 2009, than in the earlier treaties (Treaty of Lisbon 2009). The basic definition does not change much, but there is now a new emphasis on operational capacity including both civilian and military assets (Art. 42 TEU). 2 The so-called Petersberg tasks are extended to include joint disarmament operations, post-conflict stabilization as well as fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories. Both civilian and military means can be used (Art. 43 TEU). The Lisbon Treaty will introduce more flexibility in CFSP, including CSDP. This is an important aspect of the treaty. If you depend on unanimity, you need some ways to circumvent the vetoes. First, the Lisbon Treaty allows for enhanced cooperation in all areas, including CFSP and CSDP (Art. 20 TEU). The previous treaty base did not allow for enhanced cooperation in defence. Establishing enhanced cooperation will require a minimum of nine Member States (Art. 20(2) TEU), against eight previously. Enhanced cooperation in CFSP, including CSDP, does require unanimity in the Council though (Art. 329(2) TFEU). The Lisbon Treaty also introduces the new concept of permanent structured cooperation in the defence area (Art. 46 TEU). Contrary to enhanced cooperation, it does not require unanimity to be established but only a qualified majority vote (QMV). The idea is that Member 2 The Lisbon Treaty is divided into two parts: The Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 25

9 The EU, North America and Shifts in Transatlantic Security Relations States with greater willingness and capacity in the area of defence shall go together in some kind of closer cooperation of a more permanent kind. This cooperation is geared towards increasing the military capabilities of the Member States and thus the Union. Constructive abstention, which got into the treaty through the Amsterdam Treaty, can also be seen as a kind of flexibility, but more ad hoc. It allows countries to opt-out of certain missions while allowing the other Member States to move forward. Further, for the expanded Petersberg tasks, the Lisbon Treaty mentions the possibility of entrusting the implementation of a task to a group of Member States that are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task (Art. 44 TEU). All in all, there are now a number of flexibility provisions that can be applied in the areas of CFSP and CSDP. A somewhat controversial new mutual defence or mutual assistance clause has also been added to the treaties by the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 42 TEU). The language resembles the collective defence articles of the WEU and NATO treaties, but it is necessary to notice the provisos. The obligation of assistance shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States read nonaligned Member States. Further, commitments must be consistent with NATO commitments, a stipulation considered important by the more pro- Atlantic Member States, including the UK. This kind of language was actually introduced by the Maastricht Treaty when it included defence policy for the first time through CFSP, without talking about mutual defence or assistance. Finally, the new mutual solidarity clause, which is part of the TFEU, should be mentioned. This deals with terrorist attacks against Member States or natural or man-made disasters in Member States. The article asks for solidarity and mobilization of all instruments, including military resources (Art. 222 TFEU). This is the Union s response to events like 9/11 in the United States and the terrorist bombings in Madrid in 2004 and London in A Note on Defence Spending: Are There Free Riders? Americans have often complained about European defence spending. Even during the Cold War, US military spending was much higher than European spending, measured as percentage of GDP. This is still the case today, despite the EU discourse about developing an EU defence policy and improving the military capability. Table 1.1 shows estimates for The United States is spending is 5.4 per cent of GDP. The highest EU country spending is the UK with 2.7 per cent. France spends 26

10 Finn Laursen 2.0 per cent and Germany 1.4 per cent, which is more or less the level of spending in most EU NATO countries. Turkey spends 1.9 per cent and has the second largest army in NATO. Americans have also called for more burden-sharing from the Europeans in the post-cold War period, tending to see the Europeans as free riders on a US-produced public good, international security. Table 1.1: Defence Expenditures: USA, Canada, and Turkey versus EU NATO Countries (Estimates for 2010) Country Expenditures in million US dollars Expenditures, percentage of GDP at current prices Deployable military in thousands Belgium 5, Bulgaria Canada 23, Czech Republic 2, Denmark 4, Estonia France 52, Germany 45, Greece 8, Hungary 1, Italy 28, Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Netherlands 11, Poland 8, Portugal 3, Romania 2, Slovakia 1, Slovenia Spain 15, Turkey 14, UK 60, USA 785, ,427 Source: NATO, Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence, pdf [Accessed 29 December 2011]. Shifting Relations and Strategies From 1949 to 1989, NATO represented the West in a bipolar world. The other pole was the Soviet Union. Both sides saw the other side as a threat to their security. Both sides invested heavily in arms, including 27

11 The EU, North America and Shifts in Transatlantic Security Relations nuclear weapons and means of delivering these weapons, including intercontinental ballistic missiles. Threats were seen as coming from another state or other states. Realist scholars argued that certain stability was reached because each side had a secure second-strike capability, so a first strike would be irrational. It created the situation referred to as Mutually Secured Destruction (MAD) (Scott 2005). As the Soviet Bloc collapsed in 1989, and the Soviet Union itself dissolved a couple of years later, the world changed radically. Scholars now talked about a unipolar world. Some argued that democracy had won. But realist scholars argued that this new situation was a transition period. They expected a new balance of power to emerge. They still saw states as the main actors and international anarchy as the structure that could explain the conduct of foreign and security policy. They believed that institutions such as NATO and the EC/EU would disintegrate (Mearsheimer 1990). Liberal scholars, however, argued that shared values and existing international networks would help NATO and the EU to survive (Keohane, Nye and Hoffmann 1993). Many scholars pointed to new threats, including terrorism, illegal immigration, organized crime and ecological catastrophes. And the 1990s saw interethnic conflicts break out at several places in the world, including former Yugoslavia in Europe. There were clearly other actors besides sovereign states. Many of the new conflicts were intrastate conflicts. And the so-called sovereign states were becoming more and more interdependent. The moment two high-jacked airplanes hit the twin towers of the World Trade Centre in New York on 11 September 2001, it became clear that even the world s greatest superpower was vulnerable. It had a huge psychological impact. Obviously, strategic thinking had to change to take account of the new threats. We have, therefore, seen NATO and EU move towards a concept of comprehensive security in the last two decades. It is no longer the collective and territorial defence, for which NATO was set up. Defence policy must be able to address issues created by failing states and rogue states as well as terrorist groups such as al-qaeda. The chapters in this book will go into detail with some of these issues and see how the Atlantic countries have cooperated or disagreed when facing the challenges. Overview of Book Chapters After the introductory chapter, a second part of the book has four chapters dealing with transatlantic relations and international security from broad perspectives. 28

12 Finn Laursen Agnès Nahan and Edward Moxon-Browne deal with US-European security policy relations during the two Bush administrations and the Obama administration. The events of 9/11 affected the relationship profoundly, bringing the two Atlantic sides together. However, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 divided the Europeans, with the UK and some other countries, including Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), standing on the US side, but France, Germany and some other Member States opposing the invasion. This was a serious split for efforts to develop a common European security and defence policy, and transatlantic relations suffered. But during his second term, President George W. Bush tried to improve relations. Although the style changed further under President Barack Obama, there has in reality been a fair amount of continuity in US policy. US suspicions that ESDP was being developed to counterbalance the United States were unjustified. Eventually, the United States has learned to value EU contributions to soft security. In the following chapter, Roberto Durán, a scholar based in Chile, looks at European defence and transatlantic issues. What are the prospects of security cooperation in the post-9/11 period? Effective measures of preventive diplomacy and strong political will on human security are needed to build a new international security system. The chapter also takes a special look at Franco-British military cooperation, which played an important role in the case of Libya. A chapter by Veton Latifi follows. He looks at EU-NATO relations in crisis management. Cooperation in this area was to be based on the Berlin Plus agreement of 2003, which would allow EU-led operations using NATO assets. The agreement has in reality only worked in two cases, in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2003 and in Bosnia and Herzegovina from The Turkish-Cypriot issue has created a situation where Turkey blocks cooperation on the NATO side and Cyprus on the EU side. This double veto has to some extent been circumvented by creative pragmatism, but it is clearly a great nuisance. Beyond that, both sides have tried to improve their capacities for crisis management, the EU partly through the Lisbon Treaty and NATO through its new strategic concept adopted in Both sides have rather similar views of what is needed, but different capacities call for complementarities and cooperation. The final chapter in Part II by Carla Moneteleone studies coalitions in the UN Security Council, with focus on the transatlantic coalition involving the United States and EU countries, first of all the two permanent EU members, France and the UK. By looking at who sponsored draft resolutions that were approved by the Security Council, the existing coalitions can be detected and their activities followed through time. 29

13 The EU, North America and Shifts in Transatlantic Security Relations The time period covered is The latter part covers the two terms of the George W. Bush administration. She finds a dominant transatlantic coalition that is increasingly capable of controlling the agenda and decision outcomes of the Security Council. During the 1990s, the transatlantic coalition sponsored about a quarter of the resolutions. This number has increased since 2003, reaching about 69 per cent in So despite transatlantic differences, the two sides favour using the Security Council on an increasing number of international issues. Part III has four chapters, starting with a chapter where Alasdair Blair looks at the role of Britain, a relatively pro-american EU Member State, which has opted out from some important EU policies, including the single currency euro and Schengen cooperation about border controls. Focus is on the post-9/11 period where the UK has stood by the Americans in Afghanistan and Iraq. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was especially damaging for transatlantic relations, with France and Germany strongly opposing the US-led action that was supported by the UK, Denmark, Italy, Portugal and Spain as well as some of the future Member States from Central and Eastern Europe. Interestingly enough, Britain and France were the leading participants in the enforcement of the Libyan no-fly zone in 2011, which was not supported by Germany. Next, Colette Mazzucelli and Oya Dursun-Özkanca analyse French and Turkish foreign policies from an EU-NATO perspective. The two countries are seen as particularly important for the future development of transatlantic relations. In the section on France, there is focus on the Saint Malo agreement between France and the UK, which started the development of the ESDP, and President Nicolas Sarkozy s decision to rejoin NATO s Integrated Military Command structure in 2009, which President de Gaulle had left in The section on Turkey analyses Turkish NATO policy and relations with the EU, where Turkish membership negotiations have stalled. Turkey s non-recognition of Cyprus and associated problems are crucial issues for both the EU and NATO that keep blocking a formalized cooperation between NATO and the EU s defence policy. In the following chapter, Faton Tony Bislimi writes about the roles of the United States and the EU in Kosovo during the war in 1999 and subsequent efforts to build a new European state. The 78-day bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999 was followed by UN and NATO involvement, in the form of KFOR (Kosovo Force), a UN-mandated NATO-led military presence, and the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Efforts to find an agreed final status for Kosovo through negotiations headed by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari failed because of a Russian threat of veto in the UN Security 30

14 Finn Laursen Council. Kosovo therefore declared independence on 17 February In today s Kosovo, the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) represents the most ambitious EU mission so far, but NATO and the UN retain some presence too, which may become a problem for the countries new leaders, given the lack of clarity about who makes what decisions. Shirley Cloyes DioGuardi then gives a detailed historic account of the Kosovo conflict and argues that US and European approaches to the issues have been based on six myths, namely: Kosovo is the cradle of Serbia s civilisation; Kosovo s independence will lead to a Greater Albania ; An independent Kosovo will become a terrorist Muslim state; All parties to the conflicts in the Balkans share the same responsibility; Kosovo s independence will set a precedent; The Kosovo Liberation Army was a criminal enterprise. She argues that these are all unfounded myths. The chapter is a strong plea for a deeper understanding of the issues in the Western Balkans with US and EU policies based on independent research and not deference to the views of specific parties to the conflict. Part IV moves beyond Europe. Matilka Krow takes on the case of Iran, focusing on European and EU efforts to engage Iran versus the tougher US approach, especially after 9/11. After revelations of Iranian nuclear installations in 2002, France, Germany and the UK (E3) became actively involved in trying to persuade the Iranians to suspend their nuclear enrichment programme. Some agreements did follow only to unravel after the arrival of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as Iranian president in The approach changed to UN-mandated sanctions, which, however, seem to have had little effect. Basically, it is argued, Europe and the United States underestimated Iran s security concerns, being surrounded by US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, etc., and US rhetoric about regime change. The fact that European efforts were led by E3 and only included the High Representative for CFSP from 2004 also suggest serious difficulties for the EU s efforts to develop common foreign and security policies. In the following chapter, Vincent Topping studies the arms embargo against China and the disagreements between the United States and Europe on how to handle relations with the People s Republic of China (PRC). The embargo was introduced after the Tiananmen Massacre in June 1989, but China has been putting strong pressure on the EU in recent years to lift it, and European arms producers have also put pressure on their governments. But the United States has strongly opposed 31

15 The EU, North America and Shifts in Transatlantic Security Relations lifting the ban, feeling that it could affect the strategic balance in East Asia and that China would get access to Western arms technology. The Americans have also used the argument of the poor human rights record in China, which, however, suggests a double standard, given American arms exports to Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries with equally poor human rights records. In the next chapter, Toni Haastrup looks at Africa in transatlantic relations. In the past, the United States did not show much interest in Africa, but this changed after the end of the Cold War and especially after 9/11. The EU, on the other hand, has a long history of close relations with Africa. In the security area, the United States has tended to emphasise military means while the Europeans have emphasized a civilian developmental approach. This should allow for transatlantic cooperation and burden sharing. Emphasis should be on a multilateral approach, working with African institutions, including the African Union. Part V finally turns to terrorism and internal or homeland security. First, Annegret Bendiek deals with EU-counterterrorism cooperation. It is a policy area where the two sides have had divergent perceptions, the US side putting most emphasis on security and the EU side putting more emphasis on the rule of law and protection of human rights. The US side has tended to combat terrorism with military means while the EU side has concentrated on policing and intelligence measures. Some of the controversial issues include the establishment of terrorist lists, data protection, extraordinary renditions and secret detention facilities. On the EU side, the protection of human rights has been reinforced by the Lisbon Treaty, which has made the Charter of Fundamental Rights legally binding. The treaty has also introduced the ordinary legislative procedure for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), making the European Parliament a co-legislator and thereby increasing political accountability. In the final chapter, Ruben Zaiotti asks whether there has been practical learning and policy convergence in the homeland security area. He finds that, despite the tensions and controversies, especially about data protection, there has been learning and some convergence. The European Passenger Name Record (PNR) was influenced by American actions. Similarly, the US-Canada Smart Border Initiative and later the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP) involving also Mexico learned from the European Schengen cooperation experience. Zaiotti discusses the reasons for this practical learning and finds three conditions: interaction, growing formalization of transatlantic cooperation and iterated interactions. 32

16 References 33 Finn Laursen Bretherton, C. and Vogler, J., The European Union as a Global Actor. 2nd ed. London: Routledge. Dinan, D., Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration. 4th ed. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. Duchêne, F., Europe s Role in a World of Peace, in R. Maine (ed.), Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Nations Look Ahead. London: Fontana, pp Duke, S., The Common Foreign and Security Policy: Significant but Modest Changes, in F. Laursen (ed.), The Amsterdam Treaty: National Preference Formation, Interstate Bargaining and Outcome. Odense: Odense University Press, pp European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki, 10 and 11 December. Available at: [Accessed 28 December 2011]. European Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in a Better World, 12 December. Available at: Upload/78367.pdf [Accessed 5 January 2012]. Franco-British Summit Joint Declaration on European Defence, Saint- Malo, 4 December. Available at: Malo%20Declaration%20Text.html [Accessed 28 December 2011]. Hill, C. and Smith, M. (eds.), International Relations and the European Union. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hoffmann, S., Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe, in Daedalus, Vol. 95 (Summer), pp Kagan, R., Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Keukeleire, S. and MacNaughtan, J., The Foreign Policy of the European Union. Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan. Keohane, R.O., Nye, J.S. and Hoffmann, S., After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Laursen, F., The EC in the World Context: Civilian Power or Superpower?, Futures, 23: 7 (September 1991), pp Laursen, F., The Common Foreign and Security Policy of The European Union: Words or Deeds? in Ingo Peters (ed.), New Security Challenges: The Adaptation of International Institutions: Reforming the UN, NATO, EU and CSCE since Münster: Lit-Verlag, and New York: St. Martin s Press, pp Laursen, F. (ed.), The Amsterdam Treaty: National Preference Formation, Interstate Bargaining and Outcome. Odense: Odense University Press. Laursen, F. (ed.), The EU as a Foreign and Security Policy Actor. Dordrecht: Republic of Letters Publishing. Laursen, F., 2011a. The European Union as an International Political and Security Actor after the Treaty of Lisbon: An Academic Perspective, in

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