國立中山大學中國與亞太區域研究所 碩士論文 中國的國家核心利益 四個案分析

Transcription

1 國立中山大學中國與亞太區域研究所 碩士論文 Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies National Sun Yat-sen University Master Thesis 中國的國家核心利益 四個案分析 China s Core National Interests: A Study of Four Cases 研 究 生 彭妮 Nicola C. Polidor 指導教授 林文程博士 Dr. Wen-cheng Lin 中華民國 107 年 6 月 June 2018

2 Thesis Validation Letter i

3 Acknowledgements I am deeply grateful for my advisor, Professor Wen-cheng Lin, and his guidance throughout writing this thesis. His advice and mentorship during the development of my thesis was invaluable to my progress. Additionally, I would like to thank National Sun Yat-sen University, the Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies, the Institute of Political Science, and its professors and staff for their welcoming grace to this foreign student and continuous support in completing this master s degree. I would also like to recognize the Olmsted Foundation and its vision to globally educate military officers of the United States. Without the opportunities afforded to me through this program, I would not have had the privilege of learning about Taiwan s society and immersing my family and myself into Taiwan s culture. Without doubt, this experience has made me a better person and I will endeavor to pass on my experiences and knowledge as a future leader in my military community. Finally, I would like to thank my husband and children, whose love and encouragement throughout our time in Taiwan has made this experience so wonderful. Balancing this academic endeavor with our family life would not have been possible without your dedication and support. ii

4 摘要 中國是否會在南海發起戰爭 為了探討這個問題 多專家學者嘗試由中國政 府的立場分析 尋求和平解決中國在南海領土爭端 找出避免戰爭產生的方法 由國家利益的角度 分析及預測國家行為是可行的方法之一 中國對其核心利益 的立場 攸關其如何執行其國內外政策 外交 經濟和軍事行動 本文從政治和 外交政策 社會經濟因素和軍事力量等三個面相 分析中國核心利益的概念 探 討有關中國捍衛台灣 西藏 新疆與南海主權的核心利益概念 本文的目在於重 新檢視當前中國對核心利益的定義 並理解中國對於解決主權爭議的實際意圖 本文就政治 社會經濟與軍事等面向分析後得出的結論是 中國將南海視為重要 的核心利益 由此而論 當各國領導人和決策者在處理與中國的領土爭議時 就 能夠採取更好的應對措施 透過外交手段的和平方式 解決彼此之間的衝突 關鍵詞 國家核心利益 中國 台灣 西藏 新疆 南海 領土主權 iii

5 Abstract Will the People s Republic of China end up at war over the South China Sea? Diplomats, advisors, and scholars are working tirelessly to analyze the Chinese government s vision, perspective, and policies regarding this issue to find a peaceful solution to the territorial disputes. One way to analyze and predict what a country may do is to evaluate its national interests. The PRC s position on its core national interests signals how it conducts its domestic and foreign policy, and its diplomatic, economic, and military actions are directly related to these interests. This thesis analyzes the concept of China s core national interests from three perspectives: political and diplomatic policies, socio-economic factors, and military use of force. This research accomplishes this endeavor by presenting an analysis of China s core national interests and comparing case studies of four territories: Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, and the South China Sea. The purpose of this thesis is to refine the existing definition of a core national interest and acquire a holistic understanding of China s intent and resolve regarding its sovereign rights in these specific regions. This study concludes that from all three perspectives, China considers all four territories, including the South China Sea, core national interests. With this in mind, world leaders and policymakers might better predict China s ultimate goals in the region and the steps it is willing to take to achieve them. Then in turn, they might also better orchestrate the delicate diplomatic interactions necessary to maintain peace throughout this conflict resolution process. Keywords: core national interests, China, Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, South China Sea, territorial sovereignty. iv

6 Disclaimer: The terms Taiwan and the Republic of China are used interchangeably throughout this thesis. Their use intends to reference the controlling government over the islands of Taiwan, Kinmen, Matsu, and Penghu since The terms China and the People s Republic of China are used interchangeably throughout this thesis to reference the mainland territory s controlling government. The specific use of these terms is not intended to comment on the political situation regarding these territories. v

7 Table of Contents Thesis Validation Letter... i Acknowledgements... ii 摘要... iii Abstract... iv Chapter 1: Introduction Background and Motives Purpose Literature Review Research Methodology Approach and Limitations Chapter Arrangement Chapter 2: Core National Interests An Examination of the Concept Historical and Theoretical Context A Modern Analysis Chapter 3: Taiwan Political and Diplomatic Policy Socio-economic Factors Use of Force Conclusion Chapter 4: Tibet Political and Diplomatic Policy Socio-economic Factors Use of Force Conclusion Chapter 5: Xinjiang Political and Diplomatic Policy Socio-economic Factors Use of Force Conclusion Chapter 6: South China Sea vi

8 6.1 Political and Diplomatic Policy Socio-economic Factors Use of Force Conclusion Chapter 7: Conclusion Research Findings Areas for Further Research References vii

9 Table of Figures Figure 2.1: Number of People s Daily Articles Referencing Core Interests Figure 3.1: March 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis Map Figure 6.1: Territorial Claims to the South and East China Sea Islands Figure 6.2: Eleven-dash line, Nine-dash line, Ten-dash line Maps Figure 6.3: Overlapping Chinese and Vietnamese Oil Company Blocks Figure 6.4: Fiery Cross Reef Militarization Development viii

10 Chapter 1: Introduction 1.1 Background and Motives Will the United States and China end up at war over the South China Sea? This is the ultimate question to which world leaders and citizens of the world seek an answer. The subsequent question is how can we avoid it? Diplomats, advisors, and scholars are working tirelessly to analyze the Chinese government s vision, perspective, and policies regarding this issue to find a peaceful solution to the territorial disputes. One way to analyze and predict what a country may do is to evaluate its national interests. Just as the United States acts in its own national interests, so does China, and Beijing s statement on its core national interests signals how it conducts its domestic and foreign policy. China is firm in upholding its core interests which include the following: state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and national reunification, China s political system established by the Constitution and overall social stability, and the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development. Beijing s official statement on core national interests1 China s diplomatic, economic, and military actions are directly related to its core national interests. Analyzing the PRC s conduct surrounding specific controversial territories can shed light on the connection between its position on core national interests and actionable domestic and foreign policy. Historically, the regions of Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang have been foundationally affected by this fact and China s impact on these territories is related to its motivation and capability to direct such influence. 1 People s Republic of China, China s Peaceful Development, State Council, September 6, 2011, < 1

11 The first region, Taiwan, has always been at the forefront of the international stage because of the United States commitment to its defense. Due to Taiwan s controversial political status, it is a perfect case in which to analyze the PRC s conduct surrounding it. In 1949, Mao Zedong and his communist party defeated Chiang Kaishek and the Nationalists, who then fled to the island of Taiwan.2 Since this time, Taiwan, under the controlling government of the Republic of China, has existed with some degree of separation and autonomy from the Chinese Communist Party. However, ever since the end of the civil war, the PRC has never ceased its quest for complete reunification of Taiwan with the mainland, and to be fully controlled under the communist party s rule. In 1993, the PRC released a white paper describing its position concerning the territory of Taiwan explaining that the region is an inalienable part of China. The CCP further expressed its intentions for eventual reintegration by stating that the One-China Principle is the basis and prerequisite for achieving peaceful reunification.3 The clear magnitude to China s interests renders Taiwan a significant case study for this thesis. The autonomous region of Tibet is a second territory of Chinese concern that is rife with controversy spanning back many centuries, hosting a variety of dynasties, lordships, principalities, and tribal groups having a part in its administration. The Dalai Lama plays a crucial role in the governance of the Tibetan people and this figurehead is viewed as the spiritual leader of the Tibetan Buddhists.4 In 1951, Mao officially 2 Mao Zedong, The Chinese People Have Stood Up!, trans., UCLA Center for East Asian Studies, September 21, 1949, < 921.htm>. 3 People s Republic of China, White Paper The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue, Embassy of the PRC in the USA, August 6, 1993, < 4 Central Tibetan Administration, Charter of the Tibetans In Exile, retrieved September 6, 2017, < 2

12 incorporated Tibet into the PRC under the control of his communist party.5 In 1959, the 14th Dalai Lama was exiled to India where he currently oversees the Tibetan political situation via the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) organization.6 Today, the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) functions with a province-level government that is officially subordinate to the CCP. The Chinese government publically states that any interference in the ruling of the Tibet region by the Dalai Lama or his religious-driven organization is illegal and in direct conflict with China s sovereign rights.7 Similar to Taiwan, Tibet is another territory of great importance to China and one that should be analyzed to gain insight into Chinese intentions and policies. The Xinjiang province is a third territory that has historically garnered controversy regarding the sovereign rights of China. Like Tibet, the history of the Xinjiang region includes a host of varied rulers and due to the multitude of ethnic groups within its borders, governance over its people has, and still proves to be, complicated and contentious. In 1955, the CCP declared this territory the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region officiated by a provincial-level government and ultimately subordinate to Mao s rule. Since its official incorporation into the PRC, the Xinjiang people still experience ethnic and governmental strife in their quest for independence. Despite Uyghur claims of ethnic and religious oppression and persecution and their continued separatist movements, the PRC is publically committed to the preservation and unification of the Chinese state, to include the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.8 5 A. Tom Grunfeld, The Making of Modern Tibet (Armonk, New York: An East Gate Book, 1996), pg Central Tibetan Administration, Charter of the Tibetans In Exile. 7 People s Republic of China, Tibet s Path of Development is Driven by an Irresistible Historical Tide, State Council White Paper, April 2015, < 8 People s Republic of China, Historical Witness to Ethnic Equality, Unity and Development in Xinjiang, State Council White Paper, September 24, 2015, < 3

13 These three regions are publically acknowledged as core national interests to the Chinese government. Historical analysis of China s conduct in these three territories gives insight into the lengths it is willing to go to achieve its goals, the capabilities it has to accomplish them, and the value it places on each. With this in mind, the same logical evaluation can be made in the analysis of the SCS (South China Sea):9 by evaluating China s endeavors in the SCS and comparing them to its conduct in the other three territories, a determination can be made as to whether the PRC also deems this region a core national interest. If China holds the SCS in this high regard, based on historical context, the world should be able to predict behavior in China s attempts to secure it. If the SCS is not considered part of its core national interests, world leaders could expect categorically different conduct from Beijing regarding the territory. This insight can be helpful to policymakers regarding further action in the region and a peaceful resolution to these disputes. 1.2 Purpose Since the establishment of the PRC, world leaders have engaged in careful diplomacy with China regarding territorial reunification, human rights, and sovereign claims. The Taiwan, Tibetan, and Xinjiang regions specifically invoke the concept of a core national interest to China. The value China places on these core interests is significant to global leaders and dictates the types of diplomacy in which politicians engage. More recently, they have observed China s military modernization over the past 20 years and they are now witnessing an ever-growing Chinese focus on and around the disputed islands of the SCS. The international community is currently, and has been for the past 10 years, poised and ready to react to Chinese action in the South 9 In this thesis, the use of the term South China Sea is a general one intended to imply all contentious regions in the vicinity, including the East China Sea. 4

14 and East China Seas. China s behavior in this region has far-reaching effects on the politics, diplomacy, militaries, and economies of both neighboring and extra-region nations. Interest in conflict resolution for scholars, advisors, and politicians alike is growing with no signs of abating. A peaceful outcome of this dispute is the top priority for leading governments involved and, as such, a thorough understanding of China s perspective is paramount to making sound decisions for action. Current scholarship investigates and comments on the status of Chinese public declarations and its position regarding the SCS. Studies also address the implication and impact such a declaration would have on superpower dynamics. However, the two concepts, core interests and measurable action in the SCS, have yet to be concretely linked together. This thesis aims to add to the scholarship and draw new ties surrounding this area of research. In order to acquire a holistic understanding of China s intent and resolve regarding territorial sovereignty, this paper presents an analysis of China s core national interests and a thorough examination and comparison of the politics surrounding the aforementioned regions. Firstly, in order to comprehend China s perspective, this paper examines its concept and definition of a core national interest. Secondly, this thesis conducts a systematic historical evaluation of China s conduct regarding disputed territories, specifically Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Analysis of claimed core national interests juxtaposed with historical evidence illuminates China s intentions, goals, capabilities, and resolve regarding these regions. Finally, this paper examines the PRC s conduct surrounding the SCS. The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate China s sovereign territories, present an historical assessment, and compare China s actions regarding its core interests, Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, to its actions in the SCS. By applying the same criteria upon which China bases and classifies its core national interests for the other three territories, and pairing that with an evaluation of its actions 5

15 regarding the SCS, a deeper and clearer understanding of China s goals and resolve can be attained regarding this crucial region. With this in mind, world leaders and policymakers might better predict China s ultimate goals in the region and the steps it is willing to take to achieve them. Then in turn, they might also better orchestrate the delicate interactions necessary to maintain peace throughout this conflict resolution process. 1.3 Literature Review The term core interest has become a buzzword in the international arena when discussing issues affecting China and its rise in power. How China describes its areas of concern has political impacts on leading nations around the world and the evolving concept of the Chinese core national interest now has far-reaching diplomatic significance. As such, research and analysis on the use of the term core interest has become a valuable field of study with the worldwide-understood implication that China s diplomatic, economic, and military action is now deeply tied to its official and public use of the phrase. Michael Swaine is a China and East Asian security studies expert, having served as a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and chairman of the Center for Asia-Pacific Policy at the RAND Corporation. He leads the U.S.China Crisis Management Program with the China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies to conduct research for several joint studies and conferences.10 One of his works evaluates China s growing assertive behavior in an article published in the China Leadership Monitor in The article is written in four separate publications, each addressing a specific topic within the overall analysis. The intent of the article is 10 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Michael D. Swaine, retrieved September 8, 2017, < 6

16 to assess whether, to what extent, and in what manner, the Chinese government is becoming more assertive in several major areas of relevance to the United States. 11 Firstly, Swaine examines the concept of a core interest and China s increasing promotion of the term; secondly, he investigates U.S. political and military behavior along China s maritime periphery. The last two parts of his research focus on the role of the Chinese military in foreign policy and foreign crises. The first two articles are relevant to this paper s research as they directly address both the concept of a core national interest, as well as China s actions in the SCS. In part one, Swaine unpacks the origin of the term core interest, its development, and the significance that it holds in Chinese diplomatic policy. As motivation, he explains the growing interpretation that China s use of the term indicates increasing PRC assertiveness. Swaine first cites historical record in order to define the concept of a core interest and analyzes its use over the course of history, beginning with its first public reference in the 1990s. He asserts that the term was closely associated with fundamental interests as applied to China s [domestic] economic- and socialreform policies.12 Swaine continues to examine the phrase s evolution and frequency of usage by various Chinese government officials. Mention of the term in reference to sovereignty, territorial issues, and national security increased significantly in the 2000s and became an important element of PRC diplomacy. 13 Most notably for foreign powers, public use of the term began to carry an association with a rigid, uncompromising diplomatic or military stance, 14 especially regarding the controversy of Taiwan. With its use of the phrase, the Chinese government expects the United States and other countries to respect its position on certain issues, allowing no room for 11 Michael D. Swaine, China s Assertive Behavior-Part One: On Core Interests, China Leadership Monitor, No. 34, February 22, 2011, pp Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 7

17 negotiation. Swaine s final analysis of the evolution of the term core interest, and its more frequent and suggestive connotation, concludes with the possibility that China could be expanding and refining the scope of its definition to include more contentious issues, which would pose a significant challenge to U.S. (and Chinese) efforts to maintain a stable and mutually productive bilateral relationship. 15 Not only is this concept directly applicable to the Taiwan, Tibetan, and Xinjiang regions, but also most recently this could apply to the SCS and China s action in that region. As such, it is vitally important to continue to analyze the impact that the term core interest has on the international stage. Taiwan can be viewed as the most significant territorial core national interest to China. With its controversy rooted in the civil war, its historical import drives the resolve that the PRC has in its quest for reunification. It has long been understood that China considers Taiwan part of its territorial integrity, one of its core national interests, and ultimately seeks reintegration with the island, use of force being an available option with which to accomplish such a task. Analysis of the evolution of the One China Principle reveals an ebb and flow of the manner in which the PRC conducts its foreign policy regarding Taiwan, beginning with a hardline stance stressing national identity, developing into a more conciliatory position, and moving back towards underlining the importance of sovereignty. Dean Chen, associate professor of Political Science at Ramapo College of New Jersey, analyzed China s behavior over the last 20 years in his article, Constructing Peaceful Development: The Changing Interpretations of One China and Beijing s Taiwan Strait Policy. 16 He attributes economic development, Taiwanese identity, international pressure, the global order, domestic issues, and an evolving interpretation of the One-China Principle to shaping the policy towards 15 Swaine, China s Assertive Behavior-Part One: On Core Interests, pp Dean P. Chen, Constructing Peaceful Development: The Changing Interpretations of One China and Beijing s Taiwan Strait Policy, Asian Security, Vol. 10, No. 1, March 11, 2014, pp

18 Taiwan throughout history. Most recently, he cites Xi Jinping s assertive rhetoric during his 19th Party Congressional speech wherein the leader alluded to China s core national interests in response to a threat of Taiwan independence, We will resolutely uphold national sovereignty and territorial integrity and will never tolerate a repeat of the historical tragedy of a divided country We have firm will, full confidence, and sufficient capability to defeat any form of Taiwan independence secession plot. 17 The PRC s current stance on its core national interests and their applicability to Taiwan is very clear. Any disruption to the status quo of the One-China Principle is intolerable and will be met with force. Analyzing the history of China s diplomacy as well as overt action surrounding the Taiwan Strait issues offers a benchmark with which to compare other contentious regions. The examination of Taiwan as a case study of China s core interests adds to the scholarship on the topic and provides valuable insight into the implications for emerging territorial sovereignty issues. Another such case study is the region of Tibet. Plagued by cultural, societal, economic, human rights, and political turmoil, Tibet still endures a long history of unrest. As one scholar, Michael Davis, attests in his article, The Quest for Self-Rule in Tibet, the struggle between Tibetan genuine autonomy and the PRC s commitment to national sovereignty continues to dictate the dilemma. China insists that its nationalminority policy, under Article 4 of its constitution, affords the ethnic freedoms the Tibetan people desire, while simultaneously asserting this territory as core to its national interests. However, Tibetans attest the reality is far from autonomous, including religious oppression, military occupations, cultural institutional repression, legislative dominance, and human rights violations. Davis proposes renegotiating Tibetan status under the more flexible Article 31 of China s constitution, under which Hong Kong and 17 Richard C. Bush, Order From Chaos: What Xi Jinping said about Taiwan at the 19th Party Congress, Brookings Institution, October 19, 2017, < 9

19 Macao fall. He argues that establishing Tibet as a special administrative region would meet traditional obligations and recognize it as a distinctive and valued national community within the PRC.18 However, China maintains its strict position on sovereign integrity, declaring, Since ancient times Tibet has been an inseparable part of Chinese territory, where the Central Government has always exercised effective sovereign jurisdiction over the region. 19 Davis research demonstrates the influence of core national interests on the PRC policies regarding the Tibetan region. Like Taiwan, the study of Tibet as one of China s core interests sets a standard that the international community can rely on as to the resolve China has in protecting its affairs. Obtaining a deeper understanding of China s motivations and intentions regarding territorial sovereignty can guide policymakers diplomacy on a multitude of issues affecting the country. The Xinjiang region is a third territory in which China has demonstrated steadfast commitment to maintaining its sovereign nation. Like Tibet, the Xinjiang province has been, and is still, plagued by civil unrest, quests for independence, or at least minority autonomy, and a constant struggle with the Chinese central government. Two scholars on the subject, Yuchao Zhu and Dongyan Blachford, describe how the highly volatile minority regions, such as Xinjiang, continue to experience unrest and pose a persistent problem for China both on a domestic and international scale. Their article, Ethnic minority issues in China s foreign policy: perspectives and implications, examines the impact of China s ethnic minority policy on its foreign policy within the context of global norms and international law. In it they cite China s foreign policy being driven by, as with any other nation, its perceived fundamental national interests, 18 Michael C. Davis, The Quest for Self-Rule in Tibet, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 18, No. 4, October 2007, pp People s Republic of China, Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet, State Council White Paper, May 24, 2004, < 10

20 including national security, economic prosperity, political independence and international prestige. 20 Specifically in the case of Xinjiang, the government has consistently treated the ethnic minority issue as an essential national concern, meanwhile rejecting any foreign criticism on the grounds of protection of state sovereignty. 21 China views the potential secession of the Uyghur people completely unacceptable and rejects any international allegations of human rights violations. Historically, China has been willing to use force to suppress any separatist movements, on the grounds that it is an internal affair and a most threatening scenario concerning territorial integrity and national unity, and therefore has to be treated accordingly. 22 Additionally, another scholar, Mingjiang Li of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, examines other roles that the Xinjiang region serves in China s foreign policy, roles that are very important for China s national security.23 For example, it is argued that Xinjiang functions as a buffer zone between China s mainland and the western bordering nations.24 Such significance that this region holds in shaping China s foreign policy speaks volumes to the perspective the PRC maintains in dealing with its national interests. The Xinjiang region is of great importance to Chinese sovereignty, as well as fulfilling other matters of domestic concern. This case study aims to add to the existing research on the topic as well as shed light on the connection between the region and the term, core interest, thus providing implications of China s rhetoric and action in the region. 20 Yuchao Zhu and Dongyan Blachford, Ethnic minority issues in China s foreign policy: perspectives and implications, The Pacific Review, Vol. 18, No. 2, June 2005, pp Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Mingjiang Li, From Look-West to Act-West: Xinjiang s role in China-Central Asian relations, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 25, No. 100, 2016, pp Lillian Craig Harris, Xinjiang, Central Asia and the implications for China s policy in the Islamic World, The China Quarterly, Vol. 133, March 1993, pp

21 Finally, an examination of China s more recent activity in the SCS is the concluding case study in this thesis. A review of the current literature regarding the PRC s action in the SCS finds that China is becoming more and more aggressive in its action in the region. However, scholars refrain from classifying the SCS as one of China s core interests, arguably because historically China has been reluctant to do so. Michael Swaine s second publication assesses China s assertion along its maritime periphery and examines the internal and external factors that motivate the PRC government. His research shows that during the 2000s, China increased its assertive behavior along its coastal borders, specifically in the SCS. These actions included a unilateral fishing ban, maritime security patrols, various overt forms of political signaling including placing markers on unoccupied reefs, and conducting scientific and naval exercises in the vicinity. Whether by official PRC diplomacy or by physical action from subordinate governmental actors, to include oil companies, fisherman, scientists, maritime law enforcement agencies, local governments, and the PLA Navy, China has demonstrated a growing willingness and ability to affirm its claims and to support its claims in new ways, in large part via an enhanced physical presence and more clearly defined legal and diplomatic statements. 25 Swaine concludes, however, that China s overall strategy in the region has largely remained unaltered. Beijing, on the one hand, continues to avoid conflict by deferring dispute resolution, while, on the other hand, still maintaining a resolute defense against perceived attempts by others to undermine China s diplomatic, legal, political, economic, and military position. 26 Swaine s evaluation of China s increasing action in the SCS speaks volumes and is important in understanding the Chinese perspective regarding this hotly disputed territory. 25 Michael D. Swaine, China s Assertive Behavior-Part Two: The Maritime Periphery, China Leadership Monitor, No. 35, September 21, 2011, pp Ibid. 12

22 Swaine s two articles addressing the concept of a core national interest and China s action in the South China Sea are relevant to this research and this thesis aims to build on the topic in two ways. Firstly, the timeframe for Swaine s analysis ends in Since this time, China has been even more active in the SCS, to include substantial military build up of certain islands, and there have been even more interactions between neighboring countries and the United States, which warrant further study. Secondly, Swaine researches the historical context behind the evolution of the term core interest. He then, separately examines China s action in certain maritime regions, including the SCS. However, there is no explicit link drawn between the two. This inquiry aims to specifically tie these concepts together. It aims to build on the existing scholarship by connecting China s conduct in the SCS to its definition of core national interests. Even if China has made no official declarations of the SCS being of core interest to it, perhaps its actions do so in and of themselves. Ultimately, this thesis intends to add understanding to China s perspective of its core national interests and its conduct in this region. On the question of whether China considers the SCS an official core interest, most literature focuses on the historical record of Chinese government officials statements. Both Swaine s research and Yoshihara and Holmes article Can China Defend a Core Interest in the South China Sea? cite numerous instances when PRC diplomats have specifically avoided use of the term in public conferences when referencing this disputed territory.27 In the same context, Zeng, Xiao, and Breslin go on to describe that since 2009, the concept of a core interest has become increasingly controversial. Their article, titled Securing China s core interests: the state of the debate in China, researches other dimensions affecting China s motivation for using 27 Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Can China Defend a Core Interest in the South China Sea? The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 2, March 22, 2011, pp

23 the phrase, including domestic issues. These authors surmise that the Chinese definition of core interest further muddy the water and make things less clear. 28 Their conclusion is that despite its increasing use by the Chinese government to legitimize its diplomatic actions and claims, the concept of China s core interests remains a rather vague one. 29 In a similar vane, Campbell, Meick, Hsu, and Murray investigate the impact of China declaring the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands in the East China Sea a core national interest in their research for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. While the accuracy of the reporting news source is questionable, their article cites the Tokyo Kyodo News Service that reported the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating the islands are about sovereignty and territorial integrity. Of course, it s China s core interest. Their research also analyzed the evolution of the phrase and ultimately found that China s official stance on the islands remains vague and unchanged.30 Clearly, in this environment of nuances, misinterpretation, and semantics, in order for policymakers and world leaders to predict China s actions and to continue peaceful diplomacy, a better understanding of core interests is crucial. What scholars, advisors, and politicians do know for relative certainty regarding China s intentions is once it declares something a core interest it is wholeheartedly committed to defending it. Xi Jinping has been quoted as publically declaring China s stance on what it views to be of vital importance, by stating we will never give up our legitimate rights and will never sacrifice our national core interests. No country should presume that we will engage in trade involving our core interests or that we will [harm] 28 Jinghan Zeng, Yuefan Xiao, and Shaun Breslin, Securing China's core interests: the state of the debate in China, International Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 2, March 1, 2015, pp Ibid. 30 Caitlin Campbell, Ethan Meick, Kimberly Hsu, and Craig Murray, China s Core Interests and the East China Sea, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, May 10, 2013, < s- core-interests -and-east-china-sea>. 14

24 our sovereignty, security, or development interests. 31 Scholars generally attribute the intent of this message to the defense of Taiwan and maintaining the unification of the Tibet and Xinjiang provinces. The ultimate question now is how should world leaders view China s intentions regarding the SCS? Most media reporting, scholarly research, and political discussions present this disputed region as the next global flashpoint. While Brendan Taylor, head of the Strategic and Defense Studies Center at the Australian National University, argues otherwise in his article published in The Washington Quarterly, he cites several scholars and analysts who believe it is. He quotes strategic commentator, Robert Kaplan s characterization as the future of conflict, and the International Institute for Strategic Studies description of the region as having the potential to influence the evolving balance of power and perhaps even the prospects for peace. 32 Similarly, David Scott also depicts the tumultuous state of affairs surrounding the territory. An expert in Asia-Pacific international relations at Brunel University in London, Scott explains the situation in his article by stating that conflict management has not brought about resolution, but conflict irresolution has ensued instead. 33 Based on the intense hostile activity constantly surrounding the region, it would seem that the territory is extremely important to China. Yet, no one is willing to label the SCS a core national interest. As scholars attest, the official classification or elevation of the SCS to a Chinese core national interest, would in turn, generate specific, measurable, and predictable, albeit, aggressive action from China. World leaders would expect to see a strong military response to any interference in claimed sovereign rights, as they do regarding Taiwan. This is why much has been written on the public declaration, or lack thereof, 31 Zeng, Xiao, and Breslin, Securing China's core interests: the state of the debate in China, pp Brendan Taylor, The South China Sea is Not a Flashpoint, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 1, March 12, 2014, pp David Scott, Conflict Irresolution in the South China Sea, Asian Survey, Vol. 52, No. 6, November 2012, pp

25 of the SCS as a core interest to China. And yet, does this region and the activities therein not meet the definitions of the other core interests? Indeed, all major players understand the significance and impact that declaring the SCS a core interest would bring to the international stage. This may be an obvious reason why the PRC has been historically reluctant to do so. However, what if China s physical actions in the region already point in that direction? Perhaps China s increasing military posture surrounding the contested islands and its aggressive, military or otherwise, conduct towards neighboring nations actually indicate its true stance concerning the territory. Without officially declaring the SCS a core interest, China is able to avoid full-scale war; however, its actions in the region test the limits of international conduct regarding unclaimed territories. 1.4 Research Methodology The theoretical framework for this thesis is based on the concept of core national interests. Each country establishes criteria on which to base is domestic and foreign policy and makes general declarations of goals and intentions regarding said policies. This research presents a comparative analysis of four case studies and specifically investigates how the concept of a core national interest is applied to the PRC s foreign policies on sovereign territories. From China s perspective, it would consider these topics of a domestic nature, but the concept remains the same. How does China deal with these specific territorial regions considering its definition of a core interest? This study analyzes this question within this theoretical framework. This research study examines three indicators in order to analyze China s concept of a core national interest in each region. The first indicator is the political nature regarding China s actions surrounding the specific region. Public declarations, official stances, and diplomatic negotiations made by the PRC government are 16

26 examined to determine the relationship between its public official position and its definition of a core interest. Whether China publically acknowledges a certain territory as vital to upholding its core interests can indicate its intentions and resolve in carrying out its goals. This is vital information to policymakers and government officials of leading nations in the world. The second indicator addresses the socio-economic factors affecting each region. Cultural, ethnic, and economic facets are analyzed to similarly draw connections between specific actions taken in the regions and the concept of core national interest. Finally, military action is analyzed as the third indicator to reveal the goals, intentions, and resolve undertaken by China in its quest to secure its core national interests. The research methods utilized throughout this thesis include comparative research, case studies, and document analysis. Case studies have long been used in the social sciences discipline to provide a detailed and specific examination of a subject and its contextual conditions. A case may be an individual, organization, event, or location and in this research the cases of interest are based on their location and China s perspective regarding the location and its official sovereign territory. The case studies in this thesis include the Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, and SCS regions. There are several different types of cases that can comprise a study. These include illustrative, exploratory, cumulative, or critical instance case studies. Illustrative case studies are descriptive in nature used in order to present a specific situation to the audience for the purposes of further investigation. Exploratory cases are condensed studies performed as a precursor to a bigger investigation used to help identify questions and areas of research. Cumulative case studies serve to combine information from past studies to make larger-scale generalizations. Lastly, critical instance case studies examine unique situations useful for cause and effect studies. For the purposes of this research, 17

27 illustrative case studies of the aforementioned territories are presented to analyze China s stance on core national interests. Theoretically speaking, generalizations may follow case study research. A case study can strategically affect the general problem being examined and results from a critical case can be systematically applied to the general population. By focusing on these case studies, this thesis uses the comparative research technique to conduct qualitative analysis in order to make comparisons across the different territories in question. 34 By thoroughly exploring these cases and comparing the PRC government s policies and actions surrounding them, an in depth understanding of core national interests is gained. Political scientists use three main ways in which to collect data for their research purposes. These methods include interviews, observation, and document analysis.35 Of these techniques, interviews and observation are not employed to accomplish this study. The conduct of interviews and physical observation are not feasible for this researcher to address the research question due to the broad scope and large-scale collective behavioral nature of the subject. Additionally, the historical aspect of certain topics is distant in time and combined with the sheer space between regions renders these methods unsuitable. Document analysis, therefore, is the principal method of data collection for this thesis. The written record consists of documents, reports, statistics, manuscripts, speech transcripts, and other visual or oral material. These records are categorized into episodic or running material. Using a combination of both types of records, this research collects information on the public position of China regarding its idea of core national interests, sovereign territories, and foreign policies. Additionally, data is gathered on the socioeconomic impact and military actions in the Taiwan, Tibet, 34 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research and Applications: Designs and Methods, 6th Edition (California: Sage Publications, 2017). 35 Janet Buttolph-Johnson and Richard A. Joslyn and H.T. Reynolds, Political Science Research Methods (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2001), pp

28 Xinjiang, and SCS regions. Subsequently, comparative analysis is conducted on the variety of research amassed. Specifically, analysis of primary documents includes official public reports, statements, and government white papers pertaining to China s position on its core national interests and its conduct regarding disputed territories throughout modern history. These primary sources, directly originating from the PRC s government, are one of the best ways to analyze China s foreign and domestic policies, its goals and intentions, and its resolve to carry them out. Additionally, news sources are a crucial primary written record in which to analyze military action that China has undergone in the vicinity of these territories. This information gives insight into what lengths China is truly willing to go regarding its core interests. Finally, analysis of secondary documents examines previous scholastic research pertaining to the areas of focus. For the purposes of this study, in order to completely evaluate the implications and impact of China s core national interests on the international stage, secondary academic works must be considered and included in this analysis. Additionally, in order to research the socioeconomic impacts within the regions of intended study, secondary sources of scholarly articles are used as a crucial framework in which to analyze the research problem. Overall, given the practical restraints encapsulating this thesis, document analysis is the principal method for data collection, allowing for the best opportunity to analyze the pertinent information and formulate conclusions regarding China s core interests and territorial sovereignty-related issues. 1.5 Approach and Limitations In its quest to analyze the concept of a core interest and its implication and impact on Chinese domestic and foreign policy, this thesis compares historically relevant regions of significance. The paper conducts comparative research of specific cases to determine the connection between China s overt action regarding these regions 19

29 and the government s official core national interests. The thesis concludes with an analysis of the SCS by applying the same criteria used for the other regions. One goal of the thesis is to supplement existing research on how China views the SCS and whether it is significant to its core national interests. The data collected for the analysis is presented in a logical sequence of case studies. The research specifically focuses on four territories of fundamental importance to China: Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, and the SCS. The regions of Hong Kong and Macau have not been included in this study because they are considered Special Administrative Regions and are subject to different conditions and control from the other case studies. However, further research into their significance could add to the scholarship of understanding regarding China s position on its core national interests. 1.6 Chapter Arrangement This thesis is organized into seven parts beginning with the introduction. Chapter two discusses the definition of a core national interest and how China has applied this concept on the international stage. The next three sections explore each of China s claimed territorial regions: Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Since each of these regions officially satisfies China s core national interest definition, events surrounding these territories shed light onto the goals, intentions, and capabilities of the Chinese government. Chapter six examines China s conduct in the SCS region and adds to the scholarship on China s perspective of core national interests and this region. The thesis concludes with an overall summary of the comparison of these case studies and discusses possible implications regarding future diplomacy surrounding these issues. 20

30 Chapter 2: Core National Interests An Examination of the Concept 2.1 Historical and Theoretical Context The concept of a core national interest is the foundation for the theoretical framework of this thesis. Examining the manner in which a given nation defines and applies its concept of a national interest has guided international relations as far back as the emergence of the modern civilized world. Interests are wholly tied to the definition of a state, which in turn, influence the relationships between the state and its citizens, the state and neighboring nations, and the state and the world. This thesis studies three indicators that can be utilized to evaluate a nation s core interests and their effect on the world. The first is the political and diplomatic realm in which a nation asserts itself on the world. The second is the socio-economic factors that influence a state s decision to define and then in turn, act on its national interests. Finally, the third indicator is the military action a nation takes in order to secure its interests. Prior to examining the current methods that modern countries use to handle their national interests and the impacts those decisions have on the international community, a full understanding of the historical and theoretical context of this concept is necessary. Niccolo Machiavelli is generally considered the first philosopher to theorize on the interests of a state and the maintenance of power. The Prince was published in the 16th century and while it focuses on the reality of the deplorable morals of those in power, the impact of its foundational definitions of a state and theories on political philosophy was revolutionary. The realization that realism, as opposed to idealism, guides states was completely anti-establishment and radical at this time.36 This era, previously dominated by religious conflict, saw the emergence of nationhood driving 36 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Harvey Mansfield (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985). 21

31 international action. Where the French Wars of Religion and the Thirty Years War began under religious pretenses, the concept of national interests and state power, as opposed to theological ideology, emerged as the motivation for conflict. The French expression, raison d état, encompasses the idea that a nation has specific reasons to wage war other than individual allegiances to one God. This premise is evidenced by French Cardinal Richelieu who, during the Thirty Years War, chose to ally with the Protestants in order to counter the increasing papal power of the Catholic Church.37 Throughout the following centuries, European conflict persisted and having lived through the Napoleon era, Carl von Clausewitz reflected on how and why states wage war. Clausewitz is arguably the most prominent figure to influence Western military philosophy and his analysis of the motivations of a state cannot be overstated. He argues that a state s behavior, including the potential act of war, should only be motivated by its need to survive and prosper, this idea being at the core of its national interests.38 As the world modernized, Europe went through its industrialization era and the leading powers were confronted with major wars. The impact of these bloody spells in world history reinvigorated political philosophical exchanges and a debate among the prominent theories emerged. The most notable theory within this discussion of international relations is realism. The commonly accepted propositions around which realism revolves include the concept of states, not individuals or institutions, being the central actors within the political landscape. Secondly, the main assumption holds that the international political system is anarchic in structure without a higher governing authority to enforce rules, thereby obliging states to arrive at relations amongst each 37 William F. Church, Publications on Cardinal Richelieu since 1945: A Bibliographical Study, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 37, No. 4, December 1965, pp Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). 22

32 other on their own.39 Finally, the theory purports that the actors are rational, and most importantly, they seek to maximize their self-interests and desire power in order to accomplish this.40 These interests are driven by the need to survive and they are given priority over any ideologies. Neorealism focuses on the structure of the system that acts on the state and also emphasizes ensuring security through economic and military strength. In this context, Kenneth Waltz revolutionized preceding concepts of international relations by placing the utmost significance on the anarchic ordering principle.41 Finally, neoclassical realism links the neorealist explanations of political outcomes to states behavior and foreign policy decisions.42 Realism, and its subset of theories, maintains the idea of self-interested drive for survival as the principle interest of the state,43 whether due to the inevitable outcome of the structure or long-term foreign policy goals. This then becomes a prerequisite for the pursuit of any other goals.44 Specifically, the pursuit of power is the manifestation of a state fulfilling its national interest. As such, the concept of a national interest and the role it plays within the international relations context are constantly debated and important to this theoretical discussion. Liberalism is a second theory of international relations that offers a different explanation for state dynamics wherein realists and liberalists often deliberate. The liberalist belief that interdependence and international institutions play key roles within the context of international relations is a fundamental distinguishing feature between the two theories. Liberalists assert that international cooperation guides preferences and 39 Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, The Oxford Handbook of International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pg Jill Steans and Lloyd Pettiford, Introduction to International Relations, Ed. 2 (Harlow, England: Pearson Education Limited, 2005), pg Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979). 42 Gideon Rose, Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy, World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1, October 1998, pp Steans Pettiford, Introduction to International Relations, pg Waltz, Theory of International Politics. 23

33 policy choices. The resulting state interdependence has the ability to reduce the propensity for conflict.45 International cooperation coupled with the collective desire for peace and prosperity highlight numerous topics that emerge within this theory. For example, political regime impacts on international relations leading to the concept of democratic peace theory, impacts of free trade, globalization, and economic interdependence on state behavior, and impacts of international institutions affecting the pursuit of national interests.46 Neoliberalists, such as Joseph Nye, contend that democracies may engage in conflict, however not for capitalist reasons. Economic interdependence and international institutions prevent actual conflict, relying instead on diplomatic measures to resolve issues.47 Within the liberalist theory, navigating the intricacies of international diplomacy and the coordination within global institutions is deeply tied to the concerns of each state and its overall goals. Liberalists believe the interconnectedness and institutional relationships affect the manner in which states seek to fulfill their national interests and carry out their foreign policy. Lastly, constructivism differs from the prior two theories by introducing the effect of socially constructed factors on international relations. This theory demonstrates an ongoing process of social practice and interaction of shared ideals that form and influence state interests. The concepts of national identities, moral influences, common ideals, shared interests, among others, in addition to the traditional ideas of power politics, asserting influence over the political landscape are rooted in the constructivist theory. Alexander Wendt is renowned for challenging realists and liberalists by advocating that the structure of international relations is socially constructed, not organizationally inevitable, and capable of being deliberately 45 Steans and Pettiford, Introduction to International Relations, pg. 27. Ibid., pg Robert Owen Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, Ed. 4 (Longman Classics in Political Science, 2011)

34 transformed. Specifically, he argues that constructivism explains realists observations of political outcomes by recognizing the dependence on social institutions. Examining the identities and interests of key actors is crucial because they can actually be tailored and they subsequently impact conceptions of security. As such, this philosophy renders the concept of national interests central to international relations theory and central to determinants of state behavior.48 All three theories spark the debate of the role of national interests in international relations and this examination is at the core of this thesis. National interests tend to be categorized in order to place priority on policies that stem from these interests. A classical two-pronged categorization proposed by the realist, Morgenthau, includes vital and non-vital components, where he describes the concept as containing two elements, one that is logically required and in that sense necessary, and one that is variable and determined by circumstances. 49 According to him, vital factors correspond to, and seek to secure, survival and national identity. Identity can be thought of to represent the physical, political, and cultural elements comprising a nation. Further definition classifies territorial borders as a nation s physical identity. Additionally, the diplomatic and economic systems of a nation encompass its political identity. Lastly, traditional heritage, that lays the foundation for a people, comprises its cultural identity. Morgenthau explains in simple terms that the foreign policies of all nations must necessarily refer to their survival as their minimum requirements. 50 He classifies vital national interests as essential to the survival of a nation and, as a result, a nation could use force against external entities in order to protect them. Following from this realist line of reasoning, a nation s foreign policy is therefore centered on 48 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp Hans J. Morgenthau, Another Great Debate : The National Interest of the United States, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 46, No. 4, December 1952, pp Ibid. 25

35 strengthening its security in order to secure its survival.51 Another theorist, Donald Nuechterlein, goes one step further and subcategorizes the highest group into survival and vital interests. This delineation introduces the concept of time, whereby survival interests are time-sensitive, imminent threats, whereas vital ones refer to a threat, which by its very nature, allows for more time to address it, including the employment of other tools of national power.52 Non-vital components are the elements of national interests that do not warrant the use of force. Morgenthau is practical in the development of his theories: he states, No nation has the resources to promote all desirable objectives with equal vigor; all nations must therefore allocate their scarce resources as rationally as possible. The indispensable precondition of such rational allocation is a clear understanding of the distinction between the necessary and variable elements of the national interest. 53 This statement is recognition that there is a hierarchy of interests within the structure of a nation s identity and subsequent foreign policy. He follows by asserting, the scientific analysis has the urgent task of pruning down national objectives to the measure of available resources in order to make their pursuit compatible with national survival. 54 Thomas W. Robinson, international relations expert of the RAND Corporation, builds upon Morgenthau s definitions and further categorizes the national interests of a nation by utilizing a six-pronged system. The first category is primary interests, including Morgenthau s physical, political, and cultural identities, on which nations cannot compromise and that a nation will defend at all costs. Secondary interests are subservient to primary ones but contribute to them in a supporting manner. The third group is permanent interests that reflect the long-term interests of a nation that could 51 Morgenthau, Another Great Debate : The National Interest of the United States, pp Donald E. Nuechterlein, America Recommitted: United States National Interests in a Restructured World (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1991), pg Morgenthau, Another Great Debate : The National Interest of the United States, pp Ibid

36 evolve, however very gradually. The fourth set is variable interests wherein a certain set of circumstances at a given time dictates such interests of a nation. As Morgenthau describes, these changing elements are a function of the cross currents of personalities, public opinion, sectional interests, partisan politics, and political and moral folkways. 55 The fifth category is general interests that a nation can apply to a large geographic area, a large number of countries, or a large number of topics. Lastly, specific interests are concerns that fall outside of the general interests group but are a logical outgrowth of that category, having specifics in time or space.56 The above examination lays the foundation for a thorough understanding of the historical and theoretical context in which to understand the concept of a national interest. 2.2 A Modern Analysis A modern analysis of the subcategories within the concept of national interests reveals the numerous definitions and interpretations each state possesses and the methods in which they implement their visions. Two examples that illustrate clear and defined national interests are the United States and China. While differing in name, each of these states has similar basic ideals and goals that encompass their definition of vital or core interest. The United States has a wide array of issues that it deems of national interest. These include topics such as security, economic prosperity, international law enforcement, promotion of democracy, and other global issues. It declares that it is in the interest of national security to protect vital interests and secure peace; deter aggression; prevent, defuse, and manage crises; halt the proliferation of weapons of 55 Morgenthau, Another Great Debate : The National Interest of the United States, pp Thomas W. Robinson, A National Interest Analysis of Sino-Soviet Relations, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 2, June 1967, pp

37 mass destruction; and advance arms control and disarmament. 57 Within this context, the United States seeks regional stability to prevent a threat to the security and wellbeing of the nation. Economically, the U.S. aims to expand exports and open markets, assist American businesses, foster economic growth, and promote sustainable development in developing countries. The U.S. is committed to protecting its citizens at home and abroad, and seeks to safeguard its borders. Countering international terrorism, minimizing international crime, and reducing the entry of illegal drugs into the country are pillars of the international law enforcement goals of the U.S. The United States supports the establishment of democracies and strives for a worldwide community of democracies where human rights, including worker rights and religious freedom are universally respected. 58 Additionally, it seeks to provide humanitarian assistance to victims of crises, conflicts, and natural disasters to prevent or minimize the cost of human life. Globally, the U.S. aspires to improve the environment, foster a healthy and educated world population, and improve human health. Diplomatically, the United States aims to improve mutual understanding within the international community through educational and cultural exchanges.59 According to the 2017 National Security Strategy, President Trump asserts that in order to maintain the American advantage on the global stage, the United States must protect four vital national interests. The first is to protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life. Within this category, President Trump identifies strengthening control of the borders and reforming the immigration system. Additionally, he mentions the importance of infrastructure, preventing cyber attacks, and the layered missile defense system, which all play crucial roles in securing this 57 United States, Department of State National Interests and Strategic Goals, United States Department of State, retrieved March 17, 2018, < 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 28

38 interest. The second vital national interest is the promotion of American prosperity, which will be accomplished through the rejuvenation of the American economy. Addressing trade and intellectual property imbalances is key to the successful realization of this interest. The third vital interest is to preserve peace through strength by bolstering America s capabilities. President Trump addresses the role of the military and stresses the deterring military capability of the U.S. and the possible use of force in achieving this interest. He aims to rebuild the military so that it remains preeminent, deters our adversaries, and if necessary, is able to fight and win. We will compete with all tools of national power to ensure that regions of the world are not dominated by one power. 60 The final vital national interest announced by the president is advancing American influence in order to protect American principles. President Trump concludes the discussion of vital national interests by identifying the immutable concept of sovereignty. He states, strengthening our sovereignty the first duty of a government is to serve the interest of its own people is a necessary condition for protecting these four national interests We are proud of our history and confident of the positive example the United States offers to the world Free men and women have created the most just and prosperous nation in history. 61 Given the aforementioned introduction to political theory discussed in the previous section, traces of realism, as well as constructivism, can be found in this strategy. The idea of protecting and strengthening the territorial sovereignty through military might, as mentioned in vital interests one and three, is indicative of the realist political philosophy. Additionally, the constructivist view, that policies are influenced by the socially constructed ideals and norms of a society, is plainly evident in the fourth vital interest, as well as the president s final remarks. 60 United States and Donald Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington D.C.: The White House, 2017). 61 Ibid. 29

39 The hierarchy of, and the manner in which a nation categorizes its interests indicate the political will it boasts regarding a specific issue. The higher the classification, the more resources a nation assigns to the matter in order to secure it. Additionally, it is necessary to periodically reevaluate the hierarchy of interests as the affairs of the globe evolve. Throughout history, United States leadership has reassessed its national interests and found striking differences in priorities depending on issues facing the world at the time. In 2000, the Commission on America s National Interests identified the end of the Cold War as crucial in guiding the revision of this time. During the Cold War, there were clear and simple answers to the problems brought about by communism and nuclear weapons. However, since then, constant reevaluation of what global regions and issues the U.S. should prioritize creates a much more complicated situation. In order for the United States to be successful, and due to the limited resources it holds, the Commission advises strict adherence to maintaining a selective perspective and the proper basis for making such judgments is a lean, hierarchical conception of what American national interests are and what they are not. 62 Policymakers and scholars classify U.S. national interests in the following categories: vital, extremely important, important, and secondary. The Commission on America s National Interests defines vital interests as ones whose conditions are strictly necessary to safeguard and enhance Americans survival and well-being in a free and secure nation. 63 Counter to the expansive and general tone of President Trump s National Security Strategy, the commission identifies a list of five specific goals the country should strive to achieve. The first is to prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons attacks on U.S. soil or military forces 62 Graham T. Allison and Robert Blackwill, America s National Interests, The Commission on America s National Interests, July 2000, pp Ibid. 30

40 overseas. The second is to ensure U.S. allies survival by fostering active cooperation in influencing the existing international system. The third vital interest is to prevent the emergence of hostile nations on U.S. borders. The fourth is to ensure the viability and stability of major global systems including trade, financial markets, energy supplies, and environmental issues. Finally, the last vital interest is to establish productive relations with nations that could become strategic adversaries. Sequentially, the subsequent categories follow on from the principal, vital interests. Extremely important interests are defined as conditions that, if compromised, would severely prejudice but not strictly imperil the ability of the U.S. government to safeguard and enhance the wellbeing of Americans in a free and secure nation. Important interests are those that, if compromised, would have major negative consequences for the ability of the U.S. government to safeguard and enhance the well-being of Americans in a free and secure nation. Lastly, secondary national interests are desirable conditions, but ones that have little direct impact on the ability of the U.S. government to safeguard and enhance the well-being of Americans in a free and secure nation. 64 Throughout history, there is no shortage of examples that demonstrate how the United States puts into practice its definition of vital national interests, and to what lengths the nation is willing to go in order to secure them. In this context, the use of force is always at the forefront of the debate concerning this dilemma. A recent example is a speech on foreign policy by President Obama in 2009, As Commander-inChief, I have determined that it is in our vital national interest to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan These are the resources that we need to seize the initiative, while building the Afghan capacity that can allow for a responsible transition 64 Allison and Blackwill, America s National Interests, pp

41 of our forces out of Afghanistan. 65 As with other great powers of the world, the United States declares its intentions clearly and is not hesitant to use force in order to secure what it deems vital. Vision, mission, goals, and intentions are the substance that lay the foundation of a nation. Value and import are allocated to these goals, which then drive the domestic and foreign policy of a nation. China similarly outlines its nation s goals and communicates these intentions with very specific language. The term, core national interest, is the nomenclature employed when referencing China and its concerns. In 2011, Beijing released a white paper describing the future outlook on the PRC s national goals. In it, the Chinese government addressed its idea of peaceful development, what the country aims to achieve via this quest, China s foreign policy for this pursuit, the historical context driving these goals, and the implications for the world. Within this detailed vision for the nation, the PRC clearly defined what its core national interests are in the following statement. China is firm in upholding its core interests which include the following: state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and national reunification, China s political system established by the Constitution and overall social stability, and the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development. Beijing s official statement on core national interests66 More recently in 2017, during the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, President Xi Jinping outlined his modified, evolved, and ambitious vision for the future of China in the 21st Century. Xi reiterated his grand goal to realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, also known as the Chinese Dream. Included in achieving this goal are two centennial economic targets set by previous leadership. The first is to build a moderately prosperous society by 2021 by eradicating 65 Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Helene Cooper, Obama Adds Troops, but Maps Exit Plan, New York Times, December 2, 2009, < 66 People s Republic of China, China s Peaceful Development. 32

42 Chinese-spread poverty. The second economic goal, and one that is relatively more challenging given the current domestic infrastructure, is to turn China into a fully developed nation by Xi presented intermediate steps and a timeline in order to realize this final target. He will lead China to achieve socialist modernization by 2035, including narrowing its wealth gap and improving the environment, among others. Subsequently, through hard work between the years 2035 and 2050, China will become a global leader in terms of composite national strength and international influence. 67 Xi Jinping s overall message was as much about national identity and safeguarding its national interests as it was about the economic realization of the Chinese dream. Towards the beginning of his speech, the president stated, We must do more to safeguard China s sovereignty, security, and development interests, and staunchly oppose all attempts to split China or undermine its ethnic unity and social harmony and stability. 68 On national security, he employed the option of use of force in order to protect the nation s interests by stating, We should ensure both development and security and be ever ready to protect against potential dangers in time of peace. This is a major principle underlying the Party s governance. We must put national interests first, take protecting our people s security as our mission and safeguarding political security as a fundamental task, and ensure both internal and external security, homeland and public security, traditional and non-traditional security, and China s own and common security. 69 On territorial sovereignty, China s core interests are guided by the unification principle, Resolving the Taiwan question to realize China s complete reunification is the shared aspiration of all Chinese people, and is in the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation We stand firm in safeguarding China s sovereignty and 67 Xi Jinping, Full text of Xi Jinping s report at 19th CPC National Congress, Xinhuanet.com, November 3, 2017, pp. 1-65, < 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid. 33

43 territorial integrity. 70 Lastly, Xi alluded to the successful on-going construction on islands and reefs in the South China Sea when addressing the nation s economic accomplishments thus far. While he did not refer to the controversial international issue surrounding this territorial region, the debate remains an issue of sovereignty and of great importance to China as a whole. Xi Jinping s contemporary vision, where China is the modern leader in today s advancing world, can also be viewed through a constructivist lens. Much like the United States vision to spread democracy for a prosperous and peaceful world, ideology, identity, cultural norms, and common ideals drive national interests and guide foreign policy. Similarly, Xi boasted that China s political system could be a model for, and contribute to the world, by inspiring other developing nations to adopt the concept of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era as a new choice of political scheme. The core interests of the Chinese Communist Party and its political system are deeply rooted in historical tradition, shaped by Chinese cultural norms, and molded by common ideals and national identity. Michael Swaine, a leading expert in Chinese diplomacy and security studies, references the manner in which Chinese officials have used the term and the implications these uses have on international and domestic interactions. Swaine s article, China s Assertive Behavior-Part One: On Core Interests, examines China s employment of the term and whether, and to what extent, its usage indicates that China is becoming more assertive.71 Through a historical lens, Swaine documents the origination of the phrase and the approach China utilizes by referencing the expression in public settings. The first appearance was in the 1990s in reference to China s domestic goals. During the economic and social reform policies, China used Xi, Full text of Xi Jinping s report at 19th CPC National Congress, pp Swaine, China s Assertive Behavior-Part One: On Core Interests, pp

44 fundamental interest in a 1995 publication of the PLA Daily to promote overall economic development on a domestic level. Additionally, core interest was employed to address and focus on the attainment of common prosperity and greater economic and social equality. Subsequently, the 2000s saw the emergence of the term being applied in a foreign context. In 2002, U.S.-China relations scholar, Wang Jisi, wrote on the quest for common ground to prevent conflict between the two countries, stating such conflict could jeopardize or damage the core interests of both nations.72 This article, featured in People s Daily, was the first of two unofficial references made in the same year associating core interests and great powers on an international level. It was this era where a definitive link between core national interests and territorial, sovereignty, and national security issues was established and thus a clear rhetoric began to drive PRC diplomacy. The first official public statement of this nature was during a meeting between Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan and Secretary of State Colin Powell in 2003, in which Tang identified Taiwan as one of China s core interests.73 As the language within PRC rhetoric evolved, in 2004, Chinese officials began to identify sovereignty and territorial integrity as a core interest when describing the situation across the Taiwan Strait. Later, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing explicitly identified national security as a core interest during a speech in As time progressed, China quickly began to use the expression more and more frequently. As Figure 2.1 shows, the number of times the term was mentioned in a People s Daily article skyrocketed in this decade. Moreover, this chart does not account for the 72 Jisi Wang, Seek common ground and stability-celebrating the 30th anniversary of the China-US Shanghai Communiqué, People s Daily, February 28, 2002, 7th edition. 73 Gang Ding, Tang Jiaxuan Meets U.S. Secretary of State, People s Daily, January 21, 2003, 3rd edition. 74 Zhaoxing Li, Valuable spiritual wealth of new China s diplomatic work-studying Jiang Zemin s diplomatic thought, People s Daily, September 30, 2006, 2nd edition. 35

45 additional rise in frequency of use of the term during official speeches and meetings with foreign dignitaries.75 Figure 2.1: Number of People s Daily Articles Referencing Core Interests Michael D. Swaine, China s Assertive Behavior-Part One: On Core Interests, pp As the frequency of use has recently increased, scholars have been searching for political implications as a result. Some speculate the possibility for more aggressive behavior from the PRC under the guise of a redefined scope of the term. Michael Swaine describes how the implication of this phrase began to have far-reaching effects on foreign leaders. These leaders began to attribute an indomitable force that accompanied the term, indicating an uncompromising, rigid military Chinese stance on issues associated with the concept. The ensuing dialogue follows from this line of thinking where policymakers and scholars are constantly striving to answer questions and predict behavior. What is expected when a nation employs the term vital or core national interest? Is the use of force guaranteed during a confrontation or are other tools of national power available? 75 Swaine, China s Assertive Behavior-Part One: On Core Interests, pp

46 Does an issue first have to be defined as vital or core before the use of force is justified? The different categories of interests within the overall hierarchy dictate varying degrees of action in response to evolving situations. With a thorough understanding of the concept s definition and the manner in which a nation employs the term, it is now possible to analyze issues from a variety of perspectives. Given the aforementioned discussion on the concept and definitions of core or vital national interests, and the importance they have in international political dynamics and foreign policy decisions, this thesis aims to use the concept as a theoretical framework to examine China s current state of affairs. Analysis of different countries definitions, use of this concept, and the impact on their foreign policy decisions indicate their resolve and political will in international situations. This thesis analyzes three indicators that guide the study to specifically investigate China s stance on its core national interests. Political diplomacy, through the lens of public declarations, official stances, and diplomatic negotiations made by the PRC government are examined to determine the relationship between its public, official position and its definition of a core interest. The second indicator addresses the socio-economic factors affecting each case. Cultural, ethnic, and economic facets are analyzed to similarly draw connections between specific actions taken in the regions and the concept of core national interest. Finally, military action and the use of force is analyzed as the third indicator to reveal the goals, intentions, and resolve undertaken by China in its quest to secure its core national interests. Examination of these dimensions offers a comprehensive explanation for China s action and can offer implications for China s resolve regarding these regions. The next four chapters assess this concept through the lens of four case studies, the Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, and South China Sea regions, all of which are analyzed from the perspective of the aforementioned three indicators. With the assumption that the 37

47 first three regions are already-claimed core interests of China, this thesis analysis, through the lens of these indicators, can shed light on, and add to the existing scholarship of, how the South China Sea region plays a role in China s interests. 38

48 Chapter 3: Taiwan 3.1 Political and Diplomatic Policy It has long been understood that the PRC considers Taiwan part of its territorial integrity, deems it a core national interest, and ultimately seeks reunification with the island. This chapter aims to evaluate this claim through the lens of three different perspectives: political and diplomatic policy, socio-economic factors, and military action. The first section of this chapter addresses the evolution of the diplomatic policies, official positions, and public statements the PRC has made since the separation of the two governments. Since 1949, the world has witnessed an ebb and flow of the manner in which the PRC conducts its foreign policy across the Taiwan Strait. Over the course of history, China s policy towards Taiwan has transitioned full circle from a hardline stance stressing national identity, to a more conciliatory position recognizing the ROC government, and finally, with Xi Jinping s tenure, it has returned back to a more assertive standpoint, underlining the importance of sovereignty once again. However, throughout these rolling waves of political rhetoric, China has never wavered on its official stance regarding the island. The degree of peace with which China seeks reunification, and the levels of force with which it ensures its core interests is of great importance to the United States and Taiwan, and scholars continually debate the potential for war when analyzing this aspect of PRC foreign policy. Three joint communiqués, the Shanghai Communiqué, the Normalization of Relations Communiqué, and the 1982 Communiqué, outline the issue of Taiwan and its relationship with the United States, China, and Taiwan itself. The Shanghai Communiqué of 1972 declares the PRC s position by stating, the Government of the People s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is 39

49 China s internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere. 76 Deng Xiaoping s bold endeavor of opening up China to the international world in the 1980s carried along with it many complications regarding the dynamics of international statehood roles, especially considering the United States official recognition of the PRC in Due to the political and economic fragilities of sensitive regions like Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, the integration of China as a player on the global stage posed real difficulties for the PRC government to practically resolve its idea of sovereignty. The One Country, Two Systems policy was directed at Hong Kong and Macau but it also had political implications regarding Taiwan. Deng Xiaoping stated, within the People s Republic of China, the mainland will maintain the socialist system while Taiwan continue[s] under the capitalist system, 77 the ultimate goal of the nation being eventual reunification. During Taiwan s transition to democracy in the late 1980s, two leading political parties emerged: the historical, KMT (Kuomintang) and the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party). Generally, the KMT maintains that the ROC has sovereignty over all of China, including the mainland, and it does not agree with the PRC s definition of one China. However, given its historical ties to China, it is sometimes more willing than the DPP to negotiate with the PRC on Chinese matters and maintain a status quo atmosphere. The DPP, however, is a more independent-leaning faction that does not subscribe to the idea of one China ruling over Taiwan. Even given these seemingly hardline stances each party holds, the reality of compromise with the PRC often leads to both parties engaging in status quo politics. At this early time in Taiwan s political development, cross-strait dialogue increased and after much negotiation, the unofficial 76 Shirley A. Kan, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the One China Policy Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, Congressional Research Service, March 12, 2001, pp Chen, Constructing Peaceful Development: The Changing Interpretations of One China and Beijing s Taiwan Strait Policy, pp

50 1992 Consensus was formed in November of that year.78 This accord was the defining moment where obscurity of terms and agreement to disagree on the definition of China finally permitted the continuation of cross-strait relations. Still, standing by its definition of core interests, the PRC s language pertaining to eventual reunification has historically included the use of force, especially with regards to the issue of Taiwan independence. The 1993 white paper, The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue stressed the desire for a peaceful solution but stated that on the premise of securing its core national interest, the PRC reserved the right to resort to the use of force if necessary.79 In January 1995, Jiang Zemin delivered his Eight Point speech, which signaled a more conciliatory approach in diplomatic engagements.80 In it, Jiang Zemin proposed, ending the state of hostility between the two sides and explains that our not undertaking to give up the use of force is not directed against our compatriots in Taiwan but against the schemes of foreign forces to interfere with China s unification. 81 Scholars suggest the lack of traditional language in this speech, including rights over sovereign territory and attacks directed at Taiwan leaders for the promotion of independence, subsequently offered Taiwan opportunity to exploit this leeway, leading to the Taiwan Strait Crisis in that year.82 Taiwan president Lee Tenghui s overt displays of independence by traveling under the ROC flag with official diplomatic intentions, requesting membership in international organizations, and buying military equipment from the United States became an immediate cause of concern to 78 Chen, Constructing Peaceful Development: The Changing Interpretations of One China and Beijing s Taiwan Strait Policy, pp People s Republic of China, White Paper The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue. 80 Chen, Constructing Peaceful Development: The Changing Interpretations of One China and Beijing s Taiwan Strait Policy, pp Kan, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the One China Policy Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, pp Richard L. Russell, The 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis: The United States and China at the Precipice of War? Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 2000, pp

51 China.83 The PRC then changed its behavior and insisted on reiterating with forcible clarity its condemnation of Taiwan s blatant and offensive diplomatic gestures. As such, Jiang Zemin drastically altered the degree to which peace drove China s international relations. The PRC s foreign policy instantly converted into a military threat wherein the CCP was intent on displaying China s resolve and its capability to safeguard its sovereignty. The resulting consequence was the crisis of Since the dissipation of those heightened military hostilities, the triangular affair between the PRC, Taiwan, and the U.S. has not again experienced the same degree of escalated military confrontation. Towards the end of the 1990s, China began to realize the hegemonic influence of the United States and its military, economic, and technological superiority. The PRC accepted the lengthy process China would have to endure to achieve its goal of overall advancement and international dominance. Thus, in the meantime, Jiang Zemin s administration initiated a grand strategy of multilateralism to appease the U.S. and reassure Asian neighbors of its leadership and commitment to the region. As such, the PRC increased its diplomatic efforts within international organizations like the WTO, ASEAN, ASEAN+3, and the Six-Party Talks on North Korea.84 Along with Deng Xiaoping s conciliatory strategy, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao also promoted peaceful development, building a harmonious world and attempting to refrain from aggressive power politics. China s domestic challenges of economic reform, economic inequalities, and corruption focused and guided the policies of these administrations. The combined result was a peaceful, assuaging foreign policy towards Taiwan, extending friendly gestures to remind others of China s commitment to economic prosperity and stability 83 Russell, The 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis: The United States and China at the Precipice of War? pp Bates Gill, Rising Star (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010). 42

52 in the region.85 From a liberalist perspective, China was demonstrating that it bought into the world establishment and was committed to participating in influential international institutions to engender overall prosperity. However, some scholars assert the above paradigm is not the only rationale that can explain China s behavior at this time. In his article, Constructing Peaceful Development: The Changing Interpretations of One China and Beijing s Taiwan Strait Policy, Dean Chen discusses the multitude of theories attempting to describe the evolution of China s policy towards Taiwan. Chen declares that conventional strategic factors to which rationalists subscribe are not sufficient to explain China s behavior over the last 20 years. He proposes that the constructivist international relations theory could also be an explanation for why the PRC took a conciliatory stance towards Taiwan during these administrations. He argues that China s behavior was not just due to domestic troubles, American hegemonic influence, international pressure, or a growing Taiwanese identity. Chen suggests China actually transformed its own interpretation of the One-China Principle, which, in turn, shaped a more peaceful foreign policy regarding Taiwan. He states, in line with the constructivist argument the one China principle is a socially constructed discourse subject to competing deliberations and persuasions from both China and Taiwan. 86 Towards the end of Jiang Zemin s tenure, Taiwan was referenced as an equal political entity, as opposed to a subservient region of the PRC, thereby demonstrating a marked shift in diplomatic rhetoric. According to Chen, this shift had a lasting effect on cross-strait relations and has, most importantly, reformulated Beijing s definition of one China. In unprecedented style in 1997, the PRC foreign minister, Qian Qichen, utilized new verbiage, without referencing the PRC as the sole legitimate government of all of China, 85 Chen, Constructing Peaceful Development: The Changing Interpretations of One China and Beijing s Taiwan Strait Policy, pp Ibid. 43

53 when he called to resume negotiations with Taiwan after the military crisis.87 Furthermore in 2001, another Chinese official remarked on the very transformation of the PRC foreign policy by stating, once we said we would liberate Taiwan, then we said Taiwan was just a province of China, now we are saying Taiwan can be our equal For the mainland to make these kinds of adjustments in policy is not an easy thing. 88 These statements signaled a fundamental revision in how the PRC viewed Taiwan, how it treated its core interest, and how it defined China. During the early 2000s, China s government chose to further its peaceful promotion across the strait even though the Democratic Progressive Party s proindependence influence was strong within the Taiwan government. In 2007, Hu Jintao publicized his common destiny community and a common homeland for both sides. 89 Once the Kuomintang Party regained power in 2008, hoping for less independent rhetoric from Taiwan, Beijing showed even more tolerance towards President Ma Ying-jeou s administration. Cross-strait dialogue revolved around each side s interpretation of China and the ROC, and the roles each government would play in representing their territories. Hu urged both sides to make pragmatic explorations in their political relations under the special circumstances where the country has not yet been reunified. 90 This peaceful approach, however, did not indicate that China no longer considered Taiwan a core interest or that it no longer 87 Chen, Constructing Peaceful Development: The Changing Interpretations of One China and Beijing s Taiwan Strait Policy, pp John Pomfret, Beijing Signals New Flexibility on Taiwan: Comments Appear Aimed at Bush, Washington Post, January 5, 2001, < 89 Qiang Xin, Beyond Power Politics: institution-building and Mainland China s Taiwan policy transition, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 19, No. 65, April 28, 2010, pp Hu Jintao, Let Us Join Hands to Promote the Peaceful Development of Cross-Straits Relations and Strive with a United Resolve for the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation, speech at the Forum Marking the 30th Anniversary of the Issuance of the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan, Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC, December 31, 2008, < 44

54 sought reunification. Additionally, the delicate nature of the cross-strait situation hosted a plethora of complicating factors concerning international organizations. While both governments rationally accepted that a reunification in the near future was not realistic, this did not stop the mainland from obstructing official Taiwan representation in international organizations. Even during this conciliatory era of PRC foreign policy towards Taiwan, China still dictated that Taipei was treated in unofficial capacities. President Xi Jinping, and his apparent aspiration to cement his place in an uncontested legacy of Chinese strongmen, is confirming what scholars have historically speculated. That is, with the rise of China and its great advances in military, economic, and technological realms, coupled with the personal desire for absolute power, Xi is setting the stage for a more aggressive, less peaceful, less tolerant policy towards Taiwan. This brings China s historical precedence, its position, and its policies surrounding Taiwan, one of its core national interests, full circle. As Chen forecasts in his article, as Beijing s strength increases relative to the United States in the long-run, it may embark upon a more revisionist and even aggressive policy toward Taiwan. 91 During his 19th Party Congress address in 2017, Xi Jinping referenced nine policy elements that guide the PRC s approach to Taiwan and reiterated similar messages that his predecessors have expressed in the past, We must uphold the principles of peaceful reunification [and] work for the peaceful development of cross-straits relations. 92 However, unlike his predecessors, his tone then changed and he took a stern stance regarding territorial sovereignty and the threat of Taiwan independence by stating, We stand firm in safeguarding China s sovereignty and territorial integrity we have firm will and sufficient capability to defeat any form of Taiwan 91 Chen, Constructing Peaceful Development: The Changing Interpretations of One China and Beijing s Taiwan Strait Policy, pp Xi, Full text of Xi Jinping s report at 19th CPC National Congress, pp

55 independence secession plot. 93 Xi progressed in his speech by tying the reunification of Taiwan to his broader quest for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation indicating that a China, which remains divided, cannot achieve this ultimate dream. With this in mind, Xi has set an ambitious agenda to end the delay for reunification.94 After a myriad of recent diplomatic scuffles between the United States and the PRC, including President Trump speaking with President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016, Xi Jinping s retaliation to restrict Chinese tourism to Taiwan, and recent PLAAF flights in the vicinity of the island, the vulnerable nature of the Taiwan issue has resurfaced on the international stage. Most recently on March 16, 2018, President Trump signed into law the Taiwan Travel Act, which allows officials at all levels of the U.S. government to travel to Taiwan on official business. It conversely welcomes Taiwanese government officials to visit the United States and meet their diplomatic counterparts.95 In response to this development, the PRC expressed its offense, labeled it a violation of the OneChina Principle, and President Xi sent a harsh message during his keynote speech at the National People s Congress. He boasted, China will crush any attempt to separate an inch of territory of our great country, reiterating his stance on Taiwan as a core interest.96 Xi Jinping s overt consolidation of power within the CCP by eliminating presidential term limits and the aggressive tone of his reassertion of core national interests suggest yet another evolution in China s foreign policy towards Taiwan. This line of thinking could be extended to other contested regions and, given Xi s assertive undertakings surrounding China s coastal territories, a close eye should be kept on a possible reversion back to the traditional concept of national identity, one China, and 93 Bush, Order From Chaos: What Xi Jinping said about Taiwan at the 19th Party Congress. Ibid. 95 United States, Taiwan Travel Act, Public Law th Congress, March 16, Minnie Chan, Six key points from Xi Jinping s speech wrapping up China s national congress, South China Morning Post, March 20, 2018, <

56 sovereign territorial rights. China still upholds its willingness to wage war to secure its core national interests and no nation, thus far, has been willing to challenge this declaration. 3.2 Socio-economic Factors Socio-economic factors can greatly influence a nation s desire to secure its national interests, and as such ultimately can drive its foreign policy. Chinese ties to Taiwan are rooted in ethnic and cultural bonds dating back to the Han emigration from southeast provinces of China in the 17th Century. Following the Communist triumph in the civil war in 1949, the issue of Taiwan became politicized and Han cultural and ethnic linkages have been used as one reason to justify the mainland s sovereign claim over the island. President Xi Jinping reiterated these ideals as recently as his 19th Party Congress address in October After expressing how the One-China Principle guides the political nature of the two regions in order to realize ultimate reunification, he stated, Blood is thicker than water. People on both sides of the Taiwan Straits are brothers and sisters; we share the bond of kinship. Guided by the conviction that we are all of the same family, we respect the current social system and way of life in Taiwan and are ready to share the development opportunities on the mainland with our Taiwan compatriots first. We will expand cross-straits economic and cultural exchanges and cooperation for mutual benefits. We will ensure that over time, people from Taiwan will enjoy the same treatment as local people when they pursue their studies, start businesses, seek jobs, or live on the mainland, thus improving the wellbeing of Taiwan compatriots. We will encourage people from both sides to work together to promote Chinese culture and forge closer bonds between them. 97 From the CCP s perspective, the Han people of Taiwan are an extension of China s traditional community who, 97 Xi, Full text of Xi Jinping s report at 19th CPC National Congress, pp

57 ultimately, belong to the People s Republic of China. Due to historical developments, they have become separated but the eventual reunification is the desire and wish of all people involved on either side of the strait. In this sense, the PRC uses social factors as a tool and as a logical reason to defend its claim over Taiwan as a core interest. From an economic standpoint, China might also be vested in combining the successes of the PRC and the ROC under one umbrella. Taiwan s GDP is ranked 22 in the world, boasting Int$1,177,052 million in For China to absorb Taiwan s economy into theirs would significantly supplement its financial holdings. It stands to reason then that the eventual goal of reunification of China s homeland, from an economic standpoint, would be in the best interest of China. While this could be one logical reason for why the PRC views Taiwan as a core national interest, it is more likely that national identity, sovereign claims, historical significance, and political dynamics are more substantial factors that guide China s policies across the Strait. 3.3 Use of Force The Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995 and 1996 was the closest Taiwan has come to experiencing war on its soil in almost 40 years. Previously in 1955 and 1958, as a de facto continuation of the civil war, the PRC engaged in military conflict across the Taiwan Strait against Chiang Kai-shek s government on Taiwan. The international political nature surrounding these events included the United States aiding the nationalist government on Taiwan due to its recognition of Chiang Kai-shek s government as the official government of the Republic of China. Since then, the political environment has evolved to become more complicated, with the United States official recognition of the PRC, yet its unofficial pledge to support Taiwan. This most 98 Data is based on purchasing power parity (PPP) as opposed to nominal GDP and given in international dollars. World Economic Outlook Database, Report for Selected Country Groups and Subjects (PPP valuation of country GDP), International Monetary Fund, retrieved October 24, 2017, < 48

58 recent crisis in 1995 and 1996, in addition to the previous spats of conflict, are examples of the PRC s resolve to resort to use of force in order to secure one of its core national interests. Viewed through the realist political theory lens, China sought to secure its survival and thus, in these instances, use of force was required. As described in the earlier political policy section of this chapter, China has recently exhibited increased resolve in its adamant position regarding Taiwan and its status of sovereignty. While no side involved in this political issue has the appetite for disturbing the status quo or testing the military impetus of those implicated, the position of China is clear and unwavering. The degree to which the PRC chooses to employ its tools of political power is the only flexible variable. A detailed examination of the events of the Taiwan Strait Crisis reveals the specific motives that led the PRC to use force to secure its core national interest. The 21st of July 1995 sparked the beginning of what was to be called the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. China launched a total of six DF-15 missiles from the Fujian province that targeted an area approximately 90 miles off the coast of northern Taiwan. Following this first display of military use of force, the PLA conducted a series of military exercises and missile tests along the Taiwan Strait stretching through March In August 1995, one month following the initial missile launches, PLA naval vessels targeted an area 50 times larger than the first exercise by conducting additional live-fire missile tests for ten consecutive days.99 In persistent shows of force, the PLA, PLAAF, and PLAN subsequently conducted a joint exercise south of the Taiwan Strait in November of that year.100 In response, the United States sent the USS Nimitz aircraft 99 Wang, Chronology of Recent Events in U.S.-Taiwan and U.S.-China Relations. Andrew Scobell, China s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (Cambridge University Press: 2003)

59 carrier and four escort vessels through the Taiwan Strait on December 19th.101 Showing further resolve, in February 1996, the PLA began mobilizing in its southeastern provinces once again by moving 150,000 troops along the strait. China reinforced both its air and naval forces in the region. It bolstered its air strength by adding over 80 additional aircraft to its Fujian Province. Furthermore, the Xiamen and Pingtan ports saw the addition of four more amphibious ships.102 March 1996 saw the culmination of the crisis where the PRC organized weeklong, large-scale, jointly-operated, live-fire missile tests and war-game exercises. As Figure 3.1 depicts, these operations were conducted simultaneously in the waters to the east of the Fujian province, to the south of the Taiwan Strait, and to the north of it, with missile launches directed some 50 miles from Taiwan ports. The war games utilized 40 vessels, 260 aircraft, and approximately 150,000 troops to practice nuclear-capable surface-to-surface missile employment, aerial bombings, and amphibious assault landings.103 On 8 March, three live DF-15 missiles landed inside the intended target area and subsequently on 12 March, the PRC government continued with naval and air force maneuvers, closing off the entire 6,000 square-mile area of international waters around the Taiwan Strait.104 Additionally, PLAAF aircraft conducted aerial bombing exercises and surveillance patrols, and naval warships practiced formation drills. Shipping lanes and air traffic operations of Taiwan s major commercial ports, Keelung and Kaohsiung, were disrupted and significantly delayed as a result of these exercises.105 Additionally, the PLA military exercises prompted approximately three hundred Taiwanese people to move from 101 Russell, The 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis: The United States and China at the Precipice of War? pp Wang, Chronology of Recent Events in U.S.-Taiwan and U.S.-China Relations. 103 Scobell, China s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March. 104 Russell, The 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis: The United States and China at the Precipice of War? pp Scobell, China s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March. 50

60 outlying islands where the maneuvers were planned.106 At this time, Taiwan placed its military on heightened alert.107 Figure 3.1: March 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis Map Jamie McIntyre, Pentagon: China fires another missile, CNN, March 12, 1996, < This instance of the PRC s use of military force during the crisis was brought about by several international diplomatic factors. Earlier in 1995, Taiwan president Lee Teng-hui visited the United States that summer. He had received an invitation to deliver a speech on Taiwan Democratization at Cornell University and after some debate, the United States granted his visa to enter the country. At this time, Taiwan s domestic political environment favored the idea of independence and as such, President Lee was eager to gain international recognition and status for Taiwan.108 This visit to the U.S. was one among a series of bold efforts to integrate Taiwan with leading nations and international institutions. The PRC government was strongly critical of the 106 Russell, The 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis: The United States and China at the Precipice of War? pp Wang, Chronology of Recent Events in U.S.-Taiwan and U.S.-China Relations. 108 Russell, The 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis: The United States and China at the Precipice of War? pp

61 Clinton administration for allowing the Taiwan president to enter the U.S. and condemned the government for marring Sino-American relations. In addition to the initial military response in 1995, China s state media published harsh critiques of President Lee, accusing him of rejecting the commitment of overall unification with China, and advocating for Taiwan s independence. The Chinese Communist Party also made grand diplomatic gestures by suspending dialogue with Taiwan, removing its ambassador to the U.S., rejecting the new U.S. ambassador in Beijing, and canceling a variety of high-level U.S. government discussions.109 Even in the midst of this tense situation, Lee Teng-hui announced his candidacy for president in the upcoming Taiwan general elections of With each diplomatic gesture, tensions across the Taiwan Strait rose and rose, culminating in March In the lead up to Taiwan s general election, China decided to conduct another military show of force, intending to send a stern message to its leaders and to the Taiwan electorate. The PRC relied on its guiding policy regarding Taiwan, the One-China Principle, and Lee was viewed as deliberately moving the ROC vision and policies away from this strategy.111 These PLA shows of force were intended to influence Taiwan voters and steer them away from supporting Lee, deter Taiwan from declaring independence, and to send a message to the United States that the PRC was willing to go to extreme lengths to secure its core national interest.112 China made careful and intentional decisions regarding these military exhibitions in order to accomplish this messaging. Firstly, the chosen tool of military force was the nuclear-capable DF-class missile that communicated a critical, while subtle, message of 109 Russell, The 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis: The United States and China at the Precipice of War? pp Wang, Chronology of Recent Events in U.S.-Taiwan and U.S.-China Relations. 111 Russell, The 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis: The United States and China at the Precipice of War? pp Scobell, China s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March. 52

62 nuclear threat to Taiwan.113 Additionally, by staging the exercises 250 miles apart, the PRC intended to showcase its capability to coordinate large-scale, complex military operations, encompassing large geographic areas, including the entire island of Taiwan and its essential ports.114 The United States was alarmed about the evolving situation for several reasons. Firstly, President Clinton s advisors were concerned about the scale of China s maneuvers that proved the feared assumption that the PRC had the capability of targeting Taiwan and conducting large-scale, coordinated, military missions. Additionally, the resulting disruption of regional commerce was not only financially impactful on a global scale, but the intentional obstruction of free market trade was a significant diplomatic move. Furthermore, China was, for the first time, restricting free sea access to the region with military forces and the United States wholeheartedly rejected this challenge to freedom of navigation in international waters. Therefore, the Clinton administration concluded that a U.S. military counter show of force was necessary to dissipate tensions, quell anxieties, reassure friends and allies, and reestablish dominance in the region. As such, the United States subsequently responded by staging the largest display of military force in the Asia-Pacific in decades. On March 9, 1996, President Clinton ordered a robust assembly of naval assets into the region, including 16 ships armed with 200 cruise missiles and 100 combat aircraft. Carrier Strike Group Seven was redirected from the Persian Gulf, and along with Carrier Strike Group Five, sailed into the Southeast Pacific region thereby countering the PRC s aggression.115 On March 13, Rear Admiral James Ellis Jr., Carrier Strike Group Five and Battle Force Seventh Fleet commander, ordered the launch of multiple F-14 and F113 Russell, The 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis: The United States and China at the Precipice of War? pp Wang, Chronology of Recent Events in U.S.-Taiwan and U.S.-China Relations. 115 Russell, The 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis: The United States and China at the Precipice of War? pp

63 18 flights from the USS Independence to conduct standard air intercept practice and bombardment exercises. During the exercises, the commander made a public statement addressing the battle groups purpose in the region, reiterating U.S. commitment to peace in the region.116 The deterrence shows of force by the United States were enough to diffuse the extreme tensions across the Taiwan Strait. At the conclusion of the PLA s military exercises, the crisis dissolved. Following a year-long series of private dignitary exchanges between Washington and Beijing that culminated in March 1997,117 and coupled with China s lack of appetite to engage in a full-scale war, China determined that its strong message to Taiwanese leader, Lee, had been heard and heeded. However, one outcome of these tense shows of force was the Chinese realization that its military capabilities were lacking, in comparison to the United States. In the midst of multiple global displays of United States military might across the world, including a broadscale military standoff that exemplified the U.S. naval fleet in the Taiwan Strait and the demonstrations of technological advancements and employment capabilities of the U.S. Army and Air Force during the Gulf War, China made the decision to modernize its PLA in an effort to meet and challenge the world s hegemon.118 Military investments, foreign acquisitions, indigenous resourcing, and embracing modern war fighting strategies became the PRC s main focus in the years to come. Specifically, in order to have a credible military deterrent to thwart Taiwan s crusade for greater autonomy, China needed the capability to successfully invade the island. This ability included adjustments, advancements, and increases in combat training, mobile rapid reaction 116 Wang, Chronology of Recent Events in U.S.-Taiwan and U.S.-China Relations. Terry Atlas and William Neikirk, U.S., China Quietly Worked To Defuse Taiwan Crisis, Chicago Tribune, March 31, 1996, < 118 Richard A. Bitzinger, Military Spending and Foreign Military Acquisitions by the PRC and Taiwan, in James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs, ed., Crisis in the Taiwan Strait, (Ft. McNair, Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1997), pg

64 forces, high-technology weapons systems, military strategy operations, the role of the Nanjing Military Region, and amphibious and sea-lift operations.119 Focus transitioned to the procurement of tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, other precision-guided munitions, advanced fighter aircraft, modern submarines and anti-ship cruise missiles, and improved tactical surveillance and communications suites.120 From the PRC s perspective, China s economic rise would have to be matched with the military capability to secure its core national interests in the future, specifically Taiwan. Scholars describe the PLA s modernization at the end of the 1990s by stating, The pace of upgrading [its military forces] is accelerating because of mounting concerns among policymakers in Beijing that Taipei is seeking independence. Beijing considers this the most serious challenge to China s national security since the end of the Cold War. 121 In the case of Taiwan, the PRC has been willing to resort to use of force in order to secure one of its treasured and historic core national interests, and in order to carry out this threat, its capacities must be credible. As such, it must constantly adapt its military to match current capabilities in anticipation of the day when use of force against Taiwan is necessary. 3.4 Conclusion Evaluation of China s core interests through the lens of three perspectives, political and diplomatic positions, socio-economic influences, and concrete military action, sheds light on the manner in which the PRC determines and handles its interests. Assessment of Taiwan, the first case study in this thesis, reveals that this region does, in fact, satisfy these three criteria. In this light, and in accordance with these three criteria, 119 Tai Ming Cheung, Chinese Military Preparations Against Taiwan Over the Next 10 Years, in James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs, ed., Crisis in the Taiwan Strait, (Ft. McNair, Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1997), pg Bitzinger, Military Spending and Foreign Military Acquisitions by the PRC and Taiwan, pg Cheung, Chinese Military Preparations Against Taiwan Over the Next 10 Years, pg

65 a determination can be reached to determine that Taiwan is, indeed, a core national interest of China. Specifically, national identity, sovereign rights, territorial integrity, historical context, and cultural bonds play enormous and significant roles in influencing China s stance on this region and driving the policies and action the PRC takes with regard to cross-strait issues. Firstly, the official political position that the PRC has on Taiwan is that the region is, and has always been, an indivisible part of the Chinese nation. The ultimate, long term goal is for eventual reunification of the Chinese people to live and prosper under one system. While, practically speaking, the One-China Principle allows these two regions to operate semi-autonomously, the PRC makes very clear diplomatic overtures to declare that officially, the two communities are one, belonging to one sovereign state. There is no question in the minds of leaders across the world that the Chinese government holds Taiwan, from a political perspective, to be a core national interest. President Xi Jinping has made this stance ever more unambiguous during his recent public addresses to the Chinese nation. Additionally, in the face of diplomatic provocations by President Trump, Xi continues to react in an aggressive, intolerant manner. Instances like President Tsai Ing-wen s phone call and President Trump s signing of the Taiwan Travel Act both incite stern and disapproving messages from President Xi, reiterating China s resolve to secure its core national interest. Secondly, socio-economic factors have historically tied the two regions together. The concept of national identity and the Han people continue to provide impetus for the eventual reunification across the Taiwan Strait. The influences of traditional cultural heritage and ethnic bonds highlight the importance of this region to the PRC. The government uses cultural ties as a founding reason to justify Taiwan as a core national interest and China s quest to reunite these populations. Therefore, in this case study, a 56

66 determination can be made that Taiwan meets the criteria of a core national interest through the lens of socio-economic influences. Lastly, concrete, measurable, military action is the third and final perspective from which this case study is analyzed. As the realist school of international relations theory suggests, use of force will be used in order to secure national concerns in the interest of survival. Throughout the course of history, the Chinese Communist Party has resorted to the use of force against Taiwan multiple times. The government continues to boast its sovereign right to use force and wholeheartedly insists on using its military as a tool of political power. Additionally, China undergoes specialized and focused modernization of its armed forces to adapt to current Taiwan issues. This indicates that the PRC deems Taiwan vital to the survival of its statehood. This, therefore, by logical deduction, classifies Taiwan a core national interest of China. The manner in which China conducts itself, from a military perspective, indicates to the world the lengths to which, and the resolve with which, it is willing to go to secure its core national interests. In summary, the case study of Taiwan, examined through the aforementioned perspectives, demonstrates that it does, indeed, meet these three criteria. Within the theoretical framework of this thesis, Taiwan satisfies the definition of core national interest. The ability to use this case study s analysis and apply it to other regional contestations and, or broader contexts of Chinese diplomacy could be a valuable tool for world leaders in making decisions. The South China Sea region is one example of where this evaluation could prove to be useful. From the perspectives of political diplomacy, socio-economic influences, and military action, how does China view this region? What is its resolve, when considering Southeast Asian dynamics and the implications on the regional and global stages? This paper aims to examine two 57

67 additional regions, Tibet and Xinjiang, to further refine China s definition of core national interests, before applying this theoretical framework to analyze the South China Sea situation. 58

68 Chapter 4: Tibet 4.1 Political and Diplomatic Policy The second case study examined in this thesis is the region of Tibet. Plagued by cultural, societal, economic, human rights, and political turmoil, Tibet has endured a long path of unrest and continues with these struggles. The autonomous region of Tibet is a vital region of Chinese concern that is laden with controversy dating back many centuries, and hosts a variety of dynasties, lordships, principalities, and tribal groups having a part in its governance. Within the context of modern history, Tibet has been under constant pressure to succumb to the communist regime. Examination of the political situation regarding the PRC s stance concerning the region reveals China s unwavering commitment to ensuring Tibet remains a province under the national Chinese banner. Shortly after the Communist Party gained control of China and established the PRC, in an effort to consolidate his rule over the entire mainland, Mao ordered the PLA to invade the Tibetan region in After quickly defeating the Tibetan army, negotiations began in Beijing to establish communist rule over the region, thereby indicating that Tibet was considered a core national interest of China. By 1951, Mao officially incorporated Tibet into the PRC so as to safeguard national unity and territorial integrity via the Seventeen Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet.122 The most notable points within the agreement dictated that Tibetans would assist the PRC to consolidate national defenses and the Tibetan Army would be dissolved into the PLA. Additionally, the Central People s Government would have centralized handling of external affairs in the region through the operation of the Military and Administrative Committee located in Tibet. The agreement stated that the 122 People s Republic of China, Tibet s Path of Development is Driven by an Irresistible Historical Tide. 59

69 Tibetan religion (including the organizational leadership of the Dalai Lama), political system, cultural customs, and educational system would remain unchanged.123 However, in reality, struggles between pro-independence Tibetan rebels and Chinese communist soldiers continued. Finally, in fear of his life, the 14th Dalai Lama exiled himself to India in From India, he now oversees the Tibetan political situation via the Central Tibetan Administration organization.124 His official duties surrounding the governance of Tibet and his role therein include negotiating with the CCP government to achieve genuine autonomy for all Tibetans. The Middle-Way Approach was a strategy proposed by the Dalai Lama in the 1980s, and adopted by the CTA in 1997, in an attempt to forge a compromise between the two sides by not demanding independence, but at the same time not accepting the status of Tibet under CCP rule.125 However, China has not reacted positively towards this proposed policy and has not made any indications it will alter its approach towards Tibet. Thus, the Dalai Lama has, since, had to modify his strategy and reengage in negotiations with the PRC. For decades, the Dalai Lama and his government have worked tirelessly to represent and support the people living in Tibet who, from their perspective, are subjected to continual oppression of their individual rights. Today, the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) functions with a provincial-level government that is officially subservient to the CCP. The PRC publically states that any interference in the ruling of Tibet by the Dalai Lama or his religiously-driven organization is illegal and in direct conflict with China s sovereign rights. The most 123 People s Republic of China, Seventeen-Point Plan for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet (1951), University of British Columbia, May 23, 1951, < _0.pdf>. 124 Central Tibetan Administration, Charter of the Tibetans In Exile. 125 Central Tibetan Administration, The Middle-Way Approach: A Framework for Resolving the Issue of Tibet, Department of Information and International Relations, August, 2006, < 60

70 recent white paper released by China s government in 2015 reiterates its official stance regarding the Tibet region. It states, Tibet has been a part of China s territory since ancient times, and the Tibetans have been one communal member of the Chinese nation In today s world, all countries acknowledge this as a fact; no country has ever acknowledged Tibetan independence. There is no question about Tibet s political status. 126 In response to the Dalai party s demands for a high degree of autonomy, the PRC retorts by asserting this would undermine national unity, sovereignty and the state systems of China. 127 Finally, China purports that the central government has always had effective sovereign jurisdiction over the region, therefore, the issue of resuming some sort of independence, asserted by the Dalai Lama, is not a factor and runs counter to China s fundamental political system of socialism with Chinese characteristics.128 In recognition of wide-ranging and diverse ethnic situations facing China s overall national make-up, the PRC has established ethnically-driven policies in attempt to appease regional communities, while still maintaining control over its nation as a whole. Specifically, Tibet falls under the Law of Regional Ethnic Autonomy, which, according to the Chinese government, enjoys extensive autonomy in legislation, language, culture and education, and flexible application of relevant state laws as well as fiscal management and official appointments. 129 The 2015 white paper describes that regional ethnic autonomy means that the minority ethnic groups, under unified state leadership, practice regional autonomy in areas where they live in compact communities and establish their own organs of self-government to exercise their right of autonomy. Ethnic autonomous areas are classified into the three levels of autonomous 126 People s Republic of China, Tibet s Path of Development is Driven by an Irresistible Historical Tide. Ibid. 128 Ibid. 129 Ibid

71 regions, autonomous prefectures and autonomous counties. All ethnic autonomous areas are integral parts of the People s Republic of China. 130 Additionally, the PRC publically supports the freedom of religion, boasting that the region hosts a multitude of belief systems, including Tibetan Buddhism, Bon, Islam, and Catholicism, which are all treated equally. Michael Davis, professor of law at the Chinese University of Hong Kong and scholar on China s international relations, attests in his article, The Quest for Self-Rule in Tibet, the struggle between Tibetan genuine autonomy and the PRC s commitment to national sovereignty continues to dictate the dilemma. China insists that its national-minority policy, under Article 4 of its constitution, affords the religious and ethnic freedoms the Tibetan people desire, while simultaneously maintains the region as core to its national interests.131 China upholds its strict position on sovereign integrity, declaring, Since ancient times Tibet has been an inseparable part of Chinese territory, where the Central Government has always exercised effective sovereign jurisdiction over the region. 132 Davis research demonstrates the influence of core national interests on the PRC policies regarding the Tibetan region. Given the historical diplomacy and current political policies that dictate the intricate and dynamic affairs of the Tibetan region, China has demonstrated its unwavering, official position on this territory. From the public political perspective, as evidenced by official policy, public statements, and diplomatic action, this region, indeed, satisfies this criterion within this thesis theoretical framework. That is to say, viewed through this lens, Tibet is a core national interest of China. 130 People s Republic of China, Tibet s Path of Development is Driven by an Irresistible Historical Tide. Davis, The Quest for Self-Rule in Tibet, pp People s Republic of China, Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet

72 4.2 Socio-economic Factors From a societal perspective, ethnic factors have always been at the heart of the contentious situation in Tibet. Various ethnic compositions, other than Han, comprise the Tibetan community. Additionally, the culture of traditional customs, language, religious observations, Buddhist organizational structure, and education practices of this small, tightly-woven community has always differentiated Tibetans from the rest of the communist community on the mainland. Historically, these differences, coupled with the desire for consolidation of a communist nation, have perpetuated unrest in the region. The Communist Party, however, is insistent on the notion that Tibet is a part of China and, therefore, cultural and ethnic issues should be handled internally. The PRC is outwardly proud of the multiethnic composition of its nation and publically proclaims this is a founding cornerstone of the country by stating, The People s Republic of China is a united multi-ethnic country created through the joined efforts of the peoples of all the ethnic groups in China. Over the long course of history, these ethnic groups have grown into a single community that responds to each and every challenge under the single name of the Chinese nation. 133 Additionally, the PRC has encouraged westward Han migration in an effort to amalgamate the differing ethnic groups and assimilate Tibetans into the larger Chinese community.134 The central government recognizes the multitude of peoples within Tibet, including Tibetans, Monbas, Lhobas, Naxis, Huis, and Han, and is publically committed to the ideal that these ethnic groups should enjoy unimpeded practice of their beliefs and customs. The PRC professes that Article 4 of the nation s constitution, coupled with the Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy, afford Tibetans extensive autonomy in legislation, language, culture and education, and flexible application of relevant state laws as well as fiscal management People s Republic of China, Tibet s Path of Development is Driven by an Irresistible Historical Tide. Ibid. 63

73 and official appointments. 135 It claims that the leadership of the Communist government has engendered the inheritance and spread of positive aspects of traditional Tibetan culture, for example, the preservation of the Tibetan language. Additionally, and perhaps most notably, China attests that Tibetan citizens enjoy the full freedom of religious exercise, whereby all beliefs are respected and protected by the constitution, with all sects being treated equally.136 However, Tibetans testify the reality is far from autonomous, including cultural institutional repression, legislative dominance, religious oppression, military occupations, and human rights violations. While the superficial intent of the law is to grant autonomy to ethnic minority communities, the reality of the issue lies in how effectively minorities can exercise the powers that the law affords them.137 Tibet citizens view the official encouragement of westward Han migration as an attempt to dilute the Tibetan culture and dominate the urban sectors of the region. Ultimately, the overall purpose of the Communist Party in the region has been to totally integrate, assimilate and merge the Tibetan people with the Han majority not only politically and economically but also culturally, linguistically, socially. Such an assimilationist policy in the name of revolution amounts to a systematic destruction of Tibetan autonomy and sinicization of Tibetan identity. 138 What Tibetans desire is socio-cultural independence over true political independence. However, the Chinese government systematically implements a tight, multilayered security system with structural violence that denies any sort of free civil society or social space, and this continues to oppress the community People s Republic of China, Tibet s Path of Development is Driven by an Irresistible Historical Tide. Ibid. 137 Davis, The Quest for Self-Rule in Tibet, pp Warren W. Smith, China s Tibet Policy by Dawa Norbu A Review, The Tibet Journal, Vol. 28, No. 4, November 2003, pp Smith, China s Tibet Policy by Dawa Norbu A Review, pp

74 Overall, the socio-cultural factors play a significant and historically deep-rooted role in China s stance regarding the Tibet region. Analysis of this case study from the socio-cultural perspective, demonstrates that Tibetan ethnic and cultural elements and their implications on PRC policies meet the criteria within the theoretical framework of this thesis. That is to say, Tibet does qualify as a Chinese core national interest when viewed through the lens of the societal perspective. China has declared the multifaceted ethnic composition of its citizens to be vital to the foundation of its nation. Additionally, the socio-cultural ethnic minority policies and laws, coupled with the incentivized westward Han migration, indicate the unwavering desire to assimilate Tibetan peoples under the overall Chinese banner. Nowhere, within this view of the Tibet region and the role it plays as a part of the greater Chinese nation, does China welcome a proindependence debate. Unfortunately, the realities, of what should be an autonomously functioning region, are riddled with community cultural dissatisfaction and continuous unrest. 4.3 Use of Force Counts of PRC use of force within the territory of Tibet are numerous and deliberate, and support overall Chinese policies of sovereign protection. Throughout modern communist history, China has decided, on multiple occasions, to employ its military forces to suppress uprisings and separatist movements in order to maintain complete control over the greater Chinese territories. This willing and persistent use of force is telling when analyzing China s stance on the region. The establishment of Tibet s tenure under communist rule even began under militaristic hostilities. As Mao Zedong came to power in 1949, and with the intentions of consolidating his power over the newly-established People s Republic of China, he utilized his military forces to compel the Tibetans to succumb to Maoist rule and 65

75 officially absorbed Tibet under the communist flag. The Battle of Chamdo in October 1950 was a result of previously failed negotiations between the PRC and Tibet representatives to establish official relations. Intolerance of an independent Tibet nation drove the CCP to use military force in the region in order to suppress separatist movements. The PLA mission was to capture the Tibetan army in Chamdo and demoralize the Lhasa government to force its surrender and impose an official agreement of subservient existence. On October 6, 1950, PLA forces crossed the Yangtze River and by October 19th they surrounded Tibetan forces around the border town of Chamdo. All told, 180 Tibetan soldiers died or were wounded and with the Tibet army commander captured, the PRC government was in a position to dictate terms.140 The resulting contract became known as the Seventeen-Point Agreement of 1951 that officially amalgamated Tibet as a province under Maoist control. This marked the beginning of a continued PLA presence within the region that persists today, messaging PRC resolve that it is willing to use military force in order to maintain control over one of its core interests. Years of cultural and religious oppression provoked an environment of rebellious activity and uprisings. In 1959, the pressure peaked and armed conflict between Tibetan rebels and the PLA erupted in the capital city of Lhasa. In March of that year, protestors marched on the city demanding Tibet s independence. The uprising and subsequent PLA military response, fraught with violence, was so intense that the Dalai Lama was forced to evacuate and exile to India. The Tibetan forces were severely outnumbered and under-armed, and after two days of combat, the PRC suppressed the revolt and regained control. Due to the unyielding tensions between communist party members and Tibetan citizens, an environment of minority uprisings and guerilla 140 Grunfeld, The Making of Modern Tibet, pg

76 warfare persisted for years to come, while the PLA maintained an ever-present authority in the region.141 Resulting from the generally conciliatory policies of Deng Xiaoping and a relatively relaxed notion of centralized communist manipulation throughout all levels of Chinese communities, the 1980s saw the emergence of citizen uprisings across all of China, the most notable being the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident. Similarly, 1987 through 1989 saw revisited unrest in Tibet. Pro-independence groups protested in the Sichuan, TAR, Qinghai, Yunnan, and Gansu regions, with the largest demonstration taking place in the Tibetan capital of Lhasa in The lead up to this massive uprising included sporadic violent unrest and resulting deaths during the fall of 1987, March and December 1988, and a string of sequential skirmishes in the spring of Each instance was a confrontation between Tibetan citizens, Chinese police and PLA representatives. As a result of the extreme tensions and violence during the Lhasa protest, the PRC declared martial law on March 8th and subsequently an even larger military force was utilized to control the situation and suppress further dissent.142 Tibet s violent history under communist rule has demonstrated the PRC resolve to employ its military forces to suppress separatist movements and minority community unrest. In line with the theoretical framework structuring this thesis, it can be concluded that, from the military use of force perspective, Tibet satisfies the criterion to classify the region as a core national interest of China. In accordance with theoretical political philosophy, the use of force surrounding a situation dictates that the state considers it a matter of survival. In this case, China deems Tibet s role within its nation as vital to its national identity and is willing to go to extreme lengths to secure this core interest. 141 Grunfeld, The Making of Modern Tibet, pg.134. Tsering Shakya, The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet Since 1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pg

77 4.4 Conclusion The case study of Tibet, as analyzed through the three lenses of official political policy, socio-economic factors, and military action, reveals that the region does, indeed, fulfill the criteria of a core national interest. In accordance with this research s theoretical framework, classifying Tibet as a core national interest, specifically via the aforementioned three perspectives, helps further refine the definition of the term and how leaders of great nations apply it to their policies. In the case of Tibet, it is a question of national identity and territorial sovereignty that drives the PRC s actions in the region. Diplomatic policies concerning the region of Tibet reveal the official, unwavering political stance of the PRC. Chinese top-level leaders draw on historical context as the backdrop to describe why Tibet has never been, nor ever will be, an independent state. Rhetoric, including terms such as national unity and sovereign jurisdiction, reveal the government s position of total and complete authority over Tibet, which serves as a subservient region within the greater Chinese nation. The PRC caveats this claim with the constitutional provision that affords ethnic minority communities freedom of cultural preservation and religious practice under the Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy. The case for Tibet to be classified as a core national interest, from the perspective of official political policy, is supported in this context. Societal and cultural factors are the most significant sources of contention that permeate this hostile dynamic. Tibetans profess their freedoms are severely impinged by the oppressive communist delegates who represent their region. Religious exercise, cultural traditions, and daily customs are continuously repressed. Tensions, formed from decades of living in a stifled environment, often result in violent outcomes. The Chinese government has historically, and perseveres to, proudly insist that the 68

78 multiethnic composition of Chinese citizens is a cornerstone of its national identity. The PRC continues to express its superficial desire to foster a prosperous, culturallypreserving environment within which Tibetans can flourish within the greater nation of China. The central government recognizes the significance of the socio-cultural factors that influence the situation in Tibet. As such, it considers these aspects vital to maintaining control over the region. In this light then, Tibet satisfies the criterion of a core national interest, when analyzed from the societal perspective. History paints quite a clear picture of the military force used in the region of Tibet and the resolve China has in securing its territory. From its outset in 1950, again in 1959, and once more in 1989, the CCP s PLA has played a large role in the region, with a constant and persistent presence throughout the years in between these violent confrontations. The willingness of the PRC to consistently crack down on Tibetan protests with the use of military force is a testament to how seriously it considers the situation in the region. Instances of military employment in the region exemplify the resolve of China to secure its areas of concern. From the perspective of concrete military action, the territory of Tibet satisfies the criterion of being one of China s core national interests. In summary, taking into consideration the three perspectives within the analysis of this case study reveals that in all three instances, Tibet fulfills the criteria to classify it a core national interest of China. This deeper and well-rounded understanding of China s motivations and intentions regarding territorial sovereignty helps refine the existing definition of core national interests. Like Taiwan, the study of Tibet as one of China s core interests sets a standard that the international community can rely on as to the resolve China has in protecting its affairs. It can subsequently help guide policymakers diplomacy on a multitude of issues affecting the country. 69

79 70

80 Chapter 5: Xinjiang 5.1 Political and Diplomatic Policy Faced with complicated, historical, ethnic, cultural, and religious issues, coupled with industrialization and modernization developmental concerns, China must confront many challenges in the stark and harsh region of Xinjiang. Like Tibet, the PRC treats the Xinjiang province and its citizens in a similar manner. Based on historical legacy, China upholds its sovereign rights over the territory by claiming the area is part of China s homeland and has been since ancient times. In the 2015 white paper on the development of Xinjiang, the PRC State Council stated, China is a unified and multiethnic country. Xinjiang has been home to several of China s ethnic peoples since ancient times. They have worked hard to build Xinjiang, to safeguard border stability, national unification and ethnic unity, and to promote the development and progress of China. 143 After the PLA liberated Xinjiang in 1949, and subsequently established the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in 1955, this territory and its citizens were formally incorporated under modern China s flag. The PRC s objectives, of national unification, territorial integrity, and the development of a prosperous China, are supported by political policies and diplomatic action specific to this region, which indicates the government s commitment to securing this vital interest. Firstly, just like in Tibet, the implementation of an autonomous region for the benefit of ethnic minorities is China s attempt to assuage Xinjiang s citizens objections while still maintaining PRC control over the territory. The CCP states, Under the unified state leadership, implementing regional autonomy in areas where ethnic minorities live in concentrated communities is a basic political system of 143 People s Republic of China, Historical Witness to Ethnic Equality, Unity and Development in Xinjiang. 71

81 China. It is an important step on the correct path towards resolving ethnic problems in a Chinese manner and an institutional guarantee that the path will be followed. 144 Following on from this, the constitutional Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy signals China s further commitment to fostering a productive community by allowing the citizens to maintain their cultural identity and continue their religious practices unimpeded. Within a region comprised of Uyghur, Han, Kazak, Hui, Kirgiz, Mongolian, Xibe, Tajik, Manchu, Uzbek, Russian, Daur, and Tartar peoples, the PRC claims, The practice of ethnic regional autonomy in Xinjiang has ensured the democratic rights of all ethnic peoples in the region, making them the masters of Xinjiang. It is also of great significance in strengthening the harmonious relationship of equality, unity and mutual assistance of the various ethnic groups, safeguarding national unification, accelerating economic development, and promoting social progress in Xinjiang. 145 Secondly, in order to have a direct role in, and closely monitor, the situation in the remote region of Xinjiang, the PRC created the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) in This organization was charged with cultivating the local economy and safeguarding China s national borders. The CCP describes the functions of the XPCC, which operate with unified party, government, military, and enterprise roles stating, Combining the functions of production, administration, and defense, the XPCC has made indelible contributions to the development of Xinjiang, by promoting unity among ethnic groups, maintaining social stability, and strengthening national border defense. 146 Since its inception, the Corps has evolved, dissolved, and been reinstated, but throughout every turn, it has maintained a strong paramilitary 144 People s Republic of China, Historical Witness to Ethnic Equality, Unity and Development in Xinjiang. 145 Ibid. 146 People s Republic of China, The History and Development of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, State Council White Paper, October 5, 2014, < 72

82 presence in the region through the use of the PLA, militia, and armed police. Through China s official policies, it is evident that this constant military force, regimenting the region, signals China s continuing resolve to enforce strict control over the people in order to secure this territory as part of the greater Chinese nation. Among the multitude of challenges that encompass community integration, China faces the struggles of ethnic separatism, religious extremism, and violent terrorism, movements that have had, and continue to have, a strong influence in the region. The PRC is adamant about punishing terrorism and the government is wholeheartedly intolerant of separatist movements. China recognizes strife caused by internal conflict, as well as external pressures (specifically the Soviet Union, and now Russia), and has classified these threats as the three forces, stating they are a great and real threat to ethnic unity and social stability in Xinjiang. 147 According to the CCP, judicial entities within the community are committed to enforcing the ability to exercise religious freedom and are also empowered to suppress overt religious supremacy or violence from any sect. Whether these ethnic and cultural struggles promoting independence, which often times result in massive protestations and violence, are founded in legitimate claims is a topic of heated debate. However, regardless of the validity of either side s argument, China is resolute about suppressing uprisings and protecting its territorial integrity with the existing policies written in its constitution. Evaluation of the PRC s political stance regarding the Xinjiang region reveals that China is politically dedicated to securing it as a core national interest. 147 People s Republic of China, Historical Witness to Ethnic Equality, Unity and Development in Xinjiang. 73

83 5.2 Socio-economic Factors Due to its location, bordering many nations including Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, the Xinjiang region of China has historically encompassed a multitude of ethnic groups and cultural customs that stray from the traditional Han-oriented society. This combination of multiple ethnic groups, coupled with the Han-dominated PRC command rule, results in Xinjiang suffering a long-lasting struggle between ethnic minorities and governmental agencies. Throughout it all, the PRC maintains that the multiethnic composition of this territory is a positive and foundational component of the greater Chinese nation. As such, societal aspects existing in this region are vital to China s claim of territorial sovereignty over Xinjiang. China s constitution attempts to address the substantial societal and ethnic problems that plague the Xinjiang region and the Chinese nation as a whole. With the Uyghur people representing 46% of the ethnic makeup of the region,148 cultural and religious tensions persist within the overall Han-majority country of China. The PRC 2015 white paper on development in Xinjiang presents the Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy as the solution to ethnic equality problems. It states, The establishment of the system of ethnic regional autonomy serves to protect the legitimate rights and interests of ethnic minorities and safeguard the equal rights and interests of individual citizens. People of all ethnic origins in Xinjiang are ensured an equal legal status. They enjoy the rights to vote and stand for election as prescribed by the Constitution and the law, the right of equal participation in the administration of state affairs, the right of religious belief, the right to receive education, the right to use their own spoken and written languages, the right to inherit and carry on the traditional culture of their own 148 Stanley Toops, Spatial Results of the 2010 Census in Xinjiang, China Policy Institute, March 7, It is widely known that national minorities are undercounted in Chinese censuses. 74

84 ethnic groups, etc. 149 In similar ways that the Chinese government handles its ethnic minority issues in Tibet, Xinjiang is also afforded the benefits of being an autonomous region. The local communities are supposedly entitled the rights to maintain their culture and enjoy an unimpeded existence. In this way, the PRC can officially claim social equality, and thereby, more legitimately retain control over this large portion of the nation. The government uses the XPCC as a tool to regulate social issues in the region, whereby the PRC states its responsibilities comprise promoting social progress and unity among ethnic groups in Xinjiang. 150 This endeavor includes social equality, social justice, fair welfare programs, a complete education system, and public cultural service systems.151 However, the official recognition of a multiethnic society by the Chinese government is not received positively by the local citizens. Claims of cultural, religious, and ethnic persecution have plagued this region for decades. Separatist, religious extremist and terrorist forces and their sabotage activities have become a major threat to national unity and to Xinjiang s social stability. They are hence the focus of the work of the XPCC. 152 This statement provides the PRC with, what it deems, a legitimate authority to crush any form of independence movements. However, from the perspective of ethnic minorities in the region, in reality, this has become a practice of racial profiling and overt prosecution of all ethnic people, not merely the criminals. As such, this region sees a persistent struggle between the oppressed peoples and the communist government. Previously, the PRC s political strategy included downplaying the seriousness of ethnic strife in the region. However, more recently, general cultural 149 People s Republic of China, Historical Witness to Ethnic Equality, Unity and Development in Xinjiang. 150 People s Republic of China, The History and Development of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. 151 Ibid. 152 Ibid. 75

85 and ethnic repression, and second-class citizenship has become the result of the latest propaganda campaign to label all Uyghur opposition as international terrorist networks. The 9/11 attacks in the U.S. fueled this change in political approach, whereby the PRC now explicitly links independent religious activities and political dissent to terrorism. Consequently, citizens are subjected to widespread arbitrary arrests, places of worship closures, suppression of traditional religious activities, and sentencing of extreme prison terms or death. The minorities in the region attest that their peaceful protests are reclassified as acts of terrorism, allegations that they then can never escape. Not only are their day-to-day cultural practices and education methods severely impinged and restricted, but every expression of dissatisfaction is immediately associated with separatist ideology, which is, in turn, directly linked with actions conducted by terrorist forces.153 Nevertheless, China is resolute in presenting an official appearance of tolerance for ethnic diversity and social equality. Priding itself on being a multiethnic nation and advocating for the contributions of each cultural group as fundamental elements of the greater Chinese nation, the PRC uses the same line of reasoning as it does for Tibet to justify Xinjiang being an uncontested part of China. In no situation would the CCP tolerate any form of separatism and the government continually suppresses any signs of dissent. This signals that the region of Xinjiang, from the societal perspective, is a core national interest of China. From an economic perspective, the Xinjiang region offers a multitude of reasons for China to maintain the territory within PRC control and part of the Chinese nation. Historically, this western territory has served as a gateway to Central Asia, with multiple communities engaging in trade and commerce exchanges. With the Sino153 Nicolas Becquelin, Criminalizing Ethnicity: Political Repression in Xinjiang, China Rights Forum, 2004, No. 1, pp

86 Soviet split in the 1960s, relations between Xinjiang and other bordering nations were severed and the region s economic development suffered greatly. Since the open and reform policy, Xinjiang has experienced slow and gradual economic progression as China builds infrastructure and makes great efforts to advance the region. These efforts, beginning in the 1990s, were part of the early stage of China s look-west policy, which has now evolved into the new Belt and Road Initiative. As the economic growth of China emerged rapidly, so too did a strategic guideline for fossil fuel industry resource development in the west. The potential of the region, boasting enormous quantities of energy and mineral reserves, was vital to China s growth. In the 2000s, in addition to regional resource extraction and industrial modernization, China also focused on relations development with westward nations, with Xinjiang serving as a bridgehead to the western periphery and the channel by which to explore markets in Central Asia. Since then, the government has invested heavily in the area, providing incentives and subsidies in the infrastructure, energy, technology, industry, and communications fields. President Xi s announcement for the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013 has further legitimized the vital role Xinjiang plays in China s overall strategy.154 Given these economic advantages of the Xinjiang territory, China demonstrates that it is not willing to let them go. The PRC uses the XPCC as a tool to implement these economic strategies and achieve its goals in the region. It is a large state-owned enterprise engaged in agriculture, industry, and transport, building, and commerce assum[ing] state assigned economic tasks. 155 The government entity began by first establishing farms in an effort to boost agricultural output in the early stages of communist rule. Subsequently, it expanded to operating mines, building factories and roads, and developing commerce. 154 Li, From Look-West to Act-West: Xinjiang s role in China-Central Asian relations, pp People s Republic of China, The History and Development of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps

87 Its goal, to boost and support Xinjiang s industrial development, has been achieved by the promotion of large-scale industrial, construction, transport, and commercial enterprises, as well as the establishment of large metropolises, all facilitating the modernization and urbanization of Xinjiang. The powerful and authoritarian characteristic of the XPCC, which has a strong CCP and paramilitary presence, indicate China s resolve to ensure the economic success of the region, thereby transferring such success to the overall Chinese nation. In summary, the Chinese government is heavily invested in the economic potentials the Xinjiang region can offer the country. The natural resources abundant within the region, coupled with the geographic access to numerous nations in Central Asia, make the Xinjiang region a vital interest to China. Consequently, the societal and ethnic problems that persist within the Xinjiang communities are a major concern to the PRC. As such, it invests considerable manpower and resources to develop ethnic minority programs to engender assimilation and quell dissent, and to provide paramilitary security to control uprisings and suppress separatist movements. From a socio-economic perspective, the Xinjiang region proves to be a core national interest of China. 5.3 Use of Force The use of military force and paramilitary entities by the PRC within the territory of Xinjiang is unrelenting. China s objectives are to maintain order, ensure compliance, suppress any violent unrest or separatist dissent, and secure its national borders. Much like instances in Tibet, the Xinjiang region has been subjected to countless occurrences of military force and subsequent violence in order for the PRC to secure its interests in the area. 78

88 From the onset, beginning with the communist takeover in 1949 and the subsequent declaration of Xinjiang as an autonomous region in 1955, PLA and police forces have been a constant presence in the region. As early as 1954, the PRC used the XPCC as a military force in order to implement economic and social reforms and safeguard its frontiers. The organization brought millions of Han soldiers and civilians to build cities, foster agricultural development, and provide security.156 The PRC has never disguised the purpose of troop presence in the region, describing the founding of the XPCC as fulfilling the responsibilities the state has entrusted to it to cultivate and guard the border areas and improving China s strategic position in its northwest border defense. 157 Within this context, its role is to also prosecute criminal sabotage activities by terrorist forces.158 This mandate, to crack down on the three forces of ethnic separatism, religious extremism, and violent terrorism, has become the modern political strategy of the PRC to handle the social unrest in the area. With the legitimacy of the XPCC intact, the government has the power and leeway to use military and paramilitary forces via this official unit. The CCP classifies it as a paramilitary entity with military organs and armed forces units wherein the militias are the mainstay. 159 The government boasts that stationed troops, armed police, and local militias cooperate to secure the border area. China professes the organization s purpose is to secure its national sovereignty by stating, the XPCC has built a strong border joint defense system. It has played a special role in safeguarding the country s unification. 160 This clearly indicates that China is willing to use military force in order to secure this core territorial interest. 156 Justin V. Hastings, Charting the Course of Uyghur Unrest, The China Quarterly, December 2011, Vol. 208, pp People s Republic of China, The History and Development of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. 158 Ibid. 159 Ibid. 160 Ibid. 79

89 Several incidents of protest, including a wide array of peaceful marches, armed riots, assassinations, and bombings, have occurred in which the PRC deemed the use of force necessary to regain order. Three of the most violent incidents took place in April 1990, February 1997, and July Initially, Soviet support of Uygur uprisings during the 1960s and 1970s fueled separatist activities in the region, which in turn triggered increased Chinese border security and resulting violence. The Baren Township riot in April 1990 was widely reported on an international scale shedding light on the ongoing social unrest in Xinjiang. Biased interpretations aside, it is generally accepted that a protest march of the Uygur minority, some 200 strong aimed at Chinese paramilitary forces, resulted in violence spreading throughout the city. Armed soldiers and PLA air power were used to crush the uprising, resulting in countless fatalities and arrests.161 In the years following, several bombings took place as part of a low-level violent campaign targeting government offices and XPCC units, as well as civilians. In February 1997, another large-scale demonstration devolved into a huge, violent confrontation, known as the Yining Incident. In this case, in response to Chinese officials arrests of suspected separatists, Uygur citizens launched a series of protests. As is often the case, the demonstration turned violent and upwards of 100 people died as a result of clashes between Chinese PLA and Uygur dissidents.162 Between 1997 and 2009, repeated small-scale incidents occurred, including more bombings and protests. In July 2009, violence erupted in the Urumqi Riots where thousands of Uygurs confronted Han citizens, PLA soldiers, and police officers over the course of several days. In the wake of the riots, communications were cut off in the region, mosques 161 James Millward, Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment, Policy Studies, 2004, No. 6, pp. ix-54. Depending on the source, various death counts were documented ranging from 20 to 1,600 people. 162 Hastings, Charting the Course of Uyghur Unrest, pp

90 were closed, and armed police remained in place for months to follow. 163 Subsequent unrest has ensued since, with ethnic and cultural tensions continuing to prevail. Whether the incidents are the cause of peaceful communities voicing their objections or violent groups conducting acts of terrorism, the Chinese government has never been hesitant to use force in suppressing these occurrences. It has always had the PLA and paramilitary forces locally and readily available for employment. Just as Xinjiang serves as an economic gateway to countries on its western front, it also, simultaneously serves as China s buffer zone from a security perspective. Many scholars agree that the strategic importance of this territory actively shapes the PRC s policies in Central Asia.164 Just as the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. altered the way in which Chinese authorities deal with cultural and ethnic issues that relate to terrorism from a societal perspective, they also affected the manner in which the PRC conducts its security operations regarding bordering nations. Immediately following the terrorist attacks in New York City, China closed the border to Pakistan along its Xinjiang perimeter. Additionally, the government proclaimed a first-grade military alert and rushed rapid reaction, air-defense missile, helicopter, anti-chemical warfare, and fighter aircraft units to the Xinjiang region. In the aftermath of U.S. involvement in Central Asia, the PRC also committed to fighting the Taliban from its western border. The Xinjiang province has since become known as the wall of steel and of significant strategic importance as one of China s frontline military commands. As Yitzhak Shichor, a Sino-Uygur scholar, states in his work, The Great Wall of Steel: Military and Strategy in Xinjiang, Beijing has managed to accomplish the fundamental objective of 163 Edward Wong, Riots in Western China Amid Ethnic Tension, New York Times, July 5, 2009, < 164 Li, From Look-West to Act-West: Xinjiang s role in China-Central Asian relations, pp

91 its defense policy, primarily to guarantee China s territorial integrity against external threats and hostilities. 165 In summary, through the lens of military action, China s willing use of force in the Xinjiang region signals its intent to secure it as an integral part of its greater nation. Through its implementation of the XPCC as a tool for paramilitary enforcement, it is able to quell any social uprisings or terrorist activities with military force. Additionally, PLA forces are used to secure the borders of the country. With the statement that military entities are used to safeguard national unification, China declares its intentions. Namely, that it views the region as vital to its national identity. In accordance with theories of political philosophy discussed in Chapter 2, the use of force indicates a nation s desire to ensure its survival. It follows then, from the military perspective, that the Xinjiang region satisfies the criterion to be a core national interest of China. 5.4 Conclusion The case study of Xinjiang reveals, like Tibet, that this territory can be classified as one of China s core national interests. Analyzing the region from the political, socioeconomic, and military perspectives proves that all three criteria are satisfied with regard to the Xinjiang province. As Yuchao Zhu and Dongyan Blachford attest, Generally speaking, any given country s foreign policy serves its perceived fundamental national interests, including national security, economic prosperity, political independence and international prestige. China is no exception. 166 Diplomatic action and political policies surrounding Xinjiang demonstrate that the region is unquestioningly a part of China and the PRC is committed to enforcing its constitution in order to maintain control of the territory. The socio-economic factors are 165 Shichor, The Great Wall of Steel: Military and Strategy in Xinjiang, pp Zhu and Blachford, Ethnic minority issues in China s foreign policy: perspectives and implications, pp

92 crucial issues that drive China s political strategy in the area. The PRC proclaims the positive aspects of being an inclusive, multiethnic nation to its citizens and to the international community, thereby possessing legitimacy in having the Xinjiang region as part of its country. It maintains, the government has consistently treated the ethnic minority issue as an essential national concern, meanwhile rejecting any foreign criticism on the grounds of protection of state sovereignty. 167 Economically, the territory is full of natural energy and mineral resources, providing motivation for China to control and exploit the region. Finally, the continuous presence of formal and paramilitary units that are interwoven within the community signals China s paramount resolve to secure this core national interest. Examination of this case within the context of the core national interest theoretical framework of this thesis, further refines the existing definition with the addition of the three aforementioned perspectives. 167 Zhu and Blachford, Ethnic minority issues in China s foreign policy: perspectives and implications, pp

93 Chapter 6: South China Sea 6.1 Political and Diplomatic Policy Five trillion U.S. dollars of yearly trade and eleven billion barrels of oil:168 these are just some of the staggering figures the South China Sea boasts. Unquestioningly, the islands within the South and East China Seas have immense political, economic, and strategic importance due to their abundant natural resources and geographic location. Unfortunately, territorial boundary disputes with regional neighbors prevent any peaceful, prosperous, or constructive resolution in the area. For decades, the region has been plagued with recurring conflict that has been caused by political differences and diplomatic consternation. The SCS is the final case study examined in this thesis, analyzed within the theoretical framework of core national interests. As with the other cases analyzed in this research, the political policies and diplomatic stance taken by the PRC are significant when assessing a territory as a core national interest. Over the years, China has become more and more aggressive regarding this hotly contested region, thereby indicating its resolve in the area. After an in depth analysis of the political position of China through official statements and policies, it can be determined that the South China Sea territory is a core national interest of China. As with opposing factions in Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, likewise, the PRC faces confrontation in the SCS from several nations that seek to challenge these sovereign declarations. Seven official claimants, China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Japan, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei, all declare their perceived rights to territories in the South and East China Seas. However, these proclaimed boundaries overlap and so ensues 168 Dingli Shen, China s Maritime Disputes, Council on Foreign Relations, January, 2017, < 84

94 persisting disputes over the territories. Figure 6.1 illustrates the geographic layout of the region denoting each nation s interest. Figure 6.1: Territorial Claims to the South and East China Sea Islands Note: Brunei s claim, a small area in the Spratly Islands, is not shown. Scott Neuman, Little Islands Are Big Trouble In The South China Sea, National Public Radio, September 7, 2012, < In 1947, the government of the Republic of China published its eleven-dash line map that depicted its official claim to territories in the region.169 With this declaration, China set a precedent from which its modern political course would follow. The boundary line included the Spratly Islands, the Scarborough Shoal, the Pratas Islands, and the Macclesfield Bank. Following negotiations with the Vietnamese government shortly after this initial declaration, China subsequently removed two of the dashes in the Gulf of Tonkin. Post-1949, subsequent PRC-published maps and territorial claims then referenced the nine-dash line. Decades later, China, still 169 United States, Limits in the Seas China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea, Department of State, No. 143, December 5, 2014, pp

95 steadfast in its political position, formally added a tenth dash to its map of sovereignty, officially including the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands within the East China Sea to its claims. This was a clear signal to Japan and Taiwan, and, indirectly, to the rest of the world, that China was resolute in its claims to the SCS based on territorial integrity.170 Figure 6.2 illustrates the progression of China s claims in the region through the evolution of the dashed line maps. Figure 6.2: Eleven-dash line, Nine-dash line, Ten-dash line Maps Note: Chinese maps as early as 1984 have depicted the tenth dash but it is more commonly seen in the 2013, and later, publications. Maps 1, 3: United States, Limits in the Seas China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea, pp Map 2: Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection, South China Sea, University of Texas Libraries, 1998, < Generally speaking, China does not associate specific dashes with geographic coordinates, nor does it distribute the dashes uniformly, therefore, there is ambiguity in the specific range of waters, islands, and other submerged features that could lie within the PRC s claims. Additionally, there are variations among different map publications, which complicate the matter further.171 These discrepancies notwithstanding, the Chinese government s overt declaration of a territorial boundary in the region indicates its stance on the matter. Put simply, by declaring the area a component of Chinese Shen, China s Maritime Disputes. United States, Limits in the Seas China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea, pp

96 sovereignty, just like Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, China views this territory as part of the greater Chinese nation. Political contests between all claimants can be traced back for many centuries. Since the First Sino-Japanese War, Japan and China have disputed over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands in the East China Sea. At the conclusion of this war, both Japan and China claimed these uninhabited islands. Following the Second Sino-Japanese War, Japan was forced to cede all of its overseas territories as a condition of surrender. This official change then incited a reemergence of the disagreement over these islands. To complicate matters further, the internal split within China happening at the same time has now caused the Republic of China, on Taiwan, to have an official claim on the territory as well. As a result of the Okinawa Reversion Treaty, the Ryukyu Islands were returned to Japan in 1971, again igniting the unresolved dispute over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands for a third time.172 In September 2012, the PRC released a white paper addressing the disputes surrounding the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands, standing by its historical legacy, legal rights, and sovereignty over the region. The policy is specifically aimed at Japan and the paper strives to discount any Japanese claims and condemn its attempts to implement its rule over them. Plainly, the PRC states, Diaoyu Dao is China s inherent territory in all historical, geographical and legal terms, and China enjoys indisputable sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao. 173 The paper explains the historical context whereby the Chinese first discovered the islands in ancient times and maintained control of them until the Japanese illegally occupied the area during the First Sino-Japanese War. China also accuses the United States of meddling in these affairs through backroom deals with Japan following World War II. Finally, the paper 172 Shen, China s Maritime Disputes. People s Republic of China, Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China, State Council White Paper, September, 2012, <

97 details the measures by which China has safeguarded this sovereign territory, including policies and diplomatic action. It has taken active and forceful measures such as issuing diplomatic statements solemnly stating China s consistent position, firmly upholding China s territorial sovereignty enacted domestic laws maintained routine presence and exercised jurisdiction in the waters of Diaoyu Dao The Chinese government has the unshakable resolve and will to uphold the nation s territorial sovereignty. 174 Regarding the territories in the East China Sea, there is no question about China s political stance. Similarly, the Paracel and Spratly Islands have long been contested between Vietnam and China. Due to the Chinese occupation of the Paracel Islands following the Vietnam War, Vietnamese troops relocated to various Spratly Islands, thereby generating unresolved disputes in those locations.175 Malaysia and the Philippines also lay claims to the Spratly Islands. Additionally, Taiwanese and Filipino claims encompass the Macclesfield Bank and the Scarborough Shoal. Throughout this complex web of contested islands, China stands firm in its declarations of sovereignty and has established policies by which to carry out its objectives in the region. In February 1992, the PRC passed the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, laying claim to the entire South China Sea and establishing its jurisdiction over the islands and seas in the region.176 Over the years, periodic clashes between claimant nations have persisted, with an ebb and flow of intensity. Following an episode of relative calm in the late 90s and early 2000s, 2009 saw the return of regional tension, international attention and intense debate about the prospect of the disputed territories. At this time, Vietnam and Malaysia formally filed with the United Nations for an 174 People s Republic of China, Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China. Shen, China s Maritime Disputes. 176 People s Republic of China, Law on the People s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Administrative Law Order No. 55, February 25, 1992, <

98 extension to their continental sea shelf. This was a planned provocation directed at China, which in turn responded aggressively, and ultimately pushed the regional issue to the forefront of the international debate once again. As a result, multiple fishing boat and coast guard clashes occurred between China, Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines. The Philippines has also challenged the PRC s political position over these contested islands by seeking support from the international court. In 2013, the Philippines filed a case with the Permanent Court of Arbitration condemning China s aggressive behavior in the region. Three years later, in 2016, The Hague declared that China had no legal basis for its actions by stating, to the extent China had historic rights to resources in the waters of the South China Sea, such rights were extinguished to the extent they were incompatible with the exclusive economic zones provided for in the Convention [and there was] no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas falling within the nine-dash line. 177 The Tribunal determined that China had violated Philippines sovereign rights within its EEZ by interfering with Filipino fishing and petroleum exploration, constructing artificial islands, and failing to prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing in the zone. 178 China has subsequently rejected this court ruling, insisting on its sovereign claims and continues with its unilateral approach in the region. As a response to this official, international incident, the PRC released a white paper on disputes between it and the Philippines in July In it, China, once again, reiterates its political position stating its sovereign rights to justify domination in the region. In line with other white papers regarding similar territorial disputes, the CCP cites historical events, ancient legacies, current legal rights, illegal occupation of challenging nations, and territorial integrity as grounds for defending its position. It claims China was the first to have continuously 177 Permanent Court of Arbitration, Press Release - The South China Sea Arbitration: The Republic of the Philippines v. The People s Republic of China, July 12, 2016, pp Ibid. 89

99 exercised sovereignty and jurisdiction, thus establishing, and firmly upholding, its sovereignty over the contested islands.179 The above accounts are just some examples of the PRC s specific political policies directed at individual nations regarding the many disputes in the region. Additionally, they illustrate the methods by which opposing nations challenge Chinese claims. Since China s declaration of its dashed borderline of territorial ownership, the international community has attempted to respond to, and address, the associated challenges on a global scale. Scholarly experts contend that the international community has tried to forge a united effort in response to China s expansionist policies and declarations of sovereignty by addressing the issue at the United Nations. As such, in 1982, the U.N. established the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The intent of the law was to take aim directly at China and specifically address the disagreements in the South China Sea region by broadly regulating the way in which nations interact in the seas. This law defines an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that extends into the sea 200 nautical miles beyond a state s territory,180 and establishes the rights and responsibilities of said state regarding the use of this sea territory.181 While UNCLOS governs certain operational rights in these zones, it does not address sovereignty clashes and as a result, these disputed regions remain contested and unresolved. To complicate matters further, China s political policies and diplomatic action not only effect local, neighboring nations, but they also have far-reaching effects on non-claimant states as well. While the U.S. lays no claims to any islands in the South or 179 People s Republic of China, China Adheres to the Position of Settling Through Negotiation the Relevant Disputes Between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea, State Council White Paper, July 13, 2016, < 180 Ronald O Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, May 31, 2016, pp Shen, China s Maritime Disputes. 90

100 East China Seas, it does however have a vital interest in the status and operations in the seas surrounding the contested islands. The U.S. is the most powerful and influential country involved in these disputes, and therefore China s policies and conduct in the area have direct impacts on the U.S. and its own policies in the region. Owing to the immense American economic dependence on goods sailing through the seas in the region, the U.S. fiercely advocates for open access to be protected for all nations. Via this concept, the U.S. secures its ability to freely conduct commercial and military activity around these islands and through the waters in the region. The U.S. ensures this right under the U.S. Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program where it invokes authority under the UNCLOS.182 Ironically, China s official stance on this international law is to fully adhere to it. From the PRC s perspective, it wholeheartedly supports full access to the seas, as long as it does not impinge on its sovereign territories. China s public statement regarding the law states, it adheres to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the fundamental principles and legal system defined by universally recognized international laws and modern maritime laws, including the UNCLOS and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. 183 Engrossed in complicated, international dynamics, China appeared to alter its political strategy regarding its diplomatic interaction with other nations in the region. Historically, it had insisted on bilateral negotiations on topics such as operations within the contested seas and on disputed islands. In 2002, the PRC signed the ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, indicating that it was open to multilateral endeavors. Unfortunately, due to each nation s unwavering 182 O Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress, pp The U.S. frequently invokes the UNCLOS even though it is not technically a party to it. 183 People s Republic of China, China s Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation, State Council White Paper, January 11, 2017, < 91

101 position on its sovereign rights over specific territories and the failure to compromise, no meaningful progress was made.184 China has since reverted back to taking a course of unilateral action to satisfy its own political objectives. However, in order to gain international respect, show cooperation with its neighbors, and create an environment that engenders conflict-free exchanges, China s leaders publically advocate for joint exploration and commercial development. However, the method in which the PRC accomplishes this is by postponing issues of sovereignty. Deng Xiaoping has stated, considering the fact that China has good relations with the countries concerned, we would like to set aside this issue [of sovereignty] now and explore later a solution acceptable to both sides. We should avoid military conflict over this and should pursue an approach of joint development. 185 This policy of joint exploration is preconditioned on four stipulations that must be acknowledged by all parties involved. The first is that the sovereign rights of the territories in question belong to China. The second element explains that if disputes escalate, issues of sovereignty may be set aside, but this does not imply that China renounces its sovereign rights. Thirdly, disputed territories may be explored and developed jointly. The final point suggests that joint development is intended to promote cooperation for the eventual resolution of sovereign rights.186 Unfortunately, because the other claimant nations view these stipulations as recognition and acceptance of PRC sovereign claims, they are unwilling to commit to future joint endeavors.187 Clearly, China s political stance and subsequent diplomatic engagements with regional neighbors are founded in its claim of sovereign territorial integrity. 184 Shen, China s Maritime Disputes. People s Republic of China, Set aside dispute and pursue joint development, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 17, 2000, < 186 Ibid. 187 Crisis Group Asia Report, Stirring up the South China Sea (IV): Oil in Troubled Waters, International Crisis Group, No. 275, January 26, 2016, pp

102 In conclusion, existing scholarship asserts that China s definition of core national interests is unspecific and vague, and linking this concept to the SCS region creates further ambiguity and controversy.188 It is widely accepted that the PRC is refraining from officially declaring the South China Sea a core national interest, as purported by Swaine, Yoshihara and Holmes, and many other scholars and experts in the field.189 However, analysis of this contentious region through the lens of China s political policies and diplomatic action reveals a clear resolve to classify the SCS as part of the greater Chinese nation. As with policies surrounding Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, China considers the SCS region in the same light. Through the use of geographic boundaries, territorial maps, historical legacies, official political policies, domestic laws, and diplomatic action, the PRC consistently indicates that it has sole, sovereign claims in the region. Furthermore, evaluation of China s definition of a core national interest dictates that sovereign rights and territorial integrity are of the utmost importance and will be unquestioningly secured. It stands to reason, then, by linking these two concepts together, it can be concluded that, from the political perspective, the SCS satisfies the criterion of a core national interest of China. 6.2 Socio-economic Factors Rivaling that of political factors, the economic significance of this region cannot be overstated. Between hosting enormous quantities of wildlife and containing vast amounts of natural resources, the South China Sea is an untapped treasure land. The surrounding waters yield more than ten percent of the global fisheries production, are home to over 3,000 species, and deliver over 16 million tons of caught wildlife per 188 Zeng, Xiao, and Breslin, Securing China's core interests: the state of the debate in China, pp Yoshihara and Holmes, Can China Defend a Core Interest in the South China Sea? pp

103 year.190 China is expected to consume almost 40 percent of the global fish production by As fossil fuels are abundant, experts attest there are a projected 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas potentially available in the region.192 Lastly, each year over five trillion U.S. dollars in total world sea-based trade pass through the South China Sea. Although the Strait of Malacca is not a contested territory, it is a vital organ to the economics in the SCS region and hosts 50 percent of the world s natural gas shipments and 25 percent of the world s oil shipments.193 Given the astounding economic potential afforded by this area, it is understandable why each claimant is adamant about insisting on its sole sovereign rights. China s interests in these territories can be justified by evaluating their economic significance and PRC policies regarding the region are influenced by these factors. This section uses this thesis theoretical framework to analyze China s concept of a core national interest from the economic perspective. Investigation reveals that through this lens, the SCS satisfies the criterion to be a core national interest of China. The PRC s statement on core national interests in 2011 clearly indicates the government s desire to secure economic prosperity for its citizens. It is resolute in upholding the safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development. 194 Efforts that offer gains and prosperity for China s overall economic standing are of fundamental importance to the nation. As such, economic pursuits in the South China Sea fall in line with these vital interests. Over the years, as China has grown richer and more powerful, it has become hungrier for energy and bolder in its 190 Rachael Bale, One of the World s Biggest Fisheries Is on the Verge of Collapse, National Geographic, August 29, 2016, < 191 Keith Johnson, Fishing Disputes Could Spark a South China Sea Crisis, Foreign Policy Magazine, April 7, 2016, < Shen, China s Maritime Disputes. 193 Terri Cronk, Pacom Chief: China s Land, Reclamation Has Broad Consequences, United States Department of Defense News, July 24, 2015, < 194 People s Republic of China, China s Peaceful Development. 94

104 quest for resources in the South China Sea, 195 clearly aiming to take advantage of the economic gains of the region. However, China is not the only country to benefit from the economic profits of the region. The United States also has a vested economic interest in the outcome of these unresolved discords. One of the main disputes between the United States and China is that of open access to the seas. Due to the U.S. s immense economic dependence on goods being shipped through these waters, it strongly advocates for open access to be protected for all nations. The U.S. claims this right under the U.S. Freedom of Navigation (FON) program where it cites authority under UNCLOS.196 Adherence of all parties to this concept secures the U.S. s ability to freely conduct commercial activity and thereby benefit economically from these trade transactions. China also publically supports this idea regarding commercial activity surrounding the SCS islands. Within its 1992 Territorial Sea law, Article 6 describes that foreign ships for nonmilitary purposes shall enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea of the PRC. 197 However, undeniably, this assumes international acceptance of China s claimed rights in the region, and its subsequent ability to dictate operational terms. The U.S., on the other hand, uses its FON program to challenge such claims and insists on unimpeded open access to the seas in the area. As for claimant nations, unlike the United States, their interests lie in the physical, natural resources lying beneath the surface of the sea. Acquiring the fossil fuel reserves of the SCS is a major motivator for nations to conduct exploration and development in the area. The potential for crude oil and natural gas extraction is a key reason for regional countries to be so invested in their sovereign claims and unwilling to 195 Crisis Group Asia Report, Stirring up the South China Sea (IV): Oil in Troubled Waters, pp O Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress, pp People s Republic of China, Law on the People s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone

105 sacrifice access to these territories. China s expansion strategy for oil began with its economic interest and pursuit of energy but has been sustained by its potential political gains and subsequent foreign policy. The PRC s national oil companies include the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), and the China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (CPCC), and they have been on the forefront of Chinese exploration and development in the South China Sea. As China aims to decrease its reliance on imported oil, it continues to pursue exploration in the southern waters. Due to the heavy involvement of Chinese oil executives in the political arena of the Chinese Communist Party, the delineation of economic and business interests with political agendas is often blurred, if not completely merged. Nationalist propaganda to promote Chinese sovereignty in the SCS has caused great competition amongst the three oil companies.198 This combination of political and economic influences has driven and maintained the PRC s involvement in the region. Understandably, Chinese economic ambitions conflict with other nations interests in the region, resulting in a tumultuous rivalry for hydrocarbon exploration and development. This dispute is especially notable for China, Vietnam, and the Philippines. In the case of Vietnam, its reliance on oil fuels its endeavors in the sea territories surrounding its border. This country is a leading Southeast Asian state in oil and gas production and most of its reserves are in the South China Sea. It imports oil products for domestic use, and its consumption increased more than 70 percent between 2004 and Additionally, it exports crude oil as part of its economic portfolio. The nation is currently self-sufficient in natural gas; however, consumption is expected to exceed supply in the near future. Consequently, and with the strategic goal of becoming a 198 Crisis Group Asia Report, Stirring up the South China Sea (IV): Oil in Troubled Waters, pp

106 strong marine economy, the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) prioritizes the development of oil and gas in the South China Sea. In 2007, the Central Committee set a target for sea-related economic ventures to comprise 55 percent of exports and 53 percent of GDP by Vietnam has sought foreign partners for joint exploration, including British Petroleum, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, and Indian oil company, ONGC Videsh. The government-owned Vietnam Oil and Gas Group (PetroVietnam) is responsible for all production, storage, processing, and distribution in Vietnam, and similar to Chinese oil companies, it has strong ties to its communist government, thereby linking political and business interests.200 Both political and economic national interests guide Vietnam s strong opposition to China s sweeping, unilateral action in its EEZ and allowing China to reap the benefits of these resources would crucially affect Vietnam s economic viability. Both nations, with competing economic interests, have experienced heated confrontation due to simultaneous exploration in the same territories. In 2012, the China National Offshore Oil Company offered oil exploration leases to investors in nine blocks within the Vietnamese EEZ. Figure 6.3 shows CNOOC s blocks overlapping PetroVietnam s blocks. Additionally, China deployed its first, indigenously-designed, ultradeep-water drilling platform within the Paracel Islands area in Vietnam has continued to oppose China s actions, which it deems in violation of its economic sea rights within its EEZ, as afforded by UNLCOS. 199 Le Hong Hiep, Vietnam s South China Sea Disputes with China: The Economic Determinants, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 26, No. 2, June, 2014, pp Crisis Group Asia Report, Stirring up the South China Sea (IV): Oil in Troubled Waters, pp Ibid. 97

107 Figure 6.3: Overlapping Chinese and Vietnamese Oil Company Blocks Crisis Group Asia Report, Stirring up the South China Sea (IV): Oil in Troubled Waters, pp The Philippines is another nation economically driven by oil explorations in the SCS. It produces a minimal amount of petroleum products, imports more than 90 percent of its crude oil consumption, and currently heavily relies on the Middle East as its supplier. Its natural gas fields are expected to run dry in 2030, although power demands are projected to increase annually by approximately four percent. Its lacking infrastructure prevents the Philippines from importing natural gas and, subsequently, means that it will have to turn to coal for power generation. The resources of the SCS offer the Philippines a reliable, domestic source to sustain its energy requirements. Like China and Vietnam, the Philippines, too, operates its oil and gas industry through a state-owned enterprise and politics also influences the governance of oil and gas exploration. The Philippines faces a unique challenge in that its deficient infrastructure prevents it from exploring and developing hydrocarbon resources on its own, requiring 98

108 foreign partnerships for finances and technological competencies. However, international companies are dissuaded from investing due to the hotly contested territories that the Philippines can offer.202 Still, the Philippines will rely on the potential resources of this area to sustain its energy consumption, vital to its survival. Interference and, often, violent conflict over economic endeavors are countless and unyielding throughout this region. Each player deems the economic potential crucial enough to risk civilian loss of life, and even, military conflict. China continues to take unilateral action to secure its economic interests in the area, and in so doing, challenges the six claimants. Analysis of the definition of China s core national interests describes the nation s commitment to securing economic development. As evidenced by its economically-driven undertakings in the South China Sea, a link can be drawn between these two concepts to declare the SCS a core national interest of China from the economic perspective. 6.3 Use of Force The final section in this chapter analyzes the military action taken by China throughout its endeavors in the South China Sea. By evaluating this in the backdrop of this thesis theoretical framework of core national interests, a determination can be made as to whether the contentious region of the SCS is considered vital to China. The East and South China Sea waters see recurring fishing, oil, and military vessel skirmishes, often times only narrowly escaping escalated military confrontation. Much of this aggressive behavior is provoked by China, which is evermore focused on unilateral action as opposed to coordinated efforts, seemingly disregarding international backlash. In part due to the significance of the territory s geostrategic location and China s aim to expand its military power projection, and in part due to the PRC s 202 Crisis Group Asia Report, Stirring up the South China Sea (IV): Oil in Troubled Waters, pp

109 insistence on enforcing sovereign claims to national and economic rights, China employs its military forces to achieve these goals. As all claimant nations actively pursue the exploration and exploitation of the fishing and natural resource potential in the SCS region, so ensues countless, endless, and often, violent confrontation over the competition for rights to the area. China often employs military mechanisms to counter Vietnamese, Filipino, or other nations activities in the region. Additionally, since Chinese oil companies are state-operated, skirmishes occurring between these agencies are, for all intents and purposes, CCPsanctioned. The cabbage strategy, of slowly and methodically consolidating control by wrapping those islands, like the leaves of a cabbage, in successive layers of occupation and protection formed by fishing boats, Chinese Coast Guard ships, and then finally Chinese naval ships, is a premeditated, military strategy of creeping invasion. Currently, China regularly uses its Coast Guard, employing lightly armed vessels, as well as civilian fishing boats and mobile oil exploration platforms, to assert its political maritime claims.203 For example in 2011, PRC law enforcement vessels violently antagonized a Filipino Forum Energy survey ship. This skirmish hindered Forum Energy exploration and in 2013, further developments were officially halted.204 In 2012, China took control of the Scarborough Shoal after another confrontation with the Philippines. Since 2013, PRC Coast Guard ships have conducted frequent patrols around the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands, displaying shows of force to Japan and Taiwan. In 2014, PRC authorities forcefully apprehended multiple non-chinese boats that were supposedly in violation of its fishing regulations. Additionally, that same year, China s Coast Guard and naval ships enforced a restrictive zone around a large oil rig, resulting in numerous incidents between Vietnamese agencies. Military aggression also occurred 203 O Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress, pp Crisis Group Asia Report, Stirring up the South China Sea (IV): Oil in Troubled Waters, pp

110 in the air, for example, in August 2014, a PRC fighter aircraft hostilely intercepted a U.S. naval aircraft.205 This willingness of China to engage other nations in an aggressive, hostile, military manner indicates the lengths to which the PRC is prepared to go to secure its interests in the region. In addition to China s use of force to prevent other nations reaping the material profits of the region, its military is also used for a second reason: expansion of its power projection. In describing China s military modernization, Richard Bitzinger said, As a result of this doctrinal shift, acquiring the capabilities for force projection, in particular, long-range patrolling by air and by sea, and sovereignty enforcement (for example, of Chinese claims over the Spratly Islands), are increasingly important operational priorities. 206 China has deemed the region a geostrategic priority and is conducting military operations in line with its goals of expanding its power projection. In under three short years, the PRC has systematically transformed a previously, entirely submerged rock into a fully functioning military installation. Currently, Fiery Cross Reef hosts a runway capable of landing most large transport, bomber, and fighter aircraft along with hangars to house such aircraft. Imagery analysts surmise there are four completed fighter aircraft hangars, four completed larger aircraft hangars for bombers, refueling, or transport aircraft, and space for 20 more combat aircraft hangars. Specialists predict possible aircraft deployed to the area include J-11B fighters and Y-8 transport aircraft, some of which are capable of intelligence gathering. Communications and defense are the two main drivers dictating the course of militarization on the island. China has constructed numerous tall towers housing radomes and other sensor equipment, comprising multiple large radar arrays on both ends of the island. Other high-frequency radar structures and communications facilities 205 O Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress, pp Bitzinger, Military Spending and Foreign Military Acquisitions by the PRC and Taiwan, pg

111 have been identified. Additionally, point defense facilities, hardened shelters for missile launchers, and underground storage facilities have also been completed.207 Figure 6.4 depicts the development of China s militarization of Fiery Cross Reef with imagery taken in 2014 and Figure 6.4: Fiery Cross Reef Militarization Development Image dates are August 14, 2014 and April 23, 2017 respectively. Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Fiery Cross Reef, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, accessed May 8, 2018, < Fiery Cross Reef is just one example of numerous other islands, reefs, rocks, and submerged features that have been completely developed into robust military outposts for China. Other islands showcasing PRC militarization include, but are not limited to, Subi Reef, Mischief Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Hughes Reef, Johnson Reef, and Woody Island. China s goal of expanding its power projection in the South China Sea is making huge strides with no end in sight. The most recent instance of China s military build up on these islands in the South China Sea is its missile deployment in April During this month, the U.S. observed the PRC deploying anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles to the Spratly Islands, 207 Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Comparing Aerial and Satellite Images of China s Spratly Outposts, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 16, 2018, < 102