THE STABILITY OF THE SLOVENIAN PARTY SYSTEM: REASONS FOR THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF NEW PARTIES. Danica Fink-Hafner and Alenka Krašovec.

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1 THE STABILITY OF THE SLOVENIAN PARTY SYSTEM: REASONS FOR THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF NEW PARTIES Danica Fink-Hafner and Alenka Krašovec Draft version Addresses: Faculty of Social Sciences University of Ljubljana Kardeljeva ploščad Ljubljana SLOVENIA danica.fink-hafner@guest.arnes.si alenka.krasovec@fdv.uni-lj.si Paper presented at the section on The State of Democracy in Europe, panel Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Central European Countries at the 6 th ECPR General Conference at the University of Iceland, Reykjavik Iceland, August

2 ACRONYMS POLITICAL PARTIES AS Active Slovenia DeSUS Democratic Party of Retired Persons of Slovenia LDS Liberal Democracy of Slovenia NSi New Slovenia - Christian People's Party SD Social Democrats SDS Slovenian Democratic Party S LS Slovenian People's Party SMS Party of Youth of Slovenia Zares-Nova politika For Real-New Politics 2

3 Abstract This paper fills in the gap in the literature on new parties entering parliament by focusing on particularities of a post-communist party system by taking Slovenia as a case study. During the Slovenian party system s consolidation period ( ) only four new parties (DeSUS, SMS, NSi, Zares) succeeded in entering parliament. However, just one (DeSUS) has endured over the long term. Based on the literature on new parties in the Western party system, the literature on particularities of post-communist party systems embedded in parliamentary systems and empirical research into the case of Slovenia it has been revealed that, in general, Slovenia s institutional rules do matter when it comes to new parties entering the parliamentary system. However, besides the institutional milieu there are necessary preconditions that need to be fulfilled by a new party to enter parliament: previously existing organisational resources and/or sponsors; an appeal to particular social groups with some elements of catch-all politics and particular embedment in the existing system of party divisions. Nevertheless, in order to maintain a long-term parliamentary position, newcomers also need to satisfy sufficient preconditions. Apart from the necessary preconditions listed above they need to focus on a long-term policy issue which is vital to a large proportion of a targeted social group; this social group needs to represent an important share of the electorate, there should not be other serious competitors with the same social appeal and the party must have strong coalition potential. INTRODUCTION In spite of some earlier political science interest in party formation and survival (Duverger, 1954; LaPalombara and Weiner, eds.,1966), it can be said that it has not developed into a very visible stream of research. Probably this is because in the West not many countries have experienced a rich phenomenon of new parties emergence except for the Netherlands. The electoral success and parliamentary durability of new parties has remained relatively under-researched. However, two waves of research can be detected so far. They correspond with two waves of political innovation. First, during the 1980s political scientists analysed the process of de-freezing post-wwii party systems embedded in post-modern social movements (so-called New Social Movements), which among others also brought about a new party family (the Greens). The most recent wave of more profound research interest in new parties has just started (e.g. works by Allan Sikk, Tim Haugton, Kevin Deegan-Krause). 1 It has been predominantly linked to studying the dynamics of post- 1 Attempts to create more focus on new party research include a workshop on Novelty and Endurance: Understanding Change and Stability in Central and East European Party Politics, at the Centre for East European Language Based Area Studies, UCL School of Slavonic and East European 3

4 communist party systems, but has so far not yet produced a considerable number of publications. The paper s ambition is to contribute to filling in the following research gaps: a) specifically analysing the durability of new parties; b) looking at the durability of new parties in the framework of the idiosyncrasies of fragmented party systems while taking account of the characteristics of party competition according to Mair s (2006) suggestions on analysing party system change; c) taking the ideological characteristics of new parties into account when comparing their success; and d) focusing on post-communist party systems. The empirical research is based on comparisons of four cases of new parties which entered parliament during the Slovenian party system s consolidation period ( ) (DeSUS, SMS, NSi, Zares). Of these four parties, only one (DeSUS) has endured. The main research question is which factors compose the necessary conditions and which factors compose the sufficient conditions for a new party to endure. In the following sections we first present an overview of the literature focused on new political parties. A presentation of an analytical framework for analysing new parties in the Slovenian party system since 1992 is followed by a section on empirical findings and a concluding section providing a summary of our findings. PREVIOUS THEORETICAL FINDINGS Previous studies into new parties have varied substantially. In terms of the subject of inquiry they have focused on only one cluster of many kinds of new parties such as Green, leftlibertarian, right-wing populist, immigrant parties and regional parties (Hug, 2000; Selb and Pituctin, 2010). Variations can also be found in methodological designs, involving e.g. case studies, cross-national statistical analysis, Boolean methods and game-theoretic methods (Selb and Pituctin, 2010). In general, the selection of cases for empirical studies stands out as a particularly problematic methodological point (Hug, 2000). In terms of the dynamics of new political parties two main streams of research can be found in the literature. Some authors focus on factors of the emergence of new parties, while others talk about both factors of the emergence and success of new parties. Looking at processes Studies (Convenors Sean Hanley, UCL; Tim Haughton, Birmingham and Allan Sikk, UCL) held in London on 28 June

5 of new party formation, there have been more studies of particular country cases than crosscountry comparisons (Harmel and Robertson, 1985). Most of the existing literature seems to deal with factors which support the emergence of new parties. Of these, the following are usually cited: institutional rules (particularly electoral rules), new issues or values, various kinds of social diversity and socio-economic inequalities, political factors involving the behaviour of existing parties, voters attitudes, characteristics of party competition, the salience of new issues as well as structural characteristics of political systems (e.g. Harmel and Robertson, 1985; Krouwel and Lucardie, 2008; Müller-Rommel, 1985). In the wave of post-modern politics, among others also expressed in the emergence of new Green parties they have been further explained by the link between the shift from modern industrial society to a post-modern, post-industrial society on one hand and the emergence of new dimensions of political conflict as well as the emergence of a new social core group supportive of new politics on the other (see e.g. Bürklin,1985). Similarly, some authors explain the entry of new parties by a political opportunity structure. According to Rochon (1985), this could involve a rapid dealignment of the electorate. Alternatively, opportunity structure is viewed as a combination of an electoral market failure and a high number of perfectly elastic voters (e.g. Lago and Martínez, 2011) or by a combination of the positions of other relevant parties as well as institutional, socioeconomic and cultural conditions (Lucardie, 2000). While many authors have been concerned with institutional and structural factors of new party emergence, some have also looked at strategic calculations of elites as to whether to enter the electoral arena or not, involving an estimation of the cost of entry, the probability of electoral support, and the expected benefits of holding office (e.g. Cox, 1997; Tavits, 2006). Much less research seems to have been conducted on the placement of new parties in existing parliamentary party systems and on the long-term functioning of party systems. Nevertheless, some researchers have dealt with the question of what are the impacts of new parties. It has been shown that new parties may impact the political agenda even when they are short-lived (see e.g. Krouwell and Lucardie, 2008). However, very little research seems to have been conducted to answer the question of which factors support the durability of new parties and their long-term presence in the party system. Examples here include an investigation of why some new parties in Britain live and most die (Berrington, 1985). An analysis of factors explaining the survival of the hardiest perennials in post-communist Central Europe (e.g. Haughton and Deegan-Krause, 2010) in fact (at least as far as the Slovenian case is concerned) also looks at parties which are new in relation to the transformed old socio-political organisations, but may currently present the hard core of 5

6 continuously present parties. All in all, this kind of research in the framework of a fragmented party system and a focus on new parties in the consolidated post-communist party system still seems to be lacking. Further, what seems to be under-researched is the explanatory power of (changing) patterns of party competition as suggested in Mair s (2006) analysis of party system dynamics. Institutional factors A cross-country statistical analysis of data on 233 new parties formed in 19 Western European and Anglo-American democracies from 1960 to 1980 revealed that the type of electoral system is the key explanatory variable for new party success (Harmel and Robertson, 1985). In addition, electoral system research often stresses that proportional systems tend to be more open to newcomer parliamentary parties than systems with majoritarian rules. Although stricter electoral rules may have temporary visible effects (e.g. in getting rid of small parties), in the longer run they lose their effectiveness since political parties tend to adapt to new rules in order to be more successful at elections e.g. by forming party coalitions. However, the details of electoral rules can be extremely important. Actual district-level electoral rules may have different effects than suggested by the general type of electoral system at the national level (see e.g. Selb and Pituctin, 2010). When looking at post-communist countries it can be said that the level of parliamentary threshold plays a very important role. While a 5-percent (or higher) threshold can shut out many small parties, a 4-percent threshold (or lower) might no longer be as efficient. Of course, the prescribed procedure for changing the electoral rules is important when it comes to engineering the electoral rules. In the event a big majority is needed in the circumstances of a relatively fragmented party system (e.g. in Slovenia the rule applies of a two-thirds majority of votes in parliament), radical changes are unfeasible. Also when analysing the timing of an electoral system change it has been shown that in fact parties with the necessary parliamentary majority allow for the electoral system change when party systems are already changing in practice (see e.g. Shugart, 1992). Resources of new parties Party resources usually include: members, brainpower and leadership, money, publicity and a political project (Lucardie, 2000; Krouwel and Lucardie, 2008). Interestingly enough, organisational sources in terms of networks and sponsor organisations known from the 6

7 organisational literature (e.g. Panebianco, 1988) do not seem to have been systematically tackled by research into new parties. As a rule, party resources seem to be understood as a starting basis for a new party, which needs to be combined with a favourable institutional milieu and political opportunity structures in order to make the emergence of a new party a viable endeavour. Party system milieu Although institutional rules largely determine how successful competing parties are in entering a legislature, it is also true that political parties, as a rule 2, decide on electoral rules. Researchers have been pointing out the fact that in old democracies it is difficult to determine what comes first a change in the party system or a change in the electoral rules. Once a sufficient parliamentary majority is created to change the electoral rules, the adopted rules can have negative consequences for small parties which did not have a say in the majoritarian decision. When small political parties are needed to create a majoritarian consensus on a particular electoral system change, they are probably also in a position to prevent rules being adopted which would prevent them entering parliament. Party system characteristics are also very important for the key characteristics of party system functioning. In a two-party system only two parties have realistic chances of coming into power. They typically alter in government or at least they have realistic expectations that this could happen (Sartori, 1976). When both parties are weakened and voters largely turn to a third party, we can talk about a two and a half party system like in the case of the UK. However, the third party is only rarely successful in entering government. Even where such a party comes to office, for example, the Liberal Democrats in the UK, it has to share power with one of the two main parties. Ideological conflicts within the coalition government and disappointment by supporters of the third party due to it making concessions usually have negative consequences for the third party s public opinion and consequently electoral support. Contrary to the UK, the American party system does not allow third parties to enter government. Instead, political themes and policy ideas are integrated into one of the two main parties politics (see e.g. Berrington, 1985 and literature on third parties in the US party system). In multiparty systems where government coalitions are formed small parties can come to power if their coalition capacity is acceptable to other parties. In fact, where only a 2 Referenda on electoral rules have been held in Western countries (e.g. in Italy in 1999 and 2009, in New Zealand in 1992 and will be also be held in the UK in 2011) as well as in post-communist countries (e.g. Slovenia in 1996). 7

8 small gap in the proportion of parliamentary seats for a possible ruling coalition needs to be filled, small parties can gain a relatively influential position disproportionally greater than their parliamentary size measured by the number of seats. Since the end of the 1970s, political scientists have tried to explain some dynamic phenomena in party systems, such as new cleavages, new parties and changing party system dynamics. It is exactly the appearance of new cleavages (materialism vs. postmaterialism) which did not find a proper expression in already existing parties that some authors find the main explanation for the emergence of Green parties (e.g. Bürklin, 1985; Müller-Rommel, 1985). Similarly, the emergence of issue-oriented parties such as pensions parties in the context of demographic changes and emerging intergenerational cleavages needs to be explained (see an overview of the literature in Hanley, 2011). Although recent debates on the classification of party systems and their changes do not seem to be directly linked to our research agenda, we argue the opposite. Since new parties tend to be small parties we find several aspects of Mair s innovation in measuring party system change potentially useful for explaining not only the entrance of new parties, but also their durability in the party system. The main aspect of Mair s indicators for analysing changes in party competition patterns we find potentially useful (Mair 2006: 65-66) takes account of the prevalent pattern of government change allowing (or not) a change in the whole coalition government or only part of it and whether the government is made up of parties of the same ideological colour or if it allows a wider variety of party ideology within the same ruling coalition. Particularities of post-communist party systems Post-communist party systems have been characterised (compared to older Western party systems) by high fragmentation, high volatility as well as low trust in parties and parliaments (Lewis, ed., 2001; Jungerstam-Mulders, ed., 2006; Rose, 2009). The latter translates into relatively widespread anti-party sentiments (Fink Hafner, 1994). The first electoral system choice (together with the first constitutional choice) significantly determines party system developments (Fink-Hafner and Hafner-Fink, 2009). Semipresidential and presidential systems have tended toward a majoritarian system, including a tendency toward a predominant party system. The combination of a parliamentary constitutional system and a proportional electoral system has produced very fragmented party systems. In Hungary, the parliamentary system and the combined electoral system together created a majoritarian tendency. In these circumstances, not only did the two main 8

9 parties alternation in government prevail, but it also ensured the early freezing of the system by making it very hard for new parties to enter parliament. Although many of the main cleavages are quite similar to cleavages seen in Western party systems (e.g. centre-periphery, urban-rural), the key cleavage in post-communist countries has been the communist-anti-communist cleavage (see e.g. Jungerstam-Mulders, 2006: ). In the course of integration into the global economic system, the liberalism-welfare state cleavage and also at least in some countries (e.g. Slovenia) the inter-generational cleavage seem to have been gaining in weight. As a rule, both parties and party systems have remained relatively dynamic phenomena (Enyedi and Casal Bértoa, 2011) in spite of tendencies for their consolidation. It is not simply that individual parties and the active party universe have been dynamically changing. Patterns of party competition have as a rule also been changing. The initial two-polar systems (communist vs. anti-communist bloc) evolved in various ways into two-polar, threepolar or multi-polar systems. While the Czech Republic and Slovakia basically retained a two-polar structure, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia have seen shifts toward a three-polar system, Romania, Estonia, Lithuania and Bulgaria have tended to develop a multi-polar party competition pattern (Enyedi and Casal Bértoa, 2011: 126). According to the same authors, patterns of competition have usually also changed several times in the last 20 years in individual countries within various time-spans. Hungary can be highlighted as a case of moving from the initial communist vs. anti-communist polarisation towards quite a short period of a three-polar pattern of competition and the relatively early prevalence of a twopolar system (already since 1994). All other post-communist countries current EU members seem to have kept a more vivid dynamic in party competition. Yet polarisation has not been equally deep in all of these countries. While the Czech, Slovak and Hungarian party systems have been the most polarised, followed by Lithuania and Poland and after a gap also by Estonia, Bulgaria and Latvia, Slovenia and Romania have presented the opposite cases (Enyedi and Casal Bértoa, 2011: 134). Also, levels of polarisation and discipline in bloc politics as well as in innovation of a governing formulae differ among countries, allowing newcomers possible success to varying degrees. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE ANALYSIS Our research focuses on the factors of new party success beyond winning parliamentary seats at only one parliamentary election. For the purpose of our research, we define a new 9

10 parliamentary party as a party which either a) results from the split of an existing party or b) is genuinely new and in (either case) enters parliament based on its own electoral result. 3 Based on the literature on new parties in the Western party system, as well as the literature on the particularities of post-communist party systems functioning within a parliamentary constitutional framework (Berrington, 1985; Harmel, 1985; Harmel and Robertson, 1985; Rochon, 1985; Lucardie, 2000; Sikk, 2005; Krouwel and Lucardie, 2008; Enyedi and Casal Bértoa, 2011) along with Mair s approach to studying party system dynamics (Mair 1996, 2002 and 2006), the following factors of the durability of new parliamentary parties have been taken into account: a) the institutional rules (electoral system characteristics); b) the characteristics of party system change, particularly a change in the pattern of party competition (Mair, 2006); b) contextual circumstances the timing and political context of the entrance of new parties; c) the organisational resources of a new party; d) a new party s social appeal (a focus on particular issues linked to targeting a particular social group; the size of potential voters support); e) the extent to which a new party is embedded in the political divide or engaged with a longterm policy issue embedded in a relatively new ideological division; and f) a new party s coalition potential. The empirical effects of the theoretically determined factors on the success of new parliamentary parties and their parliamentary durability will be studied in the case of Slovenia in the period from 1992 when elections were first held in the country on the basis of a new constitution (adopted in 1991) until June The analysis is based on the following data: previous research into changes in the Slovenian party system; interviews conducted in 2011 with representatives of some of the 3 This definition differs from Tavits' definition of a new party (Tavits 2007: 115) in the second part of the definition. Tavits' definition (based on Simon Hug's definition from Hug, 2001) is as follows: "A new party is one that either results from a split from an existing party or is genuinely new in the sense that it emerges without the help from members of existing parties." Our definition excludes parties which emerge within parliament between elections. For more on a definition of a new party, see e.g. Harmel (1985), Hug (2000) and Sikk (2005). 4 The last parliamentary elections were held in

11 abovementioned parties 5 ; secondary analysis of Slovenian Public Opinion Poll data 6 ; demographic statistical data 7 ; and reviews of party programmes. RESEARCH FINDINGS Institutional Rules During the transitional period the old and new political elites first experimented with all three main types of electoral rules. For the first free elections (held to fill the already existing, but politically pluralised assembly at the level of the Republic of Slovenia, then still part of the Yugoslav federation) different electoral systems were used a different electoral system type for each of the three chambers. For the socio-political chamber (by being composed of political organisations it is in fact the closest institutional approximation of a parliamentary lower chamber) a proportional system was agreed (Fink-Hafner, Lajh and Krašovec, 2005). This first institutional choice has actually remained in place until now despite several waves of debates on changing them. Slovenia has a proportional electoral system. Although it seems that it has a relatively high district magnitude (11) in real life competition among political candidates takes place at a lower level and closer to a majoritarian system. It can be said that the parliamentary threshold has remained very low although it has slightly increased. Up until 2000 it was three mandates/seats or approximately 3.3 percent, while since 2000 it has been 4 percent. In 2000 the electoral formula was also changed slightly at the national level the d Hondt formula has been used, while on the district level the Hare quota was used until 2000, but was later replaced by the Droop quota (Krašovec, 2007). Establishing a new party has been relatively easy in Slovenia. Despite the introduction of some stricter rules in 1994, only 200 signatures along with party programme and internal party rules are still needed to establish a new party (Fink-Hafner, 2001; current law 8 ). The only exception in the institutional rules seems to relate to the state financing of parties. The public financing of political parties can to some extent also be treated as part of the 5 The interviews were conducted with the Secretary-General of the SMS and a former Secretary- General of the DeSUS. 6 Available at and 7 Available at the homepage of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia; and at the homepage of the Pension and Disabled Insurance Office of Slovenia; 8 Zakon o političnih strankah (uradno prečiščeno besedilo) (ZPolS-UPB1) 2005, Zakon o spremembah in dopolnitvah Zakona o političnih strankah 2007 (ZPolS-D), 11

12 institutional context this source is by far the most important source of party finances (Krašovec, 2000). However, up until 2000 only parliamentary parties were entitled to it and only later (after several cycles of struggles to change the rules and after Constitutional Court decisions in 1999 and 2002) have all parties gaining at least 1 percent of votes at elections become entitled to such public subsidies (Krašovec and Haughton, 2011). We can conclude that Slovenia s institutional context (a parliamentary system with proportional representation, a relatively low threshold and fairly undemanding requirement for establishing a new party), with the partial exception of the rules related to the public financing of political parties, has been relatively open to new parties. Characteristics of party competition Based on Sartori s typology of party systems (Sartori, 1976), one could say that the Slovenian party system has been changing quite dynamically over the last 20 years. The initial atomised party system that developed on the basis of changes in the law allowing political pluralism in Slovenia since 1989 (Kranjc, 1992) was transformed into a parliamentary party system after the first multi-party elections in April The transitional party politics were based first of all on the communism vs. anti-communist cleavage. The 1992 elections based on the 1991 Constitution allowed for the development of polarised pluralism with a three-polar pattern of competition. In that system, the LDS occupied the metric centre for about a decade. At the 2000 elections its support rose to the highest electoral support in recent Slovenian democratic history (36.21 percent of votes). However, the more it was approaching the position of a possible predominant party it was losing its electoral profile and the more it was burdened by clientelism and corruption linked to its long-term governmental position. Its electoral loss in 2004 is at the same time a milestone in a further change in the Slovenian party system, particularly in the predominant pattern of party competition. The 2004 shift towards moderate pluralism has brought about two-polar party competition and the alternation of centre-right and centre-left governments. However, in circumstances where the four biggest parties attract around three-quarters of all votes (74 percent of votes at the last elections in 2008) and no individual party within each of the two poles is able to govern on its own, small parties are still needed to create government coalitions. These small parties can be newcomers. In fact, new parties in the Slovenian party system seem to have been doing both nurturing anti-party sentiments among voters and allowing for the creation of 12

13 majoritarian government coalitions. 9 Through the lenses of Mair s (2006) characterisation of patterns of party competition, one can say that changes in the structure of competition for control of the executive in Slovenia have not only been allowing the entrance of new parties to parliament, but also the relative openness of government for new parties. Although a tendency towards bipolarity has been visible since 2004, blocs of parties have remained fairly malleable and more or less flexible. Political and social contexts and new parties entering parliament Windows of opportunity Despite the stable favourable institutional arrangements, the political and social context in a country can play an equally important role in offering a chance for new parties to be established and for their success. First of all, characteristics of political and social environments can offer a special window of opportunity for new parties. In general, parties in Slovenia have been seen as an integral part of democratic life. Only a minority of people (between 13 and 15 percent) did not view them as an essential element of the political system in the period. In spite of that, relatively high levels of distrust in both parliament and political parties have been constantly observed. Nevertheless, when looking at the Slovenian Public Opinion Pool data for the period some oscillations can be noticed. The highest levels of distrust were seen in 1995 and 1998 (Fink-Hafner, Krašovec, Kustec Lipicer and Filej, 2002). A more detailed insight into these periods shows that political variables have the strongest impact on levels of trust in parliament and parties (Fink-Hafner, Krašovec, Kustec Lipicer and Filej, 2002). The highest levels of distrust correspond with periods of political scandals, political instability when interpellations of ministers and changes of ministers were frequent and in periods of a culmination in ideological heat among parties (the concentration of political conflicts among parties). Although the share of undecided voters a year before elections has relatively high oscillations (in the period from 1992 to 2008 they ranged between 25 and 35 percent, but without a clear trend of a constant increase or decrease), it does not seem to hold any 9 According to a survey conducted by Delo Stik between 27 and 30 June 2011 on a representative sample of 402 adult citizens and published by the daily newspaper Delo (Delo , p. 2), 52 percent of those surveyed estimated that the best time for early elections is autumn 2011; only 33 percent would vote for any of the existing parties and up to 50 percent would vote for a new party; 17 percent of those surveyed chose to answer Don t know. 13

14 explanatory power for answering the question why some new parties have been able to enter parliament, or why just one new party has been able to survive in the long term. According to the public opinion poll no great enthusiasm about the need to establish a new party in Slovenia was noticed in the period. However, 10 to 15 percent of voters constantly agreed that a new party needed to be established. Based on the data presented above it is hard to say political and social contexts are explanatory variables of the success of new parties. Taking into account the year of establishing the parties under investigation (in , 2000 and 2007), the concentration of political scandals and high levels of distrust in parliament and parties per se do not seem to offer a plausible explanation of a window of opportunity for new parties. However, the explanation of a window of opportunity seems to be found in the growing change in the relationship among generations and related socio-economic problems. Since the early 1990s the population of pensioners in Slovenia, as a share of the electorate, has constantly expanded (from 28 percent in 1992 to 31 percent in 2008), while the population of youth 11 has slowly but constantly decreased (from 29 percent/19 percent 12 in 1996 to 26 percent/18 percent in 2006). Yet a dramatic decrease in youth is forecasted for the period (Lavrič, et al. 2010). In contrast, according to official statistical data for 2009 the at-risk-of-poverty level was 11.3 percent and has generally been decreasing in Slovenia since the mid-1990s, with retired persons (together with the unemployed) being among the most vulnerable in this regard. Moreover, in the last six years the gap between retired persons and the younger generation at risk of poverty has been increasing and, in the case of retired people even reached 19 percent, even though at the beginning of the 1990s the economic situation of retired people in Slovenia was not so bad at all (Stropnik et al., 2010). Nonetheless, the economic situation faced by young people has also not been very optimistic since the early 1990s. When the SMS was established in percent of young people 10 The DeSUS was established in 1990, but only since the 1996 elections has the party participated at elections independently. 11 Here the problem of statistical data arises. Slovenian statistics have several statistical categories which can be used in the examination of the youth population, yet none is completely suitable. Namely, one statistical category includes people aged 15 19, but in Slovenia voting rights are acquired by the age of 18. If we include this category in our calculations then also some youth without voting rights are included in the population, but if exclude this category and use the statistical category which follows (ages on) then part of the youth population with voting rights is excluded from the electorate. 12 The first calculation includes the following age statistical categories; 15 19; and 25 29, while the second one includes only two statistical categories, namely and

15 (aged between 15 and 24) were unemployed, in the last decade there was first a slow decrease up to 2008 and in the last three years a slow rise in the unemployment rate has again been recorded (Lavrič et al., 2010). Contrary to the statistics, data from a public opinion poll conducted among youth in 2010 (Lavrič, et al., 2010) show that the share of young perceiving themselves as unemployed was much bigger in 2010 (25 percent) than in 2000 (18 percent of young people perceived themselves as unemployed). In addition, while in 2000 'only' half of young people lived with their parents, in 2010 more than 60 percent of young people were living with their parents, which is usually seen as an indicator of a youth s relatively bad economic situation (Lavrič et al., 2010). These data suggest a more or less latent cleavage among generations. However, translating that into party politics has not been automatic or equal in terms of expressing all conflicting interests. In Slovenia, the retired represented almost one-third of the electorate at the beginning of the 1990s and more than one-third of the electorate in In the circumstances of a very poor economic situation in the early 1990s and with a historical memory from socialist Yugoslavia about how to first try to handle such problems, pensioners had expected that first pensions and their interests would come under attack. This, alongside with the finding that pensioners would be unable to realise their interests simply with the of a non-party organisation or by linking the political representation of their interests to another party (the successor of the reformed League of Communists of Slovenia) comprised the main reasons for the new party DeSUS being established. In contrast, young people needed more time to organise themselves into a party organisation. In fact, less interest in institutional political activities (Miheljak, 2002) along with internal political differences among youth also reflected in many struggles between different student organisations had prevented the establishment of a youth party for several years. To conclude, the contextual circumstances examined above that may be expected to have created windows of opportunity for the entrance of new parties to parliament do not seem to hold any explanatory power, with the exception of the changing demographic structure and related socio-economic problems. Organisational resources and successful new parliamentary parties Organisational resources are important for the establishment and survival of political parties (Panebianco, 1988). We can speak about different forms of organisational resources, especially: organisational network, cadre and finances. An analysis of the development of 15

16 DeSUS, SMS, NSi and Zares reveals some important information related to cadre and network resources, while it is hard to obtain information on financial help/support. The DeSUS first developed in Maribor, the second biggest Slovenian city, on the basis of the Pensioners Association of Maribor its first name was the Democratic Party of the Pensioners Association of Maribor (in 1990). The party was established at the country level in At the 1992 elections it cooperated with the Workers Party, the Social Democratic Union and the Social Democratic Renewal (a successor of the reformed League of Communists of Slovenia). At the start of the 1990s it also had close connections with the Association of Disabled Persons of Slovenia as well as the League of Associations of WWII Veterans (Zveza združenj borcev ZZB) (Tovornik, 2001). The majority of the party s bodies were filled by people active in these organisations, but mainly came from pensioners associations throughout Slovenia. These pensioners associations are associated in the umbrella organisation Union of Pensioners Associations of Slovenia which has a welldeveloped territorial organisation network of more than 500 associations with around half of all pensioners among its members. The SMS was established in June 2000 on the basis of two strands of youth organisations: a) independent candidate lists at local elections in 1998, mostly in the eastern part of Slovenia; and b) youth organisations from the Ljubljana and Gorenjska regions under the sponsorship of the Student Organisation of the University of Ljubljana (Goleš, 2007). Together with other youth organisations, these structures created an organisational network on the local level. Most of the party s bodies were filled by the leaders of these organisations. Those leaders also had some experience with politics (chiefly on the local level) in addition to work involving student and youth politics. The NSi was established in August 2000 after the split of the SLS + SKD Slovenska ljudska stranka. The NSi s emergence followed the very dynamic life of parties linked to farmers interests and political expressions of Christian values. The SKD and SLS were both established during the transition period (in 1989). In April 2000 they merged despite mixed opinions about doing so. Only a few months after that merger, many people who had formerly belonged to the SKD decided to form a new party. Further, even though the merger between the SLS and SKD had been formally concluded, in practice local organisations remained separated even after several months. The founders of the NSi took advantage of this situation and linked the still alive SKD local organisations to the local NSi network. Zares emerged in 2007 after a split within the LDS. Several MPs who had been elected on the list of the LDS left its parliamentary party group and established a group of non-attached MPs. In March they established a civil society association the Association For Real 16

17 Združenje Zares 2007) and six months later the party For Real. At the end of 2007 the party merged with the party Active Slovenia (Aktivna Slovenija AS). 13 Many of the highest positions in the party s bodies were taken by former LDS and AS members. When considering the broader picture, it can be stated that all the new parties which made it to parliament in fact needed to have relatively solid organisational resources. In all four cases, many resources had come from pre-existing organisations and/or sponsors either previously existing political parties or civil society associations. Social appeal of the successful new parliamentary parties The SMS started with both a relatively narrow and simultaneously also a relatively broad scope. Focusing its social appeal on youth seemed to be quite narrow due to it only directly inviting members of one particular marginal social group. However, the fact that youth is internally socially and politically stratified (like with pensioners) and at the same time also less engaged in institutional politics meant that the appeal seemed to be too broad and too optimistic. In addition, (unlike the DeSUS) the SMS did not clearly define a policy issue important for all generations. After the split (2004) the SMS tried to broaden its social appeal to voters by supporting the Green ideas, but without an elaborated programme and clear idea of a targeted social basis for seeking to gain more voters for the SMS. Unlike the SMS, the DeSUS has had a clear focus on a particular social group (pensioners) and one overarching policy issue pension reform in the framework of a broader set of issues related to the socio-economic status of pensioners. This fairly narrow policy focus has recently not only been broadened to the socially handicapped (as the party put it). In particular, party leader Karel Erjavec has recently been stressing the party s catch-all orientation by inviting young people to join the DeSUS. Contrary to the DeSUS and the SMS, Zares has not focused on a particular social group. In its programmatic statement of 2007 it set out policy principles based on social and green liberalism. Many policy proposals in various policy fields tackle a range of social interests e.g. those favouring social justice, the welfare state, equality before the law, equal opportunities, an open market, intergenerational justice, and the limitation of political power. Within particular policy proposals it has targeted various social groups such as students, the old, the unemployed as well as organisations and politico-territorial units (such as 13 The AS emerged from part of the SMS; in May 2004 several MPs and members of the highest SMS bodies established the AS. 17

18 enterprises, universities, local communities etc.) Although the party s stress on urban development and some postmodern values may be seen as attractive to more educated, postmodern-oriented voters, the party has not clearly defined its particular social appeal. Unlike the other three parties, the NSi has been identifying itself with Catholic conservative values and a related policy orientation. However, it has not succeeded in becoming more broadly embedded in the electorate in spite of its catch-all tendencies. All political parties have a certain social appeal, targeting particular segments of society and voters. A party is less likely to win sufficient long-term electoral support by appealing to a large social segment determined by certain social circumstances (in the case of the SMS it was the youth group, which is in fact quite a heterogeneous group that only moderately participates at elections) than from a combination of: a) targeting a relatively large social group; b) simultaneously focusing on a policy issue vital to the majority of such a group; and c) choosing a group that also makes up a major share of the electorate (the DeSUS case). Ideological issues relating to left-right divisions do not appear to have been a good long-term currency (the NSi case; attempts by the SMS to add environmentalism to its image; probably also the case of Zares). Embedment in the party system s cleavage structure and successful new parliamentary parties The main idea declared by the SMS founders was to represent the interests of youth in the social circumstances of a newly emerging socio-political cleavage. Since the party did not express any clear ideological position it also did not want to formally join the centre-left ruling coalition (although it did in fact support the LDS). Because the party had declared it would represent the interests of youth and since the population of young people was quite mixed the party also faced internal divisions. A similar phenomenon occurred in its sponsor organisations. The party s declaratory shift toward Green politics by developing close relations with the European Greens just before the European parliamentary elections in 2004 did not prove to be convincing enough to attract substantial public opinion and voters support. The DeSUS has been characterising itself as a political party focusing on representing pensioners interests in the social circumstances of a newly emerging inter-generational socio-political cleavage. Although it has not clearly expressed a particular ideological position within the existing cleavage structure the party has been perceived as a centre-left party. The main reason for this is that, by striving for welfare state policies, it has in practice positioned 18

19 itself as centre-left. However, it has co-operated in all coalitions since 1996 due to the more or less continuous discussions of pension reform. It recently partly sought to boost its catchall appeal by also including an emphasis that it is actually a party for both youth and pensioners since the key policy problems the party addresses have intergenerational aspects. In 2007 Zares entered the Slovenian political arena by criticising the older parliamentary political parties shallow politics and making promises of a new type of politics. At the declaratory level this included transparent, inclusive and self-restricting party and party elite functioning, consensus-building politics and some postmodern understandings of politics. While Zares invited the involvement of active citizens and civil society to collaborate with this new politics party, it kept the scope of its policy issues predominately within national politics. Only to a limited extent has it mentioned internationally relevant policies (primarily related to ecology). Due to the cadre involved in establishing Zares as a new party it has had a clearly centre-left image. At the same time, it has failed to clearly identify its targeted pool of voters in line with the general claim of new politics especially its green aspects. The only new parliamentary party clearly positioned on the centre-right has been the NSi. Its programmatic orientation and specific policy stands are based on conservative, in particular Catholic, values. In addition, the embedding of a new party in the structure of the political divide does matter. Again the DeSUS has proved that engaging in a specific long-term policy issue embedded in the long-term ideological division (liberalism vs. the welfare state) that has developed since the country s multiple transitions pays off very well. It is involved in relatively frequent cyclical debates and reforms of the pension system, which at least implicitly involve conflicts of interest among generations. In Slovenia, retired people represented almost one-third of the electorate at the start of the 1990s, and more than one-third of the electorate in Youth represented around 20 percent of the electorate in the period, and have not been mobilised around an equally focused and ideologically embedded policy issue making electoral success harder for the SMS party. The other two parties (NSi and Zares) have more or less inserted themselves into the existing system of party divisions without a particular single policy focus. 19

20 All in all, one can assert that all new parties have had to compete with the already existing parties except the DeSUS. 14 Zares has targeted educated, urban and liberal-oriented voters to a considerable extent like the LDS. The SDS has been able to attract most centre-right voters, including the religious and interests close to the Catholic Church which has squeezed out the NSi. The SMS has been unable to develop an idiosyncratic social appeal beyond what all of the established parties have been developing in the area of youth policy or other policies seeking to solve particular problems of certain segments of youth. Coalition potential Being embedded in the party system structure is closely related to a new party s coalition potential. Among the four parties, only the DeSUS has been able to be a part of all of the last four governing party coalitions since it entered parliament (in 1996) regardless of the government s prevalent ideological colour. The SMS has kept its centre-left image even though it has tried to stay out of the left-right ideological divisions. Although it did not participate formally in the centre-left coalition of , its support for the LDS-led government was awarded with the position of Head of the Youth Policy Office. After deciding to compete at the 2008 elections with a combined list with the SLS, it lost MP seats despite the list actually entering parliament. Both the NSi (centre-right) and Zares (centre-left) have been ideologically profiled clearly enough to be situated to only one particular side on the left-right ideological continuum. Zares has so far participated in one centre-left coalition, while the NSi has participated in two centre-right coalitions ( , ). In normal political circumstances the positioning of either of these parties within a coalition government of the opposite ideological colour would be difficult to imagine. CONCLUSIONS Our empirical research has shown that institutional rules clearly do matter in general for the success of new parliamentary parties but, due to the stability of the institutional rules, they have not made a substantial difference to the electoral successes of the parties investigated 14 It was only in June 2011 that the establishment of a new party (Party of Labour) was announced by a letter from the former member of the DeSUS parliamentary club and declaring to fill in a niche that the DeSUS and other parties have been unable to fill. 20