Congressmen, Constituents, and Contributors

Transcription

1 Congressmen, Constituents, and Contributors

2 STUDIES IN PUBLIC CHOICE Gordon Tullock, Editor Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Other volumes in the series: James M. Buchanan and Richard E. Wagner, Fiscal Responsibility in Constitutional Democracy, 1978 Richard B. McKenzie, The Political Economy oj the Educational Process, 1979 Richard D. Auster and Morris Silver, The State as a Firm, 1979 This series, like the journal Public Choice, is devoted to an important aspect of the interaction between the disciplines of economics and political science: the application of economic methods of analysis to matters that have traditionally been political. The objective of these publications is to further the growth of knowledge in this intersection of the social sciences.

3 Congressmen, Constituents, and Contributors Determinants of Roll Call Voting in the House of Representatives JAMESB. KAU PAULH. RUBIN The University of Georgia WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM R. CARTER HILL DONALD C. KEENAN SPRlNGER -SCIENCE+ BUSINESS MEDIA, B. V.

4 Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Kau, James B. Congressmen, constituents, and contributors. (Studies in public choice; #4) Includes index. 1. United States. Congress. House-Voting. 2. Elections-United States-Campaign funds. I. Rubin, Paul H. II. Title. III. Series. JK1319.K ' ISBN ISBN (ebook) DOI / Copyright 1982 by Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht Originally published by Martinus Nijhoff Publishers in 1982 Softcover reprint ofthe hardcover Ist edition 1982 No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means without written permis sion from the publisher.

5 CONTENTS Acknowledgments ix Introduction 1 I THEORY 1 The Problem: Economic Analysis and the Rise of New Regulation 9 Theories of Economic Regulation 10 Economic Analysis and the New Regulation 13 2 Ideology: An Explanation for Public Policy Making 21 Schumpeter's Theory 23 Stigler's Theory 24 The Theory of Class Interest 25 The Role of Information in Policy Making 27 Notes 30 v

6 vi CONTENTS 3 Roll Call Voting by Congress 31 Distinctions between Political Science and Economic Analyses 31 A General Equilibrium Model of Congressional Voting 35 II EVIDENCE 4 Public Interest Lobbies 45 Determinants of Membership in Public Interest Lobbies 46 Influence of Public Interest Lobbies 49 Appendix 53 Notes 54 5 Voting on Minimum Wages 55 Notes 61 6 Ideology and Logrolling 63 Determinants of Ratings 63 Analysis of Votes: Logit Model 66 Analysis of Votes: Conditional Probability Model 76 Notes 81 7 Empirical Estimation of the General Equilibrium Model 83 Data and Empirical Specification 83 Empirical Results 87 Relations between Laws and Interest Groups 93 Voting on Urban Bills 94 Notes 101 III CONTRIBUTIONS 8 A Comparison of the 1972 and 1978 Elections: Role of the P ACs 105 The Federal Election Campaign Act 105 The 1972 Election 107

7 CONTENTS vii 9 Some Additional Effects of Contributions 10 Conclusions and Implications Conclusions Implications for Future Research Appendix: Analysis of Econometric Models with Qualitative Dependent Variables 125 References 145 Index 151

8 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This book represents the culmination of a research effort that went on for several years. Over that time many people had helpful comments on this research. Not all of these people agreed with all of the results. We would, however, like to thank them in any case. Those who have helped with their comments are: Y oram Barzel, Thomas Borcherding, Milton Friedman, William Landes, Robert McCormick, Douglas North, Chris Paul, George Stigler, Robert Tollison, Gordon Tullock, and Dean Worcester. Special thanks are due to Gordon Tullock, General Editor of this series, for suggesting the book. We would also like to thank the publishers of the Journal of Political Economy, the Journal of Law and Economics, and Public Choice for allowing us to reprint parts of articles from those journals. Chapter 3 was written in collaboration with Donald Keenan, and the econometric appendix was written by Carter Hill, who generally helped with the econometrics. Finally, the name order of the authors of the book is alphabetical; both authors contributed equally to the effort. ix