Sofia Vasilopoulou (University of York) Theofanis Exadaktylos (LSE/University of Surrey) Daphne Halikiopoulou (London School of Economics)

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1 Sofia Vasilopoulou (University of York) Theofanis Exadaktylos (LSE/University of Surrey) Daphne Halikiopoulou (London School of Economics) Workshop on social Change: Theory and Applications, the case of Greek society Hellenic Observatory/ LSE Dept. of Sociology, University of Manchester Friday March 9 th, 2012

2 Research Questions How do countries respond during times of severe crises and the prospect of austerity? Why is Greece a highly likely case of Europeanization responding with non-substantive policies to meet European demands? There is initiation of policy but why is there not instigation of reform? Tax evasion Public procurement / public sector reform Welfare state reform

3 The EU Effect EU context conducive to high adaptation pressures We start with a classic definition of Europeanization from a top-down approach (set policy areas vs flexibility of implementation) High adaptation pressures = transformation Transformation major adjustment (e.g. change of party system, revised macroeconomic policies, and new belief systems by groups or individuals paradigmatic change) Inertia of process versus inertia of outcome

4 The Argument CATCH 22 Political accountability problem hinders the solution of the economic problem Corruption + lack of cleavages + two party system Cartelisation Corruption Widespread and institutionally embedded Tension between providing successful economic solutions and retaining political accountability. Political will to introduce and implement substantive policies is constrained by party cartelisation Cartelisation: tacit consensus against substantive measures because they could result in impeding the two main parties political and electoral opportunities.

5 PASOK and New Democracy election results since 1977

6 Lack of opposition to the cartel Election year Total combined seats June Nov

7 Corruption

8 The Greek Outcome Cartelisation causally linked to inertia of outcome Political actors: both unwilling and unable They do recognize high economic pressures and threats and the misfit but Prefer not to instigate change (established party interests); Cannot impose change (e.g. riots, strikes and civil disobedience) Cannot agree on common discourse (external and internal opposition) Lack of discursive tools to convince the public of the necessity for and the appropriateness of change.

9 Populism as a frame of party system dynamics Cartelisation is beyond party positions and party alignments and is expressed and justified through a populist blame-shifting agenda on behalf of all parties in the system The dynamics of the party system in Greece are characterised by a competition between cartel and noncartel parties Populism frames this dynamic Two main political camps carry out an agenda of blameshifting Mainstream cartel parties (ND PASOK): soft populism Who are engaged in a rhetoric of blaming each other Fringe parties (KKE LAOS SYRIZA): hard populism Whose rhetoric merges internal and external blame-shifting

10 Argument flow EU Pressure for reforms Parties Blame-shifting Populism CORRUPTION Reinforces Cartelization INERTIA of outcome Voters

11 Method and data Sophisticated qualitative content analysis Frames Time frame: elections 2009 cooperation government 2011 Unit of analysis: 35 speeches Thessaloniki International Fair 2010, 2011 Memorandum of Understanding 2010 Mid Term Financial Strategy 2011 Budget 2010, 2011, 2012

12 Populist frames Frame Mainstream (soft) Radical (hard) Rationale Holistic On behalf of all the people Specific On behalf of the people (as equated with a particular social group, e.g. class) System ontology Pro-establishment Anti-establishment Catch-all parties Left-wing (class based) Right-wing (ethnically based) Blame-shifting Exclusion (across party lines) Tactic/Rhetoric - Onto main opposition party - Onto specific domestic groups - Onto specific media outlets - Of elites (vertical); External elites (US, IMF, EU ) Domestic elite as collaborators of the external elites - Of specific social groups (horizontal): Tax evaders Public servants Closed-off professions

13 Soft populism: Cartel parties Pro-establishment: system; rule of law; democratic procedures, EU, support of the middle class. Holistic: language of togetherness we will make it together Greece is us ; our country we identify ourselves with the Greek people and their efforts we stand by the people s side we serve the Greek citizen ND more nationalistic: reference to symbols (e.g. Acropolis) Blame-shifting: The main opposition is responsible for the situation They have committed crimes They have been concealing the truth Greece has taken steps back as a result of ND/PASOK The main opposition has encouraged lack of transparency, political clientelismand corruption.

14 Hard populism: fringe parties Anti-establishment: anti-system & Euroscepticbut in varying degrees Specific: equate the people with a specific social group (class versus the Greek ethnie) Exclusion: Politics of blame onto PASOK & ND Both leaders responsible for the current crisis they are both afraid to govern Criticism of other small parties Criticism of external elites

15 Capital versus Ethnie KKE Crisis is the cause of the international capitalist system which is supported by the two main parties Distinguishes between patriotism of the capital and patriotism of the people LAOS Emphasis on nationalistic frames Immigration, history, Alexander the Great (Macedonia), Turkey, Smyrna etc. the 1922 crisis is greater than the current crisis

16 Conclusions What do we find: Initiation of change, YES Reform/Outcome NO Where can we locate the explanatory variables? Party-political discourse, cartelization, and populist frameworks Potential for change: increasing fragmentation/ polls indicate de-alignment But: cartelisation, patronage, and corruption dominate Greek politics hindering reform/ change needs to be political, systemic and generational

17 Sofia Vasilopoulou Theofanis Exadaktylos Daphne Halikiopoulou