Operation OMID PANJ January 2011 Naweed Barikzai 1

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1 Operation OMID PANJ January 2011 Naweed Barikzai 1 With the passage of every day, as the security situation becomes more volatile in Afghanistan, international forces in coordination with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are all set to start a series of operations against the Taliban in southern provinces where the insurgency is most active. Thus, Helmand province is going to be the next stage of a major operation against the insurgency in the coming weeks and months. The recent, NATO-led forces commander in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus, had stated that the forces under his command had started the initial stage of a major operation which is concentrated on securing major roads and district surrounding the Helmand city. 2 The operation code named, OMID PANJ is a significant offensive operation, which takes the independence and self-sufficiency of British-trained Afghan forces to a new level. The object of this operation is to bring security and maintain law and order in the district, said Brig. Gen. Sheren Shah, commander, Afghan national Army 3/215 Brigade. The safety of local civilians is our highest priority. 3 Operation OMID PANJ takes things a step further than OMID CHAR, with Afghan soldiers relying less on British troops, who are present to observe and advise from the background. One of the key areas where significant development of Afghan capability is being demonstrated is their growing ability to find and render safe improvised explosive devices. 4 This operation is aimed at pushing back the Taliban 1 Naweed Barikzai is a research analyst at the Centre for Conflict & Peace Studies, Kabul, Afghanistan. 2 Peters, Tom. "Afghanistan: Offensive in Kandahar Underway." World Socialist Web Site. Web. 17 th Jan < 3 Ibid. 4 "Helmand Operation Brings Transition to Afghans a Step Closer." ISAF - International Security Assistance Force. Web. 17 th Jan <

2 from major population centres and extending government authority to those areas that are cleared of insurgents. It is regarded as the second phase of operation Mushtarak which was launched in mid-february 2010 and focused on clearing areas of Nad Ali and Lashkar Gah districts from Taliban domination. Although, it is not very clear how many forces would take part in this operation, a top U.S. administration official mentioned that this operation was going to be both complex and large scaled. It is speculated that the Operation OMID PANJ will be broadly similar to operation Mushtarak, launched in Helmand province. OMID is expected to be a slow endured mission as coalition forces will try to avoid using heavy weapons to prevent civilian casualties. However, looking at the density of the population, geo-strategic location of Kandahar and the porous border it shares with neighbouring Pakistan, such an operation will face impediments that will be very different from than the ones experienced in Helmand. Thus, the Afghan government should be fully prepared to deal with these new possible outcomes. As the New Year was celebrated around the world, Afghan National Army (ANA) troops were opening a new chapter which sets the scene for their future autonomy and long-term role in the defence of their nation against insurgency. Operation OMID PANJ follows on from the successful Operation OMID CHAR which, at the time, was the largest operation in terms of size, number of soldiers and duration to have been planned, led and conducted by the ANA. However, OMID PANJ takes things a step further, with the Afghans relying on even less support from British troops, who are present not to lead the fight but to observe and advise from the background. One of the key areas where significant development of Afghan capability is being demonstrated is their growing ability to find and render safe improvised explosive devices, the indiscriminate weapon of choice for the insurgency. Being conducted in the Green Zone, north of the Helmand River, the operation is pushing the Afghan Government's influence and security further out. By the time of its conclusion, it will see a new patrol base established east of Gereshk between the Helmand River and the Bandi Barq road. This rural area, filled with irrigation ditches, canals and small farm plots, interspersed with residential compounds, has suffered from significant insurgent intimidation due to its proximity to smuggling routes into Gereshk City. 5 5 Ibid.

3 Operation OMID PANJ was devised by the 3rd Brigade of 215 Maiwand Corps of the Afghan National Army (known as 3/215 Brigade) in response to a request from the Gereshk District Governor, Abdual Ahad, for them to tackle the problem zone. The operation, which will continue into January, started on 27 December 2010 and resulted in immediate positive effects, with insurgents fleeing from the area in the face of the threat from Afghan forces, and others detained or killed. Sufficient level of peace and security has already been achieved to enable shuras to be held with local elders in the main settlement of Noorzai. These have established a desire for local construction and development projects which the Afghan Government is now looking to support. Lieutenant Colonel David Eastman, spokesman for British forces in Afghanistan said, "Operation OMID PANJ is seeing Afghan soldiers use skills learnt from and developed by their British counterparts. British troops are there at the forefront of this operation but they are there simply to observe and advise - plus, quite frankly, to watch with pride as the Afghans they have trained demonstrate their formidable capability...from the very beginning of the planning stage, the Afghan National Army has made Operation OMID PANJ its own and thanks to the outstanding training they have received from British forces that they can do that. These Afghan troops are the men who will be responsible for safeguarding Afghanistan's security in the long term so there is no greater priority than their development." Operation OMID PANJ is an example of how far the Afghan National Army's counter-ied capability has progressed. ANA have proven that they are increasingly capable of taking over from the British and they are well on the way to receiving the lead for security to bring security and maintain law and order in the district. General Sherin Shah, Commander of 3/215 Brigade, said that, "The safety of local civilians is our highest priority. 6 However, this Operation is important for all Afghan people. The new patrol base will free the local people from the intimidation of the insurgents and the operation demonstrates the reputation of the Afghan National Army to the Helmand people as legitimate, professional, disciplined forces which have the power to beat the insurgency and bring peace. 6 Ibid.

4 However, on 6 th January 2011, Sher Mohammad Karimi, the Chief of Afghan Armed Forces, said that Pakistan is greatly involved in causing troubles inside Afghanistan. Mr. Karimi said It is obvious that our problems are connected to neighbours. If they had cooperated with us, we wouldn't have any problem. Our problems are from outside and we will continue with our peaceful policies. 7 Not only this, head of Kandahar national security department has claimed that Taliban operatives are currently undergoing training in Balochistan and Chaman of Pakistan and the Taliban are preparing for a new string of attacks after the winter season. 8 Perhaps, this new blame-game marks the end of the short détente in Afghan-Pak relations, which was evident during the visit of Pak Prime Minister Yusuf Reza Gilani s visit to Kabul in early December During that visit, Afghan President Hamid Karzai even went on the record to give a clean-chit to Pakistan regarding the presence of Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan. 9 Recent reports shows that this Operation Omid Panj has resulted in immediate positive effects with insurgents fleeing from the area in the face of the threat from Afghan forces and others detained or killed. 10 But the biggest problem is that once these operations stop, the insurgents always come back. So, unless their source could be permanently destroyed, it is highly unlikely that any permanent solution is possible. Perhaps, it is due to these considerations that the Chief of Armed Forces blamed Pakistan. Pakistan has long been under intense international pressure to take genuine actions against insurgents inside its boundary; an allegation which Pakistan rubbishes. Pakistan claims that it is the biggest victim of terrorism and that it is losing troops and civilians to terrorism on a daily basis. There is, however, a general consensus in the international community that Pakistan differentiates between militants which attack Pakistan with those which operates in foreign soils like Afghanistan and India and that, Pakistan is at least, somewhat sympathetic to the later group of militants. Pakistan's approach to Afghanistan can be boiled down to two words: strategic depth 11, the holy grail of the nation's strategic policy. Attainment of strategic depth in Afghanistan has been the prime policy of Pakistan s Afghan policy since the days of General Zia ul Haq. 12 And so, initially it was Gulbuddin Hekmtyar and later the Taliban and the Haqqani network are used as instruments of this attainment. Therefore, unless the Pakistani policy makers and especially its military are convinced that: a) strategic depth in Afghanistan is nothing 7 ToloNews Military Officials Blame Pakistan on Afghan Crisis, 6 th January, Ibid. 9 Daily Times Pakistan in Kabul, 9 th December, Ibid. 11 The military concept of strategic depth refers to the distance between actual or potential frontlines and key centres of population, logistics and industrial and military production. Having such depth allows a country to withstand initial offensives and enables it to regroup to mount a counter-offensive. 12 Ahmed, Eqbal A mirage mis-named strategic depth, Al-Ahram Weekly Online, 27 th Aug 2 Sep, 1998.

5 but a hallucination b) can never be achieved c) even if achieved the costs in economic, military and political terms shall far outweigh its gains Pakistan will continue to support those elements which destabilise Afghanistan. And no amount of aid or military hardware or increased drone attacks inside Pakistani borders can help in changing that Pakistani attitude unless that core concept of strategic depth is addressed. So, instead of blaming Pakistan what is most important is trying to address its various security and political concerns vis-a-vis Afghanistan and then figure out acceptable solutions to them. Copyright 2011