(Geo)political repositioning

Transcription

1 198 part four world. According to GNP per capita, Serbia s economy is situated in the upper 40% of world economies. Also, social spending as foundation of welfare state is on reasonable level (see Figure 4-1). If the EU for Serbia is going to be a target, the chances for improvement of the current position will be much better. (Geo)political repositioning Ethnicities with different background, history and status lived in Yugoslavia. Before WWI, South Slavic nations had only two independent states, Serbia and Montenegro. A significant number of people from the same ethnic roots lived in the Dual Monarchy. In 1918, in the aftermath of WWI, the union of South Slavic nations was constituted as parliamentary monarchy under the name of Figure 4-1. Social spending and GDP for different countries Social spending in percent of GDP Finland Denmark France Sweden Austria Ukraine Slovenia Belgium Holland Portugal Italy Germany Norway Latvia Serbia Greece UK Slovakia Spain Japan Iceland Hungary N. Zealand Brazil Croatia Poland Malta Ireland Moldova Mongolia Belarus Estonia Cyprus Bulgaria Lithuania Israel Czech Rep. USA Macedonia Russia Canada Turkey Australia Uzbekistan Romania Switzerland Lesotho Egypt Iran S. Africa Albania Tunisia Chile Georgia Colombia Mauritius C. Verde China Mexico Azerbaijan Seychelles El Salvador Maldives Kazakhstan Korea Hong Kong Bhutan Peru Taiwan Jamaica Yemen UAE Timor -Leste Indonesia 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000 GDP per capita based on PPP in current $

2 Geopolitics 199 the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. It was a multinational country with three nations of equal constitutional rights. The new state was internally organized in administrative units (33 districts), not republics of nations. Change of the name into the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929 symbolically reflects the intention of the country leadership to represent the interests of the union of South Slavic nations. Muslims (Bosniaks), Montenegrins and Macedonians were recognized as nations with constitutional rights within the second (or communist) Yugoslavia after WWII. Albanians during the whole history of Yugoslavia were recognized as minority groups living in Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro. Relationships between Roman Catholics (Slovenes and Croats) and Orthodox Christians (Serbs and Montenegrins) were the essence of Yugoslavia s the rise and fall. Each geopolitical crisis tested this relationship. Political leadership from Serbia, from the birth until the death of Yugoslavia, recognized their role in history as a founder of the state of South Slavic nations and/or as a keeper of its legacy. Political leaders from Slovenia were the lever of this policy. Struggle between pro-yugoslav and anti-yugoslav politicians from the Western part of the state (Slovenes and Croats) was constant. The consequences of such political game were permanent weakening of federal state end continuous redefinitions of fundamentals of the state through constitution. Floating from one constitutional crisis to the next, the country ended tragically after demands from Western republics for disintegration of the federal state and self-determination of nations living in it in early 1990s. Beside permanent internal political tensions, our view is that the role of major international stakeholders in keeping geopolitical framework of South Slavic nations had always been inspired by their interests and balance of power argument. Internal arguments such as differences in the level of economic development, demography, and culture identity played the role of a plus factor, particularly in times of greater geopolitical changes. In the geopolitical crisis triggered by the collapse of the Soviet Union, this class of arguments was used as an alibi for some politicians to explain changes in their ideological platform. After the end of WWII, the second Yugoslavia was recognized as an independent state with significant territorial corrections which Slovenia and Croatia particularly benefited from. Also, Karadjordjevic monarchy was left to history, and a communist system established under the leadership of the Croat communist leader J. B. Tito.

3 200 part four From the perspective of ideological foundation of the state, it was a devolution. Communism was in place for almost one half of the century. According to A. Trbovich [8, p. 198], Serbs resentment of communist policy was personalized with J. B. Tito. Prominent scholars from the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts have been following a different ideological platform. They were anti-tito rather than anti-yugoslav. Two reasons stood behind such wisdom. First, economic weakening of Serb-populated territories by picking winners and allocation of investments in the Western part of the country, and centrally regulated prices of commodities (particularly agriculture and energy) penalizing Serbia s economic interests. Economic reforms collapse in the late 1960s and the early 1970s triggered a strong wave of economic emigration. In that period, approximately one million of people emigrated from the country, most of them were Serbs. As always in similar situations, J. B. Tito s reaction to economic troubles was an ideological one. Concrete manifestation this time was the constitution change. It led to the second political resentment of J. B. Tito s policy, confederalization of Yugoslavia and republicanization of Serbia. Namely, under the constitution release in 1974, Yugoslavia was de facto constituted as a confederation and Serbia was divided in three parts (Serbia proper and two provinces, Kosovo was one of them). Interestingly, decentralization as a principle applied exclusively in the case of Serbia, excluding entities with the history of decentralization (for example, status of Dalmatia or Costal Banovina in Croatia in the first Yugoslavia). After J. B. Tito s death in 1980, the intention of politicians from Slovenia and Croatia was to ruthlessly destroy SFR Yugoslavia in order to allow their republics to become independent states. Economic disparities combined with demographic trends were the primary causes of such intention. The richer Western part did not like financing the poor Eastern part, particularly the province of Kosovo. Even in the communist regime there was solidarity regarding economic inequality. During the whole period of existence of the second Yugoslavia, economic disparities between republics did not decline, despite special fund established on the federal level to help the less developed parts of the country, particularly the province of Kosovo. At the same time, differences in demography were enormous and deteriorated. For example, differences in natural rates of population growth were 1:20. Differences in culture between nations and related cultural exceptionalism of the Westerners were constantly in the spotlight of secessionists. Such policy did not

4 Geopolitics 201 get results. The general position of superpowers was to keep South Slavic nations in a multiethnic country together in order to eliminate negative consequences of disintegration like undesired geopolitical evolution, economic crisis, refugee influx, military conflicts, etc. In March 1991, the US secretary of state J. Baker, during a visit to the Yugoslav authorities, assured that the US should support a unified country and that potential separatists should restrain themselves from any destructive actions. When secessionists entered in zeitnot in the geopolitical chessboard, their last move was ideological one. Namely, they exchanged differences in cultural identity between nations as the main reason for disintegration with requests for systemic transition toward the capitalism and Trans-Atlantic integration. Timing was critical because the peak of constitutional crisis in Yugoslavia coincided with the peak of geopolitical crisis in Eastern Europe (the fall of the Berlin Wall), collapse of the Soviet Union, and start of systemic transition in CEE. Probably, it was a crucial shift in the conceptual platform for secession that had been energized by the support of unified Germany as growing international stakeholder. This support for disintegration appeared only three months after J. Baker s visit. After that, instead of supporting a unified country, the US as the most influential international stakeholder joined the standpoint of Germany, suggested the devolution of sovereignty from the federal state to the republics following immediate accession to the EU and Trans-Atlantic integration as geopolitical consideration of secession. The end of the Cold War ripped away the constraining effect of former geopolitical misconceptions about the South Slavic state by releasing serial civil wars for its heritage. Disintegration of multinational country and selfdetermination of different nations living in it took place with the resistance of the largest nation. In rapidly evolving geopolitical situation, Serbia s political leadership, as a principal supporter of the unified country, remained isolated. After unfriendly disintegration in the following chaos, some national groups like Kosovo Albanians, recognized as a minority group by the previous constitution, consumed the self-determination right, too. Every nation needs a state. A state requires borders. In each process of disintegration of a multinational state, the most critical situation occurs when different nations claim the right to the same territory. The prevailing view of Serbs leadership in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina was that Croats and Muslims could peacefully fulfill the right to self-determination by leaving Yugoslavia, but

5 202 part four only if they allowed Serbs to exercise the same right by staying in Yugoslavia within the territory which they already and, in great number of cases, historically 6 inhabited. Croat and Muslim leaders demanded the entire territory of the republic for self-determination. Two conflicting interpretations of the self-determination right by Serbs, on one side, and Croats, Bosniaks and Albanians, on the other side, led to intensification of ethnic conflicts, un-peaceful disintegration of the second Yugoslavia 7 and serial civil wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia, as well. International recognition of secessionist Yugoslav republics, along with Bangladesh secession from India, was the example of success in this controversial process that is neither legal nor illegal, but regularly ignored by international community due to enormous transaction costs and possible contingency spillover. During geopolitical crisis in the second Yugoslavia, international arbiter formed by the EU 8 expressed selective morality by selecting winners and losers of conflicting national interests. The arbiter ironically handed down on November 29, that the second Yugoslavia was dead, or engaged in the process of dissolution. Also, arbiter granted self-determination right for nations by supporting proposition that the internal (or administrative) borders between the republics that constituted federal state must be recognized as the external borders of newly formed independent states. International legal order requires an equitable approach and consistency. According to A. Trbovich [8, p. 2], redrawing of internal borders should not be automatically ruled out because the self-determination right should be concerned primarily with people, not territory. Interestingly enough, from the very beginning, the borders in Yugoslavia were sacrosanct only in terms of ideology (union of South Slavic nations with administrative districts in the first Yugoslavia, and union of working class living in different socialist republics in the second Yugoslavia). The international arbiter gave administrative borders the significance that all constitutions in the former Yugoslavia (including the last one) had refuted. Some wisdom from the Western republics submitted that recognition of the second Yugoslavia republics in internal borders was a pragmatic solution analogous to a delayed decolonization and a 6 In Dual Monarchy Krayina region was inhabited almost exclusively by Serbs. 7 In contrast to peaceful disintegration of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union which disintegrated by consent. Also, Ethiopia agreed to Eritrea s separation. 8 Badinter s Arbitration Commission. 9 The national day of SFR Yugoslavia.

6 Geopolitics 203 legal peculiarity rather than a precedent for legalized secession. Some eminent scholars 10 have strongly disagreed with such wisdom. Switch from internal to external border was a conceptual fault line for friendly disintegration. With the exception of Slovenia, where the national compactness prevented alternative administrative division, borders in Yugoslavia did not correspond to ethnic maps. For example in case of Serbs, ethnic borders deviated the most from the internal borders. Moreover, Serbs had constitutional rights in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Last but not least, borders were partly historical and the subject of some evolution, particularly in the period before Yugoslavia was constituted. For example, the province of Krayina in the Dual Monarchy populated predominantly by Serbs was defined as administrative unit with the aim to be a barrier towards the Turks expansion. Moreover, due to the borders corrections, the territory of Slovenia and Croatia was successively extended externally vis-à-vis neighbors, particularly Austria and Italy after WWI and WWII. Last but not least, in the history of the second Yugoslavia, the internal borders shifted many times as a consequence of diverging interests of political elites, particularly from Slovenia and Croatia. The second fault line of international arbiter is related to the implicit denial of territorial autonomy as an alternative for constitutional crisis. Territorial autonomy could be treated as a compromise solution between the self-determination right of people who constitute majority and universal human rights connected with people who constitute minority in secessionist republics and, by the way, have had constitutional rights in the current law regime. Also, the standpoints of international arbiter against the request for independence were not consistent. Some nations (and minority groups) consume self-determination right more than others. For example, Serbs as a nation with constitutional rights in Croatia did not consume the right of self-determination contrary to the Albanians living in Serbia which got self-determination right and formed the new independent state (Kosovo) near already existing national state of Albanians and without a constitutional right to do that. 10 For example, S. Woodward, (1995). Redrawing borders in a period of systemic transition, in International Organizations and Ethnic Conflicts, Eds. M. Esman and S. Telhani, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and P. Radan, (2002). The Break-up of Yugoslavia and International Law, Routledge Studies in International Law, London.

7 204 part four Double standards in the work of international arbiters can be easily identified through analysis of the recommendations for the legal status of Republika Srpska and Kosovo. Republika Srpska request for independence has been rejected with the explanation of necessity for implementation of a balanced approach and a need for strengthening the state federal structure as a prerequisite for the accession of whole Bosnia and Herzegovina to the EU. At the same time, international arbiters facilitating secession from Serbia in the case of Kosovo ignored federalization of Serbia as a constitutional alternative and, like in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, argument for accession to the EU. They ignored, also, the fact that in 1999 Serbs populated almost one half of the territory of Kosovo Criteria for self-determination were fully questionable. Kosovo is a good example for two reasons, at least. First, international arbiters suggested that Kosovo should be recognized as an independent state as an exception to the international rules which would not be repeated. Second, the argument of the same standpoint from M. Ahtisaari s plan for Kosovo was an intention to avoid a new Balkan war due to disappointed Albanians from Kosovo. Such arguments for self-determination threatened stability not just in the Balkan region but worldwide because it could be echoed by separatists that menaces over escalation of violence lend more credibility for such aspirations. To safeguard stability, threats over the use of violence should be strongly condemned by the international law, instead of being interpreted as a factor that undermines the separatists claim to have a right to secession. Previous proposal could be an alarming signal to multiethnic countries such as the US, Russia, Great Britain, China, Spain, Belgium, Canada, India, Nigeria, etc. International arbiter ignored quid pro quo solution, or possibility that altering borders could be a precondition for recognition, particularly when a minor group of people is not satisfied with constitutional changes. Also, they ignored the principle of exchange of territories in case that there is a territorial dispute between republics. Serial ethnic conflicts during geopolitical crisis in the second Yugoslavia confirmed that Serbia as founder of Yugoslavia, and Serbs as a constitutive nation, would not agree to the internal division of the country, particularly if this division drew negative consequences for individual and collective rights. After serial wars for heritage of former Yugoslavia, a significant number of people, particularly Serbs, sought refuge, including paradox of being a refugee within the borders of

8 Geopolitics 205 their own national states (in the case of Serbs living in the province of Kosovo). This illogical act could be a significant burden for reconciliation. In the early 1990s, something that was acceptable for a great majority of people in Yugoslavia for almost seventy years suddenly was not acceptable. Why? Our view is that the primary reason is geopolitical, namely external by nature. Internal forces such as economic disparities, differences in culture and demographic differences play only the supportive role in that process. The need for the second Yugoslavia ceased to exist when it fulfilled the intended role prescribed by major international stakeholders as a buffer zone between capitalism and socialism. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, when centripetal forces of the Cold War ceased to exist, centrifugal forces prevailed and led to its disintegration. Main centrifugal forces are geopolitical by nature. They consist of ideological defeat of socialism against capitalism and the race of main religions for influence after the collapse of the secular state. The main internal reason for disintegration is a mismatch between economic disparity and demographic trends in inverse correlation between economic development and demographic risk. No doubt, some cultural differences existed between nations in Yugoslavia, but the role of this factor in unfriendly breakup of the second Yugoslavia was not substantial. To support such view, we will offer the following argument. In the early 1980s, the second Yugoslavia was in deep economic crisis due to flawed economy, high debt and austerity measures that were inescapable due to the pressure from the IMF. Actions and inactions from the federal level made a bad situation worse. Measures from the local level like introduction of inter-republic custom duties, monetary system attacks, abandonment of tax payments to the federal budget, etc., led to the annulation of the common market, instability of monetary system, and external credibility loss. Because federal state lost support for refinancing debt from the IMF, one prominent scholar from the West underlined the IMF as a key contributor to the disintegration of Yugoslavia [11]. Federal government with the legacy of high debt, without support of major international stakeholders for debt refinancing and with limited tools in economic reforms due to obstructions from the republic level was practically disarmed in the struggle with new nationalists, majority of them from the communist nomenclature. Support of political elite is always necessary for such radical requests like disintegration of the state and self-determination of constitutive nations. It is

9 206 part four Table 4-1. Differences in economic performance between republics, 1990 Bosnia Herzegovina Population, in million GNP pc, YU=100 CAGR, Percent of YU GNP External debt, in million $ Capital/employees YU=100 Source: Partly modified [6, p. 55] Macedonia Montenegro Croatia Slovenia Serbia Proper Serbia Vojvodina Kosovo , ,994 1,778 3, not logical that in a single-party political system architects of the system and their successors take pride for destruction of their achievements. By the way, the architects of such system were the most influential politicians from the Western part of the country 11. Interestingly enough, political (meaning communist ) elite from the republics (meaning nations ) extensively manipulated with internal forces in order to recommend themselves to international stakeholders as transformative leaders. Power vacuum followed by the death of J. B. Tito in 1980, who was the strongest singular integrative factor that kept Yugoslav nations together, helped secessionists to play the national card by emphasizing differences between nations. The strategy was provocation and dramatization of ethnic conflicts with the aim to find external rather than internal solutions, including military one 12. The result was inescapable, and the second Yugoslavia disintegrated. After disintegration of the former country, Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina 11 From formation of the second Yugoslavia (J. B. Tito, Boris Kidric, Edvard Kardelj, Vladimir Bakaric, etc.), throughout post-tito period (Milka Planinc, Stane Dolanc, Janez Vrhovec, Milan Kucan, etc.) and, finally, until the period of disintegration (the last prime minister Ante Markovic, the last president of Yugoslav presidency Stipe Mesic and the last minister of foreign affairs Budimir Loncar). 12 When Slovenes seceded from Yugoslavia, their leader D. Rupel declared in Nationalities Papers, 51-9: in order for Slovenia to become democratic and European country, Yugoslavia needed to be ruthlessly destroyed.

10 Geopolitics 207 received international recognition. Also, the third Yugoslavia (reduced to the union of Serbia and Montenegro) was constituted as the successor of second Yugoslavia. It accounted for smaller part of the territory and population of the former country. The last release of South Slavic nations could not survive in the same geopolitical context that influenced the disintegration of the second Yugoslavia. Contrary to the previous disintegrations, the disintegration of the third Yugoslavia in 2006 was still peaceful. Economic disparities In the second Yugoslavia, there were great differences in economic performance and welfare state elements, like education and health care, between entities. Table 4-1 shows characteristic data before the disintegration of the second Yugoslavia started. The differences in some extreme values are as follows. GNP per capita in Slovenia was 2-fold of the Yugoslav average, while GNP per capita in Kosovo was only 0.2 of the Yugoslav average. Unemployment rate in Slovenia was 5.2%, while unemployment rate in Kosovo was 38.8%. Availability of physicians as an indicator of welfare state in Slovenia was 3-fold of Kosovo. At the same time, natural rate of population growth in Kosovo was 23.1 per mille. The same indicator for Serbia was 1.4 per mille (in Vojvodina -1.6 per mille). Despite the intention, the second Yugoslavia was not effective in closing the gap in development between republics. Some attention was paid to the financing of faster development of less development entities, particularly the province of Kosovo. Notwithstanding significant redistribution of income, the correction policy was ineffective. Namely, marginal product of investment did not improve significantly. A complementary indication is relatively small difference in the technical coefficient, the value of social capital available to the worker. Difference between Slovenia and Kosovo was only 0.5-fold. The average annual growth rate of employment was more differentiated in favor of underdeveloped entities (2.4% in Slovenia and 4.9% in Kosovo) for similar average annual growth (3.6% in Slovenia and 3.1% in Kosovo). Moreover, the correction policy caused frustration in more developed regions (particularly Slovenia and Croatia) and was going to be counterproductive in