CAPITALISM FOR THE FEW FREEZES TRANSITION AND IMPEDES CAPITALISM FOR ALL

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1 CAPITALISM FOR THE FEW FREEZES TRANSITION AND IMPEDES CAPITALISM FOR ALL OLEH HAVRYLYSHYN CERES, University of Toronto and IMF PRESENTATION TO POLITICAL ECONOMY RESEARCH GROUP UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO, FEB 19,2007 The author is on special leave from the International Monetary Fund, and the views presented here are his alone and do not represent in any way those of the IMF or its Board of Directors. II 1

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3 I: TYPES OF STATES OUTLINE II: TRANSITION OUTCOMES AFTER 15 YEARS III:EVOLUTION OF OLIGARCHS AND STATE CAPTURE IV:RECAPTURING STATES AND COLOUR REVOLUTIONS V: CONCLUSIONS I 3

4 I:TYPES OF STATES DEVELOPMENTAL State promotes business with rule-of-law environment, but regulates monopoly, fraud, commercial disputes PREDATORY- State provides framework of lawsregulations, but is dominant and may decide arbitrarily to prohibit, usurp assets, establish own business CAPTURED STATE- relatively new category ; state can act in predatory fashion, but under control of an oligarch clique which is not subject to predation by state, to the contrary directs state predation upon rest of economy II 4

5 II.OUTCOMES OF TRANSITION EARLY EXPECTATIONS, DEBATES PROGRESS TOWARDS MARKET DEMOCRATIZATION SOCIAL IMPACTS POST-COMMUNIST REGIMES II 5

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7 BIG-BANG vs. GRADUALISM DEBATE Gradual reforms: allow time to create new industries and jobs as old eliminated, put in place ROL institutions;this reduces social cost Big-Bang: change incentives, close rent-seeking opportunities and lobbying by Red Directors, prevent reform opponents delaying process for own interests. Institutions follow more slowly I 7

8 DEMOCRACY VS MARKET REFORM DEBATE Przeworski INCOMPATIBLE: market reforms cause pain,democratic elections bring back renamed communist parties,reforms reversed. Balcerowicz COMPLEMENTARY : early democratization gives historical opportunity to move from communism to full liberalism of markets and polity. (Bunce calls this Dual Liberal Vision ) I 8

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10 EBRD TRANSITION PROGRESS INDICATOR 2004 CE BALT SEE CISM CISL Chart 2.1 EBRD TRANSITION PROGRESS INDICATOR 2004 Series1 II 10 HUN CZECH POL SVK CRO SVN EST LVA LITH BUL ROM MAC ALB BiH S&M KYR ARM GEO RUS KAZ UKR MOL AZE TAJ UZB BEL TURK COUNTRY BY GROUP TPI VALUE

11 DEMOCRACY AND MARKET LIBERALIZATION 0.8 Figure 2.2: Constitutional liberalism and progress in transition 0.7 SVN HUN EST Constitutional Liberalism, TKM BLR UZB TJK YUG BIH AZE MDA KAZ UKR RUS ALB LTV, LTU ROM MKD KGZ GEO ARM BGR, HRV POL,SVK CZE y = x R 2 = Transition Progress Indicator, 2004 II 11

12 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDICATOR (UNDP: Highest Value Norway=0.944; Lowest Value Sierra Leone=0.275) Country groups: EBRD rank Central Europe (Change from 1990) (+.006).845 (+.030).864 (+.049) Baltic (Change from 1990) (-.033).822 (+.010).847 (+.035) SEE (Change from 1990) (-.003).772 (+.020).793 (+.041) CISM (Change from 1990) (-.051).737 (-.035).730 (-.042) CISL (Change from 1990) (-.024).760 (-.007).739 (-.028) CONCLUSION:GRADUAL REFORM CAUSES MORE PAIN Memo Item Ukraine (Change from 1990) (-.050).748 (-.047).766 (-.029) II 12

13 REGIME TYPES: 15 yrs. Later Liberal societies with capitalism for all, open markets (CE, BALT [Bul, Cr,Ro-marginal]) Still-undetermined polities but progressing. (other SEE) Oligarch societies, with capitalism for the few non-competitive markets (most CISM) Unreformed polities, still very soviet-like (CISL) II 13

14 State Capture Index, 1999 Hungary 0.10 Armenia 0.11 Poland 0.17 Georgia 0.34 Czech Republic 0.16 Kazakhstan 0.18 Slovakia 0.34 Russia 0.45 Croatia 0.43 Kyrgyz Republic 0.41 Central Europe 0.20 Moldova Ukraine Azerbaijan Tajikistan Estonia 0.14 Latvia (0.22) Lithuania 0.17 CISM 0.38 Baltics 0.18 Uzbekistan Belarus Bulgaria 0.40 Turkmenistan -- Romania 0.30 Macedonia (0.35) CISL 0.10 Albania (0.35) Bosnia- (0.40) Herzegovina Serbia- (0.50) Montenegro South-East Europe 0.35 (0.38) Source: Author s calculations averaging two concepts of state capture, pervasiveness and concentration, as reported in Figure 3 of Hellmann and Schankermann (2000). For bracketed cases, no values are reported in the 1999 study; 1999 values are pro-rated using a 2003 World Bank study of crony bias (a related but different concept), Hellmann and Kaufmann (2002)), Chart 2. III 14

15 Concentration of Forbes Billionaires No. of Billionaires 2006 % of Billionaires % of World GDP 2005 Ratio of % of Billionaires to World GDP %Bill> %GDP Kazakhstan Russia Ukraine USA Sweden Germany Canada %Bill<%GDP Poland Mexico UK Spain France II 15

16 III: EVOLUTION OF OLIGARCHS: THE NAVIGATION MODEL -Uncharted waters: Debate and delay cause slow and partial reforms, postpone adjustment -Pirate raids: Rent-seeking stronger if reforms are slow and partial, capital accumulation rapid, concentration into oligarch power -Safe havens: integration in global institutions disciplines reform and ensures steady progress; most powerful was EU membership III 16

17 VICIOUS CIRCLE OF DELAYED REFORM AND OLIGARCHIC DEVELOPMENT Captures State Policy For Self-Interest Against Competition, Prefer Status-Quo, Prefer Non-transparent Procedures Oligarchy Develops Fear EU Membership Discipline START Creates Rent-Seeking Opportunities / Old Elite Revived Delayed Reform New Entrants SME s Face Difficulties Weak Rule-of-Law Weak Support for EU Membership EU Membership Offer (Weak) EU Membership Desire (Weak) III 17

18 State Capture Higher the Longer Delay in Stabilization Figure 6.4: State capture and delay in stabilization AZE MDA State Capture Index, SVK CZE HUN ALB POL LTU EST SVN HRV KGZ MKD KAZ RUS BGR GEO ARM ROM UKR y = x R 2 = III 18 Months to 5% / Month Inflation

19 State Capture Lower the More Rapid Reforms Figure 6.5: State capture and delay in reform progress AZE MDA 0.5 UKR RUS State Capture Index, ALB BGR MKD ROM ARM GEO HRV KAZ KGZ SVN y = x R 2 = SVK CZE POL, LTU EST HUN Transition Progress Indicator after 4 years III 19

20 OLIGARCHS, MINI-GARCHS AND LOBBYISTS Important to define terms here-oligarch not simply= capitalism private ownership Lobbyists:capitalists who try to influence govt laws to favour their firm/industry ( Iacocca, Can. auto industry, Bombardier) Oligarchs: capitalists with enough power to capture state, determine election results, broad policy lines ; no demarcation possible, but $ Bil+ seems minimum Mini-garchs: those big enough to aspire to oligarchy II 20

21 RENT-SEEKING,GRAND CORRUPTION AND PETTY CORRUPTION Rent seeking: lobby for gov. privileges ( e.g:export license,subsidised energy ) to increase profits -the extra profits from lobbying =rents Grand Corruption: large scale bribing of high-level officials by rent-seekers; includes major campaign funding for friendly politicians the domain of oligarchs and mini-garchs Petty Corruption: small bribes to police, health inspectors, tax inspectors the domain of individuals, SME s IN A CAPTURED STATE ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGNS FOCUS ON PETTY CORRUPTION II 21

22 IV: RECAPTURING STATES BB v. GRAD debate is history; new debate is : Transition Inevitable (TI) vs. Transition Frozen (TF) TI argument: high degree of ownership eventually leads even oligarchs to seek security of property rights [Coase Theorem: in market any demand, including for institutions, will generate supply: Schleifer (1995) Aslund (1997) (Buiter (2000), Yesterday s thief is the staunchest defender of property rights ] TF counter argument: as long as rents and privileges from nontransparent lobbying exceed value of equal property rights for all, oligarchs prefer status quo [Havrylyshyn (1995); Hellman (1998); Polischuk & Savateev (2004); Sonin (2003) Havrylyshyn(2006)] IV 22

23 State Capture Leads to Frozen Transition Figure 8.1: State capture leads to frozen transition 4.5 Transition Progress Indicator, SVN HUN EST CZE POL SVK LTU HRV ARM KAZ ROM GEO BGR KGZ MKD RUS ALB BIH UKR y = x R 2 = YUG MDA AZE State Capture Index, 1999 IV 23

24 CAPITALIST ELITES IN HISTORY Rent-seeking and Oligarch resistance to liberalism not unique to Post-Communist economies; Elite Entrenchment = Resistance to liberal markets (see article by Morck et al, Journ.of.Econ.Lit., September 2005). Elite, or Incumbent Capitalist lobbies against competition (e.g. Glass-Steagall Act.,1934, USA: see Rajan and Zingales (2003) Saving Capitalism from Capitalists. Successful Rent-Seeking rewarded by shareholders: Lee Iacocca of Chrysler and US quotas on Japanese automobiles NEVERTHELESS post-communist degree and speed of oligarch creation very different and unique in history. Oligarchs NOT equivalent to US Robber Barons or Chaebol in Korea. IV 24

25 REDUCING POWER OF OLIGARCHS Create open and environment for small business, level playing field Transparent and equal application of tax licensing, tender, other government actions. Very judicious use of re-privatization,1-2 cases to signal new transparency-and only if clean legal case made. IV 25

26 COLOUR REVOLUTIONS Reflects view of the demos ( ENOUGH Mc Faul ) Shows the demos can be very powerful; does this suffice to change oligarchs? History clearly shows entrenched elites do not give up power easily (see: Morck et.al. 2005) Frozen transition arguments and evidence, suggest similar entrenchment taking place e.g. Ukraine: bitter fight of Dec.04 election ; Mar. 06 results suggest elites not giving up (Wilson-2006) II 26

27 V:CONCLUSIONS Early start and rapid resolute reforms prevented extensive rent-seeking,oligarchy,state capture Social costs lower with rapid reforms, contrary to theory of gradualism: WHY? Connected to first conclusion In post-communist episode,liberal market and liberal democracy mutually reinforcing,not in conflict ( differs from evidence in devg countries) The key misunderstanding : Invisible Hand needs both private property and market competition II 27

28 Addendum: OLIGARCHS UKRAINE &RUSSIA SIMILARITIES Generally insiders but not top nomenklatura. First wealth accumulation based on rents available under partial/delayed reforms. Bulk of eventual wealth from state asset transfer not new-value creation until Privatization via special privileges may be morally unjust, but generally legal : insider advance info or special legal rules for auctions. II 28

29 OLIGARCHS UKRAINE & RUSSIA DIFFERENCES Russia privatization early late in Ukr but outcome same (cf,poland late but full reforms thus avoid state capture) Ukr. Probably even less transparent(loans-forshares very insider but visible to all) Russia younger, non-politician insiders Ukr. More regionally based ( clans ) II 29

30 STATE-BUSINESS RELATIONS RUSSIA AND UKRAINE RUSSIA; BIG BUSINESS ALLOWED EVEN ENCOURAGED, BUT STATE HAS FINAL WORD (e.g.-controlling SHARES OF STATE IN ENERGY SECTOR; BUSINESS KEEPS OUT OF PUBLIC POLITICS, EXPLICIT ROLE IN GOVERNMENT,AVOIDS SUPPORTING OPPOSITION) : COHABITATION OF PREDATORY STATE AND CO-OPERATIVE OLIGARCHS? UKRAINE: BIG BUSINESS ALLOWED AND ENCOURAGED AND EFFECTIVELY CAPTURED STATE ( e.g NO PERMANENT RENATIONALIZATION, PRIVATIZATION CONTINUES, MOST OLIGARCHS OPENLY INVOLVED IN POLITICS, PARLIAMENT, GOVERNMENT POSITIONS) COMPARISON : IS THIS A DISTINCTION WITHOUT A DIFFERENCE? II 30